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中国的气候和能源政策呈现出一种悖论:在以惊人的速度发展清洁能源的同时,也未停下新建燃煤电厂的步伐。

仅在2023年,中国就新建了70吉瓦(GW)的煤电装机容量,比2019年增长了四倍,占当年全球新增煤电装机容量的95%。

煤电产能的激增引发了人们对中国二氧化碳(CO2)排放和气候目标能否实现,以及对未来出现搁浅资产风险的担忧。

由于光伏和风能发电量不稳定,中国政府将煤炭作为保障能源安全和满足快速增长的用电高峰的手段。

与此同时,中国的电力行业在成本、需求模式、监管和市场运作方面正在发生重大变化。我们的新研究表明,用于证明新煤炭产能合理性的传统经济计算方式可能已经过时。

我们使用一个简单的分析指标来评估能满足用电高峰需求的最经济方式是什么。结果表明,光伏加电池储能的组合可能是比新建煤电更具成本效益的选择。

中国电力格局发生了怎样的变化?

在过去十年里,可再生能源和电池储能的成本大幅下降,高峰时段的住宅和商业用电需求激增,电力交易市场获得了更大的吸引力。

与此同时,中国还宣布了“双碳”目标,即在2030年前实现碳达峰、2060年前实现碳中和。鉴于这些转型,建设更多未减排的煤电厂与中国的长期气候承诺相冲突,而且对满足用电需求对增长来说,可能不再是最具成本效益的选择。它还占用了清洁能源系统转型急需的资金。

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替代指标如何评估成本?

我们的研究引入了一种替代指标,用于计算在满足不断增长的高峰用电需求的情况下,所需的最优成本投资。

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这一指标,即“净容量成本”(net capacity cost),是满足用电高峰需求所需的基础设施投资的年化固定成本,减去该设施带给电力市场的收入,或其“系统价值”(system value)。 在该指标中,负数意味着这些投资将带来利润,而非支出。

为了探索在中国使用的情境,我们使用了一个简单的例子:在一个假定省份,高峰用电需求增加了1500兆瓦(MW)、全年需求增加了6570吉瓦时(GWh)。

然后,我们概述了满足高峰和全年能源需求的五种策略(情况),其涵盖了从严重依赖煤电到光伏和电池储能相结合的方式。

在不同的案例中,资源衡量的规模基于它们能够可靠地满足高峰供应需求和年度能源需求的程度。

  • 情况1:新的煤炭发电能力可满足高峰和年度能源需求的所有增长。
  • 情况2:光伏可满足70%的年度能源需求增长,煤炭可满足30%的年度能源需求增长;光伏可满足525兆瓦的高峰供应需求(由于光伏发电可能不在高峰期间,因此基于“容量可信度”进行折减),而煤电可提供剩余的975兆瓦。
  • 情况3:光伏可满足所有年度能源需求增长;光伏和煤炭均可满足750兆瓦的高峰供应需求,同样通过容量可信度对光伏发电量进行折减。
  • 情况4:光伏满足所有年度能源需求增长;光伏和电池均为高峰供电需求提供750兆瓦;电池提供调频储备(用于管理精确至分钟的供需差异的备用电源)。
  • 情况5:光伏满足所有年度能源需求增长;广泛和电池均为高峰供电需求提供750兆瓦;电池提供能源套利(在价格或成本较低时充电,在价格或成本较高时放电)。

如下图所示,我们针对每种情况都计算了单个资源(煤、电池或光伏),以及整个系统每年获得1千瓦(kW)发电容量的年净成本,单位为人民币元。

表上半部分的资源净容量成本是指该资源的净成本(即年化固定成本减去该资源从提供能源和辅助服务,如调频,所获得的年收入)。正数表示电网运营商在增加或获取该资源时的净成本。

表下半部分的系统总净容量成本,是在每种情况下利用资源组合满足高峰需求增长的净成本。

我们用于计算系统净成本的权重是基于装机容量与高峰需求增长的比率。

不同能源组合满足用电需求的成本

情况 1 情况 2 情况 3 情况 4 情况 5
资源净容量成本 (元/千瓦/年, 每千瓦装机容量)
煤炭 424 424 512
电池 248 781
光伏 -128 -128 -128 -128
系统净容量成本 (元/千瓦/年, 每千瓦满足高峰用电需求且折减容量可信度后)
煤炭 471 306 236
电池 138 434
光伏 -223 -319 -319 -319
总计 471 83 -83 -181 115

为了对这一简单分析进行压力测试,我们研究了不同来源的各种价格的敏感性。

由于中国的光伏价格已经很低,我们的敏感性分析主要集中在煤炭、电池和其他分析所需投入的价格上。

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满足高峰用电需求最经济的方法是什么?

我们的结果表明,当电池储能提供调频储备时(情况4),光伏和储能的组合是满足高峰用电需求增长最具成本效益的选择。

在这种组合下,每获得1千瓦发电装机容量,电网运营商的成本为-181元(约-25美元或-20英镑)。

相比之下,新建煤电产能以满足高峰用电需求增长(情况1)是最昂贵的方案,每获得1千瓦装机容量的净容量成本为471元(约合65美元或52英镑)。

情况3,即大型煤电厂仅用作备用电源(几乎不发电),在中国可能出于政治原因而至少在短期内不可行。

另外两种情况(情况2和情况5)更具可比性,但鉴于自本分析报告发布以来,电池价格下降了30%以上,约为每瓦时(Wh)1元人民币(约合0.14美元或0.11英镑),因此情况5中的电池可能比情况2中的煤炭更具经济吸引力。

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我们的解决方案如何助力中国实现气候目标?

