China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions grew by 2% in the first quarter of 2026, after a rise in the amount of “wasted” wind and solar power.
The country used more coal and gas to generate electricity than in the same quarter a year earlier, despite a record amount of new wind and solar capacity being built.
While the strait of Hormuz crisis has boosted China’s focus on energy security – including through clean energy and electrification – its electricity system is failing to keep up.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, while China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry increased in the first part of 2026, they remain below the peak in early 2024.
Other key findings for the first quarter of 2026 include:
- There was a 23% year-on-year rise in wind-power capacity and 33% for solar.
- There was also a sharp rise in the amount of wind and solar output being “wasted”, as it was not accommodated by the current electricity system.
- As a result, emissions in the power sector increased by 4% year-on-year.
- Power-sector CO2 would have been flat without the rise in “wasted” wind and solar.
- Emissions in other sectors of the economy grew by 1%.
The key reason for “wasted” wind and solar generation was the inflexible management of coal power plants and power grids, not a lack of grid infrastructure.
In the first quarter of 2026, China’s energy system also began to adjust to the surge in oil and gas prices due to the blockade of the strait of Hormuz.
This continued through April and May, with sharp reductions in oil imports and oil-based chemicals production, as well as the share of gas in electricity generation.
However, the inability to make full use of new wind and solar power plants left China more exposed to the closure of the strait of Hormuz, by increasing the need for other fuels.
This exposure could become more acute if the “super El Niño” that is forecast for later this year limits the electricity output of hydropower, while fossil-fuel supplies remain tight.
Nevertheless, the Hormuz crisis could result in China following a lower-CO2 trajectory than previously expected, if key policies in its 15th five-year plan are fully implemented.
Emissions plateau continues
Recent analysis for Carbon Brief showed that China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry had been “flat or falling” for nearly two years.
The latest analysis points to a rise of 2% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, as shown in the figure below. For now, however, emissions remain below the peak in March 2024.
In previous quarters, emissions had fallen in almost every sector of the economy, with the exception of the coal-based chemicals industry.
The latest quarter saw more widespread increases, with the power sector by far the largest source of emissions growth, as shown in the figure below.
Emissions from other sectors were relatively stable in aggregate, with some rising and others continuing to decline.
Coal consumption in the chemical industry continued strong growth, increasing by 20%, but showed no change in trend after the closure of the strait of Hormuz and surge in oil prices.
(This is contrary to some commentary arguing that the closure of the strait of Hormuz has resulted in a marked increase in the output of China’s coal-chemicals industry.)
The apparent consumption of oil products rebounded in January-February, driven by transportation, but declined slightly in March as oil prices surged.
Emissions from the cement and steel industries continued to fall, as real estate investment contracted another 11% in the first quarter of 2026, following a 17% reduction in 2025. Cement production fell 7% and crude steel output by 5%.
‘Wasted’ wind and solar power
After falling in 2025, power generation from coal and gas increased by 4% in the first quarter of the year.
Power demand grew at 5.2% and hydropower generation increased 9%. Under these circumstances, the record growth in solar and wind power capacity in 2025 should have covered demand growth and pushed fossil-power generation down.
The trend was accentuated in March, as power demand grew just 3.5%, hydropower output increased 9% and yet fossil-power generation increased 4.2%.
The reason for fossil-power generation growth was a sharp drop in the electricity output per unit of installed capacity for both solar and wind power, known as the “capacity factor”.
If capacity factors were stable, the increased solar and wind capacity would have been expected to result in 160 terawatt hours (TWh) of additional clean-power generation during the first quarter, compared with the same time last year, with nuclear and hydro bringing the total to 170TWh. This would have comfortably exceeded the 120TWh increase in power demand.
However, the actual increase in clean-power generation was just 60TWh, with wind showing almost no growth.
While wind power capacity grew by 23% from the first quarter of 2025 to the same period in 2026, an increase of 120GW, the average capacity factor fell from 27% to 22%, a reduction of 18%. This implies that power generation from wind only grew 1% year-on-year. In the case of solar, capacity grew by 33%, but the average capacity factor fell by 11%, resulting in 18% growth in solar-power generation.
