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A record surge of clean energy kept China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions below the previous year’s levels in the last 10 months of 2024.

However, the new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and commercial data, shows the tail end of China’s rebound from zero-Covid in January and February, combined with abnormally high growth in energy demand, stopped CO2 emissions falling in 2024 overall.

While China’s CO2 output in 2024 grew by an estimated 0.8% year-on-year, emissions were lower than in the 12 months to February 2024.

Other key findings of the analysis include:

  • China’s CO2 emissions grew 0.6% year-on-year in the fourth quarter, as hopes of stimulus measures pushed up industrial coal use and oil demand.
  • In addition, wind and solar fell short of expected levels in the final quarter of 2024, likely as a result of being denied grid access in favour of coal power, which was flat year-on-year.
  • Clean-energy capacity growth will accelerate in 2025 as largescale wind, solar and nuclear projects race to finish before the 14th five-year plan period comes to an end.
  • Industrial electricity demand growth has slowed since summer 2024 and total energy demand growth eased in the fourth quarter of the year.
  • These factors would be expected to push China’s coal-power output into decline in 2025, which would have international significance for energy markets and emissions.
  • However, another period of industrial demand growth driven by government stimulus efforts could change this picture, particularly if the real-estate slump turns around.

As ever, the latest analysis shows that policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory in the coming years. In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.

Emissions have plateaued since February 2024

China’s re-opening from zero-Covid began in earnest in March 2023, leading to rapid energy demand growth year-on-year until February 2024.

This resulted in a 3.8% rise in China’s CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2024.

Emissions stabilised in March-December 2024 as clean electricity supply growth covered all of the growth in electricity demand, while emissions from cement and steel production fell due to contracting demand for construction materials. This is shown in the figure below.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

After February 2024, oil consumption growth also stabilised. Coal use in the chemical industry and coal and gas use in other industrial sectors continued to grow, offsetting the fall in emissions from the construction materials industry.

Contributions to the emissions plateau during the final 10 months of 2024 are shown in the figure below, broken down by fuel and by sector, where data is available.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024 when emissions have remained stable, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

The growth in power generation from non-fossil sources set a new record, growing more than 500 terawatt hours (TWh) compared with 2023, which had already been a record year.

This is more than the total power generation of Germany in 2023. Solar power generation was responsible for half of the increase in clean power supply.

Emissions inched up in the fourth quarter

After rising in the first quarter of 2024, China’s CO2 emissions started to decline in March, falling 1% in the second quarter of the year and levelling off in the third quarter.

While power-sector emissions remained stable in the fourth quarter, industrial emissions outside the power sector swung into an increase. There was no reduction in power-sector emissions to offset that growth, resulting in an estimated 0.6% increase in overall emissions.

The largest factor was a rebound in oil and gas demand outside the power sector, indicated by the large bars under “All Sectors” and “Other Sectors” in the figure below.

Preliminary numbers from the National Bureau of Statistics indicate gas and oil demand rose 10% and 3% year-on-year, respectively, in the fourth quarter of 2024.

The supply of refined oil products fell 1.5%, so the increase in oil demand apparently came entirely from crude oil consumption in the chemical industry.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Steel output picked up after stimulus announcements in late September, increasing 2% in October-November and 12% in December after a 4% reduction in the year to September.

The December increase, however, came from the reversal of a sharp 15% drop in production in December 2023, which was a last-minute measure to adhere to a cap set by the government for steel production during the year. As a result, steel production in December 2024 saw a dramatic increase year-on-year, but remained below 2022 levels.

Gas consumption has been rebounding from a drop caused by spiking prices in 2022, but demand growth is expected to moderate this year.

Cement production fell 6% year-on-year in the last quarter, extending a decline that started in 2020 and that has seen China’s cement output fall by almost a quarter from its peak level, as construction volumes have fallen.

Clash between coal and clean energy

As shown in the chart above, emissions from the power sector remained flat during the fourth quarter of 2024, with a small fall from coal and a small rise from gas. However, as electricity demand growth slowed down to 3.5%, emissions would have been expected to fall.

Even as electricity demand growth slowed down in October and November, fossil-fuel generation continued to increase. This was due to a sharp drop in the utilisation of solar and wind capacity, as shown by China Electricity Council data accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.

It is normal for utilisation to vary month-to-month, especially in the case of wind power, as wind conditions vary. The fall in utilisation of solar power was, however, the largest on record and, in the case of both solar and wind, this specific drop is not readily explained by weather conditions.

Lauri Myllyvirta on Bluesky: The weather conditions for solar and wind were a bit worse than last year

If the fall in utilisation was not caused by weather, the other possible cause is an increase in curtailment, or the amount of solar and wind power supply not fed into the power grid.

However, officially reported curtailment rates only increased marginally.