我们的分析表明,为了应对不断变化的形势,在满足中国日益增长的能源需求的同时,实现其气候目标的近期战略是将电池储能纳入电力市场。

目前,中国政府允许包括电池在内的“新型储能”参与电力市场。然而,详细规定尚不明确,电池的参与可以更简单。

例如,电池储能不被允许提供“运转储备”,即为应对意外的供需误差所预留的发电量。如果允许电池储能提供运转储备,将增强其商业价值。

允许电池储能更多地参与市场将促进电池储能系统的持续创新和降低成本,同时为系统运营商提供宝贵的运营经验。

这种策略将与市场效益相符,并反映美国和欧洲近期的电力市场经验。

这也将有助于解决近期的产能和能源需求,因为电池和光伏发电通常比燃煤电厂的建设速度更快。

此外,它还有助于缓解未来新增燃煤发电与可再生能源之间的冲突。主要作为可再生能源发电备用电源的新建燃煤电厂要么很少运营,要么侵占了其他现有煤炭发电厂的运营时间和净收入,从而产生新搁浅资产的风险。

通过继续进行电力市场改革,也将促进对可再生能源发电和电力储存进行更有效的投资。

允许市场制定批发市场电价、允许可再生能源发电和电力储存参与批发市场,这可以提高其收入和利润。

此外,改革还将鼓励高效利用储能,这是我们的关键发现。储能可以为电力系统提供多种功能;批发电价有助于引导储能运营以最低的成本实现具有最高价值的功能。

中国国家能源局最近发出指令,要求将新型储能设施(非抽水蓄能)纳入电网调度运行,这是向我们概述的改革迈出的一步。

可能需要进一步确定适当的补偿机制,例如在某些省份对此类储能设施提供的所有服务进行容量补偿,以促进这些储能设施的可持续发展和并网。

最后,仅靠增加供应不太可能成为满足中国电力需求增长的最低成本方式。提高终端使用效率和“需求响应”也有助于降低供电的总体成本。

随着中国电力市场改革的不断深入,连接多个省份的区域市场设计,以及鼓励省份间资源共享的区域资源充裕性规划,也有助于以最具成本效益和最低碳的方式满足中国不断增长的用电量和高峰需求。

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The post 嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠” appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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DeBriefed 14 November 2025: COP30 DeBriefed: Finance and 1.5C loom large at talks; China’s emissions dip; Negotiations explained

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Finance and 1.5C dominate talks

AGENDA ADOPTED: Negotiations at the COP30 UN climate talks began in the Brazilian city of Belém this week, attended in person by Carbon Brief’s Daisy Dunne, Josh Gabbatiss and Anika Patel. The Brazilian hosts scored an unexpected early win by dodging an “agenda fight” over proposals to add various contentious issues to the official docket. Despite the neat footwork, four issues kept off the agreed agenda – climate finance; emissions reporting; trade measures; ambition and 1.5C – still loom large, having merely been diverted into “presidency consultations”.

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PRESIDENCY PROMISES: By Wednesday, the presidency was promising “good news” at a plenary later that day, which had been due to offer an update on progress with the four extra items. Instead, it ended abruptly, with COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago promising to say more at another plenary scheduled for tomorrow. It remains unclear how the presidency intends to deal with these thorny issues, leaving the COP rumour-mill in full swing.

MINISTERIAL MAGIC: Aside from the extra issues, the official agenda at COP30 already has more than 100 items to contend with, including how to track progress on adaptation and how to ensure a “just transition” as emissions-cutting measures are implemented. (You can follow them all via the Carbon Brief text tracker.) While draft texts have started to emerge, many items remain stalled, with persistent divisions along familiar lines (see below). Negotiators will be hoping that ministers arriving over the weekend are primed to unlock progress. Brazil has appointed pairs of these politicians to push for deals in key areas.

Around the world

  • Ethiopia has said it will host COP32 after beating out a bid from Nigeria, Reuters reported. Turkey and Australia are still in deadlock over who should host COP31, with a decision due by the end of these talks, BBC News reported. 
  • China will not contribute to Brazil’s Tropical Forest Forever Facility, Bloomberg reported, while Devex said two multilateral development banks are considering paying in. More than $5.5bn has been pledged so far, which BusinessGreen noted is “well short” of a $25bn target. The fund was labelled a “false solution” by some Indigenous and civil society groups.
  • After Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called for a “roadmap” away from fossil fuels ahead of COP’s opening, rumours are swirling over how this might take shape. A new declaration spearheaded by Colombia and a roadmap with backing from a number of countries, including Denmark, the UK, France, Kenya and Germany, are being floated as possible options.
  • China is currently among the countries pushing for “provision of finance from rich countries and unilateral trade measures” to be included on the agenda, reported Climate Home News. Chinese delegation head Li Gao told Agence France-Presse it is “crucial” for developed countries to fulfil their $300bn commitment.
  • Dozens of Indigenous protesters forced their way into COP’s blue zone on Tuesday night, expressing anger at a lack of access to the negotiations, Reuters said. On Friday, a peaceful protest blocked the entrance to the blue zone, causing lengthy queues as delegates were forced to use a side door.

344%

The rise in the global use of solar from 2024 to 2035 under “stated policies”, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis of the latest World Energy Outlook from the International Energy Agency.


