Since Donald Trump moved into the White House for his second term as president in January 2025, you’d be forgiven for thinking the US has abandoned all action to tackle climate change and is working aggressively to undermine the efforts of other countries towards that end.
This week, at the Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington DC, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent cast doubt on the scientific consensus around global warming and pressured the two institutions to reverse what he called their “mission creep” and “myopic focus” on climate.
But this hostile rhetoric from the Trump administration and its withdrawal from the UN climate regime – coupled with its support for fossil fuels – doesn’t tell the whole story of what’s happening in the US, according to Lou Leonard, the first dean of the School of Climate, Environment, and Society at Clark University.
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At the state, city and community level, as well as in business and higher education, efforts are resolutely continuing to reduce planet-heating emissions, boost clean energy and adapt to climate shocks, Leonard, an environmental lawyer, told Climate Home News in an interview from Massachusetts.
Thanks to impetus from coalitions such as America Is All In – whose predecessor group he helped launch – the US can still make significant progress towards its 2035 goals to cut emissions, research shows. Leonard, who worked as senior vice president for climate and energy at the World Wildlife Fund for over a decade, explains how US climate action and the Paris Agreement can survive Trump’s wrecking ball.
Q: Has the effect of the Trump administration’s efforts to undermine global climate action and the UN climate process been worse than you expected?
A: A thing that is striking to me, looking at the decade of the Paris Agreement… is that over the course of that decade, the United States had a hostile sort of leadership in Washington, and the agreement has endured.
And it has endured despite the United States, not because of the United States – at least from a federal standpoint. The US was really important in the formation stage but has not been as vital to the endurance of the agreement.
Q: Is it not fair to say though that the current US abandonment of the UN climate process could reduce the impact and influence of the Paris Agreement?
A: The nature of an international cooperative framework means that the aggregate ambition is as strong as the countries that make up it, right? I’m not saying that, in the dream scenario where every country was in a really aggressively positive place that we would not get more out of the international framework. There’s no question that that’s true.
I think it’s just when we’re thinking about the singular role of one country – even the United States – there’s much more in play here than that theory of how things were going to work; the centrality of the United States to all this, especially at the Washington level. I think that turned out to be wrong – at least in the longest sweep of the progress that we’ve made.
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I think the reason why what’s happening in Washington didn’t have as great an impact as it might have in the rest of the world is because the story of what’s happening in the United States is not limited to what’s happening in Washington.
And that’s the second part – which is the things that sometimes frustrate people about the American political system – the sharing of power and the federal system, and all of those things which were intentionally built into the US system.
In these moments, that structure has helped create a reality… and then the rest of the world can see for itself that there’s all these efforts through America Is All In and in other places to bring those actors and that leadership and analysis of the impact of that effort to the rest of the world. I think that that has been an important part of the story of why the Paris Agreement has endured.
Q: What have some of the most important of those subnational efforts been in your view?
A: California’s the most obvious example, because it’s the world’s sixth largest economy and it’s certainly one of the most aggressive states moving forward on climate action. But it’s more than that: if you look at the America Is All In analysis that was released at COP30 in Belém, it shows a roadmap to maintain US trajectories, as a way to keep things from really collapsing when you have these changes in federal leadership.
There’s a parallel there to what’s happening globally – this is a distributed effort. We need all of society, all over the world, to be moving in this direction in order to reach our most ambitious goals.
And I think the fact that the US has over half of the economy, at least, really leaning in this direction really helps. And then if you just look at the energy transition in the US, we have begun to reach this tipping point where the role of the markets and the role of politics are shifting to some degree.
We really needed the policy incentives, and a lot of that [earlier] signal coming from Washington and then the states to get us to a point where renewable energy penetration was significant enough to begin to have momentum on its own, and I think we’re starting to see that. In just the last two years, over 90% of the new generation capacity in the United States has been renewables.
Q: Where do you see real momentum on US climate action continuing or gathering pace despite what Washington is up to?
A: What I really think is going to take us to another level than just relying on state governments… is the catalysing of more of a collaborative “all of society” approach here.
That’s what led me to higher education. I felt like there was an understanding and an alignment within higher education of the importance of these topics – and then the bench within higher education is filled with some of the top experts in the world on climate who were already leading as it related to climate science and talking about the problem. But if we could take that capacity and bring it into more direct relationship with businesses, municipalities and states, then that has the potential to unlock more of the impact of those actors together … that’s the reason I made the move.
The thing that drew me to [Clark] was you had a small university with really a national research capacity. And in Massachusetts, you have the only state in the country that has a chief climate officer that reports to the governor. You’ve got policy that’s been put in place related to green banks and zoning rules related to decarbonisation of buildings. And a state-based climate law that’s aligned with the Paris Agreement goals and has decarbonisation or net zero emissions by mid-century. You’ve got that policy piece in place, and then it’s how can you begin to catalyse some more of the collaboration that’s going be necessary to actually meet those goals? I think that’s really exciting.
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Another place where we’re seeing these ingredients come together is Pennsylvania. Just a month ago, the state of Pennsylvania created a new programme called Prepare PA, which is both about preparing for climate impacts and reaching goals related to the energy transition and the like. And they’re putting Penn State University at the centre of trying to help them implement a plan that involves businesses and municipalities. I think you’re seeing more and more of this kind of experimentation.
… This was always going to be an all-of-society effort, and the more we can see that, and the more we can make it real – how we all have roles to play at the local level, at the state level, in the private sector, in universities, in civil society, the more we have the opportunity to avoid this sense of powerlessness [about climate change] that can lead us to nihilism.
The post Q&A: Look beyond Trump for the full story on US climate action, says university dean appeared first on Climate Home News.
Q&A: Look beyond Trump for the full story on US climate action, says university dean
The right-wing populist Hungarian government led by Viktor Orbán has suffered a landslide electoral defeat to the centre-right Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar.
This brings to an end 16 years of rule by Orbán and his Fidesz party, a move welcomed by many around the world who were concerned about Hungary’s “slide toward authoritarianism”.
Hungary has played a disproportionate role in EU climate and energy policy in recent years, by repeatedly vetoing climate action and by delaying the phaseout of Russian fossil-fuel imports.
Magyar did not prioritise climate and energy issues in his electoral campaign, but he has championed cooperation with the EU and proposed a 2035 deadline for “eliminating Russian energy dependence”.
Hungarian experts tell Carbon Brief that, while the new government is yet to be formed, it is likely that Magyar will move quickly to secure EU funds for “green” measures.
One expert notes that “this is not a progressive pivot”, with Hungary unlikely to emerge as a climate leader in the EU, even if it is less disruptive to the bloc’s wider climate strategy.
- What was Orbán’s approach to climate action?
- What will be the new Hungarian government’s climate and energy policies?
- How will the new government approach EU climate policy?
- What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?
What was Orbán’s approach to climate action?
Hungary has had a mixed record on climate change under then prime minister Orbán, supporting some relevant actions while opposing others – particularly those taken at an EU level. This broadly reflects his Fidesz party’s populist and Eurosceptic leanings.
Orbán has described the EU’s climate goals as a “utopian fantasy” that would “destroy the middle class”. He has also accused “western elites” of wanting people to “live in fear” of climate change.
Yet, despite being embraced by climate sceptics elsewhere and supporting climate-sceptic lobbyists, Orbán’s government has not overtly adopted such sceptical rhetoric.
In fact, reflecting broad Hungarian support for climate action, Orbán has framed his nation as a “climate champion” – albeit one taking a “pragmatic” approach. This was captured in his speech at the COP29 summit in 2024, when he said:
“We must continue advancing the green transition, while also maintaining our use of natural gas, oil and nuclear energy…Our climate policy should be guided by careful consideration and common sense, not by ideology, alarmism or panic.”
Domestically, Orbán’s government has pursued various climate goals, including a 2050 net-zero target, phasing out coal power by 2029 and supporting the expansion of solar power.
What will be the new Hungarian government’s climate and energy policies?
Climate change was not a major issue in the April election and Magyar, the incoming prime minister, hardly mentioned it in his campaign.
However, the 243-page manifesto released by his Tisza party includes many climate-related proposals, such as home insulation, railway electrification and tackling drought.
The document says some of these measures – notably “energy modernisation and efficiency programmes” – will be funded with billions of euros in EU funds that have been frozen under Orbán. (See: How will the new government approach EU climate policy?)
One notable pledge is to “double the share of renewable energy in domestic energy supply” by 2040. As the chart below shows, Hungary already generates three-quarters of its electricity from clean sources – predominantly Paks, its single nuclear power plant.
Nearly a third of Hungary’s electricity comes from solar, which has benefited from supportive government schemes in recent years. In contrast, for years, the Orbán government blocked the construction of wind turbines, meaning there is virtually no wind power in Hungary.
The Tisza manifesto recognises this imbalance, stating that “we will abolish the unnecessary restrictions preventing the installation of new wind turbines”, while also supporting geothermal energy.
Energy prices are a key political issue in Hungary, as they are in many nations around the world. Orbán’s “utility cost reduction” has been a flagship policy for many years, capping household prices using large state subsidies.
During the election, Orbán accused his opponent of planning to get rid of the energy price cap. In fact, the Tizsa manifesto says the new government will “maintain and expand” the scheme and add new VAT cuts on firewood.
Despite having few batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) domestically, Hungary has emerged in recent years as a major battery manufacturer, driven by Chinese and South Korean investment. However, this boom has sparked environmental and social concerns.
Zsolt Lengyel, founder and chair of the Institute for European Energy and Climate Policy (IEECP), tells Carbon Brief:
“Orbán’s battery and EV strategy – in theory, a flagship of the transition – has backfired politically…So Tisza inherits a paradox: it needs to accelerate the transition, but does so in an environment where parts of that transition have already lost public legitimacy.”
With much still unknown about Magyar’s attitude to climate and energy policy, some Hungarian experts that Carbon Brief spoke to cautioned against “speculation” and “wishful thinking” when assessing his climate credentials.
How will the new government approach EU climate policy?
There is cautious optimism among EU officials and leaders that a Hungarian government led by Magyar will be more cooperative on EU-led initiatives.
Under Orbán, Hungary has been a vocal and persistent opponent of EU climate policies.
Since 2011, 21 of all the 48 vetoes on joint EU actions have been used by Hungary. These include blocking efforts to sanction Russia following the country’s invasion of Ukraine. (See: What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?)
Among other issues, Hungary has vetoed or obstructed progress on the EU’s 2050 net-zero target, the “fit for 55” legislative package to help meet that goal and the 2035 ban on petrol and diesel cars.
Generally, this opposition did not totally block these policies, as most did not require unanimous agreement among EU member states. However, it did tend to slow down or complicate the process. Hungary was also not acting alone – it was often joined by fellow eastern and central European states, claiming the policies would have high costs.
Nevertheless, the Orbán government’s aversion to the EU has taken it further than other states. In recent months, for example, Hungary has launched a legal case against the EU over its phaseout plan for Russian oil and gas imports.
In this context, Lengyel tells Carbon Brief:
“Orbán’s exit removes Hungary’s most damaging feature in EU climate politics: the ideological reflex to oppose ‘anything Brussels does’.”
However, just because Magyar is less hostile to the EU does not mean his government will be a climate leader.
Magyar’s centre-right Tisza party is aligned with the European People’s Party (EPP) grouping in the European parliament, which has been instrumental in weakening EU climate goals in recent months. Given this, Lengyel tells Carbon Brief.
“Let’s be clear: this is not a progressive pivot. Tisza sits close to the EPP mainstream and is unlikely to challenge it. If anything, it will follow it, including on any watering down of green-deal elements.”
Crucially, Hungary is entitled to billions of euros of EU funds that have been blocked due to breaches of conditions regarding the rule of law and human rights under Orbán.
These include €9.5bn for Hungary’s recovery and resilience plan, the EU’s post-Covid recovery fund, much of which is earmarked for the “green transition”.
This finance needs to be disbursed before the end of August – and both Magyar and the EU have been clear that unlocking the funds is a priority.
Jozsef Feiler, director of the south-east Europe and Hungary programme at the European Climate Foundation, which funds Carbon Brief, says “full EU compliance” will be crucial for Hungary over the coming months, in order to obtain these funds. He tells Carbon Brief:
“The economic and financial stability of the new government [will depend] on obtaining the recovery and resilience facility funds and managing some kind of absorption before the 26 August hard deadline.”
Another early challenge will be the new government’s approach to the new part of the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) – known as ETS2 – which will put a price on emissions from buildings, cars and other sources not covered in the original ETS.
ETS2 is already facing criticism from member states concerned about rising fuel costs. Moreover, Hungary is likely to be one of the countries that is most exposed to high fossil-fuel prices.
István Bart, a senior director in carbon pricing at the Environmental Defence Fund, tells Carbon Brief that Orbán’s government has done little to help with the implementation of ETS2, which is currently due to start in 2028. He notes that, with the question of affordability so fraught in Hungary, it is unclear how Magyar will tackle this issue.
What has the new leadership said about Russian fossil fuels?
One of the most notable policy statements made in Tisza’s manifesto is a commitment that:
“By 2035, we will eliminate Russian energy dependence and diversify our domestic energy supply.”
Despite its relatively clean electricity supply, Hungary is still heavily reliant on fossil fuels – including in its transport, heating and industrial sectors – the majority of which are imported.
Russia is Hungary’s main fossil-fuel trading partner, with the Druzhba and TurkStream pipelines supplying much of the smaller nation’s needs for oil and gas, respectively.
Among EU member states, Hungary is second only to Slovakia in terms of reliance on Russian fossil fuels. In 2024, 74% of Hungary’s gas and 48% of its oil were imported from Russia, as shown in the chart below.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, most EU nations have taken steps to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
The EU has implemented a series of sanctions on Russia and the European Commission launched the REPowerEU plan to “fully end dependency on Russian energy”.
Under Orbán, however, Hungary has obstructed efforts to wean the EU off Russian fossil fuels, citing energy-security concerns. It has successfully negotiated exemptions from Russian oil sanctions, allowing the country to increase its reliance on cheap Russian crude.
The REPowerEU regulation involves a ban on Russian pipeline gas by September 2027. Unlike sanctions, the EU did not need unanimity among states to pass this.
It is notable that Tisza has only committed to end reliance on Russian energy by 2035 – eight years after the EU deadline. It is unclear how Magyar’s new government will negotiate this discrepancy, especially given long-term contracts with Russian suppliers.
Hungary also relies on Russia for nuclear technology and supplies of uranium for its nuclear plant. In its manifesto, Tisza says it will explore the possibility of sourcing nuclear fuel from US or French suppliers, as well as building small modular reactors.
Orbán had already started pursuing diversified nuclear and fossil-fuel supplies by buying from the US, even as it secured exemptions from US sanctions on Russian energy imports. It is possible that Tisza may maintain this approach.
However, with the Iran war and energy crisis looming in recent months, Bart, from EDF, tells Carbon Brief:
“Before the Iran war started, you could have said: ‘Why don’t you just buy LNG [liquified natural gas]?’…Now it seems like less of an option, so, unfortunately, in the short term, [Russian gas] has to stay because we don’t really have an alternative.”
The post Q&A: What Magyar’s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What Magyar’s defeat of Orbán in Hungary means for climate and energy
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