Published

8 months ago

June 3, 2025

Alice Rush

尽管中国电力需求快速增长，但清洁能源发电的增长首次使该国的二氧化碳（CO2）排放量出现下降。

Carbon Brief的最新分析显示，2025年第一季度，中国的碳排放量同比下降了1.6%，过去12个月则下降了1%。

新增风电、太阳能和核电的装机容量所带来的出力，足以应对电力需求激增，从而削减燃煤发电量；而此前的排放下降则主要被归因于经济增长放缓。

这项基于官方数据和商业数据的分析显示，中国的碳排放量一年多来一直保持稳定或下降。

不过，该排放量仅比最近的峰值低1%，这意味着只要出现短期反弹，中国的碳排放就可能创下新高。

其他主要发现包括：

清洁能源发电增长速度已经超过当前及长期电力需求增长平均值，从而压低了化石燃料的使用量。
截至2025年3月的12个月内，电力行业的碳排放同比下降了2%。
若这一趋势得以保持，意味着中国电力行业排放可能已达峰并开始持续下降。
美国总统特朗普发动的“贸易战”促使中国更加努力将经济重心从出口转向内需。
新出台的可再生能源电价政策催生了“抢装潮”，企业争相在政策实施前完成项目建设。
如果中国要实现在《巴黎协定》下承诺的2030年排放目标，仍面临日益扩大的差距需要弥补。

上微信关注《碳简报》

如果这种因清洁能源增长而带来的电力行业碳排放下降趋势得以延续，可能预示着Carbon Brief此前在分析中预测的结构性排放下降的开始。

电力行业碳排放下降的趋势很可能在2025年继续。

然而，未来的走势在很大程度上将取决于中国即将于明年公布的下一份五年规划中所设定的清洁能源与减排目标，以及中国对特朗普政府敌对贸易政策的应对策略。

中国碳排放因清洁能源而下降

过去十年来，尽管中国化石燃料和水泥行业的碳排放量有高低起伏，但总体上升了20%。

最新数据显示，该排放量可能已经接近达峰以及趋稳，甚至正步入结构性下降的阶段。

截至2025年第一季度的最新数据显示，中国的碳排放量已经连续一年多呈现稳定或下降趋势，如下图所示。

不过，由于该排放量仅比最近的峰值低1%，这意味着其仍有可能在短期内反弹并创下新高。

因此，中国未来的碳排放走向尚未确定，这取决于各经济部门的趋势，以及中国对特朗普关税政策的应对方式。

电力行业排放下降，其它行业却现反弹

2025年第一季度中国碳排放的下降主要源于电力行业排放下降了5.8%。尽管整体电力需求增长了2.5%，但火电（主要是燃煤和燃气发电）却减少了4.7%。

由于大量新建风电、太阳能和核电装机投入运行，发电量的增长足以弥补需求的增长。水电发电量也有所上升，虽然其受季节因素影响，但同样对化石能源的替代发挥了作用。

电力行业碳排放降幅超过化石能源发电量降幅，因为生物质和天然气的占比上升，同时燃煤电厂的平均能效也有所提升。

具体而言，燃煤电厂度电煤耗平均下降了0.9%。

下图底部显示了第一季度电力行业煤炭使用造成的碳排放量减少情况，该数据低于其他行业的碳排放量变化。

而在电力行业之外，碳排放量增长了3.5%，其中以金属和化工行业的煤炭使用增幅最大。

煤制化工产业正在快速扩张，背后的推动力包括对进口油气依赖的担忧。2025年第一季度，由于煤价走低而油价偏高，该产业的经济性更具吸引力。

粗钢产量同比增长了0.6%，金属制品增长6%，有色金属产量增长2%。这些增长主要集中在3月份，企业赶在关税生效前集中出口，带动金属需求激增，而高产出一直持续到4月。

房地产开工量同比下降24%，新房销售下降3%，反映出建筑行业对水泥、钢材和玻璃的需求持续疲软。

相比之下，汽车和机械制造的经济产出分别增长了12%和13%，表明对金属的需求正在上升。

水泥产量同比下降1.4%，降幅低于往年，可能是由于气温偏高使得依赖天气的施工活动提前启动。

由于燃气发电装机容量增长14%，尽管燃气发电的平均利用率下降，但电力行业的天然气消费量估计增长了6%。但在其他行业，天然气消费减少，总体上抵消了电力行业天然气需求量的增长。

