The UK government has set out an “action plan” for reaching its target of clean power by 2030, which it describes as “the most ambitious reforms to our energy system in generations”.
The plan outlines how the government hopes to “make Britain a clean energy superpower to cut bills, create jobs and deliver security with cheaper, zero-carbon electricity by 2030”.
This was one of five “missions” in the Labour manifesto, on which the government was elected with a landslide majority in July.
Following independent advice from the National Energy System Operator (NESO), the government is aiming for clean power to meet 100% of electricity demand by 2030, with at least 95% of electricity generation coming from low-carbon sources and no more than 5% from unabated gas.
The 136-page plan sees wind and solar – in particular offshore wind – becoming the backbone of the British electricity system. It says record amounts of new renewable capacity will need to be delivered, alongside reforms to the planning process and major grid enhancements.
While delivering all this would be a huge undertaking, the plan says it could unlock extra investments worth £40bn a year out to 2030, delivering “reindustrialisation”, jobs and lower bills.
Here, Carbon Brief explains the background to the clean power 2030 target, initial steps already taken by the government, the proposals in the new action plan and what comes next.
- Where the clean power 2030 target comes from
- What clean power 2030 will look like
- How the government plans to reach clean power 2030
Where the clean power 2030 target comes from
The Labour party fought the 2024 UK election campaign on a manifesto pledging to “make Britain a clean energy superpower…with cheaper, zero-carbon electricity by 2030”.
This was an advance on the previous Conservative government’s 2021 pledge to “fully decarbonise” the power system by 2035.
Both parties had identified the need for clean power in order to help decarbonise the rest of the UK economy, as heat and transport are increasingly electrified with heat pumps and electric vehicles.
However, the Labour party has explicitly tied its clean power “mission” not just to the UK’s climate goals, but to energy security and bills in the wake of the global energy crisis, as well as jobs.
In a press statement launching the report, secretary of state for energy and climate change Ed Miliband says:
“A new era of clean electricity for our country offers a positive vision of Britain’s future with energy security, lower bills, good jobs and climate action. This can only happen with big, bold change and that is why the government is embarking on the most ambitious reforms to our energy system in generations. ”
Just after taking office at the start of July 2024, Miliband reiterated his commitment to the clean power 2030 target when setting out his priorities for government.
He then appointed Chris Stark, the former chief executive of the Climate Change Committee, to head up a new “mission control” function within government, as well as informally asking NESO for independent advice on how to reach the clean power 2030 target.
(NESO was created as part of the Energy Act 2023, having already been hived off from National Grid. It was officially launched on 1 October 2024 as a new independent organisation responsible for planning the entire energy system in Britain, including operating the electricity network and offering “expert advice to the energy sector’s decision makers”.)
Speaking to UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) director Prof Rob Gross on the Talking Energy podcast, NESO chief economist Mike Thompson said the body had begun working on its advice to government in July 2024, soon after the election result became clear.
The government had then formally requested NESO’s guidance in an August 2024 letter, which asked for “practical advice on achieving clean power by 2030”.
It asked for different pathways to reach this goal, as well as key requirements for electricity grids, high-level analysis of costs and benefits, and suggested actions to get on track.
The NESO advice, published on 5 November 2024, said the 2030 target was “achievable…without increasing costs” and that it would insulate the UK from “volatile international gas prices”.
A key element of the NESO advice was to offer a working definition of clean power by 2030.
It adopted a definition with two parts. It said clean power should cover 100% of electricity demand by 2030, in a year with average weather conditions. In addition, it said at least 95% of the electricity generated within the country’s borders should come from low-carbon sources, with up to 5% coming from unabated gas. This means the country would become a net electricity exporter.
(The national electricity grid – and the clean power 2030 target – technically only covers the island of Great Britain, whereas Northern Ireland is part of the separate all-Ireland network.)
Thompson explained on the Talking Energy podcast:
“We think that there should be enough clean power to cover all of GB demand over the year…But of course, a lot of that generation is coming from wind power, from solar, and you can’t control when it is outputting…So we adopted this definition that actually you cover all of demand [with clean power], but you would also allow up to no more than 5% of generation to come from unabated gas.”
The government formally adopted the NESO definition of clean power when prime minister Keir Starmer announced his milestones for delivering a “decade of national renewal”.
This definition, for clean power to meet 100% of demand in 2030 but only 95% of generation, was widely reported as a “watering down” of Labour’s manifesto pledge. A spokesperson for the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero said this was “categorically untrue”.
Labour’s manifesto had not defined its clean power by 2030 target and had made clear reference to a “strategic reserve of gas power”.
An earlier Labour policy document had said that the country would “run on 100% clean…power”, which is consistent with the government’s target for clean power to meet 100% of demand.
What clean power 2030 will look like
The government’s action plan accepts the NESO advice as its starting point.
While NESO offered two different pathways to clean power in 2030, they share many of the same features, with wind and solar making up the largest share of electricity in both cases.
In 2023, fossil fuels made up a third of electricity generation in the country, with wind and solar making up another third, and the remainder coming from nuclear, biomass and imports.
By 2030, if the clean power target is met, unabated fossil fuels would make up less than 5% of generation, with wind and solar making up around 80% of the mix, as shown in the figure below.
Offshore wind would form the backbone of the GB electricity mix in 2030, meeting around half of demand under either the NESO “new dispatch” scenario or under “further flex and renewables”.
The difference between the two NESO pathways lies in the way that they manage gaps in the output of variable wind and solar power.
The “new dispatch” pathway relies more on low-carbon “dispatchable” power, meaning capacity that can be turned on and off at will. This includes gas-fired power stations fitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS), or turbines that burn low-carbon hydrogen fuel.
The “further flex and renewables” pathway relies on larger amounts of wind and solar capacity, coupled with a more flexible grid and higher levels of battery or long-duration energy storage.
The government’s action plan targets a range of clean power capacity by 2030 that would leave the door open to pursuing either of these scenarios, shown in the table below.
Crucially, the plan relies on keeping almost all of the country’s existing gas-fired power stations open for the rest of the decade, to help bridge those gaps in wind and solar output, until alternative low-carbon sources of flexibility become more widely available.
Thompson told the Talking Energy podcast:
“You keep something like a fleet around the size of the current gas fleet open [in 2030], but it would operate much, much less.”
While the existing gas fleet remains in place, the government will need to rapidly expand the amount of clean power capacity available to meet the 2030 target.
The action plan says the long timelines for new offshore wind projects mean there will only be time to bring forward schemes that are already or at least part-way through the planning process.
It also means that the next two “contracts for difference” (CfD) auctions, due to be held in 2025 and 2026, will need to secure the bulk of the offshore wind capacity required for 2030.
The UK currently has 15 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind capacity, with another 16GW under construction or firmly committed. To meet the level required for clean power by 2030, the plan says that this would need to expand by at least another 12GW by 2030.
Similarly, at least an additional 8GW of onshore wind and 22GW of solar would be needed.
