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U.S. Raises Tariffs on $8B China Imports, EVs, Batteries, and Solar Cells Included

The Biden-Harris Administration’s Investing in America agenda has successfully spurred more than $860 billion in business investments. In line with this, the White House has officially announced its intent to increase tariffs on Chinese imports. 

President Biden has emphasized that American workers and businesses can outcompete their global counterparts if they have fair competition. However, China’s government has been criticized for engaging in unfair, non-market practices such as forced technology transfers and intellectual property theft.

According to the White House, these practices have enabled China to dominate the global production of essential inputs for various technologies, infrastructure, energy, and healthcare, posing substantial risks to American supply chains and economic security. 

The Biden Administration’s policies aim to counter these challenges by fostering fair competition, reducing dependence on foreign supply chains, and strengthening domestic production capabilities.

To address issues related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, the President is directing an increase in tariffs on $18 billion worth of imports from China. These sectors include steel and aluminum, semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries, critical minerals, solar cells, and medical products. 

Below, we focus on the key takeaways from three crucial sectors of US clean energy manufacturing:

Boosting the Domestic EV Industry

The Biden administration is significantly increasing tariffs on EVs from China to protect and promote American manufacturing. Here are the key details and implications:

  • Tariff Increase: The tariff rate on electric vehicles under Section 301 will increase from 25% to 100% in 2024.
  • Rationale: This dramatic increase responds to extensive subsidies and non-market practices in China, which have led to a 70% growth in Chinese EV exports from 2022 to 2023. This surge threatens productive investments in other regions.

Chinese EV exports 2023

  • Objective: By imposing a 100% tariff, the administration aims to shield American manufacturers from these unfair trade practices, fostering a domestic EV industry built by American workers.
  • Supportive Measures: the administration is incentivizing the development of a robust EV market through:
    • Business tax credits for battery manufacturing and critical minerals production.
    • Consumer tax credits for EV adoption.
    • Federal investments in EV charging infrastructure.
    • Grants supporting EV and battery manufacturing.

The U.S. isn’t alone in expressing concerns over China’s strides in “new energy vehicles.” The European Commission had initiated an inquiry into subsidized electric cars from China, probing whether Chinese battery EV value chains benefit from “illegal subsidization,” potentially harming EU BEV producers.

EU trade commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis recently noted that the investigation is progressing, hinting at possible tariffs before the summer break.

China has risen as the globe’s largest electric car market, buoyed by government policies and incentives to spur EV adoption. These include subsidies, tax incentives, and a credit system mandating car manufacturers to meet specified quotas, resembling a carbon credit trading scheme.

Strengthening the Battery Supply Chain

The administration is also increasing tariffs on various battery-related products and critical minerals to strengthen the domestic supply chain:

  • Tariff Increases:
    • Lithium-ion EV batteries: From 7.5% to 25% in 2024.
    • Lithium-ion non-EV batteries: From 7.5% to 25% in 2026.
    • Battery parts: From 7.5% to 25% in 2024.
    • Natural graphite and permanent magnets: From 0% to 25% in 2026.
    • Certain other critical minerals: From 0% to 25% in 2024.
  • Rationale: China controls over 80% of certain segments of the EV battery supply chain, particularly upstream nodes like critical minerals mining, processing, and refining. This concentration poses risks to U.S. supply chains, national security, and clean energy goals.
China dominates EV battery supply chain, US clean energy
Source: Bloomberg
  • Supportive Measures:
    • Nearly $20 billion invested in grants and loans to expand domestic production capacity for advanced batteries and battery materials.
    • Manufacturing tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act to incentivize investment in U.S. battery production.
    • The American Battery Materials Initiative mobilizes government resources to secure a robust supply chain for batteries and their inputs.

RELEVANT: US Imports of Lithium and Critical Minerals Drop Amidst Shifting EV Market

Energizing the U.S. Solar Industry

Tariffs on solar cells will also be increased, with the following changes:

  • Tariff Increase: The tariff rate on solar cells (whether or not assembled into modules) will increase from 25% to 50% in 2024.
  • Rationale: China’s policy-driven overcapacity depresses prices and inhibits solar capacity development outside China. The country dominates 80-90% of certain parts of the global solar supply chain through nonmarket practices.
  • Objective: The tariff increase aims to protect and foster the U.S. solar industry, encouraging investment in solar manufacturing and reducing dependency on Chinese imports.
  • Supportive Measures:
    • Supply-side tax incentives for solar components, such as polysilicon, wafers, cells, modules, and backsheet material.
    • Tax credits, grants, and loan programs to support utility-scale and residential solar energy projects.
    • Nearly $17 billion in planned investment in the U.S. solar supply chain announced under the Biden administration, an eight-fold increase in U.S. manufacturing capacity.

The US government’s strategic investments and policy measures aim to revolutionize the American manufacturing landscape, particularly in clean energy technologies. All these measures are designed to promote fair competition, protect American industries, and ensure a secure and resilient supply chain for critical technologies and clean energy.

The post U.S. Raises Tariffs on $8B China Imports: EVs, Batteries, and Solar Cells Included appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

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Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?

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