Latest climate research

  • The 2025 Global Carbon Budget, covered in detail by Carbon Brief, finds that CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement will rise 1.1% in 2025 | Earth System Science Data
  • In its November 2025 update, Climate Action Tracker says that its projections of global warming by 2100 have “barely moved” in four years | Climate Action Tracker
  • The AI server industry in the US is unlikely to meet its 2030 net-zero goals “without substantial reliance on highly uncertain” carbon offsets | Nature Sustainability

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

China’s carbon dioxide emissions have “now been flat or falling for 18 months” since March 2024, analysis for Carbon Brief has found, due, in particular, to the transport, cement and steel sectors. The analysis has been covered widely in publications including China’s Global Times, the New York Times, Financial Times, Reuters, Bloomberg and on the frontpage of the Guardian.

Spotlight

What to expect from COP30 talks

This week, Carbon Brief’s expert team walk through what is happening with the biggest issues being negotiated at COP30.

‘Cover text’

Can you judge a COP by its cover text? At COP, the presidency has the option to pull together a new negotiated “cover text”​​, an overarching political overview of decisions agreed at the summit, along with other issues not on the agenda that it wants to draw attention to.

COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago might have dismissed a catch-all “cover decision” as a “last-minute solution” ahead of COP and dodged the question since, but other parties have been less shy in hinting that a cover text is, indeed, coming.

Cover decisions are often the product of fraught negotiations, high stakes, too little time and too many parties to accommodate.

This year, there is added pressure to address what is happening in the wider world outside the “negotiations” and to politically signal that the UN climate process is alive and making progress, despite the withdrawal of the US.

What elements could go into it? As a member of the “BASIC” group of nations comprising Brazil, South Africa, India and China, trade measures could find a place. But ideas pushed by Brazilian president Lula for new “roadmaps” away from fossil fuels and deforestation might find a place. Finance, however, could be much trickier to fit in.

Adaptation

One of the key expected outcomes of COP30 is agreement on a list of 100 indicators that can be used to measure progress under the “global goal on adaptation” (GGA). After two years of work by experts, negotiations got underway with a suggested list that had been whittled down from nearly 10,000 possible indicators.

Despite the focus on the GGA by the COP30 presidency and others, division has quickly emerged around the timeline for the adoption of the indicators. The African Group has notably requested a two-year work programme to further refine the list, while other parties are pushing for the indicators to be adopted in Belém as planned.

On Wednesday, an informal note was published that compiled elements for a draft decision. Significantly, for the first time under the GGA, this included a call for developed countries to “at least triple their collective provision” of adaptation finance by 2030, with a target to reach $120bn. This echoed a suggested target originally set out by the negotiating group of least developed countries (LDCs), supported by the African Group, Arab Group and the Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) countries.

Just transition and mitigation work programmes

Over the past year, civil society groups have been calling for the establishment of a mechanism to enact the agreed UNFCCC principles of a “just transition”. This gained momentum on Wednesday within negotiations of the just transition work programme (JTWP), when the G77 and China called for the development of the “Belem Action Mechanism” (BAM).

Chile, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), India and other developing countries supported the mechanism. However, Norway, the UK, Australia and Japan pushed back. Other long-standing points of contention have also raised their heads, including around unilateral trade measures and references to fossil fuels and aligning to global temperature goals.

Within the mitigation work programme (MWP) talks, negotiators are looking to build on two dialogues held this year. The main themes at COP30 are the links between the MWP and the global stocktake (see below) and the future of the programme itself.

Old divisions have emerged in negotiations, focused predominantly on the mandate of the MWP and the potential development of a digital platform as part of its continuation.

UAE dialogue

The landmark outcome of the first “global stocktake”, agreed at COP28 in Dubai, called on all countries to contribute to a “transition away from fossil fuels”. It also mandated a “UAE dialogue” on “implementing the global stocktake outcomes”.

Two years later, countries remain deadlocked over what this dialogue should discuss. Many want it to cover all parts of the stocktake, including the energy transition, while others want an exclusive focus on climate finance. They also disagree on whether the dialogue should have substantive outcomes, including a formal process to keep discussing the issues raised.

Having failed to reach agreement at COP29 last year, the latest draft text shows parties are just as far apart in Belém, nearly halfway into the summit.

Finance

Climate finance for developing countries does not occupy a high-profile position in the formal COP30 negotiations. Yet, as demonstrated by its role in adaptation talks and the agenda dispute, finance still has the potential to derail proceedings.

Ahead of the conference, the COP30 and COP29 presidencies released their “Baku to Belém roadmap”, exploring how finance could be ramped up to $1.3tn by 2035.

An influential group of experts also released new analysis showing a “feasible path” to this goal, leaning on private finance. They said this work would provide a “valuable signal” to those in the finance sector.

However, with no position in the Belém negotiations, it was unclear how – or whether – the roadmap would be taken forward by governments beyond COP30.

Instead, finance negotiators have been occupied with technical matters, but these still show signs of division. For example, some developing-party groups have pushed back against an EU priority goal to extend a “dialogue” about “making finance flows consistent” with climate objectives.

Watch, read, listen

UNDER THREAT: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism told the story of Kim Rebholz – an environmentalist who was threatened for his work curbing illegal logging in Democratic Republic of Congo’s mangrove parks.