石油制品消费略有上升，如图中最上方所示。由于天气偏暖，依赖天气的施工和农业活动与往年相比提前开工。

然而，从结构性角度来看，汽车电动化和货运行业改用液化天然气，预示着石油需求将持续走低。

中国是否已经碳达峰？

在2025年第一季度排放量同比下降1.6%之际，中国的碳排放自2024年3月以来已连续一年多保持平稳或下降态势。

然而，截至2025年3月底的12个月内，排放量仅比近期峰值下降了1%，这意味着只要出现短期反弹，排放量就可能再创新高。

继一季度大幅下降后，电力行业过去12个月的排放量同比也出现下滑。

在过去40年里，这种情况曾经发生过四次——分别是在2009年、2012年、2015年和2022年。但此次下降首次主要得益于清洁能源发电的增长。

2025年一季度清洁能源发电增速不仅超过整体用电需求增长，也高于过去15年电力需求的平均增长，如上图虚线所示。

此外，过去六个月水电发电量同比保持稳定，这意味着这轮清洁能源的增长是由太阳能、风能和核电装机容量的增长所推动的，而非水电的逐年波动所致。

除发电行业外，2024年12月到2025年3月期间，各行业碳排放均有所下降，但煤化工是个例外。

要使中国整体碳排放量达峰并开始下降，各下降行业的减排总量需超过仍在增长行业的排放增量。

电力和化工以外的煤炭使用量与水泥行业同时达峰，但此后一直在反弹，目前已接近之前的峰值水平。

中国煤炭工业协会预计，钢铁和建材行业的煤炭使用量将下降，而化工行业的煤炭消费量将继续增长。

对煤炭未来需求增长的预期主要集中在化工行业，这也代表着煤炭从单纯的燃料向燃料和原料双重角色的转变。

该协会还认为，燃煤发电将至少在短期内恢复增长，但他们已将2025年的预测下调，与2024年底的展望相比有所保守。

“关税战”可能影响了预期。有分析指出，如果中国GDP因关税下降0.5到1个百分点，可能导致主要用于发电站的燃煤需求也出现类似的下降。

疫情后经济反弹到2024年3月结束，石油产品的消费量自此下降，较峰值减少了2%。尽管化工和航空领域的需求在上升，但由于交通运输领域电气化趋势增强，预计其长期仍呈下降趋势。

天然气的使用量近几个月有所下降，但总体趋势仍可能保持上升。

下表列出了每个行业在12 个月周期内的最高排放量，以及自最新峰值以来的减排量。

除了水泥生产之外，其他行业目前还不能明确判断是否已达排放峰值。然而，有迹象表明，其他行业的峰值也可能已经过去。

诚然，对于石油产品消费和钢铁生产而言，行业预测表明未来排放趋势可能会下降。

对于电力行业而言，只要新增清洁能源装机容量维持在当前或更高水平，就有望带来结构性的排放峰值——因为清洁能源的增长足以覆盖新增的电力需求。

这些行业碳排放量合计占全国八成以上。若这些行业均进入结构性下降阶段，那么中国碳排放总量很可能将开启持续下降通道。

中国推动内需应对美国关税

特朗普政府实施的史无前例的贸易关税政策，以及中国的反制措施，将影响今年及未来中国的经济和碳排放前景。

关税措施实施后，首当其冲的是中国沿海出口大省的工厂减产，从而导致排放下降，同时也可能波及投资和消费支出。

但因双方随后达成90天休战协议，反而刺激美国订单短期内激增，以弥补短暂的贸易放缓，并在休战结束前囤积商品。

中国对关税的反应主要集中在通过刺激措施抵消其经济影响。

虽然暂时的休战会降低出台刺激政策的紧迫性，但当前美国对中国的平均关税税率仍高达40%，远高于特朗普上台前的水平，因此中国领导层也很可能在为未来再次加征关税做好准备。

中国的重点将是为那些原本出口至美国的产品开拓国内市场。这一转向或将助力中国实现长期以来所希望推动的经济向消费驱动型增长转型，而成功实现经济再平衡，有望带来更低能耗的经济增长。

