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China’s exports of clean-energy technologies such as solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles are increasingly helping to cut emissions in other countries.

Such exports in 2024 alone are already shaving 1% off global emissions outside of China and, in total, will avoid some 4bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) over the lifetimes of the products.

Moreover, the global CO2 savings from using these products for just one year acts to more than outweigh the emissions from manufacturing them.

This new analysis for Carbon Brief is based on a detailed assessment of clean-technology export flows, the carbon footprint of manufacturing these products and the “carbon intensity” of electricity generation in destination countries.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • The solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles (EVs) and wind turbines exported from China in 2024 are set to cut annual CO2 emissions in the rest of the world by 1%, some 220m tonnes (MtCO2).
  • Manufacturing these products resulted in an estimated 110MtCO2 within China in 2024, implying that the upfront CO2 emissions are offset in much less than a year of operation.
  • Over the expected lifetime of these products, their manufacturing emissions will be offset almost 40-fold, with cumulative CO2 savings reaching 4.0GtCO2.
  • When factoring in China’s plans to build overseas manufacturing plants for clean-energy products, as well as to construct overseas clean-power projects, the avoided CO2 increases to 350MtCO2 per year. This is 1.5% of global emissions outside China and almost equal to the annual emissions of Australia.
  • The largest emission reductions are associated with direct clean-technology equipment exports – particularly solar panels – followed by manufacturing at Chinese factories overseas, with overseas projects financed by Chinese investors a distant third.
  • China’s clean-energy footprint almost spans the entire world, with exports to 191 of the 192 other UN member states, as well as manufacturing and project finance investments in dozens of countries.
  • Clean-energy exports from China in 2024 alone, along with its overseas investments from 2023 and 2024, are set to cut emissions in sub-Saharan Africa by around 3% per year once completed and in the Middle East and north Africa (MENA) region by 4.5%.

China’s rapid expansion in clean-energy manufacturing and exports is already reshaping emissions trajectories in several key regions.

While China dominates the supply of equipment, however, most of the financing for clean-energy development outside of China is provided by others, with around three-fourths of the value from clean-energy projects and products being captured in other countries.

Nevertheless, Chinese industries stand to benefit from increased exports as global demand for clean-energy technologies grows – and there are signs that this is already starting to shift China’s political and diplomatic stance on climate action.

Clean-energy’s cumulative climate impacts

China’s booming output of clean-energy technologies is enabling rapid deployment both domestically and around the world, but their production is energy- and carbon-intensive.

The new analysis shows Chinese clean-tech exports are nevertheless having immediate global climate benefits. This contradicts many commentators who have linked China’s clean-tech boom to the rapid recent rise in its emissions.

Specifically, the analysis shows that manufacturing clean-energy equipment for export resulted in an estimated 110MtCO2 of emissions in 2024, or just 1.1% of China’s CO2 from fossil fuels.

Yet the solar panels, batteries, EVs and wind turbines exported in 2024 will avoid an estimated 220MtCO2 annually when put into operation overseas.

Moreover, these products will continue to generate emissions savings for as long as they continue operating. The clean-energy products exported in 2024 alone will avoid a cumulative total of 4.0GtCO2 across their lifetimes, as shown in the figure below.

Emissions associated with the production of China’s clean-technology exports in 2024 and the annual emissions avoided during their use (columns), as well as the cumulative impact on global emissions over the lifetime of these products, MtCO2. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

The CO2-saving impact of these exports – from just one year – will compound together with emissions savings from China’s past and future shipments of clean-energy equipment.

For example, its EV exports increased by 33% in the first five months of 2025, compared with the same period in 2024, showing the potential for further growth.

Solar panel exports held steady – despite a massive spike in domestic demand – and are likely to grow in the coming years given projected growth in global capacity installations.

Looking beyond direct equipment exports, overseas clean-energy investments announced by Chinese companies in 2023-24 – building solar panel manufacturing plants, for example – will generate another 90MtCO2 of avoided emissions per year, once the projects have been built.

In addition, overseas clean-power generation projects announced by Chinese investors in 2023-24 would save another 40MtCO2 per year.

In terms of technologies, the largest avoided emissions result from solar, at 280MtCO2, followed by batteries and EVs at 50MtCO2, as shown in the figure below. Wind turbine exports are relatively small, avoiding another 20MtCO2.

CO2 emissions avoided overseas as a result of China’s clean-technology exports in 2024 and investments in 2023-24, MtCO2, broken down by technology and type of activity. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

China’s overseas clean-energy footprint

Both economically and in terms of emissions reductions, exports of clean-energy equipment dominate China’s overseas footprint.

Equipment exports in 2024 were worth a total of $177bn, whereas across 2023 and 2024, Chinese firms announced overseas clean-energy manufacturing projects worth $58bn, as well as overseas power generation and storage deals worth $24bn.

(Note that these figures do not include Chinese-backed overseas fossil-fuel developments, including coal-fired power plants, which China has pledged to stop supporting.)

Once in operation, the Chinese owned or funded overseas clean-energy developments will help avoid 130MtCO2 of emissions, with 80Mt from solar, 35MtCO2 from EVs and batteries, as well as 13MtCO2 from wind and 6MtCO2 from hydropower.

Looking at this total another way, the avoided CO2 emissions from clean-energy equipment produced in Chinese factories overseas will amount to 90MtCO2, while its financing of clean-power generation will avoid an estimated 40MtCO2.

In contrast, avoided emissions from clean-energy equipment exported from China in 2024 will amount to an estimated 220MtCO2 per year.

China’s clean-energy footprint spans essentially the entire world, with exports to 191 of the 192 UN member states, excluding China, manufacturing plans in 25 countries in 12 of the 17 UN regions and clean-energy project financing in 27 countries in 11 regions.

Some countries and regions do stand out, however, as shown in the map below.

Avoided CO2 emissions from China’s clean-tech activity in 2024, MtCO2 by country. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

In terms of resulting emission reductions, the largest destinations for China’s overseas clean-energy activity are south Asia and the Middle East and north Africa (MENA) region.

This reflects both the large volumes of Chinese clean-technology activity reaching these countries and their highly carbon-intensive power grids, which means that installing new solar panels offsets high-emissions generation, for example.

(By the same logic, driving a Chinese EV in these countries would have smaller climate benefits than with lower-carbon electricity. See: How avoided emissions are calculated.)

Solar exports to South Asia have boomed, with Pakistan the single largest market. Pakistan’s electricity shortages and increasing affordability of solar have prompted consumers to install.

The same dynamic has played out in South Africa, which also features in the top 10 countries where China’s exports are resulting in avoided emissions (left panel in the figure below).

Top 10 countries for avoided CO2 emissions from China’s overseas engagements, by type of activity and technology, MtCO2. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

Assuming that all the overseas financing deals announced in 2023–24 are realised, the MENA region will see the largest avoided emissions due to China’s overseas clean-energy activity, resulting from a combination of solar panel exports, manufacturing and financing deals.

This includes eight solar and two wind power generation projects with a total capacity of 10 gigawatts (GW), in Egypt, Algeria, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Tunisia.

On the manufacturing side, Saudi Arabia is the main destination, with a major EV production facility, two solar factories and one for wind turbines. There are also a total of five battery manufacturing projects in Morocco and Oman.

OECD Europe is the largest destination for China’s exports and overseas manufacturing investments by value. However, relative to the volume of exports, the resulting CO2 savings are smaller than in other major destinations, due to lower carbon intensity of power generation.

The countries in the European region with the largest resulting emissions reductions are the Netherlands, Turkey, Spain, the UK, Poland and Germany.

Imports of solar power equipment are the largest category. Germany is an exception, where imports of EVs and batteries are even more significant, as is the UK, where a major battery manufacturing project could deliver larger emission reductions.

Turkey and Spain also have clean-energy manufacturing projects with Chinese involvement, while both Turkey and Germany imported wind power equipment from China in 2024.

In south-east Asia, China’s clean-energy footprint is the largest in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. Solar manufacturing plans play the largest role in Malaysia, while imports of solar power equipment are the largest category in the other countries.

Chinese financing for solar and wind power generation projects, with a total capacity of 3.7GW, plays a significant role in the Philippines and Laos, as does financing for a hydropower project in Indonesia. Vietnam imported batteries and wind turbines in addition to solar power equipment in 2024. Chinese companies also have plans for EV and battery manufacturing in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Regional emissions set to be cut by up to 4.5% a year

Another way to look at the impact of China’s clean-energy exports and investments is to consider the avoided CO2 relative to the total emissions in each region. This highlights where China’s overseas clean-energy footprint is having the biggest impact, in relative terms.

The figure below illustrates the distinction. For each region, longer bars indicate larger avoided emissions in absolute terms, whereas the furthest dots point to the biggest relative impacts.

On a relative basis, sub-Saharan Africa stands out, in addition to MENA. Specifically, China’s clean-energy exports in 2024 alone, with investments from 2023 and 2024, are set to cut annual emissions in sub-Saharan Africa by around 3% per year – and by around 4.5% in MENA.

Left: Avoided CO2 emissions from China’s overseas engagements, MtCO2 per year. Right: Avoided emissions per year relative to regional totals, %. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

For sub-Saharan Africa, this relative measure of impact indicates that the solar power uptake in the region is rapid, in relation to the size of the region’s electricity systems.

The largest markets for China’s overseas clean-energy activity in the region are South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria and Senegal.

China’s footprint in these countries is dominated by solar exports, except for Tanzania, where financing for a hydropower project and a small solar project make up most of the projected emission reduction. There are also significant wind power equipment exports into South Africa.

China’s role in global clean-energy supply chains

In 2024, clean-energy industries contributed more than 10% of China’s GDP for the first time, generating an estimated total economic output of $1.9tn.

This milestone underscores the scale of China’s clean-energy economy and its dominant role in the global manufacturing of solar panels, batteries and EVs.

On the surface, this may suggest that other countries have limited economic opportunities in clean energy. However, a closer examination reveals a more nuanced picture.

China’s involvement in global supply chains is still largely limited to exports and manufacturing, while most of the value is downstream.

For instance, a solar panel now accounts for approximately one-quarter of the total value of a utility-scale solar power plant. IRENA reported a global weighted average investment cost of $758 per kilowatt (kW) of capacity for utility-scale solar and an average module cost of $261/kW in 2023, or 34% of the total.

Module prices fell by 35% in 2024, further reducing the share of modules in total project costs. In the case of rooftop installations, which represented 43% of all newly added solar in 2023, the total investment costs are approximately 80% higher, implying a much lower share of the modules in overall costs.

Similarly, batteries exported at 2024 prices represent only about a quarter of the value of the EVs into which they are integrated. The average export value of a Chinese pure electric passenger vehicle was $22,000, calculated based on values and volumes in China Customs data. At a battery pack cost of $94 per kilowatt hour (kWh) of capacity, an average-sized 63kWh battery pack will cost a quarter of this. Out of the average retail price of an EV in Europe, some €46,000, the battery pack will make up only a sixth of the cost.

These figures highlight a key point: most of the economic value in clean energy lies downstream – in project development, system integration, installation and end-user services – rather than in upstream manufacturing, where China dominates.

In 2024, China exported $177bn worth of solar panels, EVs, batteries and wind turbines, making up roughly 5% of its total exports. If China maintains its current global market share, this figure could rise significantly.

(These exports could reach $1.1tn by 2035, according to a recent analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) – driven primarily by a projected 12-fold increase to 2035 in the global EV market outside China – under the International Energy Agency’s 1.5C-compatible net-zero emissions by 2050 scenario.)

Trumping the $177bn value of the exports from 2024, however, the downstream value of overseas clean-energy products and projects relying on Chinese components is an estimated $720bn annually, four times the value of the exported raw components.

This includes the value of solar and wind power plants built using Chinese modules and turbines, as well as the revenue from the sales of EVs using Chinese batteries and battery materials.

Further investment in overseas manufacturing – Chinese companies building solar, battery and EV plants abroad – could lift this downstream value to an estimated $1.2tn annually.

China’s outsized role in upstream clean-energy manufacturing creates potential supply chain vulnerabilities that many countries will want to address, by diversifying supply sources and strengthening domestic capabilities.

However, China’s dominance is not synonymous with capturing the majority of the economic value in global clean-energy development. Rather, it reflects a strategic advantage in segments that other economies have often neglected, due to low value and profitability.

Implications of China’s expanding footprint

China’s rapid expansion in clean-energy manufacturing and exports is already reshaping emissions trajectories in several key regions.

In particular, markets in MENA and sub-Saharan Africa – where domestic clean-energy industries remain nascent – have benefited from lower costs and improved access to technology through Chinese imports. This dynamic has helped accelerate clean-energy deployment and shift emissions outlooks downward in these regions.

At the same time, China’s central role in global supply chains has raised concerns over supply security. Many countries are now taking steps to diversify their sourcing of key components such as solar panels, batteries and EVs.

However, given the scale and cost advantages of China’s clean-energy manufacturing sector, its products are likely to remain a large part of the global clean-energy landscape for the foreseeable future.

Economically, China’s footprint is more narrowly focused on upstream manufacturing. As clean-energy deployment continues to expand globally, there is significant potential for Chinese firms to increase their participation in downstream activities – including infrastructure development, operations and maintenance – capturing a larger share of value-added abroad.

These dynamics also reinforce China’s strategic interest in the continuation and acceleration of the global clean-energy transition.

As global demand for clean-energy technologies grows, Chinese industries stand to benefit from increased export volumes.

This economic incentive is beginning to translate into diplomatic engagement. In recent public remarks, for example, President Xi Jinping emphasised China’s role in advancing the clean-energy sector, suggesting a potential shift toward more proactive international positioning on climate and clean energy.

How avoided emissions are calculated

The manufacturing of solar panels and EV batteries is energy- and carbon-intensive, resulting in upfront carbon emissions from manufacturing.

In the case of exports and overseas manufacturing, the avoided CO2 emissions depend on the CO2 intensity of the power grid in the country where the equipment is used.

The left-most shape in the figure below shows the CO2 intensity of electricity generation in countries taking clean-energy exports from China. The width of the shape indicates the share of exports, by value, going to countries with a given carbon intensity.

The bulge in the shape shows that on average, China exports clean-energy equipment to countries with a lower CO2 intensity of power generation than its own grid (dashed line).

This increases the CO2 emission reductions from battery and EV exports, relative to using these products in China, but reduces them from solar panel and wind turbine exports.

Specifically, the average CO2 intensity of electricity in China’s export markets in 2024, weighted by value, was 395 grams of CO2 per kWh (gCO2/kWh), compared to 580gCO2/kWh in China.

The centre and rightmost shapes in the figure below illustrate the equivalent distributions for countries hosting Chinese overseas manufacturing and project financing.

CO2 intensity of electricity generation in destination markets for China’s clean-energy exports, overseas manufacturing and project finance, weighted by the value of the relevant engagements. Dashed line shows China’s CO2 intensity. Source: Analysis by Lauri Myllyvirta for Carbon Brief.

Based on the country-by-country CO2 intensities and the volume of different clean-energy exports from China, the emissions associated with manufacturing these products are, on average, offset in less than a year of operation.

Chinese solar panels pay back their upfront manufacturing emissions in four months, on average, while wind turbines take two years and EVs and batteries three years.

There is, however, wide variance between different destinations.

For example, EVs exported to the countries with the most carbon-intensive power generation, such as Uzbekistan or Botswana, result in no reduction in CO2 emissions from their operation under current conditions. These countries would need to achieve substantial reductions in the carbon intensity of their power system to realise emissions reductions from the use of EVs.

On the other hand, EVs exported to countries with very clean grids can pay back their upfront CO2 emissions in less than a year.

Similarly, solar panels and wind turbines exported to countries where power generation is already almost fully decarbonised, such as Sweden or Ethiopia, result in no emission reductions, when assessed using the average carbon intensity of power generation.

However, this does not tell the whole story because solar and wind exports to such countries could prevent increases in power generation from fossil fuels in response to growth in demand.

Much of China’s overseas manufacturing investment, though not all, is in markets with a lower average CO2 intensity of power generation than in China itself, which shortens the CO2 payback time from clean-energy equipment produced by those overseas manufacturing plants.

In the case of calculating avoided emissions from plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs), a major question is how much they are driven with electricity and how much with fuel.

PHEVs are likely to be driven more on fuel in markets with weaker charging infrastructure and weaker incentives for using electricity. For simplicity, this analysis assumes a 50-50 split in all markets. Improving infrastructure and incentives would increase the emissions savings from existing and new PHEVs, as well as likely increasing the share of full EVs in new sales.

About the data

Data on China’s exports by country are taken from China Customs. Trans-shipments from the mainland through Hong Kong are treated as exports from China, with data on Hong Kong’s international trade – which is reported separately – taken from UN COMTRADE.

The product categories used in the analysis are as follows:

EVs: electric and hybrid motor vehicles, including freight, public transport and tractors (HS codes 870122, 870123, 870124, 870220, 870230, 870240, 870340, 870350, 870360, 870370, 870380, 870441, 870451, 870460).

Battery: Lithium-ion accumulators and primary lithium cells (850760, 850650).

Solar: PV generators, photovoltaic cells, solar panels, solar-grade silicon and inverters (850171, 850172, 854140, 854142, 854143, 854149, 854150, 850440, 280461, 381800).

Wind: Wind-powered electric generators (850231).

Data on overseas manufacturing and power generation deals is taken from a mapping project by Climate Energy Finance.

Emission reductions from solar panels and wind turbines were calculated using the average utilisation – sometimes referred to as the “capacity factor” – of each technology in the destination country, along with its average CO2 intensity of power generation in 2024, both taken from Ember data.

This is a conservative assumption, as new solar and wind will mainly replace fossil-fuelled power generation, resulting in higher emission reductions in countries where fossil fuels make up a small share of total power generation.

Emission reductions from EVs and plug-in hybrids were calculated using the following assumptions for the size of the battery pack in kilowatt hours (kWh), the mileage, the emissions of an internal combustion-engine (ICE) alternative and the fuel use per 100km:

BEV PHEV Heavy-duty vehicle (buses and trucks)
Battery pack, kWh 63 15 350
Mileage, km/year 15,000 15,000 80,000
ICE emissions, g/km 230 230 800
EV electricity and fuel use, per 100km 21kWh 15kWh + 4 litres 150kWh

Emission reductions from battery exports are calculated assuming that the batteries are installed in BEV and PHEV passenger vehicles, with an equal split.

Combustion-engine vehicle CO2 emissions are estimated based on average real-world fuel efficiency and CO2 emissions from petrol and biofuel production, as well as from combustion.

Annual mileage for passenger vehicles is based on data for China, the EU and the US, while it is based on US data for heavy duty vehicles. Upfront manufacturing emissions from EVs are the additional emissions compared with building a fuel-burning vehicle.

The value of solar projects using Chinese equipment is based on averages for total investment costs in 2023 from IRENA, adjusted for the reported 35% fall in module costs in 2024.

As the IRENA cost data is for utility-scale solar, the average across the utility-scale and distributed segments, such as rooftops, is estimated assuming that rooftop installations have 80% higher costs and make up a share of 43% of all newly added solar, based on data for 2023.

The total volume of solar equipment and materials exports from China in 2024 is conservatively calculated based on the reported value of solar module exports from China Customs and module export volume, as well as estimating the volume of the exports of polysilicon, wafers and solar cells using the same average value per GW as for solar modules.

The value of EVs sold overseas using Chinese batteries is estimated based on the total value of the EV market by region and market share of Chinese batteries and battery materials globally.

The market share in the overseas market is calculated based on 2024 power battery installations in China and globally, assuming that the market share of Chinese battery materials is 100% in China. The value of EVs exported from China is subtracted from this value to avoid double counting.

CO2 emissions from overseas manufacturing were calculated using the above estimates for emissions from production in China, adjusted to the average intensity of power generation in the host country.

The post Analysis: China’s clean-energy exports in 2024 alone will cut overseas CO2 by 1% appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: China’s clean-energy exports in 2024 alone will cut overseas CO2 by 1%

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DeBriefed 27 February 2026: Trump’s fossil-fuel talk | Modi-Lula rare-earth pact | Is there a UK ‘greenlash’? 

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Absolute State of the Union

‘DRILL, BABY’: US president Donald Trump “doubled down on his ‘drill, baby, drill’ agenda” in his State of the Union (SOTU) address, said the Los Angeles Times. He “tout[ed] his support of the fossil-fuel industry and renew[ed] his focus on electricity affordability”, reported the Financial Times. Trump also attacked the “green new scam”, noted Carbon Brief’s SOTU tracker.

COAL REPRIEVE: Earlier in the week, the Trump administration had watered down limits on mercury pollution from coal-fired power plants, reported the Financial Times. It remains “unclear” if this will be enough to prevent the decline of coal power, said Bloomberg, in the face of lower-cost gas and renewables. Reuters noted that US coal plants are “ageing”.

OIL STAY: The US Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments brought by the oil industry in a “major lawsuit”, reported the New York Times. The newspaper said the firms are attempting to head off dozens of other lawsuits at state level, relating to their role in global warming.

SHIP-SHILLING: The Trump administration is working to “kill” a global carbon levy on shipping “permanently”, reported Politico, after succeeding in delaying the measure late last year. The Guardian said US “bullying” could be “paying off”, after Panama signalled it was reversing its support for the levy in a proposal submitted to the UN shipping body.

Around the world

  • RARE EARTHS: The governments of Brazil and India signed a deal on rare earths, said the Times of India, as well as agreeing to collaborate on renewable energy.
  • HEAT ROLLBACK: German homes will be allowed to continue installing gas and oil heating, under watered-down government plans covered by Clean Energy Wire.
  • BRAZIL FLOODS: At least 53 people died in floods in the state of Minas Gerais, after some areas saw 170mm of rain in a few hours, reported CNN Brasil.
  • ITALY’S ATTACK: Italy is calling for the EU to “suspend” its emissions trading system (ETS) ahead of a review later this year, said Politico.
  • COOKSTOVE CREDITS: The first-ever carbon credits under the Paris Agreement have been issued to a cookstove project in Myanmar, said Climate Home News.
  • SAUDI SOLAR: Turkey has signed a “major” solar deal that will see Saudi firm ACWA building 2 gigawatts in the country, according to Agence France-Presse.

$467 billion

The profits made by five major oil firms since prices spiked following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine four years ago, according to a report by Global Witness covered by BusinessGreen.


Latest climate research

  • Claims about the “fingerprint” of human-caused climate change, made in a recent US Department of Energy report, are “factually incorrect” | AGU Advances
  • Large lakes in the Congo Basin are releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere from “immense ancient stores” | Nature Geoscience
  • Shared Socioeconomic Pathways – scenarios used regularly in climate modelling – underrepresent “narratives explicitly centring on democratic principles such as participation, accountability and justice” | npj Climate Action

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

The constituency of Richard Tice MP, the climate-sceptic deputy leader of Reform UK, is the second-largest recipient of flood defence spending in England, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Overall, the funding is disproportionately targeted at coastal and urban areas, many of which have Conservative or Liberal Democrat MPs.

Spotlight

Is there really a UK ‘greenlash’?

This week, after a historic Green Party byelection win, Carbon Brief looks at whether there really is a “greenlash” against climate policy in the UK.

Over the past year, the UK’s political consensus on climate change has been shattered.

Yet despite a sharp turn against climate action among right-wing politicians and right-leaning media outlets, UK public support for climate action remains strong.

Prof Federica Genovese, who studies climate politics at the University of Oxford, told Carbon Brief:

“The current ‘war’ on green policy is mostly driven by media and political elites, not by the public.”

Indeed, there is still a greater than two-to-one majority among the UK public in favour of the country’s legally binding target to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, as shown below.

Steve Akehurst, director of public-opinion research initiative Persuasion UK, also noted the growing divide between the public and “elites”. He told Carbon Brief:

“The biggest movement is, without doubt, in media and elite opinion. There is a bit more polarisation and opposition [to climate action] among voters, but it’s typically no more than 20-25% and mostly confined within core Reform voters.”

Conservative gear shift

For decades, the UK had enjoyed strong, cross-party political support for climate action.

Lord Deben, the Conservative peer and former chair of the Climate Change Committee, told Carbon Brief that the UK’s landmark 2008 Climate Change Act had been born of this cross-party consensus, saying “all parties supported it”.

Since their landslide loss at the 2024 election, however, the Conservatives have turned against the UK’s target of net-zero emissions by 2050, which they legislated for in 2019.

Curiously, while opposition to net-zero has surged among Conservative MPs, there is majority support for the target among those that plan to vote for the party, as shown below.

Dr Adam Corner, advisor to the Climate Barometer initiative that tracks public opinion on climate change, told Carbon Brief that those who currently plan to vote Reform are the only segment who “tend to be more opposed to net-zero goals”. He said:

“Despite the rise in hostile media coverage and the collapse of the political consensus, we find that public support for the net-zero by 2050 target is plateauing – not plummeting.”

Reform, which rejects the scientific evidence on global warming and campaigns against net-zero, has been leading the polls for a year. (However, it was comfortably beaten by the Greens in yesterday’s Gorton and Denton byelection.)

Corner acknowledged that “some of the anti-net zero noise…[is] showing up in our data”, adding:

“We see rising concerns about the near-term costs of policies and an uptick in people [falsely] attributing high energy bills to climate initiatives.”

But Akehurst said that, rather than a big fall in public support, there had been a drop in the “salience” of climate action:

“So many other issues [are] competing for their attention.”

UK newspapers published more editorials opposing climate action than supporting it for the first time on record in 2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Global ‘greenlash’?

All of this sits against a challenging global backdrop, in which US president Donald Trump has been repeating climate-sceptic talking points and rolling back related policy.

At the same time, prominent figures have been calling for a change in climate strategy, sold variously as a “reset”, a “pivot”, as “realism”, or as “pragmatism”.

Genovese said that “far-right leaders have succeeded in the past 10 years in capturing net-zero as a poster child of things they are ‘fighting against’”.

She added that “much of this is fodder for conservative media and this whole ecosystem is essentially driving what we call the ‘greenlash’”.

Corner said the “disconnect” between elite views and the wider public “can create problems” – for example, “MPs consistently underestimate support for renewables”. He added:

“There is clearly a risk that the public starts to disengage too, if not enough positive voices are countering the negative ones.”

Watch, read, listen

TRUMP’S ‘PETROSTATE’: The US is becoming a “petrostate” that will be “sicker and poorer”, wrote Financial Times associate editor Rana Forohaar.

RHETORIC VS REALITY: Despite a “political mood [that] has darkened”, there is “more green stuff being installed than ever”, said New York Times columnist David Wallace-Wells.
CHINA’S ‘REVOLUTION’: The BBC’s Climate Question podcast reported from China on the “green energy revolution” taking place in the country.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 27 February 2026: Trump’s fossil-fuel talk | Modi-Lula rare-earth pact | Is there a UK ‘greenlash’?  appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 27 February 2026: Trump’s fossil-fuel talk | Modi-Lula rare-earth pact | Is there a UK ‘greenlash’? 

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Analysis: Constituency of Reform’s climate-sceptic Richard Tice gets £55m flood funding

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The Lincolnshire constituency held by Richard Tice, the climate-sceptic deputy leader of the hard-right Reform party, has been pledged at least £55m in government funding for flood defences since 2024.

This investment in Boston and Skegness is the second-largest sum for a single constituency from a £1.4bn flood-defence fund for England, Carbon Brief analysis shows.

Flooding is becoming more likely and more extreme in the UK due to climate change.

Yet, for years, governments have failed to spend enough on flood defences to protect people, properties and infrastructure.

The £1.4bn fund is part of the current Labour government’s wider pledge to invest a “record” £7.9bn over a decade on protecting hundreds of thousands of homes and businesses from flooding.

As MP for one of England’s most flood-prone regions, Tice has called for more investment in flood defences, stating that “we cannot afford to ‘surrender the fens’ to the sea”.

He is also one of Reform’s most vocal opponents of climate action and what he calls “net stupid zero”. He denies the scientific consensus on climate change and has claimed, falsely and without evidence, that scientists are “lying”.

Flood defences

Last year, the government said it would invest £2.65bn on flood and coastal erosion risk management (FCERM) schemes in England between April 2024 and March 2026.

This money was intended to protect 66,500 properties from flooding. It is part of a decade-long Labour government plan to spend more than £7.9bn on flood defences.

There has been a consistent shortfall in maintaining England’s flood defences, with the Environment Agency expecting to protect fewer properties by 2027 than it had initially planned.

The Climate Change Committee (CCC) has attributed this to rising costs, backlogs from previous governments and a lack of capacity. It also points to the strain from “more frequent and severe” weather events, such as storms in recent years that have been amplified by climate change.

However, the CCC also said last year that, if the 2024-26 spending programme is delivered, it would be “slightly closer to the track” of the Environment Agency targets out to 2027.

The government has released constituency-level data on which schemes in England it plans to fund, covering £1.4bn of the 2024-26 investment. The other half of the FCERM spending covers additional measures, from repairing existing defences to advising local authorities.

The map below shows the distribution of spending on FCERM schemes in England over the past two years, highlighting the constituency of Richard Tice.

Map of England showing that Richard Tice's Boston and Skegness constituency is set to receive at least £55m for flood defences between 2024 and 2026
Flood-defence spending on new and replacement schemes in England in 2024-25 and 2025-26. The government notes that, as Environment Agency accounts have not been finalised and approved, the investment data is “provisional and subject to change”. Some schemes cover multiple constituencies and are not included on the map. Source: Environment Agency FCERM data.

By far the largest sum of money – £85.6m in total – has been committed to a tidal barrier and various other defences in the Somerset constituency of Bridgwater, the seat of Conservative MP Ashley Fox.

Over the first months of 2026, the south-west region has faced significant flooding and Fox has called for more support from the government, citing “climate patterns shifting and rainfall intensifying”.

He has also backed his party’s position that “the 2050 net-zero target is impossible” and called for more fossil-fuel extraction in the North Sea.

Tice’s east-coast constituency of Boston and Skegness, which is highly vulnerable to flooding from both rivers and the sea, is set to receive £55m. Among the supported projects are beach defences from Saltfleet to Gibraltar Point and upgrades to pumping stations.

Overall, Boston and Skegness has the second-largest portion of flood-defence funding, as the chart below shows. Constituencies with Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs occupied the other top positions.

Chart showing that Conservative, Reform and Liberal Democrat constituencies are the top recipients of flood defence spending
Top 10 English constituencies by FCERM funding in 2024-25 and 2025-26. Source: Environment Agency FCERM data.

Overall, despite Labour MPs occupying 347 out of England’s 543 constituencies – nearly two-thirds of the total – more than half of the flood-defence funding was distributed to constituencies with non-Labour MPs. This reflects the flood risk in coastal and rural areas that are not traditional Labour strongholds.

Reform funding

While Reform has just eight MPs, representing 1% of the population, its constituencies have been assigned 4% of the flood-defence funding for England.

Nearly all of this money was for Tice’s constituency, although party leader Nigel Farage’s coastal Clacton seat in Kent received £2m.

Reform UK is committed to “scrapping net-zero” and its leadership has expressed firmly climate-sceptic views.

Much has been made of the disconnect between the party’s climate policies and the threat climate change poses to its voters. Various analyses have shown the flood risk in Reform-dominated areas, particularly Lincolnshire.

Tice has rejected climate science, advocated for fossil-fuel production and criticised Environment Agency flood-defence activities. Yet, he has also called for more investment in flood defences, stating that “we cannot afford to ‘surrender the fens’ to the sea”.

This may reflect Tice’s broader approach to climate change. In a 2024 interview with LBC, he said:

“Where you’ve got concerns about sea level defences and sea level rise, guess what? A bit of steel, a bit of cement, some aggregate…and you build some concrete sea level defences. That’s how you deal with rising sea levels.”

While climate adaptation is viewed as vital in a warming world, there are limits on how much societies can adapt and adaptation costs will continue to increase as emissions rise.

The post Analysis: Constituency of Reform’s climate-sceptic Richard Tice gets £55m flood funding appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Constituency of Reform’s climate-sceptic Richard Tice gets £55m flood funding

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Cropped 25 February 2026: Food inflation strikes | El Niño looms | Biodiversity talks stagnate

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We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
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Key developments

Food inflation on the rise

DELUGE STRIKES FOOD: Extreme rainfall and flooding across the Mediterranean and north Africa has “battered the winter growing regions that feed Europe…threatening food price rises”, reported the Financial Times. Western France has “endured more than 36 days of continuous rain”, while farmers’ associations in Spain’s Andalusia estimate that “20% of all production has been lost”, it added. Policy expert David Barmes told the paper that the “latest storms were part of a wider pattern of climate shocks feeding into food price inflation”.

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NO BEEF: The UK’s beef farmers, meanwhile, “face a double blow” from climate change as “relentless rain forces them to keep cows indoors”, while last summer’s drought hit hay supplies, said another Financial Times article. At the same time, indoor growers in south England described a 60% increase in electricity standing charges as a “ticking timebomb” that could “force them to raise their prices or stop production, which will further fuel food price inflation”, wrote the Guardian.

TINDERBOX’ AND TARIFFS: A study, covered by the Guardian, warned that major extreme weather and other “shocks” could “spark social unrest and even food riots in the UK”. Experts cited “chronic” vulnerabilities, including climate change, low incomes, poor farming policy and “fragile” supply chains that have made the UK’s food system a “tinderbox”. A New York Times explainer noted that while trade could once guard against food supply shocks, barriers such as tariffs and export controls – which are being “increasingly” used by politicians – “can shut off that safety valve”.

El Niño looms

NEW ENSO INDEX: Researchers have developed a new index for calculating El Niño, the large-scale climate pattern that influences global weather and causes “billions in damages by bringing floods to some regions and drought to others”, reported CNN. It added that climate change is making it more difficult for scientists to observe El Niño patterns by warming up the entire ocean. The outlet said that with the new metric, “scientists can now see it earlier and our long-range weather forecasts will be improved for it.”

WARMING WARNING: Meanwhile, the US Climate Prediction Center announced that there is a 60% chance of the current La Niña conditions shifting towards a neutral state over the next few months, with an El Niño likely to follow in late spring, according to Reuters. The Vibes, a Malaysian news outlet, quoted a climate scientist saying: “If the El Niño does materialise, it could possibly push 2026 or 2027 as the warmest year on record, replacing 2024.”

CROP IMPACTS: Reuters noted that neutral conditions lead to “more stable weather and potentially better crop yields”. However, the newswire added, an El Niño state would mean “worsening drought conditions and issues for the next growing season” to Australia. El Niño also “typically brings a poor south-west monsoon to India, including droughts”, reported the Hindu’s Business Line. A 2024 guest post for Carbon Brief explained that El Niño is linked to crop failure in south-eastern Africa and south-east Asia.

News and views

  • DAM-AG-ES: Several South Korean farmers filed a lawsuit against the country’s state-owned utility company, “seek[ing] financial compensation for climate-related agricultural damages”, reported United Press International. Meanwhile, a national climate change assessment for the Philippines found that the country “lost up to $219bn in agricultural damages from typhoons, floods and droughts” over 2000-10, according to Eco-Business.
  • SCORCHED GRASS: South Africa’s Western Cape province is experiencing “one of the worst droughts in living memory”, which is “scorching grass and killing livestock”, said Reuters. The newswire wrote: “In 2015, a drought almost dried up the taps in the city; farmers say this one has been even more brutal than a decade ago.”
  • NOUVELLE VEG: New guidelines published under France’s national food, nutrition and climate strategy “urged” citizens to “limit” their meat consumption, reported Euronews. The delayed strategy comes a month after the US government “upended decades of recommendations by touting consumption of red meat and full-fat dairy”, it noted. 
  • COURTING DISASTER: India’s top green court accepted the findings of a committee that “found no flaws” in greenlighting the Great Nicobar project that “will lead to the felling of a million trees” and translocating corals, reported Mongabay. The court found “no good ground to interfere”, despite “threats to a globally unique biodiversity hotspot” and Indigenous tribes at risk of displacement by the project, wrote Frontline.
  • FISH FALLING: A new study found that fish biomass is “falling by 7.2% from as little as 0.1C of warming per decade”, noted the Guardian. While experts also pointed to the role of overfishing in marine life loss, marine ecologist and study lead author Dr Shahar Chaikin told the outlet: “Our research proves exactly what that biological cost [of warming] looks like underwater.” 
  • TOO HOT FOR COFFEE: According to new analysis by Climate Central, countries where coffee beans are grown “are becoming too hot to cultivate them”, reported the Guardian. The world’s top five coffee-growing countries faced “57 additional days of coffee-harming heat” annually because of climate change, it added.

Spotlight

Nature talks inch forward

This week, Carbon Brief covers the latest round of negotiations under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which occurred in Rome over 16-19 February.

The penultimate set of biodiversity negotiations before October’s Conference of the Parties ended in Rome last week, leaving plenty of unfinished business.

The CBD’s subsidiary body on implementation (SBI) met in the Italian capital for four days to discuss a range of issues, including biodiversity finance and reviewing progress towards the nature targets agreed under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).

However, many of the major sticking points – particularly around finance – will have to wait until later this summer, leaving some observers worried about the capacity for delegates to get through a packed agenda at COP17.

The SBI, along with the subsidiary body on scientific, technical and technological advice (SBSTTA) will both meet in Nairobi, Kenya, later this summer for a final round of talks before COP17 kicks off in Yerevan, Armenia, on 19 October.

Money talks

Finance for nature has long been a sticking point at negotiations under the CBD.

Discussions on a new fund for biodiversity derailed biodiversity talks in Cali, Colombia, in autumn 2024, requiring resumed talks a few months later.

Despite this, finance was barely on the agenda at the SBI meetings in Rome. Delegates discussed three studies on the relationship between debt sustainability and implementation of nature plans, but the more substantive talks are set to take place at the next SBI meeting in Nairobi.

Several parties “highlighted concerns with the imbalance of work” on finance between these SBI talks and the next ones, reported Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB).

Lim Li Ching, senior researcher at Third World Network, noted that tensions around finance permeated every aspect of the talks. She told Carbon Brief:

“If you’re talking about the gender plan of action – if there’s little or no financial resources provided to actually put it into practice and implement it, then it’s [just] paper, right? Same with the reporting requirements and obligations.”

Monitoring and reporting

Closely linked to the issue of finance is the obligations of parties to report on their progress towards the goals and targets of the GBF.

Parties do so through the submission of national reports.

Several parties at the talks pointed to a lack of timely funding for driving delays in their reporting, according to ENB.

A note released by the CBD Secretariat in December said that no parties had submitted their national reports yet; by the time of the SBI meetings, only the EU had. It further noted that just 58 parties had submitted their national biodiversity plans, which were initially meant to be published by COP16, in October 2024.

Linda Krueger, director of biodiversity and infrastructure policy at the environmental not-for-profit Nature Conservancy, told Carbon Brief that despite the sparse submissions, parties are “very focused on the national report preparation”. She added:

“Everybody wants to be able to show that we’re on the path and that there still is a pathway to getting to 2030 that’s positive and largely in the right direction.”

Watch, read, listen

NET LOSS: Nigeria’s marine life is being “threatened” by “ghost gear” – nets and other fishing equipment discarded in the ocean – said Dialogue Earth.

COMEBACK CAUSALITY: A Vox long-read looked at whether Costa Rica’s “payments for ecosystem services” programme helped the country turn a corner on deforestation.

HOMEGROWN GOALS: A Straits Times podcast discussed whether import-dependent Singapore can afford to shelve its goal to produce 30% of its food locally by 2030.

‘RUSTING’ RIVERS: The Financial Times took a closer look at a “strange new force blighting the [Arctic] landscape”: rivers turning rust-orange due to global warming.

New science

  • Lakes in the Congo Basin’s peatlands are releasing carbon that is thousands of years old | Nature Geoscience
  • Natural non-forest ecosystems – such as grasslands and marshlands – were converted for agriculture at four times the rate of land with tree cover between 2005 and 2020 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • Around one-quarter of global tree-cover loss over 2001-22 was driven by cropland expansion, pastures and forest plantations for commodity production | Nature Food

In the diary

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz.
Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 25 February 2026: Food inflation strikes | El Niño looms | Biodiversity talks stagnate appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Cropped 25 February 2026: Food inflation strikes | El Niño looms | Biodiversity talks stagnate

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