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China’s historical emissions within its borders have now caused more global warming than the 27 member states of the EU combined, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.

The findings come amid fraught negotiations at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, where negotiators have been invoking the “principle of historical responsibility” in their discussions over who should pay money towards a new goal for climate finance – and how much.

Carbon Brief’s analysis shows that 94% of the global carbon budget for 1.5C has now been used up, as cumulative emissions since 1850 have reached 2,607bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2).

While developed countries have used the majority of this budget, the analysis shows that China’s historical emissions reached 312GtCO2 in 2023, overtaking the EU’s 303GtCO2.

China is still far behind the 532GtCO2 emitted by the US, however, according to the analysis.

Indeed, China is unlikely to ever overtake the US contribution to global warming, based on current policies, committed plans and technology trends in both countries. This is even before accounting for the potential emissions-boosting policies of the incoming Trump presidency.

In addition, China’s 1.4 billion people are each responsible for 227tCO2, a third of the 682tCO2 linked to the EU’s 450 million citizens – and far below the 1,570tCO2 per capita in the US.

The new analysis follows Carbon Brief’s 2021 analysis of historical responsibility, based on emissions taking place within each country’s present-day borders or considering emissions embedded in imports. Further analysis in 2023 assigned responsibility to colonial rulers.

(A table at the end of this article shows which countries have the largest historical emissions according to the full range of metrics, including emissions per person.)

Animated chart shows the cumulative historical emissions of key countries since 1850. Credit: Joe Goodman / Carbon Brief

History matters

Historical CO2 emissions matter for climate change, because there is a finite “carbon budget” that can be released into the atmosphere before a given level of global warming is breached.

For example, in order to limit warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, only around 2,800GtCO2 can be added to the atmosphere, counting all emissions since the pre-industrial period. (This is according to a 2023 study updating figures from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.)

Cumulative emissions since 1850 will reach 2,607CO2 by the end of 2024, according to Carbon Brief’s new analysis, meaning that some 94% of the 1.5C budget will have been used up.

These cumulative historical emissions are directly and proportionally linked to the amount of global warming that has already been seen to date.

Conclusions adopted by countries at the end of the first week at COP29 also make this link, in light of 2024 being on track to be the hottest year on record:

“The [subsidiary body to the UN climate process] SBSTA…expressed utmost concern about the state of the global climate system…with 2024 being on track to be the hottest year on record, which is primarily a result of the long-term warming caused by emissions from pre-industrial times until now.”

In addition, draft text on the new climate finance goal explicitly links responsibility for global warming to finance “burden-sharing arrangements” – meaning who should pay and how much.

In one passage of a draft published on 16 November 2024, there is a reference to the “principle of historical responsibility”. Another passage says that developed-country cumulative emissions should be used as a “proxy for historic responsibility for climate change”. The draft states:

“[D]eveloped country parties shall establish burden-sharing arrangements to enable the delivery of the [new climate finance] goal based on cumulative territorial CO2 emissions…as a proxy for historic responsibility for climate change.”

An alternative option in the draft says that countries should have to contribute to the new climate finance target if they are one of the world’s “top 10 emitters” based on cumulative emissions – and if they have average per-capita incomes above a certain level.

(If agreed, this would mean China, as a top-10 historical emitter, being obliged to contribute to climate finance. However, the draft is not final and is likely to change significantly. Many parts of the draft are enclosed in square brackets, indicating that they are not agreed.)

At the annual UN climate talks, it is also common for developing countries to remind developed nations that they have used up a large share of the world’s carbon budget – and that they should, therefore, be making stronger efforts to cut their emissions.

For example, in the closing plenary of the first week at COP29, Saudi Arabia “lamented depleted carbon budgets…in light of historic cumulative emissions as well as developed countries’ insufficient mitigation efforts”, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

China’s rising contribution

It is true that developed countries have been the leading contributors to historical emissions. This is despite the fact that China now has the world’s highest emissions on an annual basis.

Put another way, developed countries have made a disproportionately large contribution to current global warming, particularly when considering the number of people that live in them.

This is a key reason why the Paris Agreement says they “should continue taking the lead” on cutting their emissions – and why they must provide climate finance for developing nations.

The 1992 UN climate convention (UNFCCC) listed “developed” countries in Annex I, based on membership of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development at the time.

The convention says that the “largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries”.

Indeed, at the time of the convention being agreed in 1992, Annex I countries accounted for 22% of the world’s population and a disproportionately large 61% of historical emissions.

By the end of 2024, however, Annex I countries’ share of cumulative historical emissions will have fallen to 52% of the global total. Carbon Brief’s analysis suggests that developing countries – those outside Annex I – will account for a majority of historical emissions in roughly six years.

China’s rapidly rising contribution to cumulative emissions is a major driver of this shift.

In 1992, China’s historical emissions were around two-fifths (41%) the size of the EU’s. By 2015, when the Paris Agreement was finalised, they were still only four-fifths (80%) of the EU’s total.

By the end of 2023, Carbon Brief’s analysis shows that China’s cumulative emissions (red line in the figure below) had overtaken those from the 27 EU member states (yellow).

EU27 and Chinese cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry,
EU27 and Chinese cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2024, billion tonnes. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from Jones et al (2023), Lamboll et al (2023), the Global Carbon Project, CDIAC, Our World in Data, the International Energy Agency and Carbon Monitor.

Still, it is worth emphasising that China’s emissions remain far behind those of the EU on a per-capita basis.

When weighting historical emissions per head of population in 2024, China’s contribution is just 227tCO2 per capita, less than a third of the 682tCO2 for people in the EU27.

(There are several other ways to measure historical contributions. These include adjustments to account for CO2 embedded in imported goods and services, or shifting responsibility under periods of colonial rule. See the table below to compare countries using different metrics.)

US still most responsible

While China is now the world’s second-largest contributor to historical emissions, ahead of the EU27, it remains far behind the US, as shown in the figure below.

US, EU27 and Chinese cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2024, billion tonnes.
US, EU27 and Chinese cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2024, billion tonnes. Source: Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from Jones et al (2023), Lamboll et al (2023), the Global Carbon Project, CDIAC, Our World in Data, the International Energy Agency and Carbon Monitor.

With cumulative emissions of 537GtCO2 by the end of 2024, the US total is two-thirds higher than China’s and three-quarters above the EU27.

Still, China is closing the gap, given its annual emissions are now roughly double those of the US. This is clear from the slope of the curves in the chart above, where China’s line is rising steeply.

China may never overtake the US

The fact that China’s annual emissions are so much higher than those from the US begs the question of when might it overtake the US, in terms of its cumulative historical total.

A 2023 article in the Washington Post attempted to answer this question, asserting that China would overtake the US in 2050. However, it used implausible projections in which annual emissions from the US, China and Europe remained almost unchanged for decades.

To attempt a more plausible answer, Carbon Brief has used data from the latest International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook, published in October 2024.

Specifically, Carbon Brief looked at how annual emissions in China, the US and EU27 might change under “current policy settings” in the IEA’s “stated policies scenario” (STEPS). This reflects governments’ current and committed plans, as well as the latest energy-price trends.

The dashed lines in the figure below illustrate how the annual emissions of the US, EU and China are each expected to fall steeply under those current policy settings.

US, EU27 and Chinese annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2100, billion tonnes.
US, EU27 and Chinese annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2100, billion tonnes. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from Jones et al (2023), Lamboll et al (2023), the Global Carbon Project, CDIAC, Our World in Data, the International Energy Agency, Carbon Monitor and IEA World Energy Outlook 2024. The IEA outlook ends in 2050. Emissions beyond 2050 are based on a continuation of the trend since 2040.

Adding these annual emissions outlooks to the historical totals up to this year suggests that China may never overtake the US in terms of its cumulative emissions, as shown in the figure below.

Emissions outlooks are by their nature uncertain. For example, China’s emissions might fail to fall as fast as the IEA expects – or the US might go faster than expected.
On the other hand, the impact of the incoming Trump presidency rolling back climate rules and aiming to “drill baby, drill” would make it even less likely that China would ever overtake the US.

US, EU27 and Chinese cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2100, billion tonnes.
US, EU27 and Chinese cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2100, billion tonnes. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from Jones et al (2023), Lamboll et al (2023), the Global Carbon Project, CDIAC, Our World in Data, the International Energy Agency, Carbon Monitor and IEA World Energy Outlook 2024. The IEA outlook ends in 2050. Annual emissions beyond 2050 are based on a continuation of the trend since 2040.

Whether or not China overtakes the US in terms of its historical emissions, it is unlikely to escape pressure to contribute to global flows of climate finance.

At COP29, Ding Xuexiang, Chinese president Xi Jinping’s “special representative” and the nation’s executive vice-premier, notably used the UN language of climate finance to describe Chinese overseas aid for the first time. However, China has insisted that it will only provide such finance voluntarily.

About the data

This analysis is based on historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, cement production, land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), during the period 1850-2024.

The approach mirrors the methodology used for Carbon Brief’s analysis of historical responsibility according to emissions within national borders, and when considering colonial rule.

Those articles explain how it is possible to confidently estimate emissions that took place more than 100 years ago, how the analysis deals with changes in national borders, how emissions from land use can be estimated and why the analysis only starts in 1850.

As those articles illustrated, there are many different lenses through which historical responsibility for climate change can be viewed, each offering an alternative viewpoint on the world.

The table below, which is sortable and searchable, shows a selection of the different ways that historical responsibility can be carved up.

It lists countries according to population, historical emissions within their own borders, emissions after accounting for colonial responsibility and the impact of CO2 embedded in trade since 1990.

The table also shows two alternative per capita metrics. The first shows cumulative territorial emissions for each country, divided by its population in 2024. The second shows per-capita territorial emissions in each year, cumulatively added up through to the present day.

(Note that the table excludes countries with a population of less than 1 million people.)

This data is free to use under the terms of Carbon Brief’s CC licence. The licence applies to non-commercial use and requires a credit to “Carbon Brief” and a link to this article.

The post Analysis: China’s emissions have now caused more global warming than EU appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: China’s emissions have now caused more global warming than EU

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What Is the Economic Impact of Data Centers? It’s a Secret.

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N.C. Gov. Josh Stein wants state lawmakers to rethink tax breaks for data centers. The industry’s opacity makes it difficult to evaluate costs and benefits.

Tax breaks for data centers in North Carolina keep as much as $57 million each year into from state and local government coffers, state figures show, an amount that could balloon to billions of dollars if all the proposed projects are built.

What Is the Economic Impact of Data Centers? It’s a Secret.

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GEF raises $3.9bn ahead of funding deadline, $1bn below previous budget

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The Global Environment Facility (GEF), a multilateral fund that provides climate and nature finance to developing countries, has raised $3.9 billion from donor governments in its last pledging session ahead of a key fundraising deadline at the end of May.

The amount, which is meant to cover the fund’s activities for the next four years (July 2026-June 2030), falls significantly short of the previous four-year cycle for which the GEF managed to raise $5.3bn from governments. Since then, military and other political priorities have squeezed rich nations’ budgets for climate and development aid.

The facility said in a statement that it expects more pledges ahead of the final replenishment package, which is set for approval at the next GEF Council meeting from May 31 to June 3.

Claude Gascon, interim CEO of the GEF, said that “donor countries have risen to the challenge and made bold commitments towards a more positive future for the planet”. He added that the pledges send a message that “the world is not giving up on nature even in a time of competing priorities”.

    Donors under pressure

    But Brian O’Donnell, director of the environmental non-profit Campaign for Nature, said the announcement shows “an alarming trend” of donor governments cutting public finance for climate and nature.

    “Wealthy nations pledged to increase international nature finance, and yet we are seeing cuts and lower contributions. Investing in nature prevents extinctions and supports livelihoods, security, health, food, clean water and climate,” he said. “Failing to safeguard nature now will result in much larger costs later.”

    At COP29 in Baku, developed countries pledged to mobilise $300bn a year in public climate finance by 2035, while at UN biodiversity talks they have also pledged to raise $30bn per year by 2030. Yet several wealthy governments have announced cuts to green finance to increase defense spending, among them most recently the UK.

    As for the US, despite Trump’s cuts to international climate finance, Congress approved a $150 million increase in its contribution to the GEF after what was described as the organisation’s “refocus on non-climate priorities like biodiversity, plastics and ocean ecosystems, per US Treasury guidance”.

    The facility will only reveal how much each country has pledged when its assembly of 186 member countries meets in early June. The last period’s largest donors were Germany ($575 million), Japan ($451 million), and the US ($425 million).

    The GEF has also gone through a change in leadership halfway through its fundraising cycle. Last December, the GEF Council asked former CEO Carlos Manuel Rodriguez to step down effective immediately and appointed Gascon as interim CEO.

    Santa Marta conference: fossil fuel transition in an unstable world

    New guidelines

    As part of the upcoming funding cycle, the GEF has approved a set of guidelines for spending the $3.9bn raised so far, which include allocating 35% of resources for least developed countries and small island states, as well as 20% of the money going to Indigenous people and communities.

    Its programs will help countries shift five key systems – nature, food, urban, energy and health – from models that drive degradation to alternatives that protect the planet and support human well-being by integrating the value of nature into production and consumption systems.

    The new priorities also include a target to allocate 25% of the GEF’s budget for mobilising private funds through blended finance. This aligns with efforts by wealthy countries to increase contributions from the private sector to international climate finance.

    Niels Annen, Germany’s State Secretary for Economic Cooperation and Development, said in a statement that the country’s priorities are “very well reflected” in the GEF’s new spending guidelines, including on “innovative finance for nature and people, better cooperation with the private sector, and stable resources for the most vulnerable countries”.

    Aliou Mustafa, of the GEF Indigenous Peoples Advisory Group (IPAG), also welcomed the announcement, adding that “the GEF is strengthening trust and meaningful partnerships with Indigenous Peoples and local communities” by placing them at the “centre of decision-making”.

    The post GEF raises $3.9bn ahead of funding deadline, $1bn below previous budget appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    Marine heatwaves ‘nearly double’ the economic damage caused by tropical cyclones

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    Tropical cyclones that rapidly intensify when passing over marine heatwaves can become “supercharged”, increasing the likelihood of high economic losses, a new study finds.

    Such storms also have higher rates of rainfall and higher maximum windspeeds, according to the research.

    The study, published in Science Advances, looks at the economic damages caused by nearly 800 tropical cyclones that occurred around the world between 1981 and 2023.

    It finds that rapidly intensifying tropical cyclones that pass near abnormally warm parts of the ocean produce nearly double – 93% – the economic damages as storms that do not, even when levels of coastal development are taken into account.

    One researcher, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the new analysis is a “step forward in understanding how we can better refine our predictions of what might happen in the future” in an increasingly warm world.

    As marine heatwaves are projected to become more frequent under future climate change, the authors say that the interactions between storms and these heatwaves “should be given greater consideration in future strategies for climate adaptation and climate preparedness”.

    ‘Rapid intensification’

    Tropical cyclones are rapidly rotating storm systems that form over warm ocean waters, characterised by low pressure at their cores and sustained winds that can reach more than 120 kilometres per hour.

    The term “tropical cyclones” encompasses hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons, which are named as such depending on which ocean basin they occur in.

    When they make landfall, these storms can cause major damage. They accounted for six of the top 10 disasters between 1900 and 2024 in terms of economic loss, according to the insurance company Aon’s 2025 climate catastrophe insight report.

    These economic losses are largely caused by high wind speeds, large amounts of rainfall and damaging storm surges.

    Storms can become particularly dangerous through a process called “rapid intensification”.

    Rapid intensification is when a storm strengthens considerably in a short period of time. It is defined as an increase in sustained wind speed of at least 30 knots (around 55 kilometres per hour) in a 24-hour period.

    There are several factors that can lead to rapid intensification, including warm ocean temperatures, high humidity and low vertical “wind shear” – meaning that the wind speeds higher up in the atmosphere are very similar to the wind speeds near the surface.

    Rapid intensification has become more common since the 1980s and is projected to become even more frequent in the future with continued warming. (Although there is uncertainty as to how climate change will impact the frequency of tropical cyclones, the increase in strength and intensification is more clear.)

    Marine heatwaves are another type of extreme event that are becoming more frequent due to recent warming. Like their atmospheric counterparts, marine heatwaves are periods of abnormally high ocean temperatures.

    Previous research has shown that these marine heatwaves can contribute to a cyclone undergoing rapid intensification. This is because the warm ocean water acts as a “fuel” for a storm, says Dr Hamed Moftakhari, an associate professor of civil engineering at the University of Alabama who was one of the authors of the new study. He explains:

    “The entire strength of the tropical cyclone [depends on] how hot the [ocean] surface is. Marine heatwave means we have an abundance of hot water that is like a gas [petrol] station. As you move over that, it’s going to supercharge you.”

    However, the authors say, there is no global assessment of how rapid intensification and marine heatwaves interact – or how they contribute to economic damages.

    Using the International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS) – a database of tropical cyclone paths and intensities – the researchers identify 1,600 storms that made landfall during the 1981-2023 period, out of a total of 3,464 events.

    Of these 1,600 storms, they were able to match 789 individual, land-falling cyclones with economic loss data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) and other official sources.

    Then, using the IBTrACS storm data and ocean-temperature data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, the researchers classify each cyclone by whether or not it underwent rapid intensification and if it passed near a recent marine heatwave event before making landfall.

    The researchers find that there is a “modest” rise in the number of marine heatwave-influenced tropical cyclones globally since 1981, but with significant regional variations. In particular, they say, there are “clear” upward trends in the north Atlantic Ocean, the north Indian Ocean and the northern hemisphere basin of the eastern Pacific Ocean.

    ‘Storm characteristics’

    The researchers find substantial differences in the characteristics of tropical cyclones that experience rapid intensification and those that do not, as well as between rapidly intensifying storms that occur with marine heatwaves and those that occur without them.

    For example, tropical cyclones that do not experience rapid intensification have, on average, maximum wind speeds of around 40 knots (74km/hr), whereas storms that rapidly intensify have an average maximum wind speed of nearly 80 knots (148km/hr).

    Of the rapidly intensifying storms, those that are influenced by marine heatwaves maintain higher wind speeds during the days leading up to landfall.

    Although the wind speeds are very similar between the two groups once the storms make landfall, the pre-landfall difference still has an impact on a storm’s destructiveness, says Dr Soheil Radfar, a hurricane-hazard modeller at Princeton University. Radfar, who is the lead author of the new study, tells Carbon Brief:

    “Hurricane damage starts days before the landfall…Four or five days before a hurricane making landfall, we expect to have high wind speeds and, because of that high wind speed, we expect to have storm surges that impact coastal communities.”

    They also find that rapidly intensifying storms have higher peak rainfall than non-rapidly intensifying storms, with marine heatwave-influenced, rapidly intensifying storms exhibiting the highest average rainfall at landfall.

    The charts below show the mean sustained wind speed in knots (top) and the mean rainfall in millimetres per hour (bottom) for the tropical cyclones analysed in the study in the five days leading up to and two days following a storm making landfall.

    The four lines show storms that: rapidly intensified with the influence of marine heatwaves (red); those that rapidly intensified without marine heatwaves (purple); those that experienced marine heatwaves, but did not rapidly intensify (orange); and those that neither rapidly intensified nor experienced a marine heatwave (blue).

    Average maximum sustained wind speed (top) and rate of rainfall (bottom) for tropical cyclones in the period leading up to and following landfall. Storms are categorised as: rapidly intensifying with marine heatwaves (red); rapidly intensifying without marine heatwaves (purple); not rapidly intensifying with marine heatwaves (orange); and not rapidly intensifying, without marine heatwaves (blue). Source: Radfar et al. (2026)
    Average maximum sustained wind speed (top) and rate of rainfall (bottom) for tropical cyclones in the period leading up to and following landfall. Storms are categorised as: rapidly intensifying with marine heatwaves (red); rapidly intensifying without marine heatwaves (purple); not rapidly intensifying with marine heatwaves (orange); and not rapidly intensifying, without marine heatwaves (blue). Source: Radfar et al. (2026)

    Dr Daneeja Mawren, an ocean and climate consultant at the Mauritius-based Mascarene Environmental Consulting who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the new study “helps clarify how marine heatwaves amplify storm characteristics”, such as stronger winds and heavier rainfall. She notes that this “has not been done on a global scale before”.

    However, Mawren adds that other factors not considered in the analysis can “make a huge difference” in the rapid intensification of tropical cyclones, including subsurface marine heatwaves and eddies – circular, spinning ocean currents that can trap warm water.

    Dr Jonathan Lin, an atmospheric scientist at Cornell University who was also not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that, while the intensification found by the study “makes physical sense”, it is inherently limited by the relatively small number of storms that occur. He adds:

    “There’s not that many storms, to tease out the physical mechanisms and observational data. So being able to reproduce this kind of work in a physical model would be really important.”

    Economic costs

    Storm intensity is not the only factor that determines how destructive a given cyclone can be – the economic damages also depend strongly on the population density and the amount of infrastructure development where a storm hits. The study explains:

    “A high storm surge in a sparsely populated area may cause less economic damage than a smaller surge in a densely populated, economically important region.”

    To account for the differences in development, the researchers use a type of data called “built-up volume”, from the Global Human Settlement Layer. Built-up volume is a quantity derived from satellite data and other high-resolution imagery that combines measurements of building area and average building height in a given area. This can be used as a proxy for the level of development, the authors explain.

    By comparing different cyclones that impacted areas with similar built-up volumes, the researchers can analyse how rapid intensification and marine heatwaves contribute to the overall economic damages of a storm.

    They find that, even when controlling for levels of coastal development, storms that pass through a marine heatwave during their rapid intensification cause 93% higher economic damages than storms that do not.

    They identify 71 marine heatwave-influenced storms that cause more than $1bn (inflation-adjusted across the dataset) in damages, compared to 45 storms that cause those levels of damage without the influence of marine heatwaves.

    This quantification of the cyclones’ economic impact is one of the study’s most “important contributions”, says Mawren.

    The authors also note that the continued development in coastal regions may increase the likelihood of tropical cyclone damages over time.

    Towards forecasting

    The study notes that the increased damages caused by marine heatwave-influenced tropical cyclones, along with the projected increases in marine heatwaves, means such storms “should be given greater consideration” in planning for future climate change.

    For Radfar and Moftakhari, the new study emphasises the importance of understanding the interactions between extreme events, such as tropical cyclones and marine heatwaves.

    Moftakhari notes that extreme events in the future are expected to become both more intense and more complex. This becomes a problem for climate resilience because “we basically design in the future based on what we’ve observed in the past”, he says. This may lead to underestimating potential hazards, he adds.

    Mawren agrees, telling Carbon Brief that, in order to “fully capture the intensification potential”, future forecasts and risk assessments must account for marine heatwaves and other ocean phenomena, such as subsurface heat.

    Lin adds that the actions needed to reduce storm damages “take on the order of decades to do right”. He tells Carbon Brief:

    “All these [planning] decisions have to come by understanding the future uncertainty and so this research is a step forward in understanding how we can better refine our predictions of what might happen in the future.”

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