中国的应对措施还包括加大对“新质生产力”的重视，该概念强调新兴科技的发展。

这一概念涵盖了清洁能源产业，该产业如今已成为中国经济的重要引擎，因此难以在刺激计划中被忽视。

中国发改委最新公布的低碳示范项目清单，明确了清洁能源投资的重点方向。绿氢、储能、“虚拟电厂”以及基于氢能的工业脱碳是新的增长领域。

从碳排放角度来看，中国对特朗普关税的反应最关键的问题在于：针对这些优先领域（包括新兴的低碳领域及其他清洁能源产业）的刺激措施，是否足够有力。

新风光电价政策加剧不确定性

中国碳排放面临的另一个不确定性来源，是即将于今年6月生效的新可再生能源电力电价政策。

新政策取消了与煤电价格挂钩的价格保障机制，要求新的风电和太阳能发电项目与购电方直接签订电力合同。这可能导致新建风电和太阳能发电项目的售电价格下降。

不过，政策也为满足中央政府能源目标所需的新增装机容量提供了更有利的价格机制——“差价结算”。

该政策的直接影响可能是大量项目争相在6月前完成投产，以确保能够按现行政策享有机制电价。

其效果已经体现在最新数据中：仅 3 月份中国就增加了 23 吉瓦 (GW) 的太阳能和13GW的风能，比该月之前的新增太阳能和新增风能的最高记录高出80%和110%。

下图根据不同的预测显示，预计2025年和2026年新增清洁能源发电量仍将高于去年创纪录的水平。

然而，这一政策也带来了更大的不确定性。一些行业，尤其是分布式光伏，将经历上半年装机量的激增而下半年放缓的艰难时期。

不确定性主要集中在两个方面。首先是地方如何执行这一政策，因为省级政府拥有相当大的回旋余地。考虑到清洁能源对许多省份经济的重要性，预计地方政府会力求以尽量不扰乱行业的方式来落实政策。

第二个不确定性来自中央政府的能源目标。新电价政策将更优惠的价格与中央政府的能源目标挂钩。而在过去几年中，清洁能源增长远远超过了官方设定的目标。

这凸显了即将出台的“十四五”规划中能源目标的关键作用。国家能源局设定的目标是“年均新增2亿千瓦（200吉瓦）以上新能源的合理消纳利用”，这一数字远低于去年实际新增的360吉瓦。

当然，电价政策的最终效果也取决于市场环境。当前中国煤电项目仍在快速上马，存在产能过剩风险。

中国与巴黎承诺之间的差距扩大

中国风电光伏发展面临的不确定性，也对该国履行《巴黎协定》下的国际气候承诺带来影响。

2020-2023年碳强度（即单位经济产出的排放量）下降进度明显滞后，中国已经明显偏离实现其2030年碳强度承诺的路径，几乎可以肯定将无法实现2025年的阶段性目标。2024年中国的碳强度下降了3.4%，未达到实现2025年和2030年目标所需的改善速度。

2025年政府工作计划中并未设定碳强度目标，仅包含单位国内生产总值能耗降幅超过3%（不包括原材料消耗）的目标。

这可以间接反映碳强度的改善幅度。2024年，中国的碳强度下降了3.4%，而化石能源使用强度下降了3.8%。如果2025年两者之间的比例相似，那么碳强度可能只能下降大约2.5%。在这种情况下，如果GDP增长达到5%的目标，碳排放量仍可能上升超过2%。

政府工作计划中没有设定碳强度目标，也没有特别强调碳强度的下降，显示出当局当前并未将实现这一目标作为优先事项。

政府工作报告中强调了“双碳”目标，即在2030年前实现碳达峰、2060年前实现碳中和。

然而，按照这些目标，2030年前碳排放仍可继续增长。这意味着到该年度，绝对排放量可能在2024年的水平上大幅增加。因此，即便“双碳”目标得以实现，也不能确保中国当前最核心的国际气候承诺——2030年碳强度目标——能够兑现。

即便今年碳排放有所下降，未来五年也需要大幅加快碳强度改善步伐，才能兑现中国2030年《巴黎协定》承诺。

如果中国仍然致力于兑现2030年承诺，那么该过程就需要体现在下一个五年规划设定的目标中。

2025年及未来展望

过去12个月可能标志着中国二氧化碳排放的一个重要转折点：清洁能源的增长首次超过电力需求增长，并在电力领域取代了化石燃料的使用。

尽管新的电价政策带来了一定的不确定性，但预计2025年仍将迎来创纪录的清洁能源新增装机容量，这表明这种趋势将在今年持续。

中国碳排放的未来长期走势将在很大程度上取决于即将出台的五年规划中设定的目标，以及北京应对美国关税和其他经济压力所采取的政策。

从短期看，美国加征关税将抑制能源需求增长和排放水平。为抵消特朗普关税影响而制定的经济政策，很可能会进一步推动清洁能源产业的发展，并可能促使经济重心转向国内消费，这意味着能源消费的增长将相对于GDP增长更少。

但另一方面，中国此前的经济刺激措施往往伴随着排放的急剧上升。中国若想转向消费和新技术驱动的刺激政策，而非高碳排的基建重工业，就必须突破传统发展模式。

电力行业的排放是否已经达峰，将取决于清洁能源供应增长与总体电力需求增长之间的竞赛。

按行业来看，除了电力行业，建筑材料、钢铁以及石油制品消费等领域的排放也可能已经达峰。

这些行业合计占中国与化石燃料相关碳排放的80%以上。然而，在所有这些行业中，都存在短期反弹的可能和不确定性。

目前仍有较大排放增长潜力的行业是煤化工。美国加征关税后国际油价的下跌将削弱该行业的盈利能力，可能导致即便新增产能增加，其工厂利用率也将下降。中国对自美国进口石化产品征收的报复性关税本可能本可能使煤化工行业受益，但这些关税据报已被豁免。

总体而言，这些因素可能推动中国未来五年排放持续下降，并有望在未来五年内实现大幅绝对减排。

然而，若政策出现转向，也同样可能导致碳排放在通往2030年的过程中继续上升。

The post 分析：清洁能源首次助力中国碳排放下降 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

https://www.carbonbrief.org/translations-analysis-clean-energy-just-put-chinas-co2-emissions-into-reverse-for-first-time/

Greenhouse Gases

DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss?

Published

2 days ago

February 6, 2026

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Secrets and layoffs

UNLAWFUL PANEL: A federal judge ruled that the US energy department “violated the law when secretary Chris Wright handpicked five researchers who rejected the scientific consensus on climate change to work in secret on a sweeping government report on global warming”, reported the New York Times. The newspaper explained that a 1972 law “does not allow agencies to recruit or rely on secret groups for the purposes of policymaking”. A Carbon Brief factcheck found more than 100 false or misleading claims in the report.

DARKNESS DESCENDS: The Washington Post reportedly sent layoff notices to “at least 14” of its climate journalists, as part of a wider move from the newspaper’s billionaire owner, Jeff Bezos, to eliminate 300 jobs at the publication, claimed Climate Colored Goggles. After the layoffs, the newspaper will have five journalists left on its award-winning climate desk, according to the substack run by a former climate reporter at the Los Angeles Times. It comes after CBS News laid off most of its climate team in October, it added.

WIND UNBLOCKED: Elsewhere, a separate federal ruling said that a wind project off the coast of New York state can continue, which now means that “all five offshore wind projects halted by the Trump administration in December can resume construction”, said Reuters. Bloomberg added that “Ørsted said it has spent $7bn on the development, which is 45% complete”.

Around the world

CHANGING TIDES: The EU is “mulling a new strategy” in climate diplomacy after struggling to gather support for “faster, more ambitious action to cut planet-heating emissions” at last year’s UN climate summit COP30, reported Reuters.
FINANCE ‘CUT’: The UK government is planning to cut climate finance by more than a fifth, from £11.6bn over the past five years to £9bn in the next five, according to the Guardian.
BIG PLANS: India’s 2026 budget included a new $2.2bn funding push for carbon capture technologies, reported Carbon Brief. The budget also outlined support for renewables and the mining and processing of critical minerals.
MOROCCO FLOODS: More than 140,000 people have been evacuated in Morocco as “heavy rainfall and water releases from overfilled dams led to flooding”, reported the Associated Press.
CASHFLOW: “Flawed” economic models used by governments and financial bodies “ignor[e] shocks from extreme weather and climate tipping points”, posing the risk of a “global financial crash”, according to a Carbon Tracker report covered by the Guardian.
HEATING UP: The International Olympic Committee is discussing options to hold future winter games earlier in the year “because of the effects of warmer temperatures”, said the Associated Press.

