Developed countries have poured billions of dollars into railways across Asia, solar projects in Africa and thousands of other climate-related initiatives overseas, according to a joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian.
A group of nations, including much of Europe, the US and Japan, is obliged under the Paris Agreement to provide international “climate finance” to developing countries.
This financial support can come in forms such as grants and loans from various sources, including aid budgets, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investments.
The flagship climate-finance target for more than a decade was to hit “$100bn a year” by 2020, which developed countries met – albeit two years late – in 2022.
Carbon Brief and the Guardian have analysed data across more than 20,000 global climate projects funded using public money from developed nations, including official 2021 and 2022 figures, which have only just been published.
The data provides a detailed insight into how the $100bn goal was reached, including funding for everything from sustainable farming in Niger to electricity projects in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
With developed countries now pledging to ramp up climate finance further, the analysis also shows how donors often rely on loans and private finance to meet their obligations.
- The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US
- Relatively wealthy countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients
- A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects
- There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries
- Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans
- US shares in development banks significantly inflated its total contribution
- Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more
- Methodology
The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US
A small handful of countries have consistently been the top climate-finance donors. This remained the case in 2021 and 2022, with just four countries – Japan, Germany, France and the US – responsible for half of all climate finance, the analysis shows.
Not only was 2022 the first year in which the $100bn goal was achieved, it also saw the largest ever single-year increase in climate finance – a rise of $26.3bn, or 29%, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
(It is worth noting that while OECD figures are often referenced as the most “official” climate-finance totals, they are contested.)
Half of this increase came from a $12.6bn rise in support from MDBs – financial institutions that are owned and funded by member states. The rest can be attributed to two main factors.
First, while several donors ramped up spending, the US drove by far the biggest increase in “bilateral” finance, provided directly by the country itself.
After years of stalling during the first Donald Trump presidency, when Joe Biden took office in 2021, the nation’s bilateral climate aid more than tripled between that year and the next.
Meanwhile, after years of “stagnating” at around $15bn, the amount of private investments “mobilised” in developing countries by developed-country spending surged to around $22bn in 2022, according to OECD estimates.
As the chart below shows, the combination of increased US contributions and higher private investments pushed climate finance up by nearly $14bn in 2022, helping it to reach $115.9bn in total.
Both of these trends are still pertinent in 2025, following a new pledge made at COP29 by developed countries to ramp up climate finance to “at least” $300bn a year by 2035.
After years of increasing rapidly under Biden, US bilateral climate finance for developing countries has been effectively eliminated during Trump’s second presidential term. Other major donors, including Germany, France and the UK, have also cut their aid budgets.
This means there will be more pressure on other sources of climate finance in the coming years. In particular, developed countries hope that private finance can help to raise finance into the trillions of dollars required to achieve developing countries’ climate goals.
Some higher-income countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients
The greatest beneficiaries of international climate finance tend to be large, middle-income countries, such as Egypt, the Philippines and Brazil, according to the analysis.
(The World Bank classifies countries as being low-, lower-middle, upper-middle or high-income, according to their gross national income per person.)
Lower-middle income India received $14.1bn in 2021 and 2022 – nearly all as loans – making it by far the largest recipient, as the chart below shows.
Most of India’s top projects were metro and rail lines in cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai, which accounted for 46% of its total climate finance in those years, Carbon Brief analysis shows. (See: A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects.)
As the world’s second-largest economy and a major funder of energy projects overseas, China – classified as upper-middle income by the World Bank – has faced mounting pressure to start officially providing climate finance. At the same time, the nation received more than $3bn of climate finance over this period, as it is still classed as a developing country under the UN climate system.
High-income Gulf petrostates are also among the countries receiving funds. For example, the UAE received Japanese finance of $1.3bn for an electricity transmission project and a waste-to-energy project.
To some extent, such large shares simply reflect the size of many middle-income countries. India received 9% of all bilateral and multilateral climate finance, but it is home to 18% of the global population.
The focus on these nations also reflects the kind of big-budget infrastructure that is being funded.
“Middle-income economies tend to have the financial and institutional capacity to design, appraise and deliver large-scale projects,” Sarah Colenbrander, climate programme director at global affairs thinktank ODI, tells Carbon Brief.
Donors might focus on relatively higher-income or powerful nations out of self-interest, for example, to align with geopolitical, trade or commercial interests. But, as Colenbrander tells Carbon Brief, there are also plenty of “high-minded” reasons to do so, not least the opportunity to help curb their relatively high emissions.
