Over the past decade, coal power use in the European Union (EU) has fallen by 61%, according to Carbon Brief analysis of new figures from energy analysts Ember.
Solar power output in the EU more than tripled between 2014 and 2024, the report shows, with last year seeing coal generation overtaken for the first time.
Meanwhile, wind generation has more than doubled over the same period.
Wind and solar growth over the past decade pushed EU fossil-fuel generation in 2024 to its lowest level in 40 years, despite the long-term decline of nuclear power.
The increase in wind and solar generation in the EU also helped avoid €59bn in fossil-fuel imports over the past five years, Ember says.
Without the increase in solar and wind capacity since 2019, the EU would have imported an extra 92bn cubic metres (bcm) of gas and 55m tonnes (Mt) of hard coal. Ember says this helped avoid cumulative emissions of some 460m tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2).
Accelerated wind and solar growth facilitated by permitting reform and other measures could help the EU end Russian energy imports entirely, adds Ember.
Five years of falling fossil fuels
Last year marked five years since the passing of the European Green Deal, officially declaring a “climate emergency” and requiring the European Commission to adapt all its proposals to fall in line with limiting global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.
Since then, the EU’s electricity sector has seen a “deep transformation”, according to Ember, with a “surge” in renewables driving down the use of fossil fuels and related CO2 emissions.
In 2019, fossil fuels provided 39% – some 1,130 terawatt hours (TWh) – of the EU’s electricity, while renewables provided 34% (979TWh). By the end of 2024, fossil fuels had fallen to 29% (793TWh) – the lowest level in at least 40 years – while renewables had grown to nearly half of the mix (47%, 1,300TWh).
The growth of wind and solar ensured that, despite a decline in nuclear over the past 10 years, coal and gas are both being squeezed out of the electricity generation mix in the EU, as shown in the chart below.
The growth of solar and wind over the past five years has cumulatively avoided 736TWh of fossil-fired generation. This is equivalent to 460m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2), or roughly the same as the power-sector emissions of Italy over the past five years, Ember states.
The emissions intensity of electricity fell by 26% over this period, to 213 grams of CO2 per kilowatt hour (gCO2 per kWh). This is a steeper decline than that seen in other major economies such as the US, notes Ember, where the emissions intensity of electricity generation fell by 13% over the same period.
Over the past five years, EU solar capacity tripled from 120 gigawatts (GW) to 338GW, continuing the rapid expansion seen in the previous five years. Wind capacity has grown by 37%, from 169GW in 2019 to 231GW in 2024.
Hydropower capacity since the passage of the Green New Deal has remained flat at 130GW and nuclear capacity has fallen from 110GW to 96GW, Ember notes.
The continued growth of wind and solar means EU electricity generation from coal has now dropped by nearly two thirds over the past decade, as the chart below shows. This is despite a small, temporary uptick in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2021.
Moreover, while gas-fired generation in 2024 was slightly higher than it was a decade earlier, it has also dropped every year for the past five years, Ember’s data shows.
Without the growth in renewables since the Green New Deal was brought in, the EU would have spent €59bn on fossil-fuel imports for power generation, according to Ember. Of this, €53bn would have been spent on gas and €6bn on coal.
In total, the EU avoided importing approximately 92bcm, or around 18% of gas consumed in the power sector between the end of 2019 and the end of 2024. It also avoided imports of 55Mt of hard coal.
Coal has been particularly impacted by the growth of solar and wind, falling from 16% of the EU electricity mix in 2019 to less than 10% in 2024. This has more than cancelled out the impact of the temporary uptick in 2021 and 2022 during the gas crisis.
In 2024, coal provided less than 5% of the power mix in 16 EU countries, Ember says, 10 of which had no operating coal power plants.
Portugal phased coal out of its electricity mix completely and a new wave of coal power plant closures is “imminent”, says Ember. There are 11 EU countries that have announced plans to totally phase out coal from their electricity mix in the next five years.