54%

The increase in new solar capacity installed in Africa over 2024-25 – the continent’s fastest growth on record, according to a Global Solar Council report covered by Bloomberg.

Latest climate research

Arctic warming significantly postpones the retreat of the Afro-Asian summer monsoon, worsening autumn rainfall | Environmental Research Letters
“Positive” images of heatwaves reduce the impact of messages about extreme heat, according to a survey of 4,000 US adults | Environmental Communication
Greenland’s “peripheral” glaciers are projected to lose nearly one-fifth of their total area and almost one-third of their total volume by 2100 under a low-emissions scenario | The Cryosphere

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Solar power, electric vehicles and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief (shown in blue above). Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada, the analysis said.

Spotlight

Can humans reverse nature decline?

This week, Carbon Brief travelled to a UN event in Manchester, UK to speak to biodiversity scientists about the chances of reversing nature loss.

Officials from more than 150 countries arrived in Manchester this week to approve a new UN report on how nature underpins economic prosperity.

The meeting comes just four years before nations are due to meet a global target to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, agreed in 2022 under the landmark “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF).

At the sidelines of the meeting, Carbon Brief spoke to a range of scientists about humanity’s chances of meeting the 2030 goal. Their answers have been edited for length and clarity.

Dr David Obura, ecologist and chair of Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)

We can’t halt and reverse the decline of every ecosystem. But we can try to “bend the curve” or halt and reverse the drivers of decline. That’s the economic drivers, the indirect drivers and the values shifts we need to have. What the GBF aspires to do, in terms of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, we can put in place the enabling drivers for that by 2030, but we won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point to halt [the loss] of all ecosystems.

Dr Luthando Dziba, executive secretary of IPBES

Countries are due to report on progress by the end of February this year on their national strategies to the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD]. Once we get that, coupled with a process that is ongoing within the CBD, which is called the global stocktake, I think that’s going to give insights on progress as to whether this is possible to achieve by 2030…Are we on the right trajectory? I think we are and hopefully we will continue to move towards the final destination of having halted biodiversity loss, but also of living in harmony with nature.

Prof Laura Pereira, scientist at the Global Change Institute at Wits University, South Africa

At the global level, I think it’s very unlikely that we’re going to achieve the overall goal of halting biodiversity loss by 2030. That being said, I think we will make substantial inroads towards achieving our longer term targets. There is a lot of hope, but we’ve also got to be very aware that we have not necessarily seen the transformative changes that are going to be needed to really reverse the impacts on biodiversity.

Dr David Cooper, chair of the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee and former executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity

It’s important to look at the GBF as a whole…I think it is possible to achieve those targets, or at least most of them, and to make substantial progress towards them. It is possible, still, to take action to put nature on a path to recovery. We’ll have to increasingly look at the drivers.

Prof Andrew Gonzalez, McGill University professor and co-chair of an IPBES biodiversity monitoring assessment

I think for many of the 23 targets across the GBF, it’s going to be challenging to hit those by 2030. I think we’re looking at a process that’s starting now in earnest as countries [implement steps and measure progress]…You have to align efforts for conserving nature, the economics of protecting nature [and] the social dimensions of that, and who benefits, whose rights are preserved and protected.

Neville Ash, director of the UN Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre

The ambitions in the 2030 targets are very high, so it’s going to be a stretch for many governments to make the actions necessary to achieve those targets, but even if we make all the actions in the next four years, it doesn’t mean we halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. It means we put the action in place to enable that to happen in the future…The important thing at this stage is the urgent action to address the loss of biodiversity, with the result of that finding its way through by the ambition of 2050 of living in harmony with nature.

Prof Pam McElwee, Rutgers University professor and co-chair of an IPBES “nexus assessment” report

If you look at all of the available evidence, it’s pretty clear that we’re going to keep experiencing biodiversity decline. I mean, it’s fairly similar to the 1.5C climate target. We are not going to meet that either. But that doesn’t mean that you slow down the ambition…even though you recognise that we probably won’t meet that specific timebound target, that’s all the more reason to continue to do what we’re doing and, in fact, accelerate action.

