China closed 2025 with its largest annual expansion of the energy system on record. Investment surged past a symbolic threshold. Power capacity grew at a pace rarely seen in any major economy. Together, the numbers point to a system still in rapid build-out, with renewables at the center and grids struggling to keep up.
By the end of January 2026, the National Energy Administration (NEA) announced that China’s investment in major energy projects topped 3.5 trillion yuan in 2025, or nearly US$500 billion. This marks an almost 11% rise from the previous year and is the first time China’s annual energy investment has hit that level.
This spending surge coincided with another milestone. By the end of 2025, China’s total installed power generation capacity reached 3.89 terawatts (TW), up 16.1% year on year. No other country added capacity at a comparable scale during the year.
$500B Flows Across the Energy System: Power, Grids, and Security
The NEA described 2025 as a year of broad-based energy investment. Spending increased not only in clean energy but also in grids, coal, and energy security projects.
Renewables absorbed a large share of new capital. China added more than 430 gigawatts (GW) of new wind and solar capacity during the year. This pushed combined installed wind and solar capacity beyond 1.8 TW for the first time. Solar and wind now account for nearly half of China’s total installed power capacity.
Investment in onshore wind rose especially fast. The NEA said spending on key onshore wind projects jumped by almost 50% compared with 2024. Developers focused on large inland bases and projects tied to long-distance transmission lines.

Solar continued to expand at an even faster pace. By the end of 2025, China’s installed solar capacity reached 1.20 TW, up 35.4% from a year earlier. This followed another strong year in 2024 and confirmed China’s position as the world’s largest solar market by a wide margin.
Wind capacity also grew quickly. Total installed wind power reached 640 GW, a 22.9% increase from 2024. Growth came from both onshore projects and steady additions offshore.
At the same time, investment did not shift entirely away from conventional energy. The NEA said spending also increased in coal power, hydropower, and coal mining, reflecting ongoing concerns about power reliability and supply security.
Grid construction remained a priority, particularly projects designed to move electricity from resource-rich western regions to demand centers in the east. Private companies played a larger role in this expansion.
The NEA reported that private-sector investment in major energy projects rose to almost 13% year-on-year. Much of that capital flowed into solar manufacturing, wind development, and coal-related infrastructure.
China’s Capacity Additions in Gigawatt Chunks
China’s investment surge translated into record growth in installed capacity. At the end of 2024, total power capacity stood at about 3.35 TW. One year later, it had risen to 3.89 TW. This implies net additions of roughly 540 GW in a single year.
That figure reflects capacity from all sources, including renewables, coal, gas, nuclear, and hydropower. While the NEA does not publish a single “net additions” number, the difference between year-end totals shows the scale of expansion.
Solar alone accounted for a large share of this growth. Industry data based on official statistics indicate that China added roughly 315 GW of new solar capacity in 2025. Wind additions added another large block, pushing combined wind and solar growth above 430 GW.
This pace of construction is historically unusual. Even during earlier phases of China’s renewable boom, annual additions were far smaller. The 2025 figures show that China is now building new power capacity at a speed measured in hundreds of gigawatts per year, not tens.
By contrast, capacity growth in many other major economies has slowed due to permitting delays, grid constraints, and financing challenges. China’s ability to add large volumes of capacity in a short time reflects its centralized planning, domestic manufacturing base, and strong state-backed financing.
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China vs. the United States: A Scale Gap That Keeps Widening
The scale of China’s 2025 build-out becomes clearer when placed in an international context.
In the United States, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) projected about 63 GW of new utility-scale generating capacity additions for 2025 across all technologies. This includes solar, wind, gas, battery storage, and other sources.
China’s wind and solar additions alone, at more than 430 GW, were roughly six to seven times larger than total expected US utility-scale additions for the year. If total net capacity growth is used instead, China’s increase of about 540 GW would be more than eight times the US figure.

These comparisons depend on definitions and data sources. China’s numbers are based on year-end installed capacity totals, while the US figure is a forward-looking projection of new builds. Even so, the gap in scale remains large under most reasonable comparisons.
What stands out is not only the size of China’s additions, but their composition. Renewables drove most of the growth. Solar capacity in China alone now exceeds the total installed power capacity of many advanced economies.
When Building Faster Than the Grid Can Absorb
Rapid capacity growth has consequences. One clear signal appeared in power plant utilization data.
In 2025, power plants with a capacity of 6,000 kilowatts and above recorded an average utilization of 3,119 hours. This was 312 hours lower than in 2024. Lower utilization suggests that capacity is growing faster than electricity demand or grid flexibility.
Several factors explain this trend. Wind and solar output vary by weather and time of day. Coal and hydropower plants remain in the system to provide stability, even when renewables generate strongly. In addition, grid bottlenecks can prevent power from reaching where it is needed.
The NEA has repeatedly pointed to grid expansion as a priority. In 2025, major investments went into ultra-high-voltage transmission lines, regional interconnections, and grid digitalization. These projects aim to reduce curtailment and improve the system’s ability to absorb renewable power.
Still, the utilization figures show the challenge ahead. As capacity continues to rise, grid management and market reform will play a larger role in determining how efficiently new assets are used.
Growth First, Optimization Next
China’s 2025 energy data tell a consistent story. Investment reached a new high. Capacity expanded at a historic pace. Renewables dominated new additions, but conventional power and grids remained part of the strategy.
The numbers also show a system in transition rather than completion. Record build-out has brought new pressures, especially on utilization and grid integration. These issues are likely to shape energy policy decisions in the years ahead.
For now, what stands out most is scale. With energy investment approaching $500 billion and annual capacity additions measured in hundreds of gigawatts, China continues to expand its power system faster than any other country. The 2025 data confirm that this expansion is no longer an exception, but an established pattern.
The post China Adds Power 8x More Than the US in 2025, with $500B Energy Build-Out in a Single Year appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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