It is normal for solar and especially wind capacity factors to vary year-to-year due to weather conditions, but the fall this year was an extension of a longer trend. The average capacity factors of solar and wind have fallen by 19% and 10%, respectively, from 2022 to 2025.
A quarter of the fall in capacity factors over the three-year period is explained by the increase in reported curtailment. This refers to the amount of electricity that is effectively “wasted”, or curtailed, because it cannot be accommodated by the power network.
Nor can the remainder of the fall in capacity factors be explained by the change in weather conditions, as both wind and solar conditions improved on a national-average basis from 2022 to 2025.
In the first quarter of 2026, approximately half of the drop in wind capacity factor and a quarter of the drop in solar capacity factor was explained by weather conditions, implying that the rest is due to increased curtailment resulting from inadequate grid management and integration.
One clear symptom of increased curtailment is that in January-February, both solar and wind conditions were actually better than last year, but capacity factors still fell.
The fact that capacity factors have fallen significantly more than would be expected based on reported curtailment and weather conditions indicates that a lot of curtailment goes unreported, either because it is excluded from the statistical definition, or because there are gaps in reporting.
Market participants have long noted that actual curtailment is much higher than reported in official statistics.
Official data on curtailment only includes “system reasons”, while excluding some lost generation linked to market trading, grid-connection conditions and other “special” causes.
The figure below shows actual electricity generation from wind and solar plants (dark blue), the amount that would have been generated if reported curtailment had not taken place (light blue) and the level expected if the rate of curtailment had stayed the same (mid-blue).
In total, wind and solar could have generated an extra 170TWh of electricity in the first quarter of 2026, if the rate of curtailment had not gone up in the preceding years. This is more than the total power generation of France over the same period.
The largest reductions in capacity factors, after controlling for variations in weather conditions, came from Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Liaoning. In these northern provinces, the heating season is a challenging time for grid managers due to inflexible operation of plants that provide both heat and power.
More broadly, the key reason for curtailment is inflexible grid management. Flexible operation of coal and gas-fired power plants could very substantially increase the amount of solar and wind power the grid can accommodate.
Yet currently, coal-fired power generation is largely operated via medium- and long-term contracts to supply fixed amounts of electricity at fixed prices, meaning there is no incentive for adjustments in output to make space for solar and wind.
Similarly, electricity trading between provinces is predominantly contracted annually, preventing the variable output of solar and wind from being transmitted between jurisdictions in real time.
These issues have a clear impact on the amount of wind and solar that is curtailed. For example, power-system modeling carried out for the year 2023 indicates that flexible power-grid operation would have essentially eliminated the need for curtailment.
The government has also recognised solar and wind curtailment as one of the central challenges of the energy transition.
Recent policies have called for increased inter-province trading and improved flexibility of coal-power plants as the solutions, implicitly recognising these as key issues to address.
Recent large increases in storage capacity, including pumped hydro and batteries, should have improved the integration of wind and solar into the grid. But there is a lack of incentives for storage operators that limits the benefits the system can derive from the technology.
The government has implicitly recognised this and called for establishing electricity pricing that enables energy storage to “participate fairly”.
Meanwhile, China’s new renewable-pricing rules, which shifted existing solar and wind plants to selling electricity on the market, rather than being compensated directly by the grid operator, does not seem to have reduced curtailment so far.
Most provinces only finalised their plans for implementing the policy in late 2025, which left little time for the market and operators to adapt.
China is aiming to build a “new type power system”, capable of integrating large amounts of wind and solar into the grid by 2027. In the meantime, the government has also called for “reasonably pacing” utility-scale “new energy” capacity additions to match the pace at which provinces think they are able to improve the “regulation capacity” of their grids.
How the Hormuz crisis is affecting China’s energy sector
China’s energy system has started, since March, to adjust to the surge in oil and gas prices triggered by the closure of the strait of Hormuz. There have been sharp reductions in oil imports, the share of gas in thermal power generation and in oil-based chemical production.
The consumption of gas fell overall in March, even as consumption in the power sector increased. The power sector fuel mix shifted from gas to coal, but the increase in overall thermal power generation still pushed gas use up in the sector.
High gas prices had already been straining household finances before the current crisis. Millions of households were shifted from coal stoves to gas-based heating as a part of efforts to tackle air pollution during the past decade. However, the gas-price subsidies created to enable this shift have expired in recent years, leading to a rise in heating bills.
China’s oil imports started falling sharply immediately after oil prices surged, with net imports falling even further as exports were restricted. The fall has continued into May, with shipments falling by over 40% year-on-year in the first three weeks of the month.
In the first quarter of the year, state-owned oil major Sinopec reported oil product sales up 4.8%. Apparent consumption of oil products had increased 5.5% in January-February, but fell -0.3% in March, indicating an early impact of the price surge, although the late timing of the Chinese New Year also had an effect.
Electric vehicles have continued to gain market share in 2026, reaching 53% of vehicle sales in April, up from 47% a year ago.
Electricity demand for EV charging grew over 50% year-on-year in March. The large number of plug-in hybrid vehicles on the road means that drivers can switch from petrol to power quickly when there is more of an incentive to do so.
Moreover, 24% of highway trips during the 1 May holiday were made by EVs, even though they only make up 15% of all registered cars. This shows that EVs tend to be driven more than average, making a bigger dent in oil use than their share in the fleet would suggest.
Crude oil processing volumes fell by 2% in March and 6% in April, after growth in January-February. Plastics output growth moderated in March and turned into a decline in April.
The increase in oil prices has boosted the profitability of the highly carbon-intensive coal-to-chemicals industry. There has also been speculation that the industry would have forcefully increased output in response to the Hormuz crisis, enabling China to cut back on oil use. The industry was, however, already operating at high capacity utilisation before the current crisis, reported at an average of 87% in the first half of 2025. This means there was little headroom in the sector to raise output in the short term.
Coal use in the chemical industry increased 19% in January-February and 22% in March, showing a rapidly rising trend, but no step change after the start of the crisis.
The global fossil-fuel crisis is also affecting China’s clean-energy industry through overseas demand. Exports of solar, batteries and EVs recorded 56% growth year-on-year in the first quarter, reaching $55bn. This increase was partially driven by front-loading of shipments ahead of changes to tax rebates to solar and battery exports at the end of March, but the value of exports also grew 38% in April, an indication of strong underlying demand.
Implications of the crisis for China’s transition
The oil-and-gas crisis represents an opportunity for both clean energy and coal. The economics of electrification and clean-energy production, as well as of domestic coal production, have improved dramatically as imported fossil fuels have become more expensive.
At least as importantly, the closure of the strait of Hormuz and the resulting global fossil-fuel crisis closely mirror Chinese policymakers’ long-standing concern about reliance on seaborne fossil fuels. This is likely to reinforce their focus on energy security.
The previous fossil-fuel crisis, in 2021-2022, led to a new wave of coal-power plants, coal mines and coal-to-chemicals plants being built in China.
This time around, any expansion in coal mining is expected to be limited, both by the government’s “anti-involution” drive, which aims to stem harmful price competition, as well as by the carbon constraints in China’s climate goals.
Domestic coal production fell in the first four months of the year, despite a rise in oil and gas as well as coal prices. Rising coal prices will reduce the profitability of coal-fired power generation, at least for the next few months.
The perceived need for further new coal-power projects is also limited by the fact that, after record additions in 2025, there was still another 206GW of coal-fired capacity under construction in January, due to large volumes of permitting during the previous five years.
The energy regulator recently called on provinces to “strictly limit” the addition of new coal-power plants and other “regulating” power capacity in areas with sufficient firm capacity.
There is also a ceiling on the upside for coal in the current crisis, because gas plays a limited role in China’s energy system. This leaves little space for replacing gas with coal.
The exception is the coal-to-chemicals industry, which can replace oil and gas, albeit at the cost of very high carbon emissions. As a result, investment in the industry will likely get a further boost, even though the economic incentive is lower than it may seem.
While crude oil prices for delivery this summer have increased by more than $40 per barrel since the start of the year, 2030 prices are only up $5. This is a more relevant benchmark, given that a new coal-to-chemicals plant will take several years to build and commission.
The coal-to-chemicals expansion will also be limited by the new system to control carbon emissions. In particular, the requirement for local governments to compensate for carbon emissions from new industrial projects by closing down existing capacity, if these controls are implemented effectively.
Since the previous fossil-fuel crisis, the concept of energy security has become broader, encompassing clean energy and electrification, rather than being limited to coal and fossil fuels. This shift is also clear from how state media has been covering energy security in the wake of the war on Iran.
As such, the oil-and-gas crunch is likely to speed up the electrification of transportation and buildings. It also strengthens the case for “green fuels”, referring to green hydrogen and synthetic gaseous and liquid fuels produced from it, which are an important priority in the new five-year plan.
Solar and wind also become more attractive, economically and politically, as a result of the crisis. The upside may be limited by the dominant narrative that they have grown faster than the grid can manage, rather than being limited by institutional constraints. Nevertheless, they will benefit from fossil fuels – including coal – becoming more expensive and volatile.
Still, curtailment has become a key issue affecting the pace of China’s energy transition. It both reduces the immediate benefits of clean energy and undermines further investment in clean capacity, by increasing investment risks and cutting into returns.
The flipside of the current rise in curtailment is that when the installed wind, solar and energy storage capacity is put to full use, the supply of clean energy will increase substantially.
As noted, a key priority for the government in the next few years is to build a “new type of power system”, capable of integrating large amounts of variable renewable capacity.
The balance between how much the current crisis benefits coal or clean energy will depend on implementation of key climate and energy provisions in the 15th five-year plan.
If power-system reforms that benefit solar, wind and storage are implemented, while carbon-emission controls limit the expansion of coal-to-chemicals, then China is likely to follow a lower-CO2 emission trajectory than expected before the crisis.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.
Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.
Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted.
Estimated non-energy use of fossil fuels is subtracted from total chemical industry fossil fuel consumption, and process emissions are calculated based on fossil fuel consumption with carbon retained in products subtracted. Emissions from the incineration of plastics are based on a peer-reviewed estimate of plastics incineration in 2022, combined with growth rates in the overall power generation from waste-to-energy plants. Metals industry process emissions are calculated using industrial output data and IPCC default emission factors.
Reported curtailment, and capacity utilisation in the absence of reported curtailment, is calculated as the complement of the “offtake rates” (利用率) reported by National New Energy Consumption Monitoring and Early Warning Center monthly by province for solar and wind.
Total curtailment is estimated by comparing solar and wind capacity utilisation predicted based on weather conditions, and in the absence of curtailment, to reported utilisation. Utilisation is predicted by fitting regression models to reported monthly utilisation and weather conditions in 2020-2023.
Weather data used for predicting utilisation are hourly wind speed, temperature, solar irradiation and humidity at solar and wind power plant locations in each province from NASA Power and CFSv2. Locations are taken from Global Energy Monitor data.
The post Analysis: China’s CO2 climbs 2% in early 2026 due to ‘wasted’ wind and solar appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: China’s CO2 climbs 2% in early 2026 due to ‘wasted’ wind and solar
Christopher Wright is the principal analyst at CarbonBridge, a decarbonisation consulting firm.
Less than two months ago, Colombia hosted the world’s first international conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels. This weekend, however, it appears that Colombia’s first ever leftist presidency has ended. Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, who was last week strongly endorsed by Donald Trump, will not only take the reins of government but also steer the future of Colombia’s energy transition.
As the world’s sixth-largest coal exporter, and fourth largest oil exporter in Latin America, Colombia plays a critical role in the world’s energy markets. However, this role had shrunk under President Gustavo Petro’s administration, as it sought to proactively shift the country away from its fossil-fuel based economy, ahead of a potential oil and gas production shortage over the next decade.
That could all change as De la Espriella’s takes power. Calling himself the Tiger (“El Tigre”), he has promised to focus on deregulation, exploit oil extraction “to the maximum” and leverage the energy sector as a key “engine of growth”.
Colombia’s world-leading energy transition
Over the last four years, Colombia has embarked on one of the most rapid and holistic energy transitions anywhere in the world. Shortly after coming to power in 2022, the government of Gustavo Petro halted new oil and gas exploration contracts, suspended all hydraulic fracking pilots, and pledged to end the development of new unabated coal power plants.
While many of these moves faced domestic and legislative challenges, they were widely praised in climate circles around the world.
Colombia soon became a pivotal member of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Alliance. It then went on to host the biodiversity COP in 2024, launch a $40-billion climate transition investment portfolio, and famously, host the Santa Marta conference earlier this year.
While fossil fuels still comprise around 7% of Colombia’s GDP and 56% of its total exports, there were already signs that the transition policies had begun to have an effect.
Coal production last year fell to its lowest level in the last 22 years. According to the Colombian national association of coal producers, coal export volumes declined by 23% in 2025. While the oil sector has not seen an equivalent precipitous drop, production levels have remained historically low since COVID.
What about its domestic electricity sector?
Since the 1970s Colombia’s electricity sector has been dominated by large hydro-electric dams, endowing it with some of the lowest carbon electrons anywhere in the world. Today, close to 70% of its electricity supply comes from these large dams.
However, electricity demand rose by close to 10% under the Petro government. To meet this demand, total installed electricity capacity has expanded by a similar figure, and solar power has made up over 70% of new electricity capacity since.
As a result, by the end of 2025, gas power generation in the electricity sector had hit its lowest point since 2018. Wind power had doubled, and solar power generation had risen by over 630%. Colombia’s renewable energy association predicts that, by the end of 2026, the country may be home to more than 4.2 GW of installed variable renewable energy capacity.
Far-right jumps on energy challenges
Despite the progress, the last three years have been an incredibly challenging period for Colombia’s energy sector.
During Petro’s first two years in office, inflation remained above 10%, and interest rates stayed above 13% for most of 2023. This put a pause on new energy investments, as foreign direct investment fell by a third since 2022.
On top of this, Colombia suffered through an El Niño-fuelled drought in 2023-24, crippling its hydro-electric power supply. This forced the country to turn to expensive gas and coal power, just as both sectors had effectively begun to pull back. This sent electricity prices through the roof, increasing nearly 40% in a single year, and led the Petro government to intervene with price controls, aiming to protect everyday Colombians.
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COP31 presidency ‘open’ to reflecting Santa Marta in UN climate process, ministers say
The two co-hosts want the gathering of over 60 governments in Colombia to be reflected in the official UNFCCC climate process
Unsurprisingly, this made energy investors even more cautious. By the end of 2023, GDP growth had plummeted and renewable energy investments fell by 70%. Since then, all the major credit agencies have downgraded the country’s credit rating, making it even shakier to invest.
As a result, even with the new solar coming online, and 1.2 GW of additional hydro-power from the Ituango dam expected by 2028, the country could still face a major energy deficit by 2027, with permitting delays halting project developments, and 5.1 GW of approved projects unable to reach financial close.
Challenging domestic debate
This has led to a challenging domestic debate on energy policy. While 96% of Colombians want to see solar expand further, they have been understandably frustrated by high electricity bills and limited economic growth.
As a result, De la Espriella’s campaign, which has largely focused on taking a hardline stance to combat growing concerns around security and crime, was relatively open to solar power, but sought to blame Colombia’s current energy crisis on the speed of its current energy transition.
Branding himself as neither a climate denialist nor “dogmatic environmentalist” the incoming president who will take office in August, will likely seek to revoke the ban on new hydrocarbon exploration contracts, legalise fracking and restructure the national oil company, Ecopetrol.
While he is unlikely to cancel market-driven projects and may reduce regulatory hold-ups, it is also likely that he will shift away from the government’s recent overwhelming support for long-renewable energy and battery storage projects, which have driven much of the recent uptake in solar power.
Future of energy transition in doubt
In a country of close to 54 million people, the final election count was only decided by about 250,000 votes. However, this weekend’s margin belies the magnitude of the shift that will likely now take place.
With the country facing a potential domestic energy shortage 2027, President-elect De la Espriella has promised to revitalise the hydrocarbon economy, shifting Colombia’s recent energy transition on an entirely new course.
While this may unlock some regulatory challenges hindering renewables roll-out, broader support mechanisms for solar projects will likely be dismantled, and the broader economic transition abandoned, along with its recent flurry of international climate alliances.
He will also take his place among a wave of right-leaning Presidents that have swept to power across the continent in the last 18 months. This has seen right-wing electoral victories across Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Argentina and now Colombia, with Peru’s Keiko Fujimori potentially joining the club soon – pending a final vote count.
With the Brazilian elections scheduled for October, and run-off scenarios between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro still far too close to call, 2026 will undoubtedly be a pivotal year for Latin America’s energy future.
The post Did Colombia’s energy transition just come to a halt? appeared first on Climate Home News.
Climate Change
Live from LCAW – Raw diplomacy: Can new mineral alliances deliver a just energy transition?
Join us for an afternoon of high-level discussions at London Climate Action Week on what resource-rich developing countries need to make new critical mineral partnerships genuinely beneficial.
We are bringing together high-level speakers from mineral producing countries, the finance sector, the UN and civil society to reflect on the latest developments in resource diplomacy and ask what’s next for mineral governance.
Agenda
02:00 PM
Welcome
MC, Gabriela Flores, NRGI
02:00 PM – 02:30 PM
In conversation: Minerals governance – what’s next?
Celine Kauffman, IDDRI, Patrick Schröder, Chatham House, Sascha Raabe, UNIDO (online), Moderated by Chloé Farand, Climate Home News
We will explore G7 outcomes and the practical steps the G7 and G20 can take to advance mineral governance and responsible mining, with a spotlight on how the UK can seize its 2027 G20 presidency to drive this critical agenda forward.
02:30 PM – 03:00 PM
Tracking allegations of abuse in mining for transition minerals
Phil Bloomer, BHRC, Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Resource Justice Network
The Business and Human Rights Centre presents its 2026 Transition Minerals Tracker update and unveils new data on allegations of human rights abuse linked to the extraction of bauxite, cobalt, copper, iron ore, lithium, manganese, nickel, rare earth elements and zinc – and the companies behind them.
03:00 PM – 03:30 PM
Break
03:30 PM – 04:30 PM
Can finance clean up mining? The role of investors and lenders
Stephen Barrie, Church of England Pensions Board/ Global, Pavel Laberko, Emerging Markets Investors Alliance, Margaux Day, Accountability Counsel
Finance can be a powerful force for raising environmental and social standards in mining — but only if financial actors remain in the sector rather than walking away. This session examines how investors and lenders can drive accountability and responsible practices in transition minerals, and whether the answer lies in divestment, engagement, or stronger oversight from civil society. Moderated by Caroline Avan, BHRC.
04:30 PM – 05:50 PM
What should equitable mineral partnerships look like?
Eric Ngang, African Resources Watch (Afrewatch), Thomas Scurfield, NRGI , Tobias Musonda, Director of Policy and Planning, Zambia , Wen-Yu Weng, Ellen MacArthur Foundation.
As demand for critical minerals surges, the race to secure supply chains risks repeating the extractive models of the past. This session cuts to the heart of what truly equitable mineral partnerships look like — and what it will take to to move from principle to practice. Moderated by Chloé Farand, Climate Home News
06:00 PM
Closing
Amir Shafaie, NRGI
The post <span style="color: #F39200;">Live from LCAW</span> – Raw diplomacy: Can new mineral alliances deliver a just energy transition? appeared first on Climate Home News.
Live from LCAW – Raw diplomacy: Can new mineral alliances deliver a just energy transition?
Climate Change
COP31 presidency ‘open’ to reflecting Santa Marta in UN climate process, ministers say
Colombia and the Netherlands, which co-hosted the first conference the first conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels earlier this year, say they have held “constructive” discussions on bringing the meeting’s outcomes to the COP31 climate summit.
Speaking on the sidelines of London Climate Action Week, the outgoing Colombian environment minister and Dutch climate policy minister, said COP31 presidencies Australia and Türkiye were “open” to suggestions on how to reflect the discussions in Santa Marta on transitioning away from coal, oil and gas at the end-of-year summit.
What format this might take, “we don’t know yet,” said Colombian minister Irene Vélez Torres.
“We had this very interesting conversation with COP31 and they were clearly open for suggestions about what is needed in the discussion in Türkiye, and we were explicit about the need to engage with the phasing out of fossil fuels,” she said.
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Australia and Türkiye will jointly preside over the COP31 climate conference, which is taking place in the Turkish resort city of Antalya in November. Türkiye will lead on the action agenda, referring to initiatives that lie outside of the formal negotiations, while Australia will chair the negotiations.
Dutch minister Stientje van Veldhoven said the outcomes of the Santa Marta conference could be part of COP31’s action agenda,
“We are here to facilitate action on one particular part of what COP has agreed to do, namely transitioning away fossil fuels so there is a very logical connection to the COP process, and we will make sure that we continue to bring this coalition of the willing, this coalition of the doers back into the COP process,” she said.
At the event in London, UN secretary-general António Guterres urged countries to reduce their fossil fuel dependencies, arguing that “economies based on renewables are much more secure than economies based on the imports of fossil fuels”. He added that the transition to renewables is “unstoppable”.
European, island states seek clear future for global roadmap to cut fossil fuels
Including the fossil fuel transition in UN climate negotiations, rather than the action agenda, is likely to be controversial among governments. While nations agreed to transition away from fossil fuels at COP28, at COP30 last year Saudi Arabia, Russia and others successfully opposed a push to agree for a roadmap to be drawn up on how to meet this goal.
Despite the lack of agreement, the Brazilian government which presided over COP30, is drawing up a global roadmap. But the Russian government has said it opposes this roadmap being referenced in UN climate talks.
Finding agreement on referencing the Santa Marta process in UN climate talks is also likely to be difficult. Last week in Bonn, the chair of the African Group of Negotiators, Antwi-Boasiako Amoah from Ghana, criticised “minilateral initiatives and coalitions of the willing” as distracting political attention and lacking the legitimacy that comes from multilateral climate negotiations, where any country can veto anything.
Strengthening the COP process
The Santa Marta conference kick-started a diplomatic process outside of the formal UN climate negotiations to offer a space for governments to make progress and find solutions to wean their economies away from fossil fuels.
Around 60 countries, including many large fossil-fuel producers attended the meeting after being frustrated by failed attempts to get UN climate talks to sign off on the global roadmap away from fossil fuels. They agreed to work towards voluntary national roadmaps away from fossil fuels.
A 170-page report summarising the outcome of the conference published on Tuesday says that the Santa Marta coalition of countries will seek to influence the formal UN negotiations.
The report says Colombia proposed to build “a strong coalition to bring these discussions to the second Global Stocktake”, a process in which countries will review climate progress and agree on measures forward at COP33 in 2028.
Colombia also suggested organizing “a high-level event during the next COP presidency” to discuss Santa Marta outcomes, while Italy proposed an event during the UN General Assembly.
“We will make sure that Santa Marta conference is not a separate, parallel process to the COP” but “strengthens” the negotiations without becoming a formal part of them, said van Veldhoven, adding that the process will remain “a conversation” to demonstrate that transforming economies away from fossil fuels is possible.
COP30 CEO Ana Toni from Brazil told a separate event in London that the response to the second Global Stocktake “will probably need several pages” to deliver an agreed commitment to transition away from fossil fuels. The Santa Marta report says that Brazil’s global roadmap should also be included in the response.
Colombian election signals u-turn
Colombia, which has been one of the most proactive countries promoting a global transition away from fossil fuels, is likely to reverse course after the election of right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella as the country’s new president at a general election on Sunday.
The newly elected president has branded himself as an ally of US president Donald Trump, and has promised to reverse a current halt on new coal, oil and gas licenses, as well as venture into “responsible fracking” without overlapping with protected areas or high-mountain páramo ecosystems.
Vélez Torres said the current Colombian government has already “delivered to the international community and to our sub-national forces, social forces, movements, academia” a process to keep the energy transition moving forward.
She told Climate Home News she hoped the work the government had done could be picked up by social movements in Colombia to demand change from the incoming government. “What we did cannot be erased, and we have had our voices heard, and we have been as radical as any other government could have been.”
The minister said the elections have left the country facing a “dark night” that “can really shift the politics in terms of energy transition and environmental protection”, but said she is certain that their “legacy will continue being there”.
The post COP31 presidency ‘open’ to reflecting Santa Marta in UN climate process, ministers say appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP31 presidency ‘open’ to reflecting Santa Marta in UN climate process, ministers say
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