Watch, read, listen

OIL IMPACTS: Gas flaring has risen in the Niger Delta since oil and gas major Shell sold its assets in the Nigerian “oil hub”, a Climate Home News investigation found.

LOW SNOW: The Washington Post explored how “climate change is making the Winter Olympics harder to host”.

CULTURE WARS: A Media Confidential podcast examined when climate coverage in the UK became “part of the culture wars”.

Coming up

2-8 February: 12th session of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), Manchester, UK
8 February: Japanese general election
8 February: Portugal presidential election
11 February: Barbados general election
11-12 February: UN climate chief Simon Stiell due to speak in Istanbul, Turkey

Pick of the jobs

UK Met Office, senior climate science communicator | Salary: £43,081-£46,728. Location: Exeter, UK
Canadian Red Cross, programme officer, Indigenous operations – disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation | Salary: $56,520-$60,053. Location: Manitoba, Canada
Aldersgate Group, policy officer | Salary: £33,949-£39,253. Location: London (hybrid)

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss?

Greenhouse Gases

China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK

Published

3 days ago

February 5, 2026

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Solar and wind eclipsed coal

‘FIRST TIME IN HISTORY’: China’s total power capacity reached 3,890 gigawatts (GW) in 2025, according to a National Energy Administration (NEA) data release covered by industry news outlet International Energy Net. Of this, it said, solar capacity rose 35% to 1,200GW and wind capacity was up 23% to 640GW, while thermal capacity – which is mostly coal – grew 6% to just over 1,500GW. This marks the “first time in history” that wind and solar capacity has outranked coal capacity in China’s power mix, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. China’s grid-related energy storage capacity exceeded 213GW in 2025, said state news agency Xinhua. Meanwhile, clean-energy industries “drove more than 90%” of investment growth and more than half of GDP growth last year, said the Guardian in its coverage of new analysis for Carbon Brief. (See more in the spotlight below.)

上微信关注《碳简报》

DAWN FOR SOLAR: Solar power capacity alone may outpace coal in 2026, according to projections by the China Electricity Council (CEC), reported business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald. It added that non-fossil sources could account for 63% of the power mix this year, with coal falling to 31%. Separately, the China Renewable Energy Society said that annual wind-power additions could grow by between 600-980GW over the next five years, with annual additions of 120GW expected until 2028, said industry news outlet China Energy Net. China Energy Net also published the full CEC report.

STATE MEDIA VOICE: Xinhua published several energy- and climate-related articles in a series on the 15th five-year plan. One said that becoming a low-carbon energy “powerhouse” will support decarbonisation efforts, strengthen industrial innovation and improve China’s “global competitive edge and standing”. Another stated that coal consumption is “expected” to peak around 2027, with continued “growth” in the power and chemicals sector, while oil has already peaked. A third noted that distributed energy systems better matched the “characteristics of renewable energy” than centralised ones, but warned against “blind” expansion and insufficient supporting infrastructure. Others in the series discussed biodiversity and environmental protection and recycling of clean-energy technology. Meanwhile, the communist party-affiliated People’s Daily said that oil will continue to play a “vital role” in China, even after demand peaks.

Starmer and Xi endorsed clean-energy cooperation

CLIMATE PARTNERSHIP: UK prime minister Keir Starmer and Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged in Beijing to deepen cooperation on “green energy”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. They also agreed to establish a “China-UK high-level climate and nature partnership”, said China Daily. Xi told Starmer that the two countries should “carry out joint research and industrial transformation” in new energy and low-carbon technologies, according to Xinhua. It also cited Xi as saying China “hopes” the UK will provide a “fair” business environment for Chinese companies.

Sign up to Carbon Brief’s free “China Briefing” email newsletter. All you need to know about the latest developments relating to China and climate change. Sent to your inbox every Thursday.

OCTOPUS OVERSEAS: During the visit, UK power-trading company Octopus Energy and Chinese energy services firm PCG Power announced they would be starting a new joint venture in China, named Bitong Energy, reported industry news outlet PV Magazine. The move “marks a notable direct entry” of a foreign company into China’s “tightly regulated electricity market”, said Caixin.

PUSH AND PULL: UK policymakers also visited Chinese clean-energy technology manufacturer Envision in Shanghai, reported finance news outlet Yicai. It quoted UK business secretary Peter Kyle emphasising that partnering with companies “like Envision” on sustainability is a “really important part of our future”, particularly in terms of job creation in the UK. Trade minister Chris Bryant told Radio Scotland Breakfast that the government will decide on Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Mingyang’s plans for a Scotland factory “soon”. Researchers at the thinktank Oxford Institute for Energy Studies wrote in a guest post for Carbon Brief that greater Chinese competition in Europe’s wind market could “help spur competition in Europe”, if localisation rules and “other guardrails” are applied.

More China news

LIFE SUPPORT: China will update its coal capacity payment mechanism, which will raise thresholds for coal-fired power plants and expand to cover gas-fired power and pumped and new-energy storage, reported current affairs outlet China News.
FRONTIER TECH: The world’s “largest compressed-air power storage plant” has begun operating in China, said Bloomberg.
PARTNERSHIP A ‘MISTAKE’: The EU launched a “foreign subsidies” probe into Chinese wind turbine company Goldwind, said the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. EU climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said the bloc must resist China’s pull in clean technologies, according to Bloomberg.
TRADE SPAT: The World Trade Organization “backed a complaint by China” that the US Inflation Reduction Act “discriminated against” Chinese cleantech exports, said Reuters.
NEW RULES: China has set “new regulations” for the Waliguan Baseline Observatory, which provides “key scientific references for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, said the People’s Daily.

Captured

New or reactivated proposals for coal-fired power plants in China totalled 161GW in 2025, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief.

Spotlight

Clean energy drove China’s economic growth in 2025

New analysis for Carbon Brief finds that clean-energy sectors contributed the equivalent of $2.1tn to China’s economy last year, making it a key driver of growth. However, headwinds in 2026 could restrict growth going forward – especially for the solar sector.

Below is an excerpt from the article, which can be read in full on Carbon Brief’s website.

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP)

Analysis shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly due to a new pricing system, worsening industrial “overcapacity” and trade tensions.

Outperforming the wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy, making an outsized contribution to annual growth.

Without these sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

In 2024, EVs and solar had been the largest growth drivers. In 2025, it was EVs and batteries, which delivered 44% of the economic impact and more than half of the growth of the clean-energy industries.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Within the electricity sector, the largest drivers were growth in investment in wind and solar power generation capacity, along with growth in power output from solar and wind, followed by the exports of solar-power equipment and materials.

But investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year, as the government made efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition.

Headwinds for solar

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars represents a gigantic bet on a continuing global energy transition.

However, developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar. A new pricing system for renewable power is creating uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year.

The reduction in the prices of clean-energy technology has been so dramatic that when the prices for GDP statistics are updated, the sectors’ contribution to real GDP – adjusted for inflation or, in this case deflation – will be revised down.

Nevertheless, the key economic role of the industry creates a strong motivation to keep the clean-energy boom going. A slowdown in the domestic market could also undermine efforts to stem overcapacity and inflame trade tensions by increasing pressure on exports to absorb supply.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector.

Provincial governments have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will, therefore, be of major importance.

This spotlight was written for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), and Belinda Schaepe, China policy analyst at CREA. CREA China analysts Qi Qin and Chengcheng Qiu contributed research.

Watch, read, listen

PROVINCE INFLUENCE: The Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, a Beijing-based thinktank, published a report examining the climate-related statements in provincial recommendations for the 15th five-year plan.

‘PIVOT’?: The Outrage + Optimism podcast spoke with the University of Bath’s Dr Yixian Sun about whether China sees itself as a climate leader and what its role in climate negotiations could be going forward.

COOKING FOR CLEAN-TECH: Caixin covered rising demand for China’s “gutter oil” as companies “scramble” to decarbonise.

DON’T GO IT ALONE: China News broadcast the Chinese foreign ministry’s response to the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, with spokeswoman Mao Ning saying “no country can remain unaffected” by climate change.

$6.8tn

The current size of China’s green-finance economy, including loans, bonds and equity, according to Dr Ma Jun, the Institute of Finance and Sustainability’s president,in a report launch event attended by Carbon Brief. Dr Ma added that “green loans” make up 16% of all loans in China, with some areas seeing them take a 34% share.

New science

China’s official emissions inventories have overestimated its hydