Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Hottest hat-trick

STATE OF THE CLIMATE: Scientists have announced that 2025 was either the second or third hottest year on record, with close margins between last year and 2023, reported the Associated Press. The newswire noted that “temperature averages for 2025 hovered around – and mostly above – 1.4C of industrial era warming”. Bloomberg said that this happened despite the natural weather phenomenon La Niña, which “suppresses global temperatures”, meaning “heat from greenhouse gases countered that cooling influence”. Carbon Brief’s comprehensive analysis of the data found cumulative global ice loss also “reached a new record high in 2025”.

OVERHEATING OCEANS: Separately, the world’s oceans “absorbed colossal amounts of heat in 2025”, said the Guardian, setting “yet another new record and fuelling more extreme weather”. It added that the “extra heat makes the hurricanes and typhoons…more intense, causes heavier downpours of rain and greater flooding and results in longer marine heatwaves”.

FIRE AND ICE: Wildfires in Australia have destroyed around 500 structures, said the Sydney Morning Herald, with a “dozen major fires” still burning. A wildfire in Argentinian Patagonia has “blazed through nearly 12,000 hectares” of scrubland and forests, according to the Associated Press. Meanwhile, parts of the Himalayas are “snowless” for the first time in nearly four decades, signalling a “climatic anomaly”, reported the Times of India.

Around the world

• EMISSIONS REBOUND: US emissions rose 2% last year after two years of declines” due to a rise in coal power generation, said Axios, in coverage of research by the Rhodium Group.
• ‘UNINVESTABLE’ OIL: US president Donald Trump may “sideline” ExxonMobil from Venezuela’s oil market after its comment that Venezuela is “uninvestable”, reported CNBC. TotalEnergies is also “in no rush to return to Venezuela”, said Reuters. 
• PRICE WARS: The EU issued guidelines that will allow tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to be removed in exchange for minimum price commitments, said Reuters. 
• ‘RECORD’ AUCTION: The UK government has secured “8.4 gigawatts of new offshore wind power” in a “record” auction, said Sky News. Although the auction saw some price rises, this will likely be “cost neutral” for consumers, Carbon Brief said – contrary to the “simplistic and misleading” narratives promoted by some media outlets.
• COP STRATEGY: The Guardian reported that Chris Bowen, the Australian minister appointed “president of negotiations” for COP31, plans to use his role to lobby “Saudi Arabia and others” on the need to phase out fossil fuels. 

$2bn

The size of a new climate fund unveiled by the Nigerian government, according to Reuters. 

Latest climate research

• Rooftop solar in the EU has the potential to meet 40% of electricity demand in a 100% renewable scenario for 2050 | Nature Energy
• Natural wildfires, such as those ignited by lightning strikes, have been increasing in frequency and intensity in sub-Saharan Africa, driven by climate change | Global and Planetary Change
• Engaging diverse citizens groups can lead to “more equitable, actionable climate adaptation” across four pilot regions in Europe | Frontiers in Climate

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Both China and India saw coal power generation fall in 2025, in the “first simultaneous drop in half a century”, found new analysis for Carbon Brief, which was widely reported around the world. It noted that, for both countries, the decline in coal was driven by new clean-energy capacity additions, which were “more than sufficient to meet rising demand”.

Spotlight

What are China experts watching for in 2026?

The year 2026 will be pivotal for China’s climate policy. In March, the government will release key climate and energy targets for 2030, the year by which China has pledged to have peaked its emissions.

At the same time, with the US increasingly turning away from climate policy and towards fossil fuel expansionism, China’s role in global climate action is more important than ever.

Carbon Brief asks leading experts what they are watching for from China over the year ahead.

Shuo Li, director of the China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute

After decades of rapid growth, independent analyses suggest China’s CO2 emissions may have plateaued or even begun to decline in 2025.

The transition from emissions growth to stabilisation and early decline will be the key watch point for 2026 and will be shaped by the forthcoming 15th five-year plan. [This plan will set key economic goals, including energy and climate targets, for 2030.]

However, the precise timing, scale and enforceability of these absolute emissions control measures remain under active debate. Chinese experts broadly agree that if the 2021-2025 period was characterised by continued emissions growth, and 2031-2035 is expected to deliver a clear decline, then 2026-2030 will serve as a critical “bridge” between the two.

Yan Qin, principal analyst, ClearBlue Markets

First, the 15th five-year plan inaugurates the “dual control of carbon” system. This year marks the first time industries and local governments face binding caps on total emissions, not just intensity.

Second, the national carbon market is aggressively tightening. With the inclusion of steel, cement and aluminum this year, regulators are executing a “market reset” – de-weighting older allowances [meaning they cannot be used to contribute to polluters’ obligations for 2026] and enforcing stricter benchmarks to bolster prices ahead of the full rollout of the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism.

Cecilia Trasi, senior policy advisor for industry and trade, ECCO

China’s solar manufacturing overcapacity is prompting Beijing’s first serious consolidation efforts. At the same time, its offshore wind technology is advancing rapidly [and there are] signals that Chinese wind companies are pursuing entry into European markets through local production, mirroring strategies adopted by battery manufacturers.

Together, these dynamics suggest that the next phase of cleantech competition will be shaped less by trade defense alone and more by the interaction between Chinese supply-side reforms and global market-absorption capacity.

Tu Le, managing director, Sino Auto Insights

China’s electric vehicle (EV) industry has been the primary force pushing the global passenger vehicle market toward clean energy. That momentum should continue. But a growing headwind has emerged: tariffs. Mexico, Brazil, Europe and the US are just a few of the countries raising barriers, complicating the next phase of global EV expansion.

One new wildcard: the US now effectively controls Venezuelan oil. If that meaningfully impacts global oil prices, it could either slow – or unexpectedly accelerate – the shift toward clean-energy vehicles.

Responses have been edited for length and clarity.

A full-length version of the article is available on the Carbon Brief website.

Watch, read, listen

SHAPING THE LAND: In addition to land use shaping the climate, climate change is now increasingly “changing the land”, according to satellite monitoring by World Resources Institute, creating a “dangerous feedback loop”.

‘POSITIVE TIPPING POINTS’: A commentary co-authored by climate scientist Prof Corinne Le Quéré in Nature argued that several climate trends have locked in “irreversible progress in climate action”.

FROM THE FLAMES: Nick Grimshaw interviewed musician and data analyst Miriam Quick on how she turned the 2023 Canadian wildfires into music on BBC Radio 6. (Skip to 1:41:45 to listen.)

Coming up

• 17 January: High Seas Treaty comes into force, New York
• 19-26 January: World Economic Forum annual meeting, Davos, Switzerland
• 21 January: IEA Q1 Gas Market Report, Paris

Pick of the jobs

• Eurasia Group, analyst, climate transition | Salary: Unknown. Location: Nairobi, Kenya or Mexico City, Mexico
• Heard, climate programme coordinator | Salary: £31,518. Location: London (hybrid)
• Environmental Investigation Agency, climate campaigner | Salary: £36,000- £40,000. Location: London (hybrid)

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

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DeBriefed 9 January 2026: US to exit global climate treaty; Venezuelan oil ‘uncertainty’; ‘Hardest truth’ for Africa’s energy transition

DeBriefed

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09.01.26

DeBriefed 19 December 2025:  EU’s petrol car U-turn; Trump to axe ‘leading’ research lab; What climate scientists are reading

DeBriefed

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19.12.25

DeBriefed 12 December: EU under ‘pressure’; ‘Unusual warmth’ explained; Rise of climate boardgames

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12.12.25

DeBriefed 5 December: Deadly Asia floods; Adaptation finance target examined; Global south IPCC scientists speak out

DeBriefed

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05.12.25

The post DeBriefed 16 January 2026: Three years of record heat; China and India coal milestone; Beijing’s 2026 climate outlook appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 16 January 2026: Three years of record heat; China and India coal milestone; Beijing’s 2026 climate outlook

The world’s most biodiverse nation, Brazil, has belatedly published its UN plan for halting and reversing nature decline by the end of this decade.

Brazil is home to 10-15% of all known species on Earth, 64% of the Amazon rainforest and it supplies 10% of global food demand, according to official estimates.

It was among around 85% of nations to miss the 2024 deadline for submitting a new UN nature plan, known as a national biodiversity strategy and action plan (NBSAP), according to a joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian.

On 29 December 2025, Brazil finally published its new NBSAP, following a lengthy consultation process involving hundreds of scientists, Indigenous peoples and civil society members.

The NBSAP details how the country will meet the goals and targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), the landmark deal often described as the “Paris Agreement” for nature, agreed in 2022. 

Below, Carbon Brief walks through six key takeaways from Brazil’s belated NBSAP:

1. The government plans to ‘conserve’ 80% of the Brazilian Amazon by 2030
2. It plans to ‘eliminate’ deforestation in Brazilian ecosystems by 2030
3. Brazil has ‘aligned’ its actions on tackling climate change and biodiversity loss
4. The country seeks to ‘substantially increase’ nature finance from a range of sources
5. Brazil’s plans for agriculture include ‘sustainable intensification’
6. Brazil conducted a largest-of-its-kind consultation process before releasing its NBSAP

The government plans to ‘conserve’ 80% of the Brazilian Amazon by 2030

The third target of the GBF sets out the aim that “by 2030 at least 30% of terrestrial, inland water and of coastal and marine areas…are effectively conserved and managed”. This is often referred to as “30 by 30”.  

Previous analysis by Carbon Brief and the Guardian found that more than half of countries’ pledges were not aligned with this aim. (Importantly, all of the GBF’s targets are global ones and do not prescribe the amount of land that each country must protect.)

Brazil’s NBSAP sets a substantially higher goal – it seeks to conserve 80% of the Amazon rainforest within its borders, as well as 30% of the country’s other ecosystems.

Since Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world, in addition to being the most biodiverse, this higher target represents a significant step towards achieving the global target.

For the purposes of its protected areas target, Brazil considers not just nationally designated protected areas, but also the lands of Indigenous peoples, Quilombola territories and other local communities.

As the NBSAP notes, Brazil has already taken several steps towards achieving the “30 by 30” target.

In 2018, the country created or expanded four marine protected areas in its territorial waters, increasing its protected area coverage from around 1.5% to greater than 25%. 

According to Brazil’s sixth national report, submitted to the CBD in 2020, 18% of the country’s “continental area” – that is, its land and inland waters – was part of a protected area. More than 28% of the Amazon received such a designation. 

A further 12% of the country is demarcated as Indigenous lands, which “provide important protection to a large territorial extension of the country, particularly in the Amazon biome”, the report says.

The action plan that accompanies the new NBSAP sets out 15 actions in support of achieving target three, including recognising and titling Indigenous lands, establishing ecological corridors and biosphere reserves and implementing national strategies for mangrove, coral reef and wetlands protection.

It plans to ‘eliminate’ deforestation in Brazilian ecosystems by 2030

As well as committing to the GBF targets of protecting and restoring ecosystems, Brazil’s NBSAP also sets a separate target to “eliminate” deforestation in Brazilian biomes by 2030.

Target 1B of Brazil’s NBSAP says that the country aims to “achieve zero deforestation and conversion of native vegetation by 2030”.

The country hopes to achieve this “through the elimination of illegal deforestation and conversion, compensation for the legal suppression of native vegetation, prevention and control of wildfires, combating desertification and attaining land degradation neutrality”.

This goes above and beyond what is set out in the GBF, which does not mention “deforestation” at all.

Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was reelected as leader in 2022 on a promise to achieve “zero deforestation”, following a rise in Amazon destruction under his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro.

Data from Global Forest Watch (GFW), an independent satellite research platform, found that deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon fell by a “dramatic” 36% in 2023 under Lula.

However, Brazil remains the world’s largest deforester. Separate GFW data shows that the country accounted for 42% of all primary forest loss in 2024 – with two-thirds of this driven by wildfires fuelled by a record drought.

Brazil has ‘aligned’ its actions on tackling climate change and biodiversity loss

Brazil’s NBSAP comes shortly after it hosted the COP30 climate summit in the Amazon city of Belém in November.

One of the presidency’s priorities at the talks was to bring about greater coordination between global efforts to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss.

At the Rio Earth summit in 1992, the world decided to address Earth’s most pressing environmental problems under three separate conventions: one on climate change, one on biodiversity and the final one on land desertification.

But, for the past few years, a growing number of scientists, politicians and diplomats have questioned whether tackling these issues separately is the right approach.

And, at the most recent biodiversity and land desertification COPs, countries agreed to new texts calling for closer cooperation between the three Rio conventions. 

At COP30, the Brazilian presidency attempted to negotiate a new text to enhance “synergies” between the conventions. However, several nations, including Saudi Arabia, vocally opposed the progression of a substantive outcome.

Following on from this, Brazil’s NBSAP states that its vision for tackling nature loss is “aligned” with its UN climate plan, known as a nationally determined contribution (NDC).

In addition, the NBSAP states that Brazil is taking a “holistic approach to addressing the existing crises of climate change and biodiversity loss in a synergistic manner”.

It lists several targets that could help to address both environmental problems, including ending deforestation, promoting sustainable agriculture and restoring ecosystems.

Brazil joins a small number of countries, including Panama and the UK, that have taken steps to bring their actions to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss into alignment.

The country seeks to ‘substantially increase’ nature finance from a range of sources

According to target 19 of the NBSAP, the Brazilian government will “develop and initiate” a national strategy to finance the actions laid out in the document by the end of 2026.

This financial plan “should aim to substantially increase…the volume of financial resources” for implementing the NBSAP.

These resources should come in the form of federal, state and municipal funding, international finance, private funding and incentives for preserving biodiversity, the document continues.

The accompanying action plan includes a number of specific mechanisms, which could be used to finance efforts to tackle nature loss. These include biodiversity credits, a regulated carbon market and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility.

Separately, the NBSAP sets out a goal in target 18 of identifying “subsidies and economic and fiscal incentives that are directly harmful to biodiversity” by the end of this year. Those identified subsidies should then be reduced or eliminated by 2030, it adds.

The document notes that the phaseout of harmful subsidies should be accompanied by an increase in incentives for “conservation, restoration and sustainable use of biodiversity”.

The NBSAP does “important work” in translating the targets of the GBF into “ambitious targets” in the national context, says Oscar Soria, co-founder and chief executive of civil-society organisation the Common Initiative. 

Soria tells Carbon Brief:

“While the document is laudable on many aspects and its implementation would change things for the better, the concrete financial means to make it a reality – funding it and halting the funding of activities going against it – are still lacking. In this regard, this NBSAP is a good example of the GBF’s problem at the global level.

“The hardest part of political negotiations will begin only now: in 2026, the Brazilian government will have to evaluate the cost of implementing the NBSAP and where finance will come from.”

Brazil’s plans for agriculture include ‘sustainable intensification’

Brazil is one of the world’s leading food producers, meeting 10% of global demand, according to its NBSAP.

It is also the world’s largest grower of soya beans and the second-largest cattle producer.

However, agriculture is also a major driver of biodiversity loss in Brazil, largely due to the clearing of rainforest or other lands for soya growing and cattle ranching. Agriculture itself is also affected by biodiversity loss, particularly the loss of pollinators. The NBSAP says:

“Biodiversity loss directly undermines agricultural production and human well-being, demonstrating that agriculture, other productive activities and biodiversity conservation are interdependent rather than antagonistic.”

Brazil’s NBSAP addresses sustainable agriculture in target 10A, which aims to “ensure that, by 2030, areas under agriculture, livestock, aquaculture and forestry are managed sustainably and integrated into the landscape”.

It lists several approaches to achieving sustainable production, including agroecology, regenerative agriculture and sustainable intensification.

Targets seven and 10B also pertain to food systems. Target seven seeks to reduce the impacts of pollution, including nutrient loss and pesticides, on biodiversity, while target 10B commits to the sustainable fishing and harvesting of other aquatic resources.

In 2021, Brazil launched its national low-carbon agriculture strategy, known as the ABC+ plan. The plan promotes sustainability in the agricultural sector through both adaptation and mitigation actions. 

Brazil conducted a largest-of-its-kind consultation process before releasing its NBSAP

Brazil was among the majority of nations to miss the UN deadline to submit a new NBSAP before the COP16 biodiversity summit in Colombia in October 2024.

At the time, a representative from the Brazilian government said that it was unable to meet the deadline because it was embarking on an ambitious consultation process for its NBSAP.

Braulio Dias, director of biodiversity conservation at the Brazilian Ministry of Environment, who is responsible for the NBSAP process, told Carbon Brief and the Guardian in 2024:

“Brazil is a huge country with the largest share of biodiversity [and] a large population with a complex governance. We are a federation with 26 states and 5,570 municipalities. We started the process to update our NBSAP in May last year and have managed to conclude a broad consultation process involving over a thousand people in face-to-face meetings.

“We are in the process of consolidating all proposals received, consulting all the departments of the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, all the federal ministries and agencies engaged in the biodiversity agenda and the National Biodiversity Committee, before we can have a high-level political endorsement.

“Then we still have to build a monitoring strategy, a finance strategy and a communication strategy. We will only conclude this process toward the end of the year or early next year.”

In its NBSAP, the Brazilian government says it engaged with around 200 scientific and civil society organisations and 110 Indigenous representatives while preparing its NBSAP.

Around one-third of the Amazon is protected by Indigenous territories.

Indigenous peoples in Brazil have continuously called for more inclusion in UN processes to tackle climate change and nature loss, including by holding multiple demonstrations during the COP30 climate summit in November.

Michel Santos, public policy manager at WWF Brazil, says that many in Brazil’s civil society were pleased with the NBSAP’s extensive consultation process, telling Carbon Brief:

“Brazilian civil society is very happy with everything. It was a long process with broad participation. It took a while to be completed, but we consider the result quite satisfactory.”

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22.10.25

The post Brazil’s biodiversity pledge: Six key takeaways for nature and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Brazil’s biodiversity pledge: Six key takeaways for nature and climate change

The year ahead in 2026 is an important period for China’s climate policy, amid hints that its emissions could peak and as the government publishes targets for the next five years.

Analysis for Carbon Brief shows the country’s emissions have been “flat or falling” for more than 18 months, but the timing of a peak remains uncertain.

In March 2026, the government is expected to publish a series of energy and climate targets for 2030 as part of its 15th five-year plan.

These targets could boost – or moderate – the pace of its energy transition.

A number of policy mechanisms that are already due to fully come into effect this year – such as non-binding total emissions targets and the expansion of carbon market coverage to more sectors – could also help decarbonise the country’s economy.

Meanwhile, the rise in extreme weather events intensified by human-caused climate change makes adaptation as important as ever, while also adding to the challenge of advancing clean energy.

Finally, as the US turns even further away from climate action and towards fossil-fuel expansion in 2026 – notably with Venezuelan oil – China’s climate diplomacy could send a strong signal for sustained global climate action.

Carbon Brief asked 11 leading experts on China what energy and climate developments they are watching for in 2026. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity.

Shuo Li

Director of the China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute

After decades of the rapid growth that made China the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, independent analyses suggest China’s CO2 emissions may have plateaued or even begun to decline in 2025.

Strong growth in renewable power has, for the first time outside economic contraction, outpaced rising electricity demand, pushing power-sector emissions down and contributing to an overall modest drop in total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This latest trend was picked up by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), as something that should continue over the next five years, marking an official nod to a peak in energy-related CO2 emissions years ahead of the 2030 timeline Beijing previously set.

The transition from emissions growth to stabilisation and early decline will be the key watch point for 2026 and will be shaped by the forthcoming 15th five-year plan. [This plan will set key economic goals, including energy and climate targets, for 2030.] Early policy signals suggest that the plan will introduce more explicit controls on total emissions alongside China’s traditional reliance on intensity-based targets.

However, the precise timing, scale and enforceability of these absolute emissions control measures remain under active debate. Chinese experts broadly agree that if the 2021-2025 period was characterised by continued emissions growth, and 2031-2035 is expected to deliver a clear decline, then 2026-2030 will serve as a critical “bridge” between the two.

The central questions are what this transitional period will look like in practice, how it will lay the groundwork for a sustained and timely emissions decline and whether meaningful reductions can be achieved before the end of the decade.

Xinyi Shen

China team lead and researcher, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air

In 2026, I’ll be closely watching whether China moves beyond high-level industrial decarbonisation targets and begins to address the domestic, structural constraints that have slowed progress so far. 

In heavy industry, particularly steel, the main barriers are not technological readiness, but persistent blast furnace overcapacity and the lack of clear economic incentives for low-carbon production pathways, which continue to lock in emissions-intensive assets. 

Against this backdrop, carbon-related trade measures, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), will make 2026 an important test of how China balances export competitiveness with climate commitments. In addition, we will see whether growing international scrutiny accelerates more substantive demand-side and policy reform in industry, rather than prolonging a reliance on incremental efficiency gains.

Min Hu

Director and co-founder, Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress

Of course, I’ll be tracking all the critical energy and climate targets under the 15th five-year plan.

More importantly, I’m watching whether a coherent package of measures can truly take hold to unlock green electricity on the demand side – not just expand renewable capacity – and translate policy intent into a genuine market pull for renewable electricity, especially from the manufacturing sector.

Given the challenge of balancing rapidly growing electricity demand with the pace of grid decarbonisation, progress on this front will be decisive for the long-term trajectory of emissions.

I’m also watching how provincial and municipal governments translate the dual-carbon goals into concrete targets and sectoral implementation. Subnational action – through overarching dual-carbon plans and sector-specific measures – will be fundamental to achieving national objectives. It will be critical to ensure that the subnational momentum around zero-emission industrial parks and clean-tech manufacturing competition results in measurable, additional emissions reductions.

Biqing Yang

Energy Analyst for Asia, Ember

2026 marks the first year of China’s 15th five-year plan, the planning cycle that ends with China’s target year of 2030 for carbon peaking. China’s fossil-fuel use in power generation is seeing an early sign of peaking and the upcoming years will be crucial in driving the plateau into an absolute decline.

As renewables expand, system flexibility and stability will increasingly become the priorities. By 2027, China aims to retrofit its existing coal-power fleet “as much as possible” and deploy more than 180 gigawatts (GW) of battery energy storage. Development in coal retrofit and further policies to support battery development will both be important to watch in 2026. 

On the other hand, maximising flexibility potential will rely on continued reforms in the power market and system operations, following the milestone year of 2025, which saw substantial policy development in China’s ambition to establish a unified national power market.

Yan Qin

Principal analyst, ClearBlue Markets

In 2026, I am monitoring three pivotal developments in China.

First, the 15th five-year plan inaugurates the “dual control of carbon” system. This year marks the first time industries and local governments face binding caps on total emissions, not just intensity. Watching how these national constraints cascade down to the local level will be critical.

Second, the national carbon market is aggressively tightening. With the inclusion of steel, cement and aluminum this year, regulators are executing a “market reset” – de-weighting older [emissions] allowances and enforcing stricter benchmarks to bolster prices ahead of the EU CBAM’s full rollout.

Finally, expect a surge in zero-carbon industrial parks. Following the NDRC’s announcement of 52 pilot sites, new guidelines now mandate 60% on-site renewable consumption. These “green microgrids” are becoming the primary vehicle for reducing grid reliance and certifying low-carbon exports.

Xiaopu Sun

Senior China counsel, Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development

2026 marks China’s first year of advancing a comprehensive shift from “dual control” of energy consumption to “dual control” of carbon emissions. At the policy level, it will be essential to track how this transition strengthens the governance architecture for controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly methane.

Key developments to watch for may include efforts to strengthen measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems that enable facility- and company-level accountability.

It will also be essential to monitor progress on the voluntary GHG emission trading scheme, and the extent to which methane and other non-CO2 GHG controls are embedded in broader policy frameworks, including the environmental impact assessment system.

Finally, it will be critical to understand how non-CO2 GHG data collection and management requirements are incorporated into industry policy developments, including those addressing supply chains and product carbon-footprint initiatives.

Tu Le

Managing director, Sino Auto Insights

China’s electric vehicle (EV) industry has been the primary force pushing the global passenger vehicle market toward clean energy. Its domestic market has already crossed a more than 50% new-energy vehicle (NEV) retail take rate, while exports surged 86% year-on-year to around 2.4m units [in 2025]. That momentum should continue – especially as US legacy automakers pull back from EV investment in 2026.

As China’s domestic demand cools this year, export pressure will intensify. But a growing headwind has emerged: tariffs. Mexico, Brazil, Europe and the US are just a few of the countries raising barriers, complicating the next phase of global NEV expansion.

At the same time, 2026 looks like a prove-it year for next-generation battery technologies. Longer life, lower volatility and new chemistries could unlock more range, broader use cases and wider adoption – including in tougher markets like the US.

One new wildcard: the US now effectively controls Venezuelan oil. If that meaningfully impacts global oil prices, it could either slow – or unexpectedly accelerate – the shift toward clean-energy vehicles.

Yingjie Chen

Climate and energy program manager, Greenovation Hub

In 2026, a key focus will be how China translates its 2035 “climate-adaptive society” goal into inclusive action. Finance for adaptation is a critical enabler, requiring both policy guidance and scalable financing models. As climate risks increase, financing resilience in sectors such as energy, transportation, infrastructure and public health is paramount. While China’s green finance taxonomy already includes some climate-adaptive activities, clear labeling and expanded coverage are important next steps.

Additionally, the global goal on adaptation (GGA) indicators can help measure project impact and inform policy. We have observed good practices already in motion, such as integrating meteorological technology with finance to enhance agricultural resilience.

Looking forward, expanding these innovative models to other sectors and regions is a key step, as these pilots can enhance policymaking and be replicated. In this process, identifying and managing risks for vulnerable groups, such as women and children, in public health and education is essential for an inclusive transition.

Prof Scott Moore

Practice professor of political science and director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania

First and foremost, I’ll be looking for details on climate and energy targets in China’s next five-year plan cycle, which we expect to be approved as usual in March. This will essentially operationalise China’s recent nationally determined contribution and its longstanding commitment to peak emissions before 2030.

It will also give us a sign of the tempo we can expect for non-fossil energy capacity growth and whether China will be aiming for the high end of its stated emissions-reduction range. One area I’m especially focused on is the promised expansion of China’s emissions trading system.

Second, given my particular interest in and focus on geopolitics, I’m looking for signs of how the geopolitical disruption we’ve seen in Venezuela, Iran and other regions might affect China’s energy policy – in particular, in terms of long-term contracts for liquified natural gas. 

Finally, I’m looking for signs of changes to China’s climate diplomacy following the US withdrawal from both the Paris Agreement and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This leaves a big hole in global climate governance and many countries will be looking increasingly to China for leadership – and funding – in this area.

Cecilia Trasi

Senior policy advisor for industry and trade, ECCO

China’s solar manufacturing overcapacity is prompting Beijing’s first serious consolidation efforts. The government is introducing stricter licensing requirements and tighter energy-consumption caps for polysilicon facilities, while export-tax rebates for solar products will be abolished.

At the same time, China’s offshore wind technology is advancing rapidly. In early 2026, China installed the world’s first 20 megawatt (MW) offshore wind turbine and plans mass production of 50MW dual-rotor designs, with deployment expected from 2027-2028. MingYang’s £1.5bn announced investment in Scotland signals that Chinese wind companies are pursuing entry into European markets through local production, mirroring strategies adopted by battery manufacturers.

Together, these dynamics suggest that the next phase of cleantech competition will be shaped less by trade defense alone and more by the interaction between Chinese supply-side reforms and global market-absorption capacity.

Meanwhile, following a first wave of rare-earth restrictions in April 2025, Beijing announced controls in October that extended licensing requirements to additional rare earths and introduced unprecedented extraterritorial provisions. While China suspended the October controls for one year, the April controls on seven heavy rare earths remain fully operational.

This creates persistent procurement risk for European cleantech supply chains reliant on Chinese-processed rare earths, although China has begun issuing general export licenses, providing some operational predictability.

Yixian Sun

Senior lecturer in international development, University of Bath

The biggest question is obviously the emission peak, because it’s essential to confirm if China’s carbon and greenhouse gas emissions are actually flattening or even falling. I really hope China has already reached its peak and the net-zero transition is underway.

Another important area is the evolution of China’s cleantech industries, which have become a new pillar of the country’s economy in recent years. In 2026, it is critical to see if this momentum can be sustained in China.

Given fierce competition and the gradual saturation of the domestic market, I’m also watching how Chinese cleantech companies expand their global footprint through investments in overseas manufacturing, especially as a growing number of countries want Chinese investors to create more “green jobs” and transfer cutting-edge technologies.

Analysis: Coal power drops in China and India for first time in 52 years after clean-energy records

China energy

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13.01.26

Q&A: Five key climate questions for China’s next ‘five-year plan’

China energy

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11.12.25

Interview: How ‘mid-level bureaucrats’ are helping to shape Chinese climate policy

China energy

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09.12.25

Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 18 months

China energy

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11.11.25

The post Experts: What to expect from China on energy and climate action in 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Experts: What to expect from China on energy and climate action in 2026