The apparent increase in unreported solar and wind curtailment in November is indicative of issues likely to arise in China’s electricity market as demand for coal-fired power begins to fall.

The government has pushed electricity buyers to enter into long-term contracts with coal-power companies, which involve guaranteed sales volumes. This has been a way to shore up profitability and enable investments in new coal-power capacity.

This now appears to be coming into conflict with clean-power growth and efforts to limit emissions.

When power generation from clean sources grows faster or total power demand grows slower than expected, electricity buyers with these long-term contracts can face penalties, unless they refuse power supply from clean sources and purchase from coal-power generators instead.

This conflict is accentuated when a lot of new coal-power capacity enters into the market. The new units have internal production targets and, at least in some cases, power purchase agreements signed in advance, making them unwilling to reduce output, even if there is no space in the grid.

It is notable that the first time that renewable energy curtailment became a major issue in China was around 2015, when demand for power generation from coal was falling.

Statistical analysis also reveals that solar and wind capacity utilisation tends to fall when coal-power capacity utilisation falls as well – the opposite of what should be expected. In a well-functioning market, coal-power utilisation should fall when more clean power is available.

A statistical model predicting solar and wind power utilisation by province, using daily meteorological data, failed to predict the drop in utilisation in October and November, indicating that weather conditions were not the main reason for the reduction.

If power demand growth slows down in 2025 and the expected record clean-energy additions are realised (see below), the conflict between coal and clean power could worsen. Demand for coal-fired power would be likely to fall, even as the coal industry expects rapid growth.

It would only be possible to ease this conflict by relaxing the government’s targets for long-term power contracts and accepting a fall in the utilisation of coal-power capacity.

Did emissions peak in 2024?

A year ago, an earlier iteration of this analysis predicted that China’s emissions would begin to fall in March 2024 and then continue to decline, leading to a 2% reduction in the full year of 2024.

This was based on three assumptions:

  • Clean-energy additions would continue;
  • Hydropower generation would recover to historical average levels;
  • Energy consumption growth would slow down, after abnormally rapid growth in 2020-2023, during and after zero-Covid.

Taking each of those assumptions in turn, clean-energy additions not just continued but accelerated further, with 2024 poised to see a new record for the amount of solar and wind capacity added. Hydropower also recovered, although not all the way to historical averages.

The clean-energy additions, shown by the columns in the figure below, reached a scale where they would be sufficient to cover all energy demand growth at historical pre-Covid levels (grey line).

Indeed, the growth in clean-energy supply in 2024 far exceeded the growth in total energy demand recorded in any year from 2015 to 2020. However, energy demand growth in 2023-2024 was above historical norms, increasing significantly faster than in the years before Covid, even as GDP growth rates slowed down, due to high reliance on energy intensive industries to drive growth.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply. Source: Total energy consumption growth from NBS annual data and recent economic and energy data releases. Non-fossil electricity supply from Ember yearly electricity data, except 2024 data from CREA monthly China snapshot. Electricity generation is converted into primary energy following the “coal power equivalent” methodology used in China.

Specifically, China’s power demand grew at 6.8% in 2024 while GDP expanded 5%. In contrast, last year’s analysis had assumed that power demand and GDP growth rates would converge after the zero-Covid period and its immediate aftermath were over.

This discrepancy was enough to throw off the projection for 2024. With energy demand growth far in excess of what had been assumed, even the massive clean-energy additions seen in 2024 were only enough to stabilise emissions, rather than to reduce them.

This means that while China’s CO2 emissions have been stable since March, it is still likely that they will post a small increase of around 0.8% for the full year, as January-February had rapid growth due to the rebound from zero-Covid.

As a result, the calendar year of 2023 did not become the peak year for China’s CO2 output, because emissions still inched up, according to current estimates.

From one perspective, stabilising emissions despite the rapid growth in energy demand is a major achievement. From another perspective, it is important for China’s emissions to begin to fall in absolute terms, if global climate goals are to remain within reach.

Even larger clean energy additions likely in 2025

After the enormous jump in China’s clean-energy installations in 2023 – particularly solar – even the most optimistic predictions did not expect a further increase in 2024.

Yet solar and wind capacity additions in China increased by 28% and 5% year-on-year in 2024, respectively, with 277GW of solar and 79GW of wind connected to the grid.

This year is likely to set another record, as key largescale solar, wind and nuclear projects race to complete during the 14th five-year plan period ending in 2025. State-owned enterprises, local governments and other actors have set targets that they will be striving to achieve.

Solar-power capacity additions are expected to stay at the record levels seen in 2024, with approximately 265GW added to the grid, according to forecasts from TrendForce New Energy Research Center.

Wind power is poised for a new record of 110-120GW of capacity added in 2025, according to China International Capital Corporation. Of this, 14-17GW is expected to be offshore wind power, up from 7GW in 2024.

After two slow years, China’s nuclear power capacity is expected to see a significant increase, rising to 65GW by the end of 2025, from 61GW today.

Some 3GW was added right at the end of 2024, starting to contribute to non-fossil power supply in 2025. In total, after a record number of new reactor projects was permitted in 2023 and 2024, China currently has 55GW approved or under construction, suggesting an average of more than 10GW of reactor start-ups per year over the next five years.

In addition, China had at least 14GW of conventional hydropower under construction at the end of 2024, based on Global Energy Monitor data on capacity under construction in April 2024 and subtracting capacity that was already commissioned last year.

Taken together, the new solar, wind, hydro and nuclear capacity that is likely to be connected to China’s grid in 2025 can be expected to generate more than 600TWh per year of electricity, up from the 500TWh of new clean electricity generation added in 2024, as shown in the figure below.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025. Source: Calculated based on changes in year-end capacity and average capacity utilisation for each technology from China Electricity Council data accessed through the Wind Financial Terminal.

However, as noted above, new clean-power capacity will only result in lower coal-fired generation and CO2 emissions if its output is integrated into the electricity system without a major increase in curtailment.

Aiming to avoid that outcome, in early January 2025, China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), published a new power system action plan that aims to integrate more than 200GW of new wind and solar onto the grid per year in 2025-27.

While this target is below the record-breaking clean-energy additions seen in recent years, it still indicates that there is central government support for similarly rapid growth in the next few years.

In December 2024, top economic policymakers called for accelerating the construction of very largescale clean-energy “bases” in western China and introduced a new theme of creating zero-carbon industrial parks. As industrial parks are responsible for 30% of China’s CO2 emissions, this policy could also drive significant investment in clean energy.

Energy demand outlook

Whether China’s emissions remain stable or begin to fall, cementing an emissions peak, remains a race between clean-energy additions and energy demand growth.

The big question is whether the recent trend of exceptionally rapid energy demand growth will continue, or whether it will unwind, resulting in a period of demand growing slower than GDP.

The previous periods of rapid energy and power demand growth in relation to GDP, around 2004 and 2010, were followed by periods of slower demand growth. In particular, around 2015, energy demand growth slowed down markedly and China’ emissions plateaued for several years.

There are signs of a repeat of this pattern in China’s recent energy demand data.

Specifically, industrial power demand rose sharply in 2023 and 2024, but exhibited a clear slowdown in the second half of 2024, as shown in the figure below (top left).

This was masked by a rebound in service and residential sector electricity consumption. Residential demand merely caught up to the pre-Covid trendline and service sector demand remains below it, reflecting the Covid-era distortion to the structure of the economy.

China’s electricity consumption growth by sector, terawatt-hours per month.
China’s electricity consumption growth by sector, terawatt-hours per month. Source: National Energy Administration monthly data releases.

The recent rapid energy demand growth has been driven by an economic strategy that heavily favours energy-intensive manufacturing.

This approach has likely reached its limits as China’s manufacturing expansion has led to a supply glut, falling prices for industrial products and falling profits.

Now, the government is aiming to speed up economic growth by stimulating household consumption, a much less energy-intensive part of the economy than manufacturing, and by “halting the decline and stabilising” the real-estate sector.

However, delivering this outcome is far from trivial. The 2022 economic work conference – where annual departmental priorities are set – had also said that the recovery from zero-Covid should be consumption-led, but this vision failed to materialise.

The 2024 conference reduced the emphasis on “high-quality growth”, a concept that discourages growth driven by “low-quality” construction projects. In Communist party jargon, it said that “the relationship between improving the quality and growing the total output must be well coordinated”. This was a downgrade from 2023 when “high-quality growth” was described as a “hard truth”.

What next for energy and emissions in China?

Clean-energy additions will accelerate even further this year, from the record levels of 2024. At the same time, industrial power demand growth has slowed significantly since the summer.

These two trends suggest there is likely to be a fall in power-sector emissions this year. However, this drop in CO2 could still be outweighed by government stimulus efforts leading to another period of rapid growth in heavy industry, especially if construction volumes rebound.

If construction activity makes a strong comeback, this could drive further increases in emissions. The coal industry is bullish, with the China Coal Transportation and Distribution Association projecting a 1% increase in coal consumption in 2025.

The China Coal Industry Association projects a 4.5% increase in power generation from coal and gas. It believes that the stimulus policies to expand investment and stabilise the real-estate market will lead to increases in output in steel, cement and other major coal-consuming industries.

However, even if policymakers did pursue construction stimulus, a key question is how much of an effect it will have – and how fast.

Regardless of industry association hopes, the government’s stimulus announcements, so far, have not reversed market expectations of falling steel demand.

The local governments that are expected to deliver the stimulus are likely to struggle to fund a major increase in spending – and there is much less need for new infrastructure than during previous stimulus cycles.

If the government is successful in reviving household consumption as a source of growth – which is far less energy intensive – then energy demand growth could normalise to levels where clean energy can easily meet all of the growth. If so, emissions would begin to fall in a sustained way.

Beyond 2025, China’s energy and emissions trends are harder to pin down. For example, the rate of clean-energy additions after this year is more uncertain, despite recent positive signals.

China’s new Paris commitments are due to be published this year, containing targets for 2030 and 2035. In addition, the 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030, will be prepared this year and released in early 2026. As such, policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory not only this year, but for many years into the future.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics for the first quarter, the first half and the first three quarters of the year, as well as for the full year. The effect of the adjustments is less than 0.4% for total annual emissions, with unadjusted numbers showing smaller in emissions in the third quarter.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2023.

For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.

The post Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise

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Cropped 25 February 2026: Food inflation strikes | El Niño looms | Biodiversity talks stagnate

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We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Food inflation on the rise

DELUGE STRIKES FOOD: Extreme rainfall and flooding across the Mediterranean and north Africa has “battered the winter growing regions that feed Europe…threatening food price rises”, reported the Financial Times. Western France has “endured more than 36 days of continuous rain”, while farmers’ associations in Spain’s Andalusia estimate that “20% of all production has been lost”, it added. Policy expert David Barmes told the paper that the “latest storms were part of a wider pattern of climate shocks feeding into food price inflation”.

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  • Sign up to Carbon Brief’s free “Cropped” email newsletter. A fortnightly digest of food, land and nature news and views. Sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

NO BEEF: The UK’s beef farmers, meanwhile, “face a double blow” from climate change as “relentless rain forces them to keep cows indoors”, while last summer’s drought hit hay supplies, said another Financial Times article. At the same time, indoor growers in south England described a 60% increase in electricity standing charges as a “ticking timebomb” that could “force them to raise their prices or stop production, which will further fuel food price inflation”, wrote the Guardian.

TINDERBOX’ AND TARIFFS: A study, covered by the Guardian, warned that major extreme weather and other “shocks” could “spark social unrest and even food riots in the UK”. Experts cited “chronic” vulnerabilities, including climate change, low incomes, poor farming policy and “fragile” supply chains that have made the UK’s food system a “tinderbox”. A New York Times explainer noted that while trade could once guard against food supply shocks, barriers such as tariffs and export controls – which are being “increasingly” used by politicians – “can shut off that safety valve”.

El Niño looms

NEW ENSO INDEX: Researchers have developed a new index for calculating El Niño, the large-scale climate pattern that influences global weather and causes “billions in damages by bringing floods to some regions and drought to others”, reported CNN. It added that climate change is making it more difficult for scientists to observe El Niño patterns by warming up the entire ocean. The outlet said that with the new metric, “scientists can now see it earlier and our long-range weather forecasts will be improved for it.”

WARMING WARNING: Meanwhile, the US Climate Prediction Center announced that there is a 60% chance of the current La Niña conditions shifting towards a neutral state over the next few months, with an El Niño likely to follow in late spring, according to Reuters. The Vibes, a Malaysian news outlet, quoted a climate scientist saying: “If the El Niño does materialise, it could possibly push 2026 or 2027 as the warmest year on record, replacing 2024.”

CROP IMPACTS: Reuters noted that neutral conditions lead to “more stable weather and potentially better crop yields”. However, the newswire added, an El Niño state would mean “worsening drought conditions and issues for the next growing season” to Australia. El Niño also “typically brings a poor south-west monsoon to India, including droughts”, reported the Hindu’s Business Line. A 2024 guest post for Carbon Brief explained that El Niño is linked to crop failure in south-eastern Africa and south-east Asia.

News and views

  • DAM-AG-ES: Several South Korean farmers filed a lawsuit against the country’s state-owned utility company, “seek[ing] financial compensation for climate-related agricultural damages”, reported United Press International. Meanwhile, a national climate change assessment for the Philippines found that the country “lost up to $219bn in agricultural damages from typhoons, floods and droughts” over 2000-10, according to Eco-Business.
  • SCORCHED GRASS: South Africa’s Western Cape province is experiencing “one of the worst droughts in living memory”, which is “scorching grass and killing livestock”, said Reuters. The newswire wrote: “In 2015, a drought almost dried up the taps in the city; farmers say this one has been even more brutal than a decade ago.”
  • NOUVELLE VEG: New guidelines published under France’s national food, nutrition and climate strategy “urged” citizens to “limit” their meat consumption, reported Euronews. The delayed strategy comes a month after the US government “upended decades of recommendations by touting consumption of red meat and full-fat dairy”, it noted. 
  • COURTING DISASTER: India’s top green court accepted the findings of a committee that “found no flaws” in greenlighting the Great Nicobar project that “will lead to the felling of a million trees” and translocating corals, reported Mongabay. The court found “no good ground to interfere”, despite “threats to a globally unique biodiversity hotspot” and Indigenous tribes at risk of displacement by the project, wrote Frontline.
  • FISH FALLING: A new study found that fish biomass is “falling by 7.2% from as little as 0.1C of warming per decade”, noted the Guardian. While experts also pointed to the role of overfishing in marine life loss, marine ecologist and study lead author Dr Shahar Chaikin told the outlet: “Our research proves exactly what that biological cost [of warming] looks like underwater.” 
  • TOO HOT FOR COFFEE: According to new analysis by Climate Central, countries where coffee beans are grown “are becoming too hot to cultivate them”, reported the Guardian. The world’s top five coffee-growing countries faced “57 additional days of coffee-harming heat” annually because of climate change, it added.

Spotlight

Nature talks inch forward

This week, Carbon Brief covers the latest round of negotiations under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which occurred in Rome over 16-19 February.

The penultimate set of biodiversity negotiations before October’s Conference of the Parties ended in Rome last week, leaving plenty of unfinished business.

The CBD’s subsidiary body on implementation (SBI) met in the Italian capital for four days to discuss a range of issues, including biodiversity finance and reviewing progress towards the nature targets agreed under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).

However, many of the major sticking points – particularly around finance – will have to wait until later this summer, leaving some observers worried about the capacity for delegates to get through a packed agenda at COP17.

The SBI, along with the subsidiary body on scientific, technical and technological advice (SBSTTA) will both meet in Nairobi, Kenya, later this summer for a final round of talks before COP17 kicks off in Yerevan, Armenia, on 19 October.

Money talks

Finance for nature has long been a sticking point at negotiations under the CBD.

Discussions on a new fund for biodiversity derailed biodiversity talks in Cali, Colombia, in autumn 2024, requiring resumed talks a few months later.

Despite this, finance was barely on the agenda at the SBI meetings in Rome. Delegates discussed three studies on the relationship between debt sustainability and implementation of nature plans, but the more substantive talks are set to take place at the next SBI meeting in Nairobi.

Several parties “highlighted concerns with the imbalance of work” on finance between these SBI talks and the next ones, reported Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB).

Lim Li Ching, senior researcher at Third World Network, noted that tensions around finance permeated every aspect of the talks. She told Carbon Brief:

“If you’re talking about the gender plan of action – if there’s little or no financial resources provided to actually put it into practice and implement it, then it’s [just] paper, right? Same with the reporting requirements and obligations.”

Monitoring and reporting

Closely linked to the issue of finance is the obligations of parties to report on their progress towards the goals and targets of the GBF.

Parties do so through the submission of national reports.

Several parties at the talks pointed to a lack of timely funding for driving delays in their reporting, according to ENB.

A note released by the CBD Secretariat in December said that no parties had submitted their national reports yet; by the time of the SBI meetings, only the EU had. It further noted that just 58 parties had submitted their national biodiversity plans, which were initially meant to be published by COP16, in October 2024.

Linda Krueger, director of biodiversity and infrastructure policy at the environmental not-for-profit Nature Conservancy, told Carbon Brief that despite the sparse submissions, parties are “very focused on the national report preparation”. She added:

“Everybody wants to be able to show that we’re on the path and that there still is a pathway to getting to 2030 that’s positive and largely in the right direction.”

Watch, read, listen

NET LOSS: Nigeria’s marine life is being “threatened” by “ghost gear” – nets and other fishing equipment discarded in the ocean – said Dialogue Earth.

COMEBACK CAUSALITY: A Vox long-read looked at whether Costa Rica’s “payments for ecosystem services” programme helped the country turn a corner on deforestation.

HOMEGROWN GOALS: A Straits Times podcast discussed whether import-dependent Singapore can afford to shelve its goal to produce 30% of its food locally by 2030.

‘RUSTING’ RIVERS: The Financial Times took a closer look at a “strange new force blighting the [Arctic] landscape”: rivers turning rust-orange due to global warming.

New science

  • Lakes in the Congo Basin’s peatlands are releasing carbon that is thousands of years old | Nature Geoscience
  • Natural non-forest ecosystems – such as grasslands and marshlands – were converted for agriculture at four times the rate of land with tree cover between 2005 and 2020 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • Around one-quarter of global tree-cover loss over 2001-22 was driven by cropland expansion, pastures and forest plantations for commodity production | Nature Food

In the diary

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz.
Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 25 February 2026: Food inflation strikes | El Niño looms | Biodiversity talks stagnate appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Cropped 25 February 2026: Food inflation strikes | El Niño looms | Biodiversity talks stagnate

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Dangerous heat for Tour de France riders only a ‘question of time’

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Rising temperatures across France since the mid-1970s is putting Tour de France competitors at “high risk”, according to new research.

The study, published in Scientific Reports, uses 50 years of climate data to calculate the potential heat stress that athletes have been exposed to across a dozen different locations during the world-famous cycling race.

The researchers find that both the severity and frequency of high-heat-stress events have increased across France over recent decades.

But, despite record-setting heatwaves in France, the heat-stress threshold for safe competition has rarely been breached in any particular city on the day the Tour passed through.

(This threshold was set out by cycling’s international governing body in 2024.)

However, the researchers add it is “only a question of time” until this occurs as average temperatures in France continue to rise.

The lead author of the study tells Carbon Brief that, while the race organisers have been fortunate to avoid major heat stress on race days so far, it will be “harder and harder to be lucky” as extreme heat becomes more common.

‘Iconic’

The Tour de France is one of the world’s most storied cycling races and the oldest of Europe’s three major multi-week cycling competitions, or Grand Tours.

Riders cover around 3,500 kilometres (km) of distance and gain up to nearly 55km of altitude over 21 stages, with only two or three rest days throughout the gruelling race.

The researchers selected the Tour de France because it is the “iconic bike race. It is the bike race of bike races,” says Dr Ivana Cvijanovic, a climate scientist at the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development, who led the new work.

Heat has become a growing problem for the competition in recent years.

In 2022, Alexis Vuillermoz, a French competitor, collapsed at the finish line of the Tour’s ninth stage, leaving in an ambulance and subsequently pulling out of the race entirely.

Two years later, British cyclist Sir Mark Cavendish vomited on his bike during the first stage of the race after struggling with the 36C heat.

The Tour also makes a good case study because it is almost entirely held during the month of July and, while the route itself changes, there are many cities and stages that are repeated from year to year, Cvijanovic adds.

‘Have to be lucky’

The study focuses on the 50-year span between 1974 and 2023.

The researchers select six locations across the country that have commonly hosted the Tour, from the mountain pass of Col du Tourmalet, in the French Pyrenees, to the city of Paris – where the race finishes, along the Champs-Élysées.

These sites represent a broad range of climatic zones: Alpe d’ Huez, Bourdeaux, Col du Tourmalet, Nîmes, Paris and Toulouse.

For each location, they use meteorological reanalysis data from ERA5 and radiant temperature data from ERA5-HEAT to calculate the “wet-bulb globe temperature” (WBGT) for multiple times of day across the month of July each year.

WBGT is a heat-stress index that takes into account temperature, humidity, wind speed and direct sunlight.

Although there is “no exact scientific consensus” on the best heat-stress index to use, WBGT is “one of the rare indicators that has been originally developed based on the actual human response to heat”, Cvijanovic explains.

It is also the one that the International Cycling Union (UCI) – the world governing body for sport cycling – uses to assess risk. A WBGT of 28C or higher is classified as “high risk” by the group.

WBGT is the “gold standard” for assessing heat stress, says Dr Jessica Murfree, director of the ACCESS Research Laboratory and assistant professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Murfree, who was not involved in the new study, adds that the researchers are “doing the right things by conducting their science in alignment with the business practices that are already happening”.

The researchers find that across the 50-year time period, WBGT has been increasing across the entire country – albeit, at different rates. In the north-west of the country, WBGT has increased at an average rate of 0.1C per decade, while in the southern and eastern parts of the country, it has increased by more than 0.5C per decade.

The maps below show the maximum July WBGT for each decade of the analysis (rows) and for hourly increments of the late afternoon (columns). Lower temperatures are shown in lighter greens and yellows, while higher temperatures are shown in darker reds and purples.

Six Tour de France locations analysed in the study are shown as triangles on the maps (clockwise from top): Paris, Alpe d’ Huez, Nîmes, Toulouse, Col du Tourmalet and Bordeaux.

The maps show that the maximum WBGT temperature in the afternoon has surpassed 28C over almost the entire country in the last decade. The notable exceptions to this are the mountainous regions of the Alps and the Pyrenees.

Maximum WBGT across France for the month of July from 1974-2023. Rows show the values for each decade and columns show the hourly values for 3:00pm, 4:00pm, 5:00pm and 6:00pm. Lower temperatures are shown in lighter greens and yellows, while higher temperatures are shown in darker reds and purples. Triangles indicate the six Tour de France locations analysed in the study. Source: Cvijanovic et al. (2026)

The researchers also find that most of the country has crossed the 28C WBGT threshold – which they describe as “dangerous heat levels” – on at least one July day over the past decade. However, by looking at the WBGT on the day the Tour passed through any of these six locations, they find that the threshold has rarely been breached during the race itself.

For example, the research notes that, since 1974, Paris has seen a WBGT of 28C five times at 3pm in July – but that these events have “so far” not coincided with the cycling race.

The study states that it is “fortunate” that the Tour has so far avoided the worst of the heat-stress.

Cvijanovic says the organisers and competitors have been “lucky” to date. She adds:

“It has worked really well for them so far. But as the frequency of these [extreme heat] events is increasing, it will be harder and harder to be lucky.”

Dr Madeleine Orr, an assistant professor of sport ecology at the University of Toronto who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the paper was “really well done”, noting that its “methods are good [and its] approach was sound”. She adds:

“[The Tour has] had athletes complain about [the heat]. They’ve had athletes collapse – and still those aren’t the worst conditions. I think that that says a lot about what we consider safe. They’ve still been lucky to not see what unsafe looks like, despite [the heat] having already had impacts.”

Heat safety protocols

In 2024, the UCI set out its first-ever high temperature protocol – a set of guidelines for race organisers to assess athletes’ risk of heat stress.

The assessment places the potential risk into one of five categories based on the WBGT, ranging from very low to high risk.

The protocol then sets out suggested actions to take in the event of extreme heat, ranging from having athletes complete their warm-ups using ice vests and cold towels to increasing the number of support vehicles providing water and ice.

If the WBGT climbs above the 28C mark, the protocol suggests that organisers modify the start time of the stage, adapt the course to remove particularly hazardous sections – or even cancel the race entirely.

However, Orr notes that many other parts of the race, such as spectator comfort and equipment functioning, may have lower temperatures thresholds that are not accounted for in the protocol, but should also be considered.

Murfree points out that the study’s findings – and the heat protocol itself – are “really focused on adaptation, rather than mitigation”. While this is “to be expected”, she tells Carbon Brief:

“Moving to earlier start times or adjusting the route specifically to avoid these locations that score higher in heat stress doesn’t stop the heat stress. These aren’t climate preventative measures. That, I think, would be a much more difficult conversation to have in the research because of the Tour de France’s intimate relationship with fossil-fuel companies.”

The post Dangerous heat for Tour de France riders only a ‘question of time’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Dangerous heat for Tour de France riders only a ‘question of time’

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DeBriefed 20 February 2026: EU’s ‘3C’ warning | Endangerment repeal’s impact on US emissions | ‘Tree invasion’ fuelled South America’s fires

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Preparing for 3C

NEW ALERT: The EU’s climate advisory board urged countries to prepare for 3C of global warming, reported the Guardian. The outlet quoted Maarten van Aalst, a member of the advisory board, saying that adapting to this future is a “daunting task, but, at the same time, quite a doable task”. The board recommended the creation of “climate risk assessments and investments in protective measures”.

‘INSUFFICIENT’ ACTION: EFE Verde added that the advisory board said that the EU’s adaptation efforts were so far “insufficient, fragmented and reactive” and “belated”. Climate impacts are expected to weaken the bloc’s productivity, put pressure on public budgets and increase security risks, it added.

UNDERWATER: Meanwhile, France faced “unprecedented” flooding this week, reported Le Monde. The flooding has inundated houses, streets and fields and forced the evacuation of around 2,000 people, according to the outlet. The Guardian quoted Monique Barbut, minister for the ecological transition, saying: “People who follow climate issues have been warning us for a long time that events like this will happen more often…In fact, tomorrow has arrived.”

IEA ‘erases’ climate

MISSING PRIORITY: The US has “succeeded” in removing climate change from the main priorities of the International Energy Agency (IEA) during a “tense ministerial meeting” in Paris, reported Politico. It noted that climate change is not listed among the agency’s priorities in the “chair’s summary” released at the end of the two-day summit.

US INTERVENTION: Bloomberg said the meeting marked the first time in nine years the IEA failed to release a communique setting out a unified position on issues – opting instead for the chair’s summary. This came after US energy secretary Chris Wright gave the organisation a one-year deadline to “scrap its support of goals to reduce energy emissions to net-zero” – or risk losing the US as a member, according to Reuters.

Around the world

  • ISLAND OBJECTION: The US is pressuring Vanuatu to withdraw a draft resolution supporting an International Court of Justice ruling on climate change, according to Al Jazeera.
  • GREENLAND HEAT: The Associated Press reported that Greenland’s capital Nuuk had its hottest January since records began 109 years ago.
  • CHINA PRIORITIES: China’s Energy Administration set out its five energy priorities for 2026-2030, including developing a renewable energy plan, said International Energy Net.
  • AMAZON REPRIEVE: Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has continued to fall into early 2026, extending a downward trend, according to the latest satellite data covered by Mongabay.
  • GEZANI DESTRUCTION: Reuters reported the aftermath of the Gezani cyclone, which ripped through Madagascar last week, leaving 59 dead and more than 16,000 displaced people.

20cm

The average rise in global sea levels since 1901, according to a Carbon Brief guest post on the challenges in projecting future rises.


Latest climate research

  • Wildfire smoke poses negative impacts on organisms and ecosystems, such as health impacts on air-breathing animals, changes in forests’ carbon storage and coral mortality | Global Ecology and Conservation
  • As climate change warms Antarctica throughout the century, the Weddell Sea could see the growth of species such as krill and fish and remain habitable for Emperor penguins | Nature Climate Change
  • About 97% of South American lakes have recorded “significant warming” over the past four decades and are expected to experience rising temperatures and more frequent heatwaves | Climatic Change

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

US emissions, MtCO2e, under a “current policy” scenario in which the EPA removes key federal climate regulations

Repealing the US’s landmark “endangerment finding”, along with actions that rely on that finding, will slow the pace of US emissions cuts, according to Rhodium Group visualised by Carbon Brief. US president Donald Trump last week formally repealed the scientific finding that underpins federal regulations on greenhouse gas emissions, although the move is likely to face legal challenges. Data from the Rhodium Group, an independent research firm, shows that US emissions will drop more slowly without climate regulations. However, even with climate regulations, emissions are expected to drop much slower under Trump than under the previous Joe Biden administration, according to the analysis.

Spotlight

How a ‘tree invasion’ helped to fuel South America’s fires

This week, Carbon Brief explores how the “invasion” of non-native tree species helped to fan the flames of forest fires in Argentina and Chile earlier this year.

Since early January, Chile and Argentina have faced large-scale and deadly wildfires, including in Patagonia, which spans both countries.

These fires have been described as “some of the most significant and damaging in the region”, according to a World Weather Attribution (WWA) analysis covered by Carbon Brief.

In both countries, the fires destroyed vast areas of native forests and grasslands, displacing thousands of people. In Chile, the fires resulted in 23 deaths.

Firefighters spray water on homes in Vina del Mar, Chile.
Firefighters spray water on homes in Vina del Mar, Chile. Credit: Esteban Felix / Alamy Stock Photo

Multiple drivers contributed to the spread of the fires, including extended periods of high temperatures, low rainfall and abundant dry vegetation.

The WWA analysis concluded that human-caused climate change made these weather conditions at least three times more likely.

According to the researchers, another contributing factor was the invasion of non-native trees in the regions where the fires occurred.

The risk of non-native forests

In Argentina, the wildfires began on 6 January and persisted until the first week of February. They hit the city of Puerto Patriada and the Los Alerces and Lago Puelo national parks, in the Chubut province, as well as nearby regions.

In these areas, more than 45,000 hectares of native forests – such as Patagonian alerce tree, myrtle, coigüe and ñire – along with scrubland and grasslands, were consumed by the flames, according to the WWA study.

In Chile, forest fires occurred from 17 to 19 January in the Biobío, Ñuble and Araucanía regions.

The fires destroyed more than 40,000 hectares of forest and more than 20,000 hectares of non-native forest plantations, including eucalyptus and Monterey pine.

Dr Javier Grosfeld, a researcher at Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET) in northern Patagonia, told Carbon Brief that these species, introduced to Patagonia for production purposes in the late 20th century, grow quickly and are highly flammable.

Because of this, their presence played a role in helping the fires to spread more quickly and grow larger.

However, that is no reason to “demonise” them, he stressed.

Forest management

For Grosfeld, the problem in northern Patagonia, Argentina, is a significant deficit in the management of forests and forest plantations.

This management should include pruning branches from their base and controlling the spread of non-native species, he added.

A similar situation is happening in Chile, where management of pine and eucalyptus plantations is not regulated. This means there are no “firebreaks” – gaps in vegetation – in place to prevent fire spread, Dr Gabriela Azócar, a researcher at the University of Chile’s Centre for Climate and Resilience Research (CR2), told Carbon Brief.

She noted that, although Mapuche Indigenous communities in central-south Chile are knowledgeable about native species and manage their forests, their insight and participation are not recognised in the country’s fire management and prevention policies.

Grosfeld stated:

“We are seeing the transformation of the Patagonian landscape from forest to scrubland in recent years. There is a lack of preventive forestry measures, as well as prevention and evacuation plans.”

Watch, read, listen

FUTURE FURNACE: A Guardian video explored the “unbearable experience of walking in a heatwave in the future”.

THE FUN SIDE: A Channel 4 News video covered a new wave of climate comedians who are using digital platforms such as TikTok to entertain and raise awareness.

ICE SECRETS: The BBC’s Climate Question podcast explored how scientists study ice cores to understand what the climate was like in ancient times and how to use them to inform climate projections.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 20 February 2026: EU’s ‘3C’ warning | Endangerment repeal’s impact on US emissions | ‘Tree invasion’ fuelled South America’s fires appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 20 February 2026: EU’s ‘3C’ warning | Endangerment repeal’s impact on US emissions | ‘Tree invasion’ fuelled South America’s fires

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