A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects
Japan is the largest climate-finance donor, accounting for a fifth of all bilateral and multilateral finance in 2021 and 2022, the analysis shows.
Of the 20 largest bilateral projects, 13 were Japanese. These include $7.6bn of loans for eight rail and metro systems in major cities across India, Bangladesh and the Philippines.
In fact, Japan’s funding for rail projects was so substantial that it made up 11% of all bilateral finance. This amounts to 4% of climate finance from all sources.
While these rail projects are likely to provide benefits to developing countries, they also highlight some of the issues identified by aid experts with Japan’s climate-finance practices.
As was the case for more than 80% of Japan’s climate finance, all of these projects were funded with loans, which must be paid back. Nearly a fifth of Japan’s total loans were described as “non-concessional”, meaning they were offered on terms equivalent to those offered on the open market, rather than at more favourable rates.
Many Japan-backed projects also stipulate that Japanese companies and workers must be hired to work on them, reflecting the government’s policies to “proactively support” and “facilitate” the overseas expansion of Japanese business using aid.
Documents show that rail projects in India and the Philippines were granted on this basis.
This practice can be beneficial, especially in sectors such as rail infrastructure, where Japanese companies have considerable expertise. Yet, analysts have questioned Japan’s approach, which they argue can disproportionately benefit the donor itself.
“Counting these loans as climate finance presents a moral hazard…And such loans tied to Japanese businesses make it worse,” Yuri Onodera, a climate specialist at Friends of the Earth Japan, tells Carbon Brief.
There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries
Around 730 million people still lack access to electricity, with roughly 80% of those people living in sub-Saharan Africa.
As part of their climate-finance pledges, donor countries often support renewable projects, transmission lines and other initiatives that can provide clean power to those in need.
Carbon Brief and the Guardian have identified funding for more than 500 clean-power and transmission projects in African countries that lack universal electricity access. In total, these funds amounted to $7.6bn over the two years 2021-22.
Among them was support for Chad’s first-ever solar project, a new hydropower plant in Mozambique and the expansion of electricity grids in Nigeria.
The distribution of funds across the continent – excluding multi-country programmes – can be seen in the map below.
A lack of clear rules about what can be classified as “climate finance” in the UN climate process means donors sometimes include support for fossil fuels – particularly gas power – in their totals.
For example, Japan counted an $18m loan to a Japanese liquified natural gas (LNG) company in Senegal and roughly $1m for gas projects in Tanzania.
However, such funding accounted for a tiny fraction of sub-Saharan Africa’s climate finance overall, amounting to less than 1% of all power-sector funding across the region, based on the projects identified in this analysis.
Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans
One of the most persistent criticisms levelled at climate finance by developing-country governments and civil society groups is that so much of it is provided in the form of loans.
While loans are commonly used to fund major projects, they are sometimes offered on unfavourable terms and add to the burden of countries that are already struggling with debt.
The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) has shown that the 44 “least developed countries” (LDCs) spend twice as much servicing debts as they receive in climate finance.
Developed nations pledged $33.4bn in 2021 and 2022 to the 44 LDCs to help them finance climate projects. In total, $17.2bn – more than half of the funding – was provided as loans, primarily from Japan, France and development banks.
The chart below shows how, for a number of LDCs, loans continue to be the main way in which they receive international climate funds.
For example, Angola received $216.7m in loans from France – primarily to support its water infrastructure – and $571.6m in loans from various multilateral institutions, together amounting to nearly all the nation’s climate finance over this period.
Oxfam, which describes developed countries as “unjustly indebting poor countries” via loans, estimates that the “true value” of climate finance in 2022 was $28-35bn, roughly a quarter of the OECD’s estimate. This is largely due to Oxfam discounting much of the value of loans.
However, Jan Kowalzig, a senior policy adviser at Oxfam Germany, tells Carbon Brief that, “generally, LDCs receive loans at better conditions” than they would have been able to secure on the open market, sometimes referred to as “concessional” loans.
US shares in development banks significantly raised its total contribution
The US has been one of the world’s top climate-finance providers, accounting for around 15% of all bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2021 and 2022.
Despite this, US contributions have consistently been viewed as relatively low when considering the nation’s wealth and historical role in driving climate change.
Moreover, much of the climate finance that can be attributed to the US comes from its MDB shareholdings, rather than direct contributions from its aid budget.