SPOTLIGHT ON STARMER: YouTuber Simon Clark has published a video of himself interviewing prime minister Keir Starmer about the UK’s actions on climate and nature, at COP30 and domestically.
INSIDE COP:Outrage and Optimism is running a “special edition” podcast series in partnership with the COP30 presidency, bringing “exclusive, behind-the-scenes access” to the conference.

Coming up

  • 14-21 November: UN Climate Change conference (COP30) heads into its crucial second week in Belém
  • 15 November: Informal stocktaking plenary of COP30 talks by the Brazilian presidency
  • 17 November: Launch of the Global Methane Status Report

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 14 November 2025: COP30 DeBriefed: Finance and 1.5C loom large at talks; China’s emissions dip; Negotiations explained appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 14 November 2025: COP30 DeBriefed: Finance and 1.5C loom large at talks; China’s emissions dip; Negotiations explained

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Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met

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Developed countries have poured billions of dollars into railways across Asia, solar projects in Africa and thousands of other climate-related initiatives overseas, according to a joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian.

A group of nations, including much of Europe, the US and Japan, is obliged under the Paris Agreement to provide international “climate finance” to developing countries.

This financial support can come in forms such as grants and loans from various sources, including aid budgets, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investments.

The flagship climate-finance target for more than a decade was to hit “$100bn a year” by 2020, which developed countries met – albeit two years late – in 2022.

Carbon Brief and the Guardian have analysed data across more than 20,000 global climate projects funded using public money from developed nations, including official 2021 and 2022 figures, which have only just been published.

The data provides a detailed insight into how the $100bn goal was reached, including funding for everything from sustainable farming in Niger to electricity projects in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

With developed countries now pledging to ramp up climate finance further, the analysis also shows how donors often rely on loans and private finance to meet their obligations.

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The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US

A small handful of countries have consistently been the top climate-finance donors. This remained the case in 2021 and 2022, with just four countries – Japan, Germany, France and the US – responsible for half of all climate finance, the analysis shows.

Not only was 2022 the first year in which the $100bn goal was achieved, it also saw the largest ever single-year increase in climate finance – a rise of $26.3bn, or 29%, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

(It is worth noting that while OECD figures are often referenced as the most “official” climate-finance totals, they are contested.)

Half of this increase came from a $12.6bn rise in support from MDBs – financial institutions that are owned and funded by member states. The rest can be attributed to two main factors.

First, while several donors ramped up spending, the US drove by far the biggest increase in “bilateral” finance, provided directly by the country itself.

After years of stalling during the first Donald Trump presidency, when Joe Biden took office in 2021, the nation’s bilateral climate aid more than tripled between that year and the next.

Meanwhile, after years of “stagnating” at around $15bn, the amount of private investments “mobilised” in developing countries by developed-country spending surged to around $22bn in 2022, according to OECD estimates.

As the chart below shows, the combination of increased US contributions and higher private investments pushed climate finance up by nearly $14bn in 2022, helping it to reach $115.9bn in total.

Annual climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries.
Annual climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries. Country shares include bilateral finance and multilateral finance shares from MDBs or funds that can be attributed to individual countries. “Export credits and other” includes “other” multilateral climate finance that could not be assigned to developed countries. Source: Analysis of BTRs and OECD data by Carbon Brief and the Guardian, OECD data for private finance, export credits and other finance.

Both of these trends are still pertinent in 2025, following a new pledge made at COP29 by developed countries to ramp up climate finance to “at least” $300bn a year by 2035.

After years of increasing rapidly under Biden, US bilateral climate finance for developing countries has been effectively eliminated during Trump’s second presidential term. Other major donors, including Germany, France and the UK, have also cut their aid budgets.

This means there will be more pressure on other sources of climate finance in the coming years. In particular, developed countries hope that private finance can help to raise finance into the trillions of dollars required to achieve developing countries’ climate goals.

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Some higher-income countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients

The greatest beneficiaries of international climate finance tend to be large, middle-income countries, such as Egypt, the Philippines and Brazil, according to the analysis.

(The World Bank classifies countries as being low-, lower-middle, upper-middle or high-income, according to their gross national income per person.)

Lower-middle income India received $14.1bn in 2021 and 2022 – nearly all as loans – making it by far the largest recipient, as the chart below shows.

Most of India’s top projects were metro and rail lines in cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai, which accounted for 46% of its total climate finance in those years, Carbon Brief analysis shows. (See: A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects.)

The top 15 recipients of climate finance in 2021 and 2022, via bilateral and multilateral channels.
The top 15 recipients of climate finance in 2021 and 2022, via bilateral and multilateral channels. This ranking does not include funding for projects that targeted multiple countries, which could not be disaggregated. Source: Carbon Brief and Guardian analysis.

As the world’s second-largest economy and a major funder of energy projects overseas, China – classified as upper-middle income by the World Bank – has faced mounting pressure to start officially providing climate finance. At the same time, the nation received more than $3bn of climate finance over this period, as it is still classed as a developing country under the UN climate system.

High-income Gulf petrostates are also among the countries receiving funds. For example, the UAE received Japanese finance of $1.3bn for an electricity transmission project and a waste-to-energy project.

To some extent, such large shares simply reflect the size of many middle-income countries. India received 9% of all bilateral and multilateral climate finance, but it is home to 18% of the global population.

The focus on these nations also reflects the kind of big-budget infrastructure that is being funded.

“Middle-income economies tend to have the financial and institutional capacity to design, appraise and deliver large-scale projects,” Sarah Colenbrander, climate programme director at global affairs thinktank ODI, tells Carbon Brief.

Donors might focus on relatively higher-income or powerful nations out of self-interest, for example, to align with geopolitical, trade or commercial interests. But, as Colenbrander tells Carbon Brief, there are also plenty of “high-minded” reasons to do so, not least the opportunity to help curb their relatively high emissions.

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A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects

Japan is the largest climate-finance donor, accounting for a fifth of all bilateral and multilateral finance in 2021 and 2022, the analysis shows.

Of the 20 largest bilateral projects, 13 were Japanese. These include $7.6bn of loans for eight rail and metro systems in major cities across India, Bangladesh and the Philippines.

In fact, Japan’s funding for rail projects was so substantial that it made up 11% of all bilateral finance. This amounts to 4% of climate finance from all sources.

Bilateral finance provided by Japan for metro and rail projects, compared to total bilateral finance in 2021 and 2022.
Bilateral finance provided by Japan for metro and rail projects, compared to total bilateral finance in 2021 and 2022. Source: Carbon Brief and Guardian analysis.

While these rail projects are likely to provide benefits to developing countries, they also highlight some of the issues identified by aid experts with Japan’s climate-finance practices.

As was the case for more than 80% of Japan’s climate finance, all of these projects were funded with loans, which must be paid back. Nearly a fifth of Japan’s total loans were described as “non-concessional”, meaning they were offered on terms equivalent to those offered on the open market, rather than at more favourable rates.

Many Japan-backed projects also stipulate that Japanese companies and workers must be hired to work on them, reflecting the government’s policies to “proactively support” and “facilitate” the overseas expansion of Japanese business using aid.

Documents show that rail projects in India and the Philippines were granted on this basis.

This practice can be beneficial, especially in sectors such as rail infrastructure, where Japanese companies have considerable expertise. Yet, analysts have questioned Japan’s approach, which they argue can disproportionately benefit the donor itself.

“Counting these loans as climate finance presents a moral hazard…And such loans tied to Japanese businesses make it worse,” Yuri Onodera, a climate specialist at Friends of the Earth Japan, tells Carbon Brief.

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There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries

Around 730 million people still lack access to electricity, with roughly 80% of those people living in sub-Saharan Africa.

As part of their climate-finance pledges, donor countries often support renewable projects, transmission lines and other initiatives that can provide clean power to those in need.

Carbon Brief and the Guardian have identified funding for more than 500 clean-power and transmission projects in African countries that lack universal electricity access. In total, these funds amounted to $7.6bn over the two years 2021-22.

Among them was support for Chad’s first-ever solar project, a new hydropower plant in Mozambique and the expansion of electricity grids in Nigeria.

The distribution of funds across the continent – excluding multi-country programmes – can be seen in the map below.

Climate finance for clean-power projects, 2021 and 2022, in African nations that have less than 100% electricity access, according to World Bank figures.
Climate finance for clean-power projects, 2021 and 2022, in African nations that have less than 100% electricity access, according to World Bank figures. Source: Carbon Brief and Guardian analysis.

A lack of clear rules about what can be classified as “climate finance” in the UN climate process means donors sometimes include support for fossil fuels – particularly gas power – in their totals.

For example, Japan counted an $18m loan to a Japanese liquified natural gas (LNG) company in Senegal and roughly $1m for gas projects in Tanzania.

However, such funding accounted for a tiny fraction of sub-Saharan Africa’s climate finance overall, amounting to less than 1% of all power-sector funding across the region, based on the projects identified in this analysis.

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Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans

One of the most persistent criticisms levelled at climate finance by developing-country governments and civil society groups is that so much of it is provided in the form of loans.

While loans are commonly used to fund major projects, they are sometimes offered on unfavourable terms and add to the burden of countries that are already struggling with debt.

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) has shown that the 44 “least developed countries” (LDCs) spend twice as much servicing debts as they receive in climate finance.

Developed nations pledged $33.4bn in 2021 and 2022 to the 44 LDCs to help them finance climate projects. In total, $17.2bn – more than half of the funding – was provided as loans, primarily from Japan, France and development banks.

The chart below shows how, for a number of LDCs, loans continue to be the main way in which they receive international climate funds.

For example, Angola received $216.7m in loans from France – primarily to support its water infrastructure – and $571.6m in loans from various multilateral institutions, together amounting to nearly all the nation’s climate finance over this period.

Share of 2021 and 2022 climate finance provided as loans and grants, in the LDCs most heavily-reliant on loans.
Share of 2021 and 2022 climate finance provided as loans and grants, in the LDCs most heavily-reliant on loans. Source: Carbon Brief and Guardian analysis.

Oxfam, which describes developed countries as “unjustly indebting poor countries” via loans, estimates that the “true value” of climate finance in 2022 was $28-35bn, roughly a quarter of the OECD’s estimate. This is largely due to Oxfam discounting much of the value of loans.

However, Jan Kowalzig, a senior policy adviser at Oxfam Germany, tells Carbon Brief that, “generally, LDCs receive loans at better conditions” than they would have been able to secure on the open market, sometimes referred to as “concessional” loans.

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US shares in development banks significantly raised its total contribution

The US has been one of the world’s top climate-finance providers, accounting for around 15% of all bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2021 and 2022.

Despite this, US contributions have consistently been viewed as relatively low when considering the nation’s wealth and historical role in driving climate change.

Moreover, much of the climate finance that can be attributed to the US comes from its MDB shareholdings, rather than direct contributions from its aid budget.

These banks are owned by member countries and the US is a dominant shareholder in many of them.

The analysis reveals that around three-quarters of US climate finance provided in 2021-22 came via multilateral sources, particularly the World Bank. (For information on how this analysis attributes multilateral funding to donors, see Methodology.)

Among other major donors – specifically Japan, France and Germany – only a third of their finance was channelled through multilateral institutions. As the chart below shows, multilateral contributions lifted the US from being the fifth-largest donor to the third-largest.

Climate finance provided through bilateral and multilateral channels by the top climate finance donors in 2021 and 2022.
Climate finance provided through bilateral and multilateral channels by the top climate finance donors in 2021 and 2022. Source: Carbon Brief and Guardian analysis.

While the Trump administration has cut virtually all overseas climate funding and broadly rejected multilateral institutions, the US has not yet abandoned its influential stake in MDBs.

Prior to COP29 in 2024, only MDB funds that could be attributed to developed country inputs were counted towards the $100bn goal, as part of those nations’ Paris Agreement duties.

However, countries have now agreed that “all climate-related outflows” from MDBs – no matter which donor country they are attributed to – will count towards the new $300bn goal.

This means that, as long as MDBs continue extensively funding climate projects, there will still be a large slice of climate finance that can be attributed to the US, even as it exits the Paris Agreement.

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Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries committed to achieving “a balance between adaptation and mitigation” in their climate finance.

The idea is that, while it is important to focus on mitigation – or cutting emissions – by supporting projects such as clean energy, there is also a need to help developing countries prepare for the threat of climate change.

Generally, adaptation projects are less likely to provide a return on investment and are, therefore, more reliant on grant-based finance.

In practice, a “balance” between adaptation and mitigation has never been reached. Over the period of this analysis, 58% of climate finance was for mitigation, 33% was for adaptation and the remainder was for projects that contributed to both goals.

This reflects a preference for mitigation-based financing via loans among some major donors, particularly Japan and France. Both countries provided just a third of their finance for adaptation projects in 2021 and 2022.

However, among some of the most climate-vulnerable countries – including land-locked parts of Africa and small islands – most funding was for adaptation, as the chart below shows.

Share of 2021 and 2022 climate finance provided for adaptation and mitigation in the 15 most climate-vulnerable nations, based on the ND-GAIN index.
Share of 2021 and 2022 climate finance provided for adaptation and mitigation in the 15 most climate-vulnerable nations, based on the ND-GAIN index. The countries are listed according to the share of adaptation in their climate-finance total. This excludes “cross-cutting” finance that targets both objectives. Source: Carbon Brief and Guardian analysis.

Among the projects receiving climate-adaptation funds were those supporting sustainable agriculture in Niger, improving disaster resilience in Micronesia and helping those in Somalia who have been internally displaced by “climate change and food crises”.

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Methodology

The joint Guardian and Carbon Brief analysis of climate finance includes the bilateral and multilateral public finance that developed countries pledged for climate projects in developing countries. It covers the years 2021 and 2022.

(These “developed” countries are the 23 “Annex II” nations, plus the EU, that are obliged to provide climate finance under the Paris Agreement.)

The analysis excludes other types of funding that contribute to the $100bn climate-finance target for climate projects, such as export credits and private finance “mobilised” by public investments. Where these have been referenced, the figures are OECD estimates. They are excluded from the analysis because export credits are a small fraction of the total, while private finance mobilised cannot be attributed to specific donor countries.

Data for bilateral funding comes from the biennial transparency reports (BTRs) each country submits to the UNFCCC. The lag in official reporting means the most recent figures – published around the end of 2024 and start of 2025 – only go up to 2022.

Many of the bilateral projects recorded by countries do not specify single recipients, but instead mention several countries. These projects have not been included when calculating the amount of finance individual developing countries received, but they are included in the total figures.

The multilateral funding, including projects funded by MDBs and multilateral climate funds, comes from the OECD. Many countries – including developing countries – pay into these institutions, which then use their money to fund climate projects and, in the case of MDBs, raise additional finance from capital markets.

This analysis calculated the shares of the “outflows” from multilateral institutions that can be attributed to developed countries. It adapts the approach used by the OECD to calculate these attributable shares for developed countries as a whole group.

As the OECD does not publish individual donor country shares that make up the total developed-country contribution, this analysis calculated each country’s attributable shares based on shareholdings in MDBs and cumulative contributions to multilateral funds. This was based on a methodology used by analysts at the World Resources Institute and ODI. There were some multilateral funds that could not be assigned using this methodology, which are therefore not captured in each country’s multilateral contribution.

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The post Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met

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China Briefing 13 November 2025: COP30 special

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Gearing up

PRE-COP COMMITMENTS: China has “become the defender of international cooperation on climate change”, said state-sponsored newspaper Global Times the day before COP30 opened. China’s commitment to “dual carbon” goals will be the “driving force” of building a “beautiful China”, said an article by the Communist party-affiliated newspaper People’s Daily under the byline of Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

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WORLD’S EXPECTATIONS: China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Geng Shuang, said the country is “globally recognised as the [one] with the strongest determination, the most vigorous actions” on tackling climate issues, reported news agency Xinhua. John Kerry, former US climate envoy, told the Shanghai-based Paper: “The global climate agenda has undergone a fundamental shift, and calls are being made for China to continue playing a leading role in the event of a possible absence of the US.”

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FINANCE PLEA: Meanwhile, Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva “urged” China’s vice premier Ding Xuexiang at a pre-COP30 meeting to “join financing initiatives for climate transition and resilience” and “help fund green technology and investment projects”, said the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP).

‘OUTPERFORM[ING]’ TARGETS: Most experts in a new survey expect China to “outperform” its 2035 emissions-reduction target, reported Bloomberg. About 71% of the surveyed experts believe China’s carbon-emission peak will “happen between 2026 and 2030, with most expecting it in 2028” – ahead of the official timeline of 2030, said Agence France-Presse.

Early moves

‘PROMISES KEPT’: China “keeps its promises and delivers on its commitments” on climate change, Ding said on 6 November, in remarks at COP30’s leaders summit, according to a transcript published by Communist party-affiliated newspaper the People’s Daily. Ding suggested that, to “advance” climate action, the world must “stay on the right track”, balancing “environmental protection, economic development, job creation and poverty eradication”. In addition, Ding said countries must “remove trade barriers” if the world is to meet its targets, said BBC News.

BUILDING COALITIONS: Over the weekend ahead of COP, Brazil, China and the UK co-led a summit on methane, launching initiatives that could “accelerate global action on methane and other non-CO2 greenhouse gases”, said a press release published on the COP30 website. These included “mobilising” at least $150m to support seven developing countries’ efforts, it added. China and the EU also agreed to join a Brazilian-led carbon-market coalition, Bloomberg reported, which “aims to develop common standards for monitoring, reporting and verification”.

TFFF FOREGONE: There are “still no guarantees” that China will contribute to Brazil’s Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), CNN Brasil said, contrary to reporting by Reuters in July that China might invest in the fund. The outlet added that Brazil may be able to push for Chinese participation again at the G20 meeting in late November. SCMP said “Chinese negotiators told their Brazilian counterparts that Beijing supported the fund in principle”, but cited the common but differentiated responsibilities concept as a reason not to commit.

OPENING STATEMENTS: In the face of an “intensifying” climate crisis, China “will not stop supporting” international action, Huang said at the opening of the China pavilion at COP30, attended by Carbon Brief. A number of representatives of major international organisations – including the UNFCCC’s Simon Stiell, the UN climate advisor Selwin Hart, UNEP executive director Inger Andersen – as well as Chinese climate envoy Liu Zhenmin all spoke at the event. Hart captured the mood, saying: “We are certain to count on the leadership of China over the course of the next two weeks, and also over the next decade.”

Trade spats

AGENDA FIGHT: The agenda for COP30 was “adopted on Monday as originally drafted without any amendments”, despite a request by a country group that includes China that the lineup include “provision of finance from rich countries and unilateral trade measures” such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, Climate Home News reported. The topics are instead being discussed in presidency-led consultations, alongside calls from small-island states to push for greater emissions-cutting ambition and from the EU on emissions reporting. Carbon Brief’s Simon Evans set out the issues on Bluesky.

RIGHT HERE RIGHT NOW: The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) group – of which China is a part – together with the Arab Group stated that unilateral trade measures “penalise developing countries and impact their ability to take action to address climate change”, reported Earth Negotiation Bulletin. They pushed back against arguments by Japan, the EU and others that discussions of unilateral trade measures would be “more appropriate under the World Trade Organization”, it added.

PRESIDENCY PAUSE: A “stocktaking plenary” on Wednesday ended abruptly with COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago announcing a further plenary on Saturday. Do Lago said that – despite “more than eight hours” of discussions – further consultations were still needed. Rumours are flying around how Brazil will manage this, with many expecting a COP30 decision responding to these thorny issues. It may be called a “cover decision” or be part of a “mutirão package”, a reference to an Indigenous word for collective efforts.

Cough up the cash

INDIA FOR BASIC: Meanwhile, according to a government press release, India has submitted a statement on behalf of the BASIC group, an institution initiated by China, as well as LMDCs, reaffirming that the “architecture of the Paris Agreement must not be altered, and that [common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)] remains the cornerstone of the global climate regime”. It added that “developed countries must…fulfil their obligations on finance, technology transfer and capacity-building to developing countries”, in particular by increasing adaptation finance flows by “nearly fifteen times” from current levels.

STATUS QUO: Chinese delegates have repeatedly emphasised China’s status as a developing country and the need for CBDR in early statements at COP. Writing in the Backchannel substack, Asia Society Policy Institute China climate hub and climate diplomacy director Kate Logan and E3G senior policy advisor Lily Hartzell wrote that China’s “high-level delegations have cautiously avoided any wording that might suggest a bid for formal climate leadership, particularly when it comes to climate finance”.

LEADING COMMENT: In his speech at the leaders’ summit, Ding stated that “developed countries should fulfill their obligations to take the lead in reducing emissions, honour their financial commitments and provide developing countries with more technical and capacity-building support”. This contrasts his address at COP29, where Ding highlighted China’s role in “provid[ing] and mobilis[ing]” climate finance – sparking much speculation that the country may soon change its approach to the topic.

COME BACK TO US: Li Gao, the head of China’s delegation at COP30, told Agence France-Presse that China “welcome[d]” the “Baku to Belém roadmap” towards the aspirational target of $1.3tn in climate finance by 2035 from all sources, but that it is “crucial” for the developed countries to fulfil their $300bn commitment made at COP29. Li added that “we hope that some day, and we also believe that some day in the future, the US will come back”, because “addressing climate change needs every country”.

Global south solidarity

KEY THEME: China is working towards “jointly creating a green future” for the global south, Huang said in a session on south-south development held on the first day of COP30, attended by Carbon Brief. He added: “We pay attention to the needs of developing countries.” President of the Belt and Road International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC) Zhao Yingmin said on a separate event at the China pavilion that “construction of the [Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)] is also an important driver for developing countries to advance their green transitions”. A number of initiatives were publicised during the first few days of COP, including an agreement between China, Malawi and Kenya on clean cooking and a project to collate “global case studies on green development” by BRIGC.

BUILDING CAPACITY: The BRIGC programme is “exactly the type of example we want [to see at] the COP – implementation, implementation, implementation”, said COP30 CEO Ana Toni, speaking at the launch event attended by Carbon Brief. Selwin Hart, special adviser to the secretary-general on climate action and just transition at the United Nations, emphasised at a China pavilion event that Brazil and China showed “leadership” in climate action, noting that “you [emerging economies] understand us better” than developed countries – referencing an understanding of the need for capacity building in global south countries.

‘FRANK REMARKS’: Meanwhile, an opinion article in the state-supporting Global Times, bylined simply as “Global Times”, quoted COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago saying “You can’t insist that China has to lower its emissions [and then] complain that China is putting cheap [electric vehicles] all over the world”. It added that these “frank remarks should serve as a wake-up call” against “politicising China’s green efforts”.

STRONG INTEREST: The two events on south-south cooperation, both attended by Carbon Brief, appeared to be the best-attended China pavilion events so far. One audience member, a Brazilian chemical engineer, told Carbon Brief that she was attending the session because she was interested in understanding China’s experience of navigating the energy transition as a developing country.

Views on the energy transition

‘CONCRETE PROGRESS’: “We have made concrete progress in energy transformation”, Li said at the China pavilion, adding it involved a “very hard effort”. Climate envoy Liu noted at the same event that “China, as a major country, reaffirms its confidence in achieving the [Paris Agreement] goals”. He said that China “sees the next 10 years as a critical period for delivering on the commitments made under the Paris Agreement”, adding: “We look forward to all countries delivering their contributions on this goal.”

FOSSIL PHASE-OUT?: In his opening speech at the leaders’ summit, Brazil’s Lula called on world leaders to draw roadmaps to “overcome dependence on fossil fuels”, adding that he was “convinced” that this could be done “despite [countries’] difficulties and contradictions”, Argus Media reported. In the opening session of the China pavilion, attended by Carbon Brief, UNEP’s Andersen said she “encourage[d] China to take even bolder action…[and] explore setting targets on coal”.

PRIORITIES FOR 2030: Lyu Wenbin, director general of China’s Energy Research Institute, stated that a key task in the next five years included “improving the quality of energy supply”, including “boosting non-fossil energy” while “shifting coal power to a supporting role” in the energy mix. He added that in the medium- to long-term, China will build an energy system that has “non-fossil energy as the main supply [of power] and fossil energy as a guarantee [of energy security]”.

FLAT OR FALLING: Meanwhile, analysis for Carbon Brief found that China’s carbon dioxide emissions were “unchanged from a year earlier in the third quarter of 2025, extending a flat or falling trend that started in March 2024”. The analysis has been covered widely in publications including China’s Global Times, the New York Times, Financial Times, Reuters, Bloomberg and on the frontpage of the Guardian.

Captured

Bai Quan, director of the Energy Research Institute of the Academy of Macroeconomic Research – a research institution managed by the National Development and Reform Commission – outlined how China’s energy landscape might evolve between 2024 and 2060, during the launch of the China Energy Transformation Outlook (CETO) 2025 at the China Pavilion, attended by Carbon Brief. Guest posts for Carbon Brief on previous CETO reports can be found here and here.

Watch, read, listen

EV MARKET: Research institute the Centre for Strategic and International Studies published a series of two videos talking about China’s EVs in the global market.

HEALTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE: The “Lancet Countdown” China report led by Tsinghua University found that “climate-related health risks in China reached record levels last year”, according to media outlet China.org.cn.

‘DOCUMENT 136’: China Power Enterprise Management analysed the impact of China’s “document 136” pricing reforms for new renewable energy projects.

CHINA-LAOS: A long article by Sky News talked about China’s “green technology exports” in developing countries, such as Laos.


789

The number of delegates China has sent to Belém, according to analysis by Carbon Brief. This includes more than 100 party delegates and almost 700 “overflow” delegates, including from local government, the private sector, non-government organisations and foreign consulting firms.


New science

A study on the promoting effect of environmental penalties on climate-friendly technological innovation in China

Scientific Reports

“Environmental penalties indirectly influence climate-friendly technological innovation through their effects on the digital economy and financial technology”, according to a new study. The paper used data from Chinese cities to model this influence. The authors found that environmental penalties have a “U-shaped” effect, noting a “critical inflection point where environmental penalties shift from promoting to inhibiting these innovations”.

Machine learning analysis of carbon rebound effect dynamics and drivers in Chinese prefecture-level cities

Scientific Reports

New research investigated the “carbon rebound effect”, defined in the paper as “the phenomenon in which, after energy efficiency improvements, carbon emissions rebound due to increased economic activity, thus undermining the reduction in emissions achieved through efficiency gains”. Using machine-learning methods, the authors assessed data from Chinese cities collected over 2010-21. According to the paper, the effect is stronger in the north of China than the south and in the east than the west.

China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

The post China Briefing 13 November 2025: COP30 special appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 13 November 2025: COP30 special

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