Along with the fall in coal power, gas fell by a quarter over the past five years from providing 20% of EU power in 2019 to 16% in 2024, according to Ember.
This drop has contributed to efforts to limit EU reliance on Russian gas, although imports from the nation still accounted for 14% of total gas consumption in 2024.
While this was down from around 50% in 2019, it was an increase of 18% on the previous year, mainly due to increased imports into Italy, the Czech Republic and France.
According to Ember, the power sector consumed approximately 88bcm of gas in 2024, of which 10bcm (12%) was Russian, as shown in the figure below. These imports provided the country with an estimated €4bn in revenue.
Even with the uptick in 2024, the EU’s power sector is far less reliant on importing Russian gas than it was five years earlier, Ember’s data shows.
Solar continues to surge
There was a record increase in solar generation in 2024, up 54TWh (+22%) year-on-year, according to Ember. This is despite the sector having already seen growth of 40TWh in 2023.
Additionally, 2024 saw record annual capacity additions, with the EU solar fleet growing by 66GW, 4% more than the 63GW addition seen in 2023.
This growth rate is above what national targets would require and nearly sufficient to hit the EU’s 2030 goal, notes Ember, as shown in the figure below.
Ember says this is “highlighting a disconnect between the rapid pace of on-the-ground market trends and the slow response of governments in updating their targets”.
In 2024, solar output grew in all EU members and 16 countries generated more than 10% of their electricity from the technology, the report notes – three more than the previous year.
However, in some countries, solar is getting close to exceeding demand during peak hours, according to Ember. Its report says that 12 EU countries saw solar generating 80% or more of power demand for at least one hour in 2024.
As such, plentiful solar is pushing hourly power prices to zero or even below. In 2024, negative or zero price hours became more common, growing from 2% of hours in 2023 to 4% in 2024 across the EU.
The increase in negative pricing periods highlights the business case for more flexibility options, notes Ember, with consumers able to save money by shifting demand to periods of abundant generation or using battery storage to take advantage of low-cost solar generation by selling it back to the grid during demand peaks.
While the deployment of battery storage has been growing in recent years – doubling to 16GW in 2023 from 8GW in 2022, the report notes – capacity is concentrated in a small number of countries, with Germany and Italy together housing 70% of existing battery capacity in the EU as of the end of 2023.
Additionally, demand flexibility and smart electrification could help consumers reduce their bills, Ember states. Grids and cross-border interconnectors can help to provide additional flexibility across the EU, it adds.
Wind woes easing
Beyond solar, wind generation grew 7TWh year-on-year in 2024, to reach 477TWh, according to Ember.
While this growth is lower than the average of 30TWh seen between 2019 and 2023, the technology remains cost-competitive with fossil power and installation rates are expected to increase in coming years, the report says.
Between 2010 and 2021, the cost of European onshore and offshore wind fell by 68% and 60%, respectively, Ember notes, based on levelised costs, a standardised metric used to gauge the average cost of electricity generation of a technology.
However, wind costs have broadly plateaued since then, according to the report, due to high inflation and supply chain problems following the Covid-19 pandemic and the global energy crisis.
While these issues have affected a range of sectors, the wind industry has felt them more acutely than solar, according to Ember, due to longer lead times and relatively higher upfront investment requirements.
This has been seen around the world, with the UK and the US amongst the nations to have seen their wind sectors knocked by higher prices.
Despite the impact of these factors on the deployment costs of wind, it remains competitive compared to gas generation, argues Ember. The price of buying gas fuel on European markets has grown throughout 2024, sitting at around €50 per megawatt hour (MWh) at the end of the year – well above the pre-crisis norm of €20/MWh.
As such, the average short-run marginal cost of EU gas-fired power across 2024 reached a high of around €125/MWh in December, continues Ember. This remains above the typical costs of both onshore and offshore wind.
In addition to facing macroeconomic headwinds, Ember says that expanding grids, permitting new projects and managing grid connections have been “inadequate for the pace of the energy transition”.
Action is being taken by governments within the EU however, for example, rules brought in to cut the permitting times for onshore wind from six years to two years.
Permitting rates were higher in the first half of 2024 than the previous year in most markets, which Ember says boosts confidence that the project pipeline for wind is strengthening.
In Germany, for example, approvals reached 12GW, up by 60% compared to the same period in 2023, notes the report.
Turbine orders also recovered, up 40% between January and September 2024 compared to the same period in 2023, while auctions awarded contracts to a record 28GW of new capacity across the EU in 2024.
However, while there are signs of growth, delays in recent years have created a wider delivery gap between market forecasts and EU ambition, the report notes.
In a statement, Dr Chris Rosslowe, senior analyst and lead author of the report, says:
“While the EU’s electricity transition has moved faster than anyone expected in the last five years, further progress cannot be taken for granted…However, the achievements of the past five years should instil confidence that, with continued drive and commitment, challenges can be overcome and a more secure energy future be achieved.”
The report calls on the EU to build on the momentum seen in the past five years. Ember suggests this could include ending Russian energy imports, supporting the European wind industry and enacting permitting reforms, among other changes.
The post EU’s solar and wind growth pushes fossil-fuel power to lowest level in 40 years appeared first on Carbon Brief.
EU’s solar and wind growth pushes fossil-fuel power to lowest level in 40 years
It was the second defeat for the Trump administration’s unusual litigation to stop states from acting on climate change.
In a setback to the Trump administration’s extraordinary legal campaign against state climate action, a federal judge threw out the Justice Department’s lawsuit seeking to prevent the state of Hawaii from suing oil companies for damages.
Judge Dismisses Trump Administration’s Bid to Block Hawaii Climate Lawsuit
Climate Change
DeBriefed 17 April 2026: Fossil-fuel power slumps | ‘Super’ El Niño warning | Afghanistan’s climate struggle
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Oil prices rebound
OIL UP AGAIN: Oil prices surged by more than 7% and back above $100 a barrel on Monday after US-Iran peace talks faltered and US president Donald Trump ordered the blockading of Iranian ports, reported BBC News. The jump came after prices fell last week in the wake of the announcement of a conditional two-week ceasefire, it said.
RESCUE PLANS: European countries unveiled plans to protect citizens and businesses from rising energy prices. Ireland announced a support package worth €505m, reported BBC News, while Germany agreed on measures worth €1.6bn, said Bloomberg. Meanwhile, Reuters reported on a draft EU proposal due to be unveiled next week that would see the bloc reduce electricity prices and roll out clean energy more quickly in response to the crisis.
UNSOLICITED ADVICE: Trump renewed his criticism of UK energy policy and called on the government to “drill, baby drill”, reported the Independent. Via social media, the president said: “Europe is desperate for energy, and yet the United Kingdom refuses to open North Sea oil, one of the greatest fields in the world. Tragic!!!” (See Carbon Brief’s recent factcheck of various false claims about the North Sea.)
Around the world
- C-WORD: Faced with pressure from the US, countries attending spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were urged to “not mention the climate”, reported the Guardian. It added that plans to agree a new “climate change action plan” for the World Bank “may be shelved, along with substantive discussion of the climate crisis”.
- NEW DIRECTION: Péter Magyar’s landslide victory over Victor Orbán in Hungary’s elections “presents new opportunities for the country to reduce emissions and invest in clean energy”, reported Time. Carbon Brief explored what it means for European climate action.
- ‘FURNACE’ SUMMER: There was widespread coverage – including in the Boston Globe, ABC News, CNN, Euro Weekly News, Guardian and New Scientist – of warnings from meteorologists of the development of a “super” El Niño phenomenon that could ramp up temperatures and drive extreme weather.
- ANTALYA COP: The Turkish government unveiled the dates and venues for the “leaders’ summit” segment of November’s COP31 conference, according to Climate Home News.
- PACIFIC PRE-COP: Meanwhile, the Guardian reported that Tuvalu will host a special meeting of world leaders before the climate summit in Antalya.
€10bn a year
The amount of state support that French prime minister Sébastien Lecornu has pledged for electrification through to 2030 in a bid to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. In a speech late on Friday 10 April, Lecornu noted the figure amounted to a “doubling” of existing support.
Latest climate research
- Over a four-month period of 2023, more than 70% of editorials discussing net-zero in four right-leaning UK newspapers included “at least one misleading statement” | Climate Policy
- Air pollution from global transport currently has a net cooling effect that offsets 80% of the warming impact of the sector’s CO2 emissions | npj Climate and Atmospheric Science
- The incorporation of “observational constraints” into climate-model projections suggests that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation could weaken by 50% by 2100 in a medium-emissions scenario | Science Advances
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) found that global electricity generation from fossil fuels fell in the first month of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Across all countries with real-time electricity data outside of China, coal-fired power generation fell 3.5% and gas-fired power generation fell 4.0%, according to CREA. This was offset by a rise in solar power and wind generation, which increased by 14% and 8%, respectively. Hydropower generation also saw a small increase, the analysis showed, but this was “more than offset” by a drop in nuclear power generation.
Spotlight
How climate change affects Afghan lives
This week, Carbon Brief reports on the impact of climate change in Afghanistan, following deadly floods this year.
Earlier this month, heavy rains, flash floods and landslides struck large parts of Afghanistan, damaging thousands of homes, destroying crops, bridges and roads and taking nearly 100 lives.
The flooding – reported to have affected 74,000 people in 31 of 34 provinces – is the latest weather-related catastrophe to afflict the nation, whose communities have suffered the brunt of repeated flash floods, droughts and landslides in recent years.
Hameed Hakimi, non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, told Carbon Brief the recent floods would hurt livelihoods and food security, noting reports of destroyed wheat and rice crops in the most affected eastern parts of the country. He said:
“This is common. For at least a decade now, [we have seen] these flash floodings and the damage that happens to rural life, farming, the disruption to crops…Flash flooding physically eats up the land. So, it not only damages where people live, but also people’s livelihoods, based on what they grow.”
The damage to crops will be felt acutely, he explained, given that food security in the landlocked nation is already strained by the blockage of its main transit trade artery through Pakistan and international sanctions that have frozen long-term development aid.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Abdulhadi Achakzai, founding CEO of the Environmental Protection Trainings and Development Organization (EPTDO), an Afghan NGO, described flooding in Afghanistan as a “chronic situation”.
Achakzai, whose organisation runs projects that help urban and rural communities adapt to climate impacts, says climate change hurts the country in four key ways: extreme drought; extreme temperature; “natural hazards”, including landslides and dust storms; and, finally, flash flooding. He said:
“Climate change is a serious matter in Afghanistan. Every nation and every corner within this country is severely affected.”
Ranked 176 of 187 on the University of Notre Dame “global adaptation index”, Afghanistan is among the countries most vulnerable to climate change.
Average temperature across the country has increased from 12.2C in 1960 to 14.2C in 2024, according to the World Bank’s climate change knowledge portal. Drought is widespread, severe and persistent – harming food and water security in a nation of subsistence farmers.
Meanwhile, extreme weather events are the leading driver of internal displacement in the country. More than three-quarters of the 710,000 people who relocated within Afghanistan in 2024 did so driven by “environmental hazards”, such as drought and flood, according to a recent climate vulnerability assessment from the International Organization for Migration.
Finance struggles
Despite feeling the impacts of extreme weather, Afghanistan has been barred from UN climate negotiations and had limited access to climate finance since 2021. (The government attended COP29 in Baku as guests of the Azerbaijan hosts, but did not take part in formal negotiations.)
This is because the international community does not recognise the Taliban government, which resumed power in 2021, due to its record on human rights and its repression of women and girls in particular.
Almost all financing from key climate funds has been suspended, with the exception of a few projects where UN agencies and NGOs act simultaneously as a “requesting” and “implementation” partner.
Aid from UN climate funds fell from $5.9m annually over 2014-20 to $3.9m annually over 2021-24, according to recent analysis by the Berghof Foundation. Multilateral development banks provided a further $337m of funds badged as “climate finance” over 2021-23, it said.
By comparison, Afghanistan’s national climate plan, submitted to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2016, requested $17.4bn in climate finance over 2020-30. An updated national climate plan seen by Carbon Brief – completed in 2021 and later endorsed by the Taliban government, but not accepted by member governments of the UNFCCC – called for $20.6bn through to 2030.
Achakzai, whose organisation attends the COP climate summit each year in an observer capacity, has in the past been the sole delegate from Afghanistan to the conference.
He is calling on the UNFCCC to accept the country’s latest climate plan – and to find an “alternative solution” that would give the people of the country a voice in negotiations. He said:
“Every year we are losing hundreds, thousands of people because of climate change-related matters. Every year we are losing hundreds, thousands of hectares of crops. We are affected by [the decisions of] other countries. Why are we not part of this process?”
Watch, read, listen
BLOSSOM WATCHER: The Guardian reported on the successful search to find a researcher to continue Japan’s 1,200-year cherry blossom record.
COP OUT: Deutsche Welle spoke to experts to understand why India walked away from its bid to host COP33 in 2028.
‘BOMBS AND PORN’: The New Republic looked at who is set to benefit from the rapid build-out of energy-intensive AI datacentres.
Coming up
- 20-24 April: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) working group one report author meeting, Santiago, Chile
- 22 April: Earth day
- 22 April: Launch of third edition of the Lancet Countdown’s Europe report
- 24-29 April: First conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels, Santa Marta, Colombia
Pick of the jobs
- International Organization for Migration, senior thematic associate (climate action) | Salary: UN G-6 salary grade | Location: Dakar, Senegal
- Climate Action Network UK, several board member roles | Salary: Unknown. Location: Unknown
- UK Department for Energy, Food and Rural Affairs, G7 science lead | Salary: £56,375. Location: Bristol, London, Newcastle-upon-Tyne or York, UK
- Save the Children UK, senior climate change advisor | Salary: £62,000-£65,000. Location: London
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 17 April 2026: Fossil-fuel power slumps | ‘Super’ El Niño warning | Afghanistan’s climate struggle appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The right-wing populist Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán has suffered a landslide electoral defeat to the centre-right Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar.
This brings to an end 16 years of rule by Orbán and his Fidesz party, a move welcomed by many around the world who were concerned about Hungary’s “slide toward authoritarianism”.
Hungary has played a disproportionate role in EU climate and energy policy in recent years, by repeatedly vetoing climate action and by delaying the phaseout of Russian fossil-fuel imports.
Magyar did not prioritise climate and energy issues in his electoral campaign, but he has championed cooperation with the EU and proposed a 2035 deadline for “eliminating Russian energy dependence”.
Hungarian experts tell Carbon Brief that, while the new government is yet to be formed, it is likely that Magyar will move quickly to secure EU funds for “green” measures.
One expert notes that “this is not a progressive pivot”, with Hungary unlikely to emerge as a climate leader in the EU, even if it is less disruptive to the bloc’s wider climate strategy.
- What was Orbán’s approach to climate action?
- What will be the new Hungarian government’s climate and energy policies?
- How will the new government approach EU climate policy?
- What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?
What was Orbán’s approach to climate action?
Hungary has had a mixed record on climate change under then prime minister Orbán, supporting some relevant actions while opposing others – particularly those taken at an EU level. This broadly reflects his Fidesz party’s populist and Eurosceptic leanings.
Orbán has described the EU’s climate goals as a “utopian fantasy” that would “destroy the middle class”. He has also accused “western elites” of wanting people to “live in fear” of climate change.
Yet, despite being embraced by climate sceptics elsewhere and supporting climate-sceptic lobbyists, Orbán’s government has not overtly adopted such sceptical rhetoric.
In fact, reflecting broad Hungarian support for climate action, Orbán has framed his nation as a “climate champion” – albeit one taking a “pragmatic” approach. This was captured in his speech at the COP29 summit in 2024, when he said:
“We must continue advancing the green transition, while also maintaining our use of natural gas, oil and nuclear energy…Our climate policy should be guided by careful consideration and common sense, not by ideology, alarmism or panic.”
Domestically, Orbán’s government has pursued various climate goals, including a 2050 net-zero target, phasing out coal power by 2029 and supporting the expansion of solar power.
What will be the new Hungarian government’s climate and energy policies?
Climate change was not a major issue in the April election and Magyar, the incoming prime minister, hardly mentioned it in his campaign.
However, the 243-page manifesto released by his Tisza party includes many climate-related proposals, such as home insulation, railway electrification and tackling drought.
The document says some of these measures – notably “energy modernisation and efficiency programmes” – will be funded with billions of euros in EU funds that have been frozen under Orbán. (See: How will the new government approach EU climate policy?)
One notable pledge is to “double the share of renewable energy in domestic energy supply” by 2040. As the chart below shows, Hungary already generates three-quarters of its electricity from clean sources – predominantly Paks, its single nuclear power plant.
Nearly a third of Hungary’s electricity comes from solar, which has benefited from supportive government schemes in recent years. In contrast, for years, the Orbán government blocked the construction of wind turbines, meaning there is virtually no wind power in Hungary.
The Tisza manifesto recognises this imbalance, stating that “we will abolish the unnecessary restrictions preventing the installation of new wind turbines”, while also supporting geothermal energy.
Energy prices are a key political issue in Hungary, as they are in many nations around the world. Orbán’s “utility cost reduction” has been a flagship policy for many years, capping household prices using large state subsidies.
During the election, Orbán accused his opponent of planning to get rid of the energy price cap. In fact, the Tizsa manifesto says the new government will “maintain and expand” the scheme and add new VAT cuts on firewood.
Despite having few batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) domestically, Hungary has emerged in recent years as a major battery manufacturer, driven by Chinese and South Korean investment. However, this boom has sparked environmental and social concerns.
Zsolt Lengyel, founder and chair of the Institute for European Energy and Climate Policy (IEECP), tells Carbon Brief:
“Orbán’s battery and EV strategy – in theory, a flagship of the transition – has backfired politically…So Tisza inherits a paradox: it needs to accelerate the transition, but does so in an environment where parts of that transition have already lost public legitimacy.”
With much still unknown about Magyar’s attitude to climate and energy policy, some Hungarian experts that Carbon Brief spoke to cautioned against “speculation” and “wishful thinking” when assessing his climate credentials.
How will the new government approach EU climate policy?
There is cautious optimism among EU officials and leaders that a Hungarian government led by Magyar will be more cooperative on EU-led initiatives.
Under Orbán, Hungary has been a vocal and persistent opponent of EU climate policies.
Since 2011, 21 of all the 48 vetoes on joint EU actions have been used by Hungary. These include blocking efforts to sanction Russia following the country’s invasion of Ukraine. (See: What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?)
Among other issues, Hungary has vetoed or obstructed progress on the EU’s 2050 net-zero target, the “fit for 55” legislative package to help meet that goal and the 2035 ban on petrol and diesel cars.
Generally, this opposition did not totally block these policies, as most did not require unanimous agreement among EU member states. However, it did tend to slow down or complicate the process. Hungary was also not acting alone – it was often joined by fellow eastern and central European states, claiming the policies would have high costs.
Nevertheless, the Orbán government’s aversion to the EU has taken it further than other states. In recent months, for example, Hungary has launched a legal case against the EU over its phaseout plan for Russian oil and gas imports.
In this context, Lengyel tells Carbon Brief:
“Orbán’s exit removes Hungary’s most damaging feature in EU climate politics: the ideological reflex to oppose ‘anything Brussels does’.”
However, just because Magyar is less hostile to the EU does not mean his government will be a climate leader.
Magyar’s centre-right Tisza party is aligned with the European People’s Party (EPP) grouping in the European parliament, which has been instrumental in weakening EU climate goals in recent months. Given this, Lengyel tells Carbon Brief.
“Let’s be clear: this is not a progressive pivot. Tisza sits close to the EPP mainstream and is unlikely to challenge it. If anything, it will follow it, including on any watering down of green-deal elements.”
Crucially, Hungary is entitled to billions of euros of EU funds that have been blocked due to breaches of conditions regarding the rule of law and human rights under Orbán.
These include €9.5bn for Hungary’s recovery and resilience plan, the EU’s post-Covid recovery fund, much of which is earmarked for the “green transition”.
This finance needs to be disbursed before the end of August – and both Magyar and the EU have been clear that unlocking the funds is a priority.
Jozsef Feiler, director of the south-east Europe and Hungary programme at the European Climate Foundation, which funds Carbon Brief, says “full EU compliance” will be crucial for Hungary over the coming months, in order to obtain these funds. He tells Carbon Brief:
“The economic and financial stability of the new government [will depend] on obtaining the recovery and resilience facility funds and managing some kind of absorption before the 26 August hard deadline.”
Another early challenge will be the new government’s approach to the new part of the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) – known as ETS2 – which will put a price on emissions from buildings, cars and other sources not covered in the original ETS.
ETS2 is already facing criticism from member states concerned about rising fuel costs. Moreover, Hungary is likely to be one of the countries that is most exposed to high fossil-fuel prices.
István Bart, a senior director in carbon pricing at the Environmental Defence Fund, tells Carbon Brief that Orbán’s government has done little to help with the implementation of ETS2, which is currently due to start in 2028. He notes that, with the question of affordability so fraught in Hungary, it is unclear how Magyar will tackle this issue.
What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?
One of the most notable policy statements made in Tisza’s manifesto is a commitment that:
“By 2035, we will eliminate Russian energy dependence and diversify our domestic energy supply.”
Despite its relatively clean electricity supply, Hungary is still heavily reliant on fossil fuels – including in its transport, heating and industrial sectors – the majority of which are imported.
Russia is Hungary’s main fossil-fuel trading partner, with the Druzhba and TurkStream pipelines supplying much of the smaller nation’s needs for oil and gas, respectively.
Among EU member states, Hungary is second only to Slovakia in terms of reliance on Russian fossil fuels. In 2024, 74% of Hungary’s gas and 48% of its oil were imported from Russia, as shown in the chart below.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most EU nations have taken steps to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
The EU has implemented a series of sanctions on Russia and the European Commission launched the REPowerEU plan to “fully end dependency on Russian energy”.
Under Orbán, however, Hungary has obstructed efforts to wean the EU off Russian fossil fuels, citing energy-security concerns. It has successfully negotiated exemptions from Russian oil sanctions, allowing the country to increase its reliance on cheap Russian crude.
The REPowerEU regulation involves a ban on Russian pipeline gas by September 2027. Unlike sanctions, the EU did not need unanimity among states to pass this.
It is notable that Tisza has only committed to end reliance on Russian energy by 2035 – eight years after the EU deadline. It is unclear how Magyar’s new government will negotiate this discrepancy, especially given long-term contracts with Russian suppliers.
Hungary also relies on Russia for nuclear technology and supplies of uranium for its nuclear plant. In its manifesto, Tisza says it will explore the possibility of sourcing nuclear fuel from US or French suppliers, as well as building small modular reactors.
Orbán had already started pursuing diversified nuclear and fossil-fuel supplies by buying from the US, even as it secured exemptions from US sanctions on Russian energy imports. It is possible that Tisza may maintain this approach.
However, with the Iran war and energy crisis looming in recent months, Bart, from EDF, tells Carbon Brief:
“Before the Iran war started, you could have said: ‘Why don’t you just buy LNG [liquified natural gas]?’…Now it seems like less of an option, so, unfortunately, in the short term, [Russian gas] has to stay because we don’t really have an alternative.”
The post Q&A: What Magyar’s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What Magyar’s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy
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