These banks are owned by member countries and the US is a dominant shareholder in many of them.
The analysis reveals that around three-quarters of US climate finance provided in 2021-22 came via multilateral sources, particularly the World Bank. (For information on how this analysis attributes multilateral funding to donors, see Methodology.)
Among other major donors – specifically Japan, France and Germany – only a third of their finance was channelled through multilateral institutions. As the chart below shows, multilateral contributions lifted the US from being the fifth-largest donor to the third-largest.
While the Trump administration has cut virtually all overseas climate funding and broadly rejected multilateral institutions, the US has not yet abandoned its influential stake in MDBs.
Prior to COP29 in 2024, only MDB funds that could be attributed to developed country inputs were counted towards the $100bn goal, as part of those nations’ Paris Agreement duties.
However, countries have now agreed that “all climate-related outflows” from MDBs – no matter which donor country they are attributed to – will count towards the new $300bn goal.
This means that, as long as MDBs continue extensively funding climate projects, there will still be a large slice of climate finance that can be attributed to the US, even as it exits the Paris Agreement.
Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more
Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries committed to achieving “a balance between adaptation and mitigation” in their climate finance.
The idea is that, while it is important to focus on mitigation – or cutting emissions – by supporting projects such as clean energy, there is also a need to help developing countries prepare for the threat of climate change.
Generally, adaptation projects are less likely to provide a return on investment and are, therefore, more reliant on grant-based finance.
In practice, a “balance” between adaptation and mitigation has never been reached. Over the period of this analysis, 58% of climate finance was for mitigation, 33% was for adaptation and the remainder was for projects that contributed to both goals.
This reflects a preference for mitigation-based financing via loans among some major donors, particularly Japan and France. Both countries provided just a third of their finance for adaptation projects in 2021 and 2022.
However, among some of the most climate-vulnerable countries – including land-locked parts of Africa and small islands – most funding was for adaptation, as the chart below shows.
Among the projects receiving climate-adaptation funds were those supporting sustainable agriculture in Niger, improving disaster resilience in Micronesia and helping those in Somalia who have been internally displaced by “climate change and food crises”.
Methodology
The joint Guardian and Carbon Brief analysis of climate finance includes the bilateral and multilateral public finance that developed countries pledged for climate projects in developing countries. It covers the years 2021 and 2022.
(These “developed” countries are the 23 “Annex II” nations, plus the EU, that are obliged to provide climate finance under the Paris Agreement.)
The analysis excludes other types of funding that contribute to the $100bn climate-finance target for climate projects, such as export credits and private finance “mobilised” by public investments. Where these have been referenced, the figures are OECD estimates. They are excluded from the analysis because export credits are a small fraction of the total, while private finance mobilised cannot be attributed to specific donor countries.
Data for bilateral funding comes from the biennial transparency reports (BTRs) each country submits to the UNFCCC. The lag in official reporting means the most recent figures – published around the end of 2024 and start of 2025 – only go up to 2022.
Many of the bilateral projects recorded by countries do not specify single recipients, but instead mention several countries. These projects have not been included when calculating the amount of finance individual developing countries received, but they are included in the total figures.
The multilateral funding, including projects funded by MDBs and multilateral climate funds, comes from the OECD. Many countries – including developing countries – pay into these institutions, which then use their money to fund climate projects and, in the case of MDBs, raise additional finance from capital markets.
This analysis calculated the shares of the “outflows” from multilateral institutions that can be attributed to developed countries. It adapts the approach used by the OECD to calculate these attributable shares for developed countries as a whole group.
As the OECD does not publish individual donor country shares that make up the total developed-country contribution, this analysis calculated each country’s attributable shares based on shareholdings in MDBs and cumulative contributions to multilateral funds. This was based on a methodology used by analysts at the World Resources Institute and ODI. There were some multilateral funds that could not be assigned using this methodology, which are therefore not captured in each country’s multilateral contribution.
The post Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met
With the International Court of Justice’s landmark advisory opinion on climate change hot off the press this July, hopes were high it could be used as a diplomatic lever for stronger climate action at COP30 in Brazil. But it proved a difficult tool to wield in a tense atmosphere.
The advisory opinion (AO) from the world’s top court – which determined that all states have obligations to protect the climate system from significant harm – has already been woven into new climate litigation and existing legal cases, and judges are starting to reference it in their rulings.
The Mexican community of El Bosque in Tabasco even managed to use it as leverage in recent negotiations with the central government over its latest national climate plan (NDC).
Yet, while some countries wanted the ICJ’s non-binding conclusions to feature in the main political decision approved at November’s climate COP in the Amazon city of Belém, the lack of a coordinated strategic push meant that did not happen, legal experts said.
-
Vanuatu pursues new UN resolution to turn ICJ climate opinion into action
The Pacific island nation, which led a campaign for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify states’ climate duties, said the legal opinion must not be “left on paper” -
Top UN court paves way to lawsuits over inadequate climate finance
The International Court of Justice has advised that the level of climate finance given to developing countries must be compatible with limiting global warming to 1.5C -
ICJ ruling expected to shape US climate lawsuits in defiance of Trump
The US administration’s efforts to roll back policies on clean energy and emissions cuts go against the top court’s opinion, which could be used by lawyers to fight back
Monaco, Mexico, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) all called for the ICJ’s decision – and two other climate advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea – to be recognised during various COP30 presidency consultations.
But Jennifer Bansard, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin team leader, told journalists at COP30 that these requests were “at very generic levels” and did not go into the courts’ actionable findings.
“Deep, deep, deep red line”
The closest the ICJ advisory opinion came to being mentioned in a formal text was during a review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM). This is key as experts believe the decision has particularly significant implications for the new loss and damage fund.
During these discussions, the Independent Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (AILAC) said the AO provides “an informed legal foundation” for advancing work on loss and damage. They pointed to “the need for comprehensive assessment and health protection” for vulnerable groups and “forms of reparation” This was supported by Vanuatu, which led the diplomatic work resulting in the ICJ opinion.
But Saudi Arabia, representing the Arab Group, responded that the ICJ’s final outcome is “non-binding” and “does not represent parties’ views” even though it participated in the process. Negotiations, it added, are a “party-driven process based on consensus, and not litigation”.
According to a source in the room, the Arab Group described the inclusion of the ICJ AO anywhere in the WIM document as a “deep, deep, deep red line”. “If you insist on discussing it, we might as well just suspend this session to not waste each other’s time,” said Saudi Arabia’s negotiator. The AO is not mentioned in the final agreed WIM text.
“We are still here” – COP30 tests resolve to keep fighting climate crisis
Harjeet Singh, founding director of the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation and strategic advisor to the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, said the group was particularly concerned about the ICJ’s reference to the status of a state as developed or developing as “not static”.
“They feared that formally recognising the opinion would open the door to limitless legal liability for fossil fuel production,” he explained.
Left out of the COP30 cover decision
In addition, the AO’s recognition of a “just and fast transition in line with best available science” was mentioned by Fiji, for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), at an inaugural meeting on the Just Transition Work Programme. AILAC, Egypt and the UK also raised it during just transition negotiations, while Malawi used it to try to frame transition finance as a legal necessity.
Some states had expected the cover decision to recognise the AO in some form, but text drawn up by Brazil’s COP presidency did not include relevant wording.
The lack of references came despite the fact that the UN asked the ICJ for the advisory opinion unanimously and 96 countries spoke at the hearings.
Data visualisation developed by law professor Margaret Young and designers Dan Parker and Stanislav Roudavski.
Singh said the COP30 battle lines were drawn so sharply on the ICJ opinion because it validates the claims of vulnerable countries for climate justice, while historical and large polluters wanted “to avoid acknowledging any legal framework that implies liability”.
But, he added, while pushing back strongly against it, developed countries “neither championed nor explicitly opposed it in open plenary to avoid negative optics”.
The ICJ’s recognition that COP decisions may have legal effects could also make negotiators more wary of what they agree to.
In the closing COP30 plenary, Palau for AOSIS noted the ICJ’s clear assertion of 1.5C as the legal temperature limit. Yet the final Mutirao decision explicitly reiterates the Paris Agreement’s language of “pursuing efforts” to reach that level, while retaining the original goal of “well below 2°C”.
No coordinated push to champion the AO
Harj Narulla, a barrister specialising in climate litigation and counsel for the Solomon Islands, argued the COP30 decision “undermined” the ICJ’s conclusions. But barring a few nations like Saudi Arabia, he saw the overall outcome as a “failure of capacity and coordination, rather than a principled opposition to using the AO”.
Insiders said government negotiating teams remain too separate from their legal teams, and the former were not properly briefed on how the AO could be used in practice.
The leadership expected from climate-vulnerable countries, particularly the island nations that had advocated for the AO in the first place, also seems to have been absent. A briefing by Ed King and Lindsey Smith, who work on international climate strategy for the Global Strategic Communications Council, described AOSIS’s showing at COP30 in particular as “insipid”.
EU alliance with climate-vulnerable nations frays over finance trade-off
Ralph Regenvanu, minister of climate change of Vanuatu and a key architect of the AO campaign, mentioned it several times in public, including at Cambodia’s announcement that it would formally support a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty. But his focus seemed to be on pursuing a new UN resolution recognising the ICJ’s findings.
Neither AOSIS nor Regenvanu responded to requests for comment.
Influencing the wider narrative
Nonetheless, Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa who has followed the climate talks for many years, believes the AO is “starting to influence the wider narrative around responsibility and liability”.
“Though it did not make the ‘waves’ in the formal text that many hoped for, it was clearly the ‘undercurrent’ beneath many streams of negotiation,” agreed Singh.
Nikki Reisch, climate and energy programme director at the Center for International Environmental Law, an organisation that supports the youth activists who sparked the AO process, said the opinion also supports “the need to reform the UNFCCC to make it fit for purpose”. That includes preventing fossil fuel industry influence and allowing majority voting so that a handful of countries cannot block climate action.
Eyes on Colombia fossil fuel transition conference
In 2026, the opinion may start to play a stronger role on the global stage, including at an international conference on a just transition away from fossil fuels co-hosted by Colombia and The Netherlands next April.
The Fossil Fuel Treaty initiative says that gathering will align with the AO, “which confirmed that states have a legal obligation to protect the climate, including by addressing fossil fuel production, licensing and subsidies”.
Colombia seeks to speed up a “just” fossil fuel phase-out with first global conference
Experts, meanwhile, expect more domestic lawsuits underpinned by the advisory opinion aimed at pushing countries to raise their ambition on cutting emissions and say inter-state litigation cannot be ruled out.
“COP30 in Belém is by no means the last word on the ICJ AO or the climate duties it confirms,” Reisch said.
A version of this article was originally published in The Wave.
The post Why the ICJ’s advisory opinion on climate change took a backseat at COP30 appeared first on Climate Home News.
Why the ICJ’s advisory opinion on climate change took a backseat at COP30
After holding stable for two years, China’s carbon emissions may climb back up as the construction of new fossil fuel power plants accelerates and recent policy changes cloud the outlook for clean energy, a new report warned.
The world’s biggest carbon polluter is expected to keep total emissions flat in 2025 despite rising energy demand – a sign that clean power may, for the first time, fully offset the growth in electricity consumption, the analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) showed.
But the Finland-based research group cautioned that a “concerning” policy environment for the next few years increased the risk of an emissions rebound. It added that China was also set to miss its key target for cutting carbon intensity – CO2 emissions per unit of gross domestic product – this year, meaning steeper reductions will be needed to hit its headline 2030 climate goal of slashing carbon intensity by 65%.
Belinda Schäpe, China policy analyst at CREA, said it was unclear how strongly committed China remained to its targets, despite leaders’ assertions that the government always makes good on its climate promises.
“All of this uncertainty raises a lot of questions around where emissions are going,” Schäpe told Climate Home News. “At the moment, it’s very finely balanced. They are just about flat but could well go up or down again based on the decisions that the government will make.”
New pricing model for renewables
Record solar energy installations and strong growth in wind power capacity have increased the share of non-fossil fuel electricity this year, with emissions from the power sector set to decline for the first time since 2016, the report said. But that progress has been partially countered by the rapidly growing use of coal for the production of plastics and other chemical products, meaning overall emissions are expected to remain stable.
At the same time, experts have warned that China’s new pricing system for solar and wind projects risks slowing the clean energy boom. Under the new policy introduced last June, developers of new solar and wind power plants need to secure contracts with provincial authorities through competitive auctions, instead of being guaranteed a fixed price.
-
Proposal for global minerals deal meets opposition as China looks away
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Russia oppose a UN resolution for nations to start discussing options for a global minerals agreement to reduce the environmental impacts of mining -
Tanzania pushed African nations to oppose fossil fuel transition at COP30
While chairing the African group at the summit, the gas-dependent nation advised the continent’s ministers to block language on transitioning away from fossil fuels
Schäpe said prices had been “very, very low” in some of the auctions so far. “Of course, that’s great for consumers, but it’s really bad for project developers because they don’t want to go ahead and invest in new projects facing the risk of no returns,” she said.
Earlier this year, the International Energy Agency (IEA) cut its forecast for China’s 2025-2030 renewables growth by 5% due to the changes in the pricing model. The watchdog’s head Fatih Birol said the profitability of renewables projects – especially solar and wind – was expected to decline between 10% and 15% with the new policy.
Coal power boom continues
Coal power plants, on the other hand, are protected from this market-based system, relying instead on long-term power purchase agreements that lock in prices, Schäpe said, describing it as “unfair competition”.
China’s rapidly expanding coal power fleet is adding to the concerns. In 2025, the country has added the largest amount of coal-fired capacity since 2015, while progress on retiring older plants remains very slow, CREA’s report highlighted.
This runs contrary to a pledge made by President Xi Jinping in 2021 to “strictly control” new coal power projects. That commitment was omitted from Beijing’s updated national climate plan (NDC) submitted in late October ahead of COP30.
In its new NDC, China set an absolute emission reduction target for the first time, committing to cutting its greenhouse gas emissions by between 7% and 10% by 2035 from unspecified “peak levels”.
Focus on next five-year plan
Schäpe said that the absence of a base year could create an incentive to raise emissions and “storm the peak” – pushing them as high as possible to make future reduction targets easier to meet.
She said this put the focus on China’s 2030 carbon intensity target, adding that if Beijing was still serious about meeting it, emissions would need to peak “around now”.
China targeted an 18% reduction between 2021 and 2025, but it is projected to achieve about 12% by the end of this year, CREA’s report said. If that is confirmed, China will then need to significantly ramp up efforts to cut carbon intensity in the next five years to achieve its headline climate commitment for 2030.
Analysts expect China’s new five-year plan – the blueprint for its economic development – to provide more clarity on the country’s energy policies next year.
“We will see how the government is going to balance these two opposing forces: the outgoing coal industry interests and the new cleantech sectors that are meant to become the driver of future growth,” Schäpe said.
The post China risks emissions rebound amid policy shifts, experts warn appeared first on Climate Home News.
China risks emissions rebound amid policy shifts, experts warn
Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran are among countries opposed to discussing options for agreeing on global norms to protect people and the planet from the impacts of mining, processing and recycling minerals needed for the clean energy transition, documents seen by Climate Home News show.
Environment officials gathered in Nairobi, Kenya, ahead of the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) next week are discussing a resolution by Colombia and Oman that aims to make mineral supply chains more transparent and sustainable at a time when growing demand is spurring resource-rich countries to court investment and boost production.
They have proposed the creation of an expert group to identify a range of binding and non-binding international instruments “for coordinated global action on the environmentally sound management of minerals and metals” from mining to recycling. The group would also look at how to handle mining waste and provide guidelines on recovering minerals from tailings responsibly.
Those instruments could range from a global minerals treaty to a non-binding declaration or set of standards on best practice. The resolution is co-sponsored by Armenia, Ecuador and Zambia.
Colombia has previously called for an international minerals treaty to define rules and standards that would make mineral value chains more transparent and accountable.
China, US on the sidelines for now
But Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia, which is emerging as a major player in mineral supply chains, oppose launching a process that could lead to an international agreement on the issue, according to several sources and documents shared with Climate Home News.
Countries will vote on the proposal next week, during the seventh session of UNEA, the world’s top decision-making body for environmental matters.
China, which dominates the processing of 19 of 20 minerals deemed critical for the global economy, has so far stayed quiet about the proposal, but analysts said Beijing was unlikely to support any supranational initiative to govern mineral supply chains.
China’s priority is “to remain sovereign throughout the process of how these minerals are produced and traded” and to promote cooperation “on its own terms”, said Christian-Géraud Neema, an expert on Chinese engagement in Africa’s transition minerals sector and the Africa editor of the China-Global South Project.
-
South Africa’s platinum mine dumps get a second look as clean energy lifts demand
Mining firms say extracting minerals from tailings is a sustainable way to boost global supplies, but local communities want to see benefits this time around -
Self-taught mechanics give second life to Jordan’s glut of spent EV batteries
As EV sales boom in Jordan, a lack of formal infrastructure for dealing with end-of-life batteries is leading to some innovative solutions
The US, which has been trying to counter China’s critical minerals clout, is not attending UNEA, while the EU – another major global market – is understood to broadly support the proposal.
A spokesperson for the US State Department said: “Our team in Nairobi is focused on the US-Kenya relationship and delivering results for the American people, rather than litigating endless woke climate change theater.” The European Commission did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Several other countries have raised objections. Chile, a top producer of copper and lithium, wants to narrow the focus of the resolution to voluntary cooperation on illegal mining.
In Africa, most countries back the Colombia-Oman proposal, but Uganda and Egypt oppose it, said Nsama Chikwanka, director of Publish What You Pay Zambia, an NGO focused on resource sovereignty.
“Race to the bottom”
Campaigners say countries should unite at UNEA to pave the way for talks on the issue, with some saying binding rules should be the eventual target.
“The investments that are coming to countries like Zambia are from multinational enterprises and national laws are inadequate to ensure that robust standards are applied. So we need something that is internationally binding,” Chikwanka said.
This comes after opposition from China and Russia thwarted a push by mineral-rich developing countries as well as the UK, the European Union and Australia to reflect the environmental and social risks associated with mining-related activities in the outcome of COP30.
“What we are seeing at the moment is a huge race to the bottom of environmental standards at the same time as the impacts of mining are already immense,” said Johanna Sydow, a resource policy expert who heads the international environmental policy division of Germany’s Heinrich-Böll Foundation.
“It is the chance now to create a long-lasting space for governments to work together on this issue,” she told Climate Home News.
The race to extract minerals like lithium, nickel, copper, cobalt and rare earths needed to manufacture batteries, solar panels, wind turbines and other advanced digital and military technologies has led to growing cases of human rights violations, social conflict and environmental harms around the world.
In Indonesia, nickel mining is fuelling deforestation, in Zambia, copper mining has led to catastrophic leaks of mining waste and in Latin America, Indigenous Peoples say the rush to extract lithium for batteries is trampling their rights.
In 2024 alone, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre recorded 156 allegations of human rights abuses linked to the mining of energy transition minerals.
Counter-proposals favour non-binding measures
Opposed to global discussions about possible binding tools to govern mineral supply chains, Saudi Arabia and Iran have instead suggested the creation of a technical platform that could review the impacts of mineral extraction in developing countries, explore options for support to address them, and advance voluntary cooperation on environmentally-sound practices.
Digging beyond oil: Saudi Arabia bids to become a hub for energy transition minerals
Saudi Arabia is already cooperating with mineral-rich nations on its own terms by investing billions of dollars in transition minerals abroad in a bid to become a global mineral processing hub that could become a counterweight to China’s dominance.
China, meanwhile, threw its weight behind a G20 agreement on a voluntary and non-binding Critical Minerals Framework intended to ensure that mineral resources “become a driver of prosperity and sustainable development”.
At the G20 leaders’ summit in South Africa last month, which was snubbed by the US, China also launched an economic and trade initiative on minerals, aiming to secure access to minerals in exchange for cooperation on technology, capacity-building and financing.
-
Trade breaks into agenda of UN climate talks – but will it have teeth?
Governments have agreed to hold a set of dialogues on overlapping climate and trade policies and how they can enable development -
Tanzania pushed African nations to oppose fossil fuel transition at COP30
While chairing the African group at the summit, the gas-dependent nation advised the continent’s ministers to block language on transitioning away from fossil fuels -
For blighted Niger Delta communities, oil spill clean-ups are another broken promise
Many local people are disappointed by efforts to repair the devastation left by foreign oil firms even as the Nigerian government plans to restart drilling
At least 19 countries, including Cambodia, Nigeria, Myanmar and Zimbabwe, alongside the UN Industrial Development Organisation, have reportedly joined the initiative.
For Neema, of the China-Global South Project, this is an explicit attempt to counter resource diplomacy by the US, which is offering developing countries security and military support in exchange for minerals.
“Producing countries in the Global South are more likely to be attracted by this approach because they know that the likelihood of Chinese companies and banks showing up is quite high,” he said.
The post Proposal for global minerals deal meets opposition as China looks away appeared first on Climate Home News.
Proposal for global minerals deal meets opposition as China looks away
Why the ICJ’s advisory opinion on climate change took a backseat at COP30
China risks emissions rebound amid policy shifts, experts warn
Proposal for global minerals deal meets opposition as China looks away
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Climate Change4 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases4 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change Videos2 years ago
The toxic gas flares fuelling Nigeria’s climate change – BBC News
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Why airlines are perfect targets for anti-greenwashing legal action