The Financial Times quoted a “government figure” saying that next year’s auction will need to be “huge” and the biggest ever for the country:
“When you think about the long lead times for a project like an offshore wind farm it makes sense to get going with the CfDs now and throw the book at this with a huge auction round as soon as possible, probably next year…It would be the biggest we’ve seen so far.”
In addition to building that new capacity, the plan relies on significantly enhancing the electricity transmission grid that sends power around the country, reforming the planning system so that new infrastructure can be built and ensuring the supply chains and workers are in place to deliver.
In a foreword to the action plan, Stark says the wider economic benefits of meeting the target are a “prize” worth around £40bn in investment every year until 2030.
The plan describes this as “once-in-a-generation levels of energy investment” that will “spread…the economic benefits of clean energy investment throughout the UK”. It adds:
“These investments will protect electricity consumers from volatile gas prices and be the foundation of a UK energy system that can bring down consumer bills for good. Every choice we make will be scrutinised to maximise the impact it can have in reducing consumer bills.”
The plan says that the clean power plan will “provide…the foundation to build an energy system that can bring down bills for households and businesses for good.” It adds:
“In their advice, NESO set out their analysis of potential impacts of delivering clean power on electricity costs in 2030. This indicated it could be delivered with similar costs to today, with scope for lower electricity costs and bills by 2030 as wider changes are taken into account.”
Ahead of the general election, Labour had promised that its clean power plan would cut energy bills by up to £300. The opposition Conservatives have disputed this.
On the question of how it would be possible to reduce bills while building large amounts of new infrastructure, UKERC’s Gross explained on the Talking Energy podcast that instead of spending large amounts on imported fossil fuels that are burned to generate electricity, billpayers would be investing in new clean power capacity, which would be paid back over many years.
How the government plans to reach clean power 2030
Achieving the clean power 2030 target would be a major undertaking. The government’s action plan sets out its approach to delivering this across a series of key areas.
Actions include reforming and expanding the government’s auctions for new clean power capacity, significantly expanding the country’s electricity grid and speeding up the process of connecting new projects, changing the planning system so that all this new infrastructure can be consented and built, and ensuring a supply chain with skilled workers is in place to deliver it.
Grid enhancement
The action plan outlines steps to expand and improve the electricity grid, saying that a failure to strengthen it "risks holding back our energy security, economic growth and other important infrastructure with lengthy delays”.
For example, it notes that, if no action is taken to address the annual “constraint costs” caused when networks are unable to carry all of the clean power being generated to where it is needed, then those costs are projected to increase from the “already high level” of £2bn per year in 2022 to around £8bn per year (or £80 per household) by the late 2020s.
An “unprecedented expansion” is therefore needed to deliver decarbonisation, energy security and affordability, with around twice as much new transmission infrastructure needed by 2030 as has been delivered in the past decade.
To enable this, the plan sets out several key actions, including reforming the connections process, reforming regulations, improving planning and consenting, and engaging with communities.
In the last five years, the grid “connection queue” of projects waiting to hook up to the electricity network has grown tenfold. Many of the projects within the queue are speculative or do not necessarily have the funding or planning permissions to progress, the action plan notes.
It says this means that fundamental reform is needed. Work has already begun on this. For example, in November the government, together with energy regulator Ofgem, outlined a series of changes in a joint letter that would fast-track renewable, clean power and storage projects.
The action plan includes further reform to the current “first come, first served” process for the queue. The government says it will go beyond previous plans to simply remove slow or stalled projects from the queue and prioritise readiness alone.
It will now also consider technological and locational factors, remove unviable projects, re-order the queue and accelerate connection timescales, the action plan states.
In a foreword to the plan, Miliband says:
“Ultimately, we need to move fast and build things to deliver the once-in-a-generation upgrade of our energy infrastructure Britain needs.”
Following consultations with Ofgem, NESO and network companies, there are now detailed methodologies for filtering the queue and prioritising connections for strategically important plans.
These changes will take into account recommendations from both electricity networks commissioner Nick Winser’s report in 2023 – which set out recommendations to halve the connection times of projects – and NESO’s Clean Power 2030 advice, which confirmed the need for 80 new transmission grid projects to be built, if the target is to be achieved.
Additionally, the action plan notes that, wherever renewable projects can be connected to the lower-voltage local distribution systems, instead of the high-voltage national transmission grid – known as the motorways of the electricity network – this should be encouraged.
(Projects that have secured a CfD or “capacity market” contract, “nationally significant” projects and others that are considered well advanced will be included in the reformed connections queue, according to the plan.)
Beyond the connections queue, the action plan sets out regulatory reforms to support clean power by 2030. This includes amending the Strategy and Policy Statement, wherein the government’s strategic priorities for energy policy are outlined, to ensure that 2030 clean power and decarbonisation more broadly are weighted in decision making.
The government will also work with Ofgem to explore the appropriateness of tightening incentives and penalties for network operators, for the delivery of strategically important infrastructure.
To accelerate the build out of both transmission and distribution networks required for the 2030 target, planning system changes will be required. (See: Planning reforms.)
Currently, it can take between two to four years to gain land rights in England and Wales, which can “lead to unnecessary delays”, the action plan notes.
To address these processes, the action plan says that planning consent exemptions will be expanded to include low-voltage connections and upgrades.
There are also further opportunities to provide flexibilities on the consenting of electricity substations, it adds.
The final core part of action on the grid, outlined in the plan, focuses on community engagement, as “this government believes that it is a vital principle that communities that host clean energy infrastructure should benefit from it”.
This will include publishing voluntary guidance to increase the amount and consistency of community benefit funds from transmissions networks. There will also be support for the launch of a public communications campaign around grid expansion, the plan says.
Planning reforms
Since the election in July, the Labour government has taken several steps to help transition the electricity system towards net-zero.
This includes lifting the de-facto ban on onshore wind in England, which had been in place since 2015, within weeks of taking office.
Labour also approved three large solar farms in its first few weeks in government. In total, these sites – Gate Burton in Lincolnshire, Mallard Pass in Lincolnshire and Sunnica in Suffolk and Cambridgeshire – have a capacity of over 1.3GW.
Given their size, all three solar sites are considered nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs), and as such require a development consent order from the energy secretary, as opposed to planning permission from the local planning authority.
One day before the action plan was released, the government published its response to a consultation on proposed changes to the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF).
This includes plans to bring onshore wind back under the NSIP regime, in line with other types of major infrastructure. It also intends to raise the threshold above which onshore wind and solar projects will need central government NSIP consent to 100 megawatts (MW).
The government is planning to introduce legislation in the spring of 2025 to bring in these changes.
The action plan builds on these changes in an effort to improve the planning process.
It states that the planning system is “not working at the pace required” to meet the 2030 target and that this “urgent need for change” necessitates “a wide-ranging reform programme”.
To enable clean power by 2030, most new transmission grid and offshore wind projects will need all relevant planning permissions to be in place by 2026, the report notes.
While onshore wind, solar and battery energy storage projects have shorter construction timelines, they will still likely need to have received planning consent by 2028.
The report states that the government has identified pathways for delivery for “firm” generation – such as nuclear – as well as for sources of low-carbon flexibility, but does not give a date by which they must be consented.
Other changes outlined in the report include equipping organisations such as the Planning Inspectorate, statutory consultees such as the Environment Agency, local planning authorities and government consenting teams, with the “tools they need” to make decisions faster.
The report highlights that, in 2023-24, more than 60% of delayed responses to planning applications from the Environment Agency were due to resourcing constraints, and for nature regulator Natural England it was more than 80%.
It promises changes including boosting local planning capacity, expanding cost-recovery mechanisms – which see developers pay for the work needed to give them planning consent – and longer-term reforms. In particular, the changes will allow them to “better flex and prioritise their resources” so that “mission-critical projects” can be processed faster, it says.
The action plan includes updating “national policy statements” (NPSs) for energy and planning policy guidance in 2025, along with the changes to the NPPF already announced.
A programme of legislative reform will be undertaken by the government, including through the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, which will be brought forward next year. This will include NPSs being updated every five years, through a “quicker and easier process”.
Further reforms to the NSIP planning system in England and Wales will be undertaken, as well as changes to infrastructure consenting in Scotland.
(There is executive devolution in Scotland with regards to the infrastructure planning system, however under the Electricity Act, reserved to Westminster, the UK government will be able to bring in changes to deliver a “streamlined and efficient framework”, the plan says.)
The report highlights the importance of a coordinated approach to planning and notes that, to support this, NESO will deliver a “strategic spatial energy plan” in 2026, setting out a long-term approach to planning to deliver net-zero by 2050.
Under the NSIP process, the government will undertake a review of the lawfulness of challenges to development consent for major infrastructure. While judicial review is a “constitutionally important mechanism”, the action plan notes, most are unsuccessful and can take many years, significantly delaying new infrastructure and increasing costs to consumers.
As such, the plan includes a commitment to reform the judicial review process for NSIPs, following the Banner report on why such legal challenges arise.
Additional actions announced within the plan include changes to ensure communities can directly benefit from the clean energy infrastructure they host.
It notes that locally-consented energy infrastructure can take up to 12 months to receive a decision on a planning application, despite a four-month limit on projects that require an environmental impact assessment
Finally, the plan says that, by delivering a “marine recovery fund” for offshore wind, as well as using development to fund nature recovery, the government will look to use the action plan to protect nature and ensure that it is embedded in the transition to clean power by 2030.
Renewable energy auctions
The action plan announces further changes to the CfD support scheme for new renewable energy.
This follows action by the current government earlier in the year to bolster the sixth CfD auction, including increasing its budget by over 50% from the level set in March under the previous Conservative government to £1.56bn.
(The previous fifth auction, held in 2023, had not secured any new offshore wind.)
This year’s sixth auction contracted more than 130 new wind, solar and tidal energy projects, amounting to 9.6GW of capacity. Still, some cautioned at the time that a “big step-up” would still be required if the power sector is to be decarbonised by the end of the decade.
The government is introducing a number of changes to the CfDs ahead of the seventh auction, due to be held in 2025. This includes allowing onshore wind farms that are “repowering” – meaning replacing old turbines as they retire with newer models – an extension to the “phasing” process for floating offshore wind and streamlining the appeals process to take place ahead of the auction.
There is currently around 31GW of offshore wind built, under construction or contracted. However, this needs to rise to 43-50GW in 2030. (See: What clean power 2030 will look like).
The government will therefore aim to secure at least 12GW of new projects over the next two allocation rounds. To enable this, the action plan sets out further reform to the CfD process.
Changes will include a relaxation of the CfD eligibility criteria for fixed-bottom offshore wind projects to allow projects to bid even if they have not obtained full planning consent.
To avoid a repeat of the fifth auction, there will also be changes to the information the secretary of state uses to inform the final budget for fixed-bottom offshore wind.
There will also be a review of auction parameters, following “industry concerns” around the way the notional “budget” of each round is calculated.
(The “budget” for each auction round is an artificial construct, set by the government and designed to limit the impact of CfDs on consumer bills. Any support for CfD projects is paid for by billpayers rather than from government budgets. Moreover, a larger “budget” may not translate into higher bills, because CfD projects also push down wholesale electricity prices.)
Specifically, the government will look at the “reference price” against which each new CfD scheme is valued. Recent auction rounds have used very low reference prices, which inflate the notional budget impact of new projects, even if they are likely to lower consumer costs.
The government is also considering changes to the CfD contract terms to give longer market security, once the contracts are awarded. This could see the length of the contracts increased from the current 15-year standard term.
Consultations will take place in early 2025, ahead of the seventh allocation round, with a view to implementing them in the summer of 2025.
Beyond the CfD reforms, the action plan includes a number of commitments to improve renewable energy project delivery. These include facilitating greater coordination between wind turbines, civil aviation and defence infrastructure.
Further detail on Great British Energy’s (GBE) project development is included, including promises that the state-owned energy company – a core part of the Labour manifesto – will align its projects on private land with NESOs location suggestions, and develop further projects on public land.
The action plan states that GBE will provide support to deliver the Local Power Plan, to put “local authorities and communities at the heart of restructuring our energy economy”. Additional work will be done to support the deployment of rooftop solar, assess the potential of solar “canopies” on outdoor carparks and support programmes such as the Warm Homes Local Grant.
First introduced in 2002, the UK-wide renewables obligation (RO) scheme currently supports around 30% of the UK’s electricity supply. From 2027, it will start to come to an end, with around 9GW of capacity reaching the end of the subsidy by December 2030.
The action plan commits the government to conduct further analysis to inform the possible policy options needed to manage the risk that RO-supported projects might stop operating.
For the work being undertaken on renewables and nuclear, the action plan includes a list of key upcoming milestones, including:
- Spring 2025: Solar Roadmap and the Onshore Wind Industry Taskforce report.
- Early 2025: Consultation on relevant reforms to the CfD scheme.
- “In due course”: Consultation response on the Future Homes and Buildings Standards.
- After the spending review: Further details on the Warm Homes Plan.
- In 2025: A call for evidence on the potential to drive solar canopies on carparks.
- “In due course”: Consultation response on transitional support for large-scale biomass.
Flexibility and ‘dispatchable’ clean power
Beyond renewables, the plan includes a number of actions to reform the electricity market to support energy security, through flexibility and “dispatchable” power.
As with the other core areas, the government has taken a number of actions in its first six months to support this, including signing the contracts for the first gas CCS project in the UK.
French utility firm EDF has also announced plans to keep four existing nuclear power stations open for longer, meaning 4.6GW of nuclear capacity will remain on the grid in 2030.
The action plan includes support for investor certainty through wholesale electricity market reforms, reforming the capacity market and accelerating reforms to the balancing markets through which supply and demand are matched in real time, which it says will help unlock consumer-led flexibility. It notes:
“While the state must play a role as system architect, markets are, and will remain, central to the development, delivery, and operation of the power system.”
The action plan promises to set a clear “direction of travel” for wholesale market reform. As part of this, it is continuing to conduct further analysis as part of the long-running review of electricity market arrangements (REMA), which began in 2022 under the previous government. The action plan says that its work so far has made clear that “no change” is not an option.
The government says it will conclude the REMA process by “around mid-2025”, including whether to bring in “zonal pricing” or whether electricity prices will continue to be set at national level.
Currently, Britain uses a national pricing system whereby generators are paid the same regardless of where they are. Zonal pricing is a form of “locational pricing” that would see the country divided into zones, in an effort to reduce grid constraints and energy costs.
In order to avoid any changes affecting the investment needed in new clean power capacity, the government pledges to “align” the process with the next CfD auction. It also flags the potential for “transitional or legacy arrangements” that could protect existing investments from future changes:
“We plan, therefore, to announce the final decisions on REMA and the timetable for their implementation, particularly in relation to wholesale market reform and any transitional or legacy arrangements, before the AR7 auctions open, giving investors clarity for prospective bids.”
Other actions include NESO promising an electricity system operability strategy for 2030, improved forecasting of medium to long-term grid operability needs and improved emissions reporting from NESO across all electricity markets.
To support greater flexibility in the electricity system, the government plans to publish a “low carbon flexibility roadmap” in 2025. This will consolidate existing and future actions to drive short and long-duration flexibility.
Currently, there is 4.5GW of battery storage in Great Britain, the majority of which is grid-scale assets. By 2030, 23-27GW of battery storage is expected to be needed to meet the demands of a clean power system.
The action plan includes specific measures to overcome “hurdles” in the rollout of battery storage, such as working with Ofgem to ease network connections. (See: Grid enhancement.)
It says it will bring in incremental market reforms to provide batteries and consumer-led flexibility with access to relevant markets. This could include, for example, households shifting demand from electric vehicle charging at home, to use abundant renewable generation late at night instead of during peak hours when the grid is strained.
To support this, the action plan suggests enhancing rewards for consumers who choose to participate in flexibility, as well as the need for changes to market access for flexibility providers and support for the rollout of smart appliances.
Finally, work will be undertaken to enable portfolios of projects and activities to deliver consumer-led flexibility. Among other things, this builds on the rollout of the demand flexibility mechanism, whereby households are paid to reduce energy consumption during tight periods.
The action plan identifies the need for further long-duration flexibility technologies and announces support for the development of a hydrogen power business model to derisk investment and speed up the rate of deployment.
Additionally, Ofgem will introduce a “cap and floor scheme” to support investment in long-duration electricity storage. It says it is aiming to publish an open letter on specific aspects of the scheme soon, and in the first quarter of next year, DESNZ and Ofgem will publish the technical decisions undertaken to provide clarity on any outstanding areas of its design.
NESO has agreed to provide further advice as to the range of technologies needed. The scheme is expected to open to applications in the second quarter of next year.
The post Analysis: How the UK plans to reach clean power by 2030 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 9 January 2026: US to exit global climate treaty; Venezuelan oil ‘uncertainty’; ‘Hardest truth’ for Africa’s energy transition
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
US to pull out from UNFCC, IPCC
CLIMATE RETREAT: The Trump administration announced its intention to withdraw the US from the world’s climate treaty, CNN reported. The move to leave the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in addition to 65 other international organisations, was announced via a White House memorandum that states these bodies “no longer serve American interests”, the outlet added. The New York Times explained that the UNFCCC “counts all of the other nations of the world as members” and described the move as cementing “US isolation from the rest of the world when it comes to fighting climate change”.
MAJOR IMPACT: The Associated Press listed all the organisations that the US is exiting, including other climate-related bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The exit also means the withdrawal of US funding from these bodies, noted the Washington Post. Bloomberg said these climate actions are likely to “significantly limit the global influence of those entities”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth Q&A on what Trump’s move means for global climate action.
Oil prices fall after Venezuela operation
UNCERTAIN GLUT: Global oil prices fell slightly this week “after the US operation to seize Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro created uncertainty over the future of the world’s largest crude reserves”, reported the Financial Times. The South American country produces less than 1% of global oil output, but it holds about 17% of the world’s proven crude reserves, giving it the potential to significantly increase global supply, the publication added.
TRUMP DEMANDS: Meanwhile, Trump said Venezuela “will be turning over” 30-50m barrels of oil to the US, which will be worth around $2.8bn (£2.1bn), reported BBC News. The broadcaster added that Trump claims this oil will be sold at market price and used to “benefit the people of Venezuela and the US”. The announcement “came with few details”, but “marked a significant step up for the US government as it seeks to extend its economic influence in Venezuela and beyond”, said Bloomberg.
Around the world
- MONSOON RAIN: At least 16 people have been killed in flash floods “triggered by torrential rain” in Indonesia, reported the Associated Press.
- BUSHFIRES: Much of Australia is engulfed in an extreme heatwave, said the Guardian. In Victoria, three people are missing amid “out of control” bushfires, reported Reuters.
- TAXING EMISSIONS: The EU’s landmark carbon border levy, known as “CBAM”, came into force on 1 January, despite “fierce opposition” from trading partners and European industry, according to the Financial Times.
- GREEN CONSUMPTION: China’s Ministry of Commerce and eight other government departments released an action plan to accelerate the country’s “green transition of consumption and support high-quality development”, reported Xinhua.
- ACTIVIST ARRESTED: Prominent Indian climate activist Harjeet Singh was arrested following a raid on his home, reported Newslaundry. Federal forces have accused Singh of “misusing foreign funds to influence government policies”, a suggestion that Singh rejected as “baseless, biased and misleading”, said the outlet.
- YOUR FEEDBACK: Please let us know what you thought of Carbon Brief’s coverage last year by completing our annual reader survey. Ten respondents will be chosen at random to receive a CB laptop sticker.
47%
The share of the UK’s electricity supplied by renewables in 2025, more than any other source, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Latest climate research
- Deforestation due to the mining of “energy transition minerals” is a “major, but overlooked source of emissions in global energy transition” | Nature Climate Change
- Up to three million people living in the Sudd wetland region of South Sudan are currently at risk of being exposed to flooding | Journal of Flood Risk Management
- In China, the emissions intensity of goods purchased online has dropped by one-third since 2000, while the emissions intensity of goods purchased in stores has tripled over that time | One Earth
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
The US, which has announced plans to withdraw from the UNFCCC, is more responsible for climate change than any other country or group in history, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The chart above shows the cumulative historical emissions of countries since the advent of the industrial era in 1850.
Spotlight
How to think about Africa’s just energy transition
African nations are striving to boost their energy security, while also addressing climate change concerns such as flood risks and extreme heat.
This week, Carbon Brief speaks to the deputy Africa director of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, Ibrahima Aidara, on what a just energy transition means for the continent.
Carbon Brief: When African leaders talk about a “just energy transition”, what are they getting right? And what are they still avoiding?
Ibrahima Aidara: African leaders are right to insist that development and climate action must go together. Unlike high-income countries, Africa’s emissions are extremely low – less than 4% of global CO2 emissions – despite housing nearly 18% of the world’s population. Leaders are rightly emphasising universal energy access, industrialisation and job creation as non-negotiable elements of a just transition.
They are also correct to push back against a narrow narrative that treats Africa only as a supplier of raw materials for the global green economy. Initiatives such as the African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy show a growing recognition that value addition, regional integration and industrial policy must sit at the heart of the transition.
However, there are still important blind spots. First, the distributional impacts within countries are often avoided. Communities living near mines, power infrastructure or fossil-fuel assets frequently bear environmental and social costs without sharing in the benefits. For example, cobalt-producing communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or lithium-affected communities in Zimbabwe and Ghana, still face displacement, inadequate compensation, pollution and weak consultation.
Second, governance gaps are sometimes downplayed. A just transition requires strong institutions (policies and regulatory), transparency and accountability. Without these, climate finance, mineral booms or energy investments risk reinforcing corruption and inequality.
Finally, leaders often avoid addressing the issue of who pays for the transition. Domestic budgets are already stretched, yet international climate finance – especially for adaptation, energy access and mineral governance – remains far below commitments. Justice cannot be achieved if African countries are asked to self-finance a global public good.
CB: Do African countries still have a legitimate case for developing new oil and gas projects, or has the energy transition fundamentally changed what ‘development’ looks like?
IA: The energy transition has fundamentally changed what development looks like and, with it, how African countries should approach oil and gas. On the one hand, more than 600 million Africans lack access to electricity and clean cooking remains out of reach for nearly one billion people. In countries such as Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania, gas has been framed to expand power generation, reduce reliance on biomass and support industrial growth. For some contexts, limited and well-governed gas development can play a transitional role, particularly for domestic use.
On the other hand, the energy transition has dramatically altered the risks. Global demand uncertainty means new oil and gas projects risk becoming stranded assets. Financing is shrinking, with many development banks and private lenders exiting fossil fuels. Also, opportunity costs are rising; every dollar locked into long-lived fossil infrastructure is a dollar not invested in renewables, grids, storage or clean industry.
Crucially, development today is no longer just about exporting fuels. It is about building resilient, diversified economies. Countries such as Morocco and Kenya show that renewable energy, green industry and regional power trade can support growth without deepening fossil dependence.
So, the question is no longer whether African countries can develop new oil and gas projects, but whether doing so supports long-term development, domestic energy access and fiscal stability in a transitioning world – or whether it risks locking countries into an extractive model that benefits few and exposes countries to future shocks.
CB: What is the hardest truth about Africa’s energy transition that policymakers and international partners are still unwilling to confront?
IA: For me, the hardest truth is this: Africa cannot deliver a just energy transition on unfair global terms. Despite all the rhetoric, global rules still limit Africa’s policy space. Trade and investment agreements restrict local content, industrial policy and value-addition strategies. Climate finance remains fragmented and insufficient. And mineral supply chains are governed largely by consumer-country priorities, not producer-country development needs.
Another uncomfortable truth is that not every “green” investment is automatically just. Without strong safeguards, renewable energy projects and mineral extraction can repeat the same harms as fossil fuels: displacement, exclusion and environmental damage.
Finally, there is a reluctance to admit that speed alone is not success. A rushed transition that ignores governance, equity and institutions will fail politically and socially, and, ultimately, undermine climate goals.
If Africa’s transition is to succeed, international partners must accept African leadership, African priorities and African definitions of development, even when that challenges existing power dynamics in global energy and mineral markets.
Watch, read, listen
CRISIS INFLAMED: In the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo, columnist Marcelo Leite looked into the climate impact of extracting more oil from Venezuela.
BEYOND TALK: Two Harvard scholars argued in Climate Home News for COP presidencies to focus less on climate policy and more on global politics.
EU LEVIES: A video explainer from the Hindu unpacked what the EU’s carbon border tax means for India and global trade.
Coming up
- 10-12 January: 16th session of the IRENA Assembly, Abu Dhabi
- 13-15 January: Energy Security and Green Infrastructure Week, London
- 13-15 January: The World Future Energy Summit, Abu Dhabi
- 15 January: Uganda general elections
Pick of the jobs
- WRI Polsky Energy Center, global director | Salary: around £185,000. Location: Washington DC; the Hague, Netherlands; New Delhi, Mumbai, or Bengaluru, India; or London
- UK government Advanced Research and Invention Agency, strategic communications director – future proofing our climate and weather | Salary: £115,000. Location: London
- The Wildlife Trusts, head of climate and international policy | Salary: £50,000. Location: London
- Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, senior manager for climate | Salary: Unknown. Location: London, UK
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 9 January 2026: US to exit global climate treaty; Venezuelan oil ‘uncertainty’; ‘Hardest truth’ for Africa’s energy transition appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The Trump administration in the US has announced its intention to withdraw from the UN’s landmark climate treaty, alongside 65 other international bodies that “no longer serve American interests”.
Every nation in the world has committed to tackling “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
During Donald Trump’s second presidency, the US has already failed to meet a number of its UN climate treaty obligations, including reporting its emissions and funding the UNFCCC – and it has not attended recent climate summits.
However, pulling out of the UNFCCC would be an unprecedented step and would mark the latest move by the US to disavow global cooperation and climate action.
Among the other organisations the US plans to leave is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN body seen as the global authority on climate science.
In this article, Carbon Brief considers the implications of the US leaving these bodies, as well as the potential for it rejoining the UNFCCC in the future.
Carbon Brief has also spoken to experts about the contested legality of leaving the UNFCCC and what practical changes – if any – will result from the US departure.
- What is the process for pulling out of the UNFCCC?
- Is it legal for Trump to take the US out of the UNFCCC unilaterally?
- How could the US rejoin the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement?
- What changes when the US withdraws from the UNFCCC?
- What about the US withdrawal from the IPCC?
- What other organisations are affected?
What is the process for pulling out of the UNFCCC?
The Trump administration set out its intention to withdraw from the UNFCCC and the IPCC in a White House presidential memorandum issued on 7 January 2026.
It claims authority “vested in me as president by the constitution and laws of the US” to withdraw the country from the treaty, along with 65 other international and UN bodies.
However, the memo includes a caveat around its instructions, stating:
“For UN entities, withdrawal means ceasing participation in or funding to those entities to the extent permitted by law.”
(In an 8 January interview with the New York Times, Trump said he did not “need international law” and that his powers were constrained only by his “own morality”.)
The US is the first and only country in the world to announce it wants to withdraw from the UNFCCC.
The convention was adopted at the UN headquarters in New York in May 1992 and opened for signatures at the Rio Earth summit the following month. The US became the first industrialised nation to ratify the treaty that same year.
It was ultimately signed by every nation on Earth – making it one of the most ratified global treaties in history.
Article 25 of the treaty states that any party may withdraw by giving written notification to the “depositary”, which is elsewhere defined as being the UN secretary general – currently, António Guterres.
The article, shown below, adds that the withdrawal will come into force a year after a written notification is supplied.
The treaty adds that any party that withdraws from the convention shall be considered as also having left any related protocol.
The UNFCCC has two main protocols: the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015.
Although former US president Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, its formal ratification faced opposition from the Senate and the treaty was ultimately rejected by his successor, president George W Bush, in 2001.
Domestic opposition to the protocol centred around the exclusion of major developing countries, such as China and India, from emissions reduction measures.
The US did ratify the Paris Agreement, but Trump signed an executive order to take the nation out of the pact for a second time on his first resumed day in office in January 2025.
Is it legal for Trump to take the US out of the UNFCCC unilaterally?
Whether Trump can legally pull the US out of the UNFCCC without the consent of the Senate remains unclear.
The US previously left the Paris Agreement during Trump’s first term.
Both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement allow any party to withdraw with a year’s written notice. However, both treaties state that parties cannot withdraw within the first three years of ratification.
As such, the first Trump administration filed notice to exit the Paris Agreement in November 2019 and became the first nation in the world to formally leave a year later – the day after Democrat Joe Biden won the 2020 presidential election.
On his first day in office in 2021, Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement. This took 30 days from notifying the UNFCCC to come into force.
The legalities of leaving the UNFCCC are murkier, due to how it was adopted.
As Michael B Gerrard, director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, explains to Carbon Brief, the Paris Agreement was ratified without Senate approval.
Article 2 of the US Constitution says presidents have the power to make or join treaties subject to the “advice and consent” of the Senate – including a two-thirds majority vote (see below).
However, Barack Obama took the position that, as the Paris Agreement “did not impose binding legal obligations on the US, it was not a treaty that required Senate ratification”, Gerrard tells Carbon Brief.
As noted in a post by Jake Schmidt, a senior strategic director at the environmental NGO Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the US has other mechanisms for entering international agreements. It says the US has joined more than 90% of the international agreements it is party to through different mechanisms.
In contrast, George H Bush did submit the UNFCCC to the Senate in 1992, where it was unanimously ratified by a 92-0 vote, ahead of his signing it into law.
Reversing this is uncertain legal territory. Gerrard tells Carbon Brief:
“There is an open legal question whether a president can unilaterally withdraw the US from a Senate-ratified treaty. A case raising that question reached the US Supreme Court in 1979 (Goldwater vs Carter), but the Supreme Court ruled this was a political question not suitable for the courts.”
Unlike ratifying a treaty, the US Constitution does not explicitly specify whether the consent of the Senate is required to leave one.
This has created legal uncertainty around the process.
Given the lack of clarity on the legal precedent, some have suggested that, in practice, Trump can pull the US out of treaties unilaterally.
Sue Biniaz, former US principal deputy special envoy for climate and a key legal architect of the Paris Agreement, tells Carbon Brief:
“In terms of domestic law, while the Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue (it treated the issue as non-justifiable in the Goldwater v Carter case), it has been US practice, and the mainstream legal view, that the president may constitutionally withdraw unilaterally from a treaty, ie without going back to the Senate.”
Additionally, the potential for Congress to block the withdrawal from the UNFCCC and other treaties is unclear. When asked by Carbon Brief if it could play a role, Biniaz says:
“Theoretically, but politically unlikely, Congress could pass a law prohibiting the president from unilaterally withdrawing from the UNFCCC. (The 2024 NDAA contains such a provision with respect to NATO.) In such case, its constitutionality would likely be the subject of debate.”
How could the US rejoin the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement?
The US would be able to rejoin the UNFCCC in future, but experts disagree on how straightforward the process would be and whether it would require a political vote.
In addition to it being unclear whether a two-thirds “supermajority” vote in the Senate is required to leave a treaty, it is unclear whether rejoining would require a similar vote again – or if the original 1992 Senate consent would still hold.
Citing arguments set out by Prof Jean Galbraith of the University of Pennsylvania law school, Schmidt’s NRDC post says that a future president could rejoin the convention within 90 days of a formal decision, under the merit of the previous Senate approval.
Biniaz tells Carbon Brief that there are “multiple future pathways to rejoining”, adding:
“For example, Prof Jean Galbraith has persuasively laid out the view that the original Senate resolution of advice and consent with respect to the UNFCCC continues in effect and provides the legal authority for a future president to rejoin. Of course, the Senate could also give its advice and consent again. In any case, per Article 23 of the UNFCCC, it would enter into force for the US 90 days after the deposit of its instrument.”
Prof Oona Hathaway, an international law professor at Yale Law School, believes there is a “very strong case that a future president could rejoin the treaty without another Senate vote”.
She tells Carbon Brief that there is precedent for this based on US leaders quitting and rejoining global organisations in the past, explaining:
“The US joined the International Labour Organization in 1934. In 1975, the Ford administration unilaterally withdrew, and in 1980, the Carter administration rejoined without seeking congressional approval.
“Similarly, the US became a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration unilaterally withdrew the US. The Bush administration rejoined UNESCO in 2002, but in 2019 the Trump administration once again withdrew. The Biden administration rejoined in 2023, and the Trump Administration announced its withdrawal again in 2025.”
But this “legal theory” of a future US president specifically re-entering the UNFCCC “based on the prior Senate ratification” has “never been tested in court”, Prof Gerrard from Columbia Law School tells Carbon Brief.
Dr Joanna Depledge, an expert on global climate negotiations and research fellow at the University of Cambridge, tells Carbon Brief:
“Due to the need for Senate ratification of the UNFCCC (in my interpretation), there is no way back now for the US into the climate treaties. But there is nothing to stop a future US president applying [the treaty] rules or – what is more important – adopting aggressive climate policy independently of them.”
If it were required, achieving Senate approval to rejoin the UNFCCC would take a “significant shift in US domestic politics”, public policy professor Thomas Hale from the University of Oxford notes on Bluesky.
Rejoining the Paris Agreement, on the other hand, is a simpler process that the US has already undertaken in recent years. (See: Is it legal for Trump to take the US out of the UNFCCC unilaterally?) Biniaz explains:
“In terms of the Paris Agreement, a party to that agreement must also be a party to the UNFCCC (Article 20). Assuming the US had rejoined the UNFCCC, it could rejoin the Paris Agreement as an executive agreement (as it did in early 2021). The agreement would enter into force for the US 30 days after the deposit of its instrument (Article 21).”
The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, an environmental non-profit, explains that Senate approval was not required for Paris “because it elaborates an existing treaty” – the UNFCCC.
What changes when the US withdraws from the UNFCCC?
US withdrawal from the UNFCCC has been described in media coverage as a “massive hit” to global climate efforts that will “significantly limit” the treaty’s influence.
However, experts tell Carbon Brief that, as the Trump administration has already effectively withdrawn from most international climate activities, this latest move will make little difference.
Moreover, Depledge tells Carbon Brief that the international climate regime “will not collapse” as a result of US withdrawal. She says:
“International climate cooperation will not collapse because the UNFCCC has 195 members rather than 196. In a way, the climate treaties have already done their job. The world is already well advanced on the path to a lower-carbon future. Had the US left 10 years ago, it would have been a serious threat, but not today. China and other renewable energy giants will assert even more dominance.”
Depledge adds that while the “path to net-zero will be longer because of the drastic rollback of domestic climate policy in the US”, it “won’t be reversed”.
Technically, US departure from the UNFCCC would formally release it from certain obligations, including the need to report national emissions.
As the world’s second-largest annual emitter, this is potentially significant.
“The US withdrawal from the UNFCCC undoubtedly impacts on efforts to monitor and report global greenhouse gas emissions,” Dr William Lamb, a senior researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), tells Carbon Brief.
Lamb notes that while scientific bodies, such as the IPCC, often use third-party data, national inventories are still important. The US already failed to report its emissions data last year, in breach of its UNFCCC treaty obligations.
Robbie Andrew, senior researcher at Norwegian climate institute CICERO, says that it will currently be possible for third-party groups to “get pretty close” to the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions estimates previously published by the US administration. However, he adds:
“The further question, though, is whether the EIA [US Energy Information Administration] will continue reporting all of the energy data they currently do. Will the White House decide that reporting flaring is woke? That even reporting coal consumption is an unnecessary burden on business? I suspect the energy sector would be extremely unhappy with changes to the EIA’s reporting, but there’s nothing at the moment that could guarantee anything at all in that regard.”
Andrew says that estimating CO2 emissions from energy is “relatively straightforward when you have detailed energy data”. In contrast, estimating CO2 emissions from agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry, as well as other greenhouse gas emissions, is “far more difficult”.
The US Treasury has also announced that the US will withdraw from the UN’s Green Climate Fund (GCF) and give up its seat on the board, “in alignment” with its departure from the UNFCCC. The Trump administration had already cancelled $4bn of pledged funds for the GCF.
Another specific impact of US departure would be on the UNFCCC secretariat budget, which already faces a significant funding gap. US annual contributions typically make up around 22% of the body’s core budget, which comes from member states.
However, as with emissions data and GCF withdrawal, the Trump administration had previously indicated that the US would stop funding the UNFCCC.
In fact, billionaire and UN special climate envoy Michael Bloomberg has already committed, alongside other philanthropists, to making up the US shortfall.
Veteran French climate negotiator Paul Watkinson tells Carbon Brief:
“In some ways the US has already suspended its participation. It has already stopped paying its budget contributions, it sent no delegation to meetings in 2025. It is not going to do any reporting any longer – although most of that is now under the Paris Agreement. So whether it formally leaves the UNFCCC or not does not change what it is likely to do.”
Dr Joanna Depledge tells Carbon Brief that she agrees:
“This is symbolically and politically huge, but in practice it makes little difference, given that Trump had already announced total disengagement last year.”
The US has a history of either leaving or not joining major environmental treaties and organisations, such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol. (See: What is the process for pulling out of the UNFCCC?)
Dr Jennifer Allan, a global environmental politics researcher at Cardiff University, tells Carbon Brief:
“The US has always been an unreliable partner…Historically speaking, this is kind of more of the same.”
The NRDC’s Jake Schmidt tells Carbon Brief that he doubts US absence will lead to less progress at UN climate negotiations. He adds:
“[The] Trump team would have only messed things up, so not having them participate will probably actually lead to better outcomes.”
However, he acknowledges that “US non-participation over the long-term could be used by climate slow-walking countries as an excuse for inaction”.
Biniaz tells Carbon Brief that the absence of the US is unlikely to unlock reform of the UN climate process – and that it might make negotiations more difficult. She says:
“I don’t see the absence of the US as promoting reform of the COP process. While the US may have had strong views on certain topics, many other parties did as well, and there is unlikely to be agreement among them to move away from the consensus (or near consensus) decision-making process that currently prevails. In fact, the US has historically played quite a significant ‘broker’ role in the negotiations, which might actually make it more difficult for the remaining parties to reach agreement.”
After leaving the UNFCCC, the US would still be able to participate in UN climate talks as an observer, albeit with diminished influence. (It is worth noting that the US did not send a delegation to COP30 last year.)
There is still scope for the US to use its global power and influence to disrupt international climate processes from the outside.
For example, last year, the Trump administration threatened nations and negotiators with tariffs and withdrawn visa rights if they backed an International Maritime Organization (IMO) effort to cut shipping emissions. Ultimately, the measures were delayed due to a lack of consensus.
(Notably, the IMO is among the international bodies that the US has not pledged to leave.)
What about the US withdrawal from the IPCC?
As a scientific body, rather than a treaty, there is no formal mechanism for “withdrawing” from the IPCC. In its own words, the IPCC is an “organisation of governments that are members of the UN or World Meteorological Organization” (WMO).
Therefore, just being part of the UN or WMO means a country is eligible to participate in the IPCC. If a country no longer wishes to play a role in the IPCC, it can simply disengage from its activities – for example, by not attending plenary meetings, nominating authors or providing financial support.
This is exactly what the US government has been doing since last year.
Shortly before the IPCC’s plenary meeting for member governments – known as a “session” – in Hangzhou, China, in March 2025, reports emerged that US officials had been denied permission to attend.
In addition, the contract for the technical support unit for Working Group III (WG3) was terminated by its provider, NASA, which also eliminated the role of chief scientist – the position held by WG3 co-chair Dr Kate Cavlin.
(Each of the IPCC’s three “working groups” has a technical support unit, or TSU, which provides scientific and operational support. These are typically “co-located” between the home countries of a working group’s two co-chairs.)
The Hangzhou session was the first time that the US had missed a plenary since the IPCC was founded in 1988. It then missed another in Lima, Peru, in October 2025.
Although the US government did not nominate any authors for the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7), US scientists were still put forward through other channels. Analysis by Carbon Brief shows that, across the three AR7 working group reports, 55 authors are affiliated with US institutions.
However, while IPCC authors are supported by their institutions – they are volunteers and so are not paid by the IPCC – their travel costs for meetings are typically covered by their country’s government. (For scientists from developing countries, there is financial support centrally from the IPCC.)
Prof Chris Field, co-chair of Working Group II during the IPCC’s fifth assessment (AR5), tells Carbon Brief that a “number of philanthropies have stepped up to facilitate participation by US authors not supported by the US government”.
The US Academic Alliance for the IPCC – a collaboration of US universities and research institutions formed last year to fill the gap left by the government – has been raising funds to support travel.
In a statement reacting to the US withdrawal, IPCC chair Prof Sir Jim Skea said that the panel’s focus remains on preparing the reports for AR7:
“The panel continues to make decisions by consensus among its member governments at its regular plenary sessions. Our attention remains firmly on the delivery of these reports.”
The various reports will be finalised, reviewed and approved in the coming years – a process that can continue without the US. As it stands, the US government will not have a say on the content and wording of these reports.
Field describes the US withdrawal as a “self-inflicted wound to US prestige and leadership” on climate change. He adds:
“I don’t have a crystal ball, but I hope that the US administration’s animosity toward climate change science will lead other countries to support the IPCC even more strongly. The IPCC is a global treasure.”
The University of Edinburgh’s Prof Gabi Hegerl, who has been involved in multiple IPCC reports, tells Carbon Brief:
“The contribution and influence of US scientists is presently reduced, but there are still a lot of enthusiastic scientists out there that contribute in any way they can even against difficult obstacles.”
On Twitter, Prof Jean-Pascal van Ypersele – IPCC vice-chair during AR5 – wrote that the US withdrawal was “deeply regrettable” and that to claim the IPCC’s work is contrary to US interests is “simply nonsensical”. He continued:
“Let us remember that the creation of the IPCC was facilitated in 1988 by an agreement between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who can hardly be described as ‘woke’. Climate and the environment are not a matter of ideology or political affiliation: they concern everyone.”
Van Ypersele added that while the IPCC will “continue its work in the service of all”, other countries “will have to compensate for the budgetary losses”.
The IPCC’s most recent budget figures show that the US did not make a contribution in 2025.
Carbon Brief analysis shows that the US has provided around 30% of all voluntary contributions in the IPCC’s history. Totalling approximately $67m (£50m), this is more than four times that of the next-largest direct contributor, the EU.
However, this is not the first time that the US has withdrawn funding from the IPCC. During Trump’s first term of office, his administration cut its contributions in 2017, with other countries stepping up their funding in response. The US subsequently resumed its contributions.
At its most recent meeting in Lima, Peru, in October 2025, the IPCC warned of an “accelerating decline” in the level of annual voluntary contributions from countries and other organisations, reported the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. As a result, the IPCC invited member countries to increase their donations “if possible”.
What other organisations are affected?
In addition to announcing his plan to withdraw the US from the UNFCCC and the IPCC, Trump also called for the nation’s departure from 16 other organisations related to climate change, biodiversity and clean energy.
These include:
- The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) – the biodiversity equivalent of the IPCC.
- Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development – a voluntary group of more than 80 countries aiming to make the mining sector more sustainable.
- UN Energy – the principal UN organisation for international collaboration on energy.
- UN Oceans – a UN mechanism responsible for overseeing the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and other UN agencies related to ocean and coastal issues.
- UN Water – the UN agency responsible for water and sanitation.
- UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) – a UN collaborative initiative for creating financial incentives for protecting forests.
- International Renewable Energy Agency – an intergovernmental organisation supporting countries in their transition to renewable energy.
- 24/7 Carbon-Free Energy Compact – a UN initiative launched in 2021 pushing governments, companies and organisations to achieve 100% low-carbon electricity generation.
- Commission for Environmental Cooperation – an organisation aimed at conserving North America’s natural environment.
- Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research – an intergovernmental organisation supported by 19 countries in North and South America for the support of planetary change research.
- International Energy Forum – an intergovernmental platform for dialogue among countries, industry and experts.
- International Solar Alliance – an organisation supporting the development of solar power and the phaseout of fossil fuels.
- International Tropical Timber Organization – an organisation aimed at protecting tropical forest resources.
- International Union for Conservation of Nature – an international nature conservation organisation and authority on the state of biodiversity loss.
- Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century – a global policy forum for renewable energy leadership.
- Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme – a regional organisation aimed at protecting the Pacific’s environment.
As well as participating in the work of these organisations, the US is also a key source of funding for many of them – leaving their futures uncertain.
In a letter to members seen by Carbon Brief, IPBES chair and Kenyan ecologist, Dr David Obura, described Trump’s move as “deeply disappointing”.
He said that IPBES “has not yet received any formal notification” from the US, but “anticipates that the intention expressed to withdraw will mean that the US will soon cease to be a member of IPBES”, adding:
“The US is a founding member of IPBES and scientists, policymakers and stakeholders – including Indigenous peoples and local communities – from the US have been among the most engaged contributors to the work of IPBES since its establishment in 2012, making valuable contributions to objective science-based assessments of the state of the planet, for people and nature.
“The contribution of US experts ranges from leading landmark assessment reports, to presiding over negotiations, serving as authors and reviewers, as well as helping to steer the organisation both scientifically and administratively.”
Despite being a party to IPBES until now, the US has never been a signatory to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the nature equivalent of the UNFCCC.
It is one of only two nations not to sign the convention, with the other being the Holy See, representing the Vatican City.
The lack of US representation at the CBD has not prevented countries from reaching agreements. In 2022, countries gathered under the CBD adopted the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, often described as the “Paris Agreement for nature”.
However, some observers have pointed to the lack of US involvement as one of the reasons why biodiversity loss has received less international attention than climate change.
The post Q&A: What Trump’s US exit from UNFCCC and IPCC could mean for climate action appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What Trump’s US exit from UNFCCC and IPCC could mean for climate action
Greenhouse Gases
Analysis: World’s biggest historic polluter – the US – is pulling out of UN climate treaty
The US, which has announced plans to withdraw from the global climate treaty – the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – is more historically responsible for climate change than any other country or group.
Carbon Brief analysis shows that the US has emitted a total of 542bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) since 1850, by burning fossil fuels, cutting down trees and other activities.
This is the largest contribution to the Earth’s warming climate by far, as shown in the figure below, with China’s 336GtCO2 significantly behind in second and Russia in third at 185GtCO2.
The US is responsible for more than a fifth of the 2,651GtCO2 that humans have pumped into the atmosphere between 1850 and 2025 as a result of fossil fuels, cement and land-use change.
China is responsible for another 13%, with the 27 nations of the EU making up another 12%.
In total, these cumulative emissions have used up more than 95% of the carbon budget for limiting global warming to 1.5C and are the predominant reason the Earth is already nearly 1.5C hotter than in pre-industrial times.
The US share of global warming is even more disproportionate when considering that its population of around 350 million people makes up just 4% of the global total.
On the basis of current populations, the US’s per-capita cumulative historical emissions are around 7 times higher than those for China, more than double the EU’s and 25 times those for India.
The US’s historical emissions of 542GtCO2 are larger than the combined total of the 133 countries with the lowest cumulative contributions, a list that includes Saudi Arabia, Spain and Nigeria. Collectively, these 133 countries have a population of more than 3 billion people.
See Carbon Brief’s previous detailed analysis of historical responsibility for climate change for more details on the data sources and methodology, as well as consumption-based emissions.
Additionally, in 2023, Carbon Brief published an article that looked at the “radical” impact of reassigning responsibility for historical emissions to colonial rulers in the past.
This approach has a very limited impact on the US, which became independent before the vast majority of its historical emissions had taken place.
The post Analysis: World’s biggest historic polluter – the US – is pulling out of UN climate treaty appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: World’s biggest historic polluter – the US – is pulling out of UN climate treaty
The Abuse of the Working Class
Looking Ahead to a Deepening Affordability Crisis, an Election and the Threat of an AI Investment Bubble
This Won’t End Well for the Minnesota Shooter
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Greenhouse Gases5 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change5 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change Videos2 years ago
The toxic gas flares fuelling Nigeria’s climate change – BBC News
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval