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While US President Donald Trump has ripped up much of his predecessor’s climate and foreign policy, he has pushed forward with Joe Biden’s pursuit of metals and minerals abroad while shifting the strategic focus from clean energy to military use, analysts say.

Biden spent some of his final days as US leader in Angola, talking up a railway that will bring copper and cobalt from Central Africa to the continent’s west coast where the materials can be shipped to the US.

Since coming to power in January, Trump has discussed deals to provide military assistance to the war-torn nations of Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in return for minerals, threatened to take over mineral-rich Greenland, and is reportedly considering a new law that would bypass UN discussions so as to allow mining of the deep seabed in international waters.

Explainer: Why the world is racing to mine critical minerals 

This week, Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor on Africa, travelled to DRC as his first port of call shortly after being appointed. In a meeting with DRC President Felix Tshisekedi, Boulos – father-in-law to Trump’s daughter – said the US had reviewed the DRC’s minerals proposal. He said he was “pleased to announce that the President and I have agreed on a path forward for its development,” according to a statement from the DRC government.

While the details of the mooted deal are not yet public, Boulos said he would work with Tshisekedi to build a deeper relationship that benefits both the Congolese and American people and “to stimulate American private sector investment in the DRC, particularly in the mining sector”.

A day earlier, Trump exempted key minerals like copper and cobalt from the new trade tariffs he slapped on nations around the world.

The big unanswered question is why his administration is so keen to secure supplies of these resources, which are increasingly sought after because they are key to advancing the clean energy transition.

Fadhel Kaboub, associate professor of economics at Denison University in Ohio, said Trump’s interest is likely driven primarily by the importance of critical minerals for military and high-tech purposes. “The Trump administration is known for its anti-climate action rhetoric,” he said, adding that its priority is definitely not the energy transition, but other competitive sectors such as defence.

Once extracted and processed, minerals like copper and cobalt – which the DRC has in abundance – can be used in clean technology or for military equipment, among other things. Copper can be used to channel green electricity or as a liner for anti-tank missiles. Cobalt can be used for electric vehicle batteries or alloys for fighter jets.

Stockpiling critical minerals

The Trump administration – which heavily favours fossil fuel extraction over clean energy expansion – has publicly emphasised the military uses of minerals. Adam Burstein, the Department of Defense’s technical director for strategic and critical materials, said in January that the US is committed to “stockpiling critical minerals” to reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions from China, which dominates the sector.

In February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was asked about the Dominican Republic’s minerals. He said the world needs these for “technologies that are used for defence” and other advanced technologies, adding that “we want to help develop this wealth”.

Explainer: What does it take to make clean energy technologies?

When asked if the US government’s rhetoric on sourcing minerals for defence could shift these materials away from clean technologies, Ellie Saklatvala, head of nonferrous metal pricing at Argus Media, said there may be times when “demand for metals for defence applications competes directly with demand for clean energy applications”.

When it comes to raw materials, Saklatvala added, the defence sector can usually pay more for supplies, and this can have a significant impact on overall price levels if large volumes are acquired quickly.

Thomas Kavanagh, editor for battery materials at Argus Media, said there is potential for competition between these two sectors to grow “especially as cobalt going into the US defence industry is quite limited to a small number of suppliers, mainly outside of the DRC”.

DRC lobbying campaign

While Ukraine is still working on a diplomatically tricky deal with Washington for access to its minerals and Greenland has so far resisted overtures and even threats from the US to annex it from Denmark, the DRC under Tshisekedi has actively lobbied for a deal with the Trump administration in exchange for protection from the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels which have grabbed swathes of the DRC’s east.

Shortly after Trump’s election, documents submitted to the US government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act show that the DRC began employing a Republican lobbyist called Karl Von Batten to lobby in Washington on its behalf.

By calling and emailing contacts at the House of Representatives foreign affairs committee, Von Batten managed to set up a Zoom call between its chair, Brian Mast, and Tshisekedi on February 11, according to a document published online by the US Department of Justice.

Von Batten then organised a five-day visit by a delegation from the DRC government to Washington in late February, at a cost of $350,000, where they met with US defence, state department and trade officials.

According to the official document signed by Von Batten, strengthening “military and investment ties” was on the agenda, as were “preliminary discussions about a potential meeting” between Tshisekedi and Trump and planning a media strategy on “public narratives surrounding DRC initiatives”.

Since that visit, Republican Congressman Ronny Jackson travelled to the DRC in March to meet with Tshisekedi. According to the DRC government, Jackson was acting as an envoy for Trump and said in the meeting: “We want to work so that American companies can come and invest and work in the DRC. And for that to happen, we must ensure that there is an environment of peace”.

Tshisekedi also went on Trump’s favourite TV channel – Fox News – to talk about the proposed deal. “We are very happy to say that with the Trump administration, things are moving a lot faster on both sides,” he said in French, adding, “I think the US is able to use either pressure or sanctions to make sure that armed groups that are in the DRC can be kept at bay”.

A troubled deal

Henry Sanderson, associate fellow at defence and security think-tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said the DRC is trying to “curry favour” and appeal to Trump’s “transactional” interests.

But a minerals deal with the DRC could face a “big hurdle”, Claude Kabemba, chief executive officer of Southern Africa Resource Watch, said in a policy brief.

The DRC mining sector’s “lack of transparency and accountability” could undermine a partnership, he argued, noting that “it would be difficult” for the US private sector to operate openly in the prevailing conditions of corruption and mismanagement.

Ending poverty and gangs: How Zambia seeks to cash in on the global drive for EVs

Another roadblock, according to RUSI’s Sanderson, is that the DRC wants security in return – and Trump has indicated that he does not want to get involved in foreign wars.

However, Kabemba warned that if the US does enter the DRC conflict, it could be on the other side, backing the rebels who currently control mineral-rich areas and are threatening to take over the capital Kinshasa. The rebels have, over the past year, advanced and occupied major cities in the country’s eastern region – including mining sites in North and South Kivu provinces – with large deposits of coltan.

Members of the European Parliament in February called on the European Commission to suspend an EU deal to develop sustainable raw materials value chains with Rwanda, until it stops interfering in neighbouring DRC, including exporting minerals mined from M23-controlled areas, they said in a statement. Rwanda denies that it is involved in such activities.

Kabemba believes Trump may have fewer qualms than his European counterparts. “A deal with the M23 rebels might be more appealing to Trump in the current situation,” he wrote. Trump could choose to do business with “the side that offers the best options for sustainable and long-term access to critical minerals and rare earth elements”, he added.

Making reference to the conflict during his visit this week, US Africa advisor Boulos said “there can be no economic prosperity without security”, adding that the US-DRC relationship has great potential and would involve multi-billion dollar investments which can only thrive in the most conducive business environment.

“We want a lasting peace that affirms the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the DRC, and lays the foundation for a thriving regional economy,” Boulos emphasised.

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“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos

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SYDNEY, Wednesday 22 July 2026 — Beetaloo Energy has secured land from the NT Government for a massive $40 billion “hyperscale” AI data centre near Darwin, which would be powered by 2 gigawatts (GW) of gas power fracked directly from the Beetaloo basin, prompting calls from Greenpeace for urgent federal legislation.

The proposal marks a dangerous escalation in the AI data centre industry’s expansion, which threatens to entrench fossil fuel infrastructure for decades and put immense pressure on the region’s fragile water resources — while continuing to be unregulated.

Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “This disaster proposal for a 2GW gas-powered AI data centre in the NT is a shocking example of the unchecked expansion of hyperscale data centres in Australia. It is also, critically, more evidence for the urgent need for a moratorium on all new data centres until strong, binding regulations are put in place to protect our communities and climate.

This proposal mirrors the frenzied, unchecked expansion currently wreaking havoc on communities in the US. We are seeing cowboy data centre operators treat Australia like a playground, steam-rolling ahead with projects that would lock down precious water resources and spike emissions, despite the overwhelming community opposition.

Every day, more councils, communities and environmental groups are joining Greenpeace’s call for a moratorium on data centres, yet as of today there is still no system of safeguards or rules in place to regulate these companies.  

While Beetaloo Energy and the NT Government prepare to bulldoze ahead with this climate and water disaster, the Prime Minister is asleep at the wheel, promising to legislate a vague set of standards next year.

Next year is too late, and anything less than mandating data centres cover their own energy demand, and then some, with new renewable energy is not enough.” 

-ENDS-

Media contact

Lucy Keller on 0491 135 308 or lucy.keller@greenpeace.org

“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos

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Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise

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Reports of human rights and environmental abuses linked to Chinese companies’ overseas investments in the mining and refining of minerals needed for the clean energy transition are on the rise, research by a monitoring group has found.

The number of recorded allegations of harm at projects tied to Chinese firms have increased every year since 2021, rising to 148 in 2025, according to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC). On Wednesday it released new data showing that a total of 434 allegations of abuse were made against Chinese-backed projects over the five-year period in projects across the world.

The world’s top cleantech manufacturer, China is also the leading financier of critical minerals projects worldwide. The country has committed more than $120 billion in foreign direct investment into mineral mining and processing since 2023, Australian think-tank Climate Energy Finance recently found.

“China plays a central role in global transition mineral supply chains, and as such has a unique opportunity to raise the bar on human rights and community engagement at every stage of mining,” said Michael Clements, BHRC’s executive director.

“While there have been encouraging developments, from stronger regulations to more company engagement, there remains a gap between human rights commitment and action,” he said.

The report comes as communities affected by Chinese-backed mineral projects have filed the first two cases to a Beijing-based mediation mechanism intended to bring willing Chinese companies to the discussion table with affected communities.

Allegations of harms on the rise

BHRC’s latest analysis – including data for the period 2023-2025 – covered mining, smelting and refining projects for 11 minerals considered key to manufacturing clean energy technologies such as batteries, EVs and solar panels needed to move away from climate-heating fossil fuels.

The highest number of abuses was recorded in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, which is used to make EV batteries. After the Indonesian government banned exports of raw nickel, Chinese firms invested billions of dollars to develop a large-scale nickel smelting and processing industry in the Southeast Asian country, largely powered by coal.

Other countries with a high number of recorded harms include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese firms dominate cobalt and copper production; Myanmar, where unregulated rare earths mining has caused widespread environmental destruction; Serbia, where Chinese-backed mining of some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits is swallowing land and homes, and Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments have turned the nation into Africa’s top lithium producer.

Growing risks for people and nature

Allegations tracked by BHRC included negative impacts on local livelihoods, health and land rights, workers’ health and safety and work-related deaths, as well as water pollution and environmental contamination. In addition, 18 people were attacked for raising concerns about Chinese transition mineral projects between 2023 and 2025.

The report shows that 10 Chinese companies, including Zijin Mining, Tsingshan Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, accounted for nearly two-thirds of all allegations recorded in the last five years. It found that some Chinese companies “still appear to turn a blind eye to these issues” but noted that several others have been more responsive to allegations of abuse. However, even among companies with human rights policies, implementation remains a challenge, BHRC warned.

    Zijin Mining and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt repeatedly responded to the allegations of harm by saying they take environmental and social risks seriously and adhere to international standards. Tsingshan Group never responded to BHRC’s requests for comment.

    Platform for dialogue between communities and Chinese firms

    At the same time, Chinese authorities have made “significant progress” on introducing a more specific framework for managing environmental and social risks in overseas investment, BHRC said.

    This includes global consultation on a draft Sustainable Mining Code, adherence to UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and greater emphasis on oversight of companies operating overseas.

    The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) set up a mediation and consultation mechanism intended to provide a platform for dialogue between affected communities or civil society groups that have raised concerns and Chinese companies.

    More than three years since its launch, the mechanism has now received its first two complaints from local communities and many more are considering filing a case, Margaux Day, executive director at the nonprofit Accountability Counsel, told an event hosted by Climate Home News last month.

    “This is incredibly exciting in that it fills a governance and accountability gap where often communities who are seeking to protect their rights and the environment can’t reach someone who will respond to them,” she told the panel discussion at London Climate Action Week.

    Climate Home News understands that the complaints were filed by communities in Latin America and Southeast Asia over labour rights and resettlement issues. No information about the cases has yet been made public. The mechanism’s secretariat did not respond to Climate Home News’ questions.

    The mechanism was set up after the Chinese regulator for banks and insurers called on investor-level institutions to establish complaints bodies to hear from communities outside of China. But whether the new initiative will prove effective in tackling grievances remains an open question.

    “Real potential” for better mining practices

    Participation in the mechanism is voluntary for Chinese firms and it doesn’t have a fact-finding function, nor can it impose provisions for compensation or compliance with human rights standards.

    But Day told Climate Home News that, if successful, it could bring companies to negotiate an outcome that is better for people and the planet and leads to more sustainable mining practice.

    Chen Yu, an independent China advisor for campaign group Global Witness, agreed that the mechanism holds “real potential”.

    “There exists nothing else at a similar level to promote dialogue between communities and Chinese mining companies in particular,” she said.

    For companies, the mechanism opens “a channel for problem-solving and dialogue with communities”, she added, as “Chinese companies often remain cautious of approaching affected communities directly, afraid of making the problem bigger”.

    However, Chen said the mechanism remains at an early stage of development, faces resourcing challenges and is not yet sufficiently understood by communities in mining areas or Chinese firms.

    To help it address some of these challenges, the secretariat is currently seeking technical support from a range of organisations, including civil society groups. But, Chen said, “it will take time for the mechanism to show its value”.

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    Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture

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    Andreas Sieber is head of political strategy at 350.0g. Cat Abreu is director of the International Climate Politics Hub.

    From the US abduction of Venezuela’s president at the start of this year to the Iran war which rumbles on, disruption is the new normal for global geopolitics, more often than not linked to conflict over supplies of oil and gas. 

    Events so far in 2026 – driven largely by the desire of the Trump administration to grab control of fossil fuels around the world – show that the climate community’s approach to energy diplomacy will have to evolve if we are to operate effectively and push for climate action in such a volatile landscape.

    Today’s climate and energy governance must be able to cope with trade wars, genocide, fascism, spiralling inequality and challenges to multilateralism. The increasingly dominant paradigms of economic competitiveness, energy security and green industrialisation can help drive the transition but they also challenge our collective mission to deliver an equitable green shift.

    US-China rivalry dominates

    Longer-term geopolitical trends that are seeing power move from West to East and North to South have fuelled a US–China “superpower rivalry”, which is pulling the global economy apart and reining in trade.

    A key question will be how the fracture “lines” are drawn: by the US and China, or also by other countries or blocs? Many governments will try to remain “in the middle” between the two giants to capture economic gains from both sides. Yet despite the language of “strategic autonomy”, Washington and Beijing may be in a position to force choices via market access, export controls and sanctions.

      At first glance, this may not seem particularly relevant for climate and energy politics. But Huawei’s exclusion from 5G operations across the political West and India following the so-called Clean Network Campaign by the US government serves as a warning of what could happen to climate green tech.

      And the recent debate to cut out Chinese inverters from European markets follows the same pattern – US security forces perceive a risk and start encouraging their allies to drop Chinese technology.

      The new drivers: competition and security

      Despite this fracturing geopolitical and economic context, energy transition is still happening. To ensure it is effective and equitable, we need to understand what is driving it and how to adapt climate politics so that it better responds to these drivers.

      Put simply, China is supplying the world with low-cost renewables (roughly 60% of critical wind and 80% of solar components), batteries, EVs and other key elements. Other countries now also want their piece of the green tech pie and are forming industrial policies to get it.

      It is this new competitiveness-driven logic that will shape the quest for decarbonisation, which has shifted from cooperating around the cost of tackling climate change to rivalry for the benefits of climate action.

      Over 90% of new renewables projects are now cheaper than fossil alternatives. Gas-fired power is 3–4 times more expensive than solar and wind. In 2015, most decarbonisation policies were “traditional” emissions-cutting strategies like carbon pricing or net zero dates, whereas green industrial policies now underpin the majority.

      Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister

      Meanwhile, security has become a central driver of energy politics. We are living through the second major fossil fuel crisis in just four years. Elevated oil and gas prices will impose up to $1 trillion in additional costs on the global economy by the end of the year if disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz. Fossil fuel supply chains have exposed countries to conflict, coercion and brutal price shocks.

      Fossil fuel volatility destabilises whole economies – higher fuel costs drive up food prices, increase political instability, and push millions into poverty and hunger. This incentivises governments to shield themselves from global shocks, especially in countries that are net fossil fuel importers and home to roughly three-quarters of the world’s population. 

      Yet security fears can cut both ways. The same instability that makes fossil fuel dependence untenable is also sharpening concern over China’s dominance of critical clean technologies and supply chains.

      Equity, cooperation and the opportunity for change

      Developing countries benefit from the rapid uptake of renewables enabled by low-cost Chinese technologies. But significant fiscal space and public investment is needed for the electricity grids and infrastructure required to fully unleash the energy transition, as well as for green industrialisation to diversify revenue streams.

      Despite this, industrial-scale domestic production and ownership often remain out of reach for too many countries that lack the fiscal space to allow green supply chains to flourish and compete with their traditional industrial base. But more just and diversified green tech supply chains could be achieved with concomitant support.

      Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?

      For the first time in decades, the international order is being substantially reshaped. If within this context, decarbonisation is increasingly driven by green industrial policy, energy security and competitiveness, the climate policy community must better anticipate where these debates are moving. We must speak the same language, and enter the forums where decisions are made, including security, trade and bilateral or trilateral spaces.

      We should build on an enlightened self interest recognising that cooperation remains essential and beneficial. This includes using the UN climate process differently: less as an ever-expanding negotiation machine, and more as a space for norm-setting, political alignment and deal-making. In an age of fragmentation, effective cooperation must not only be framed as necessary but thought of as a strategically compelling source of resilience and shared advantage.

      The post Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture appeared first on Climate Home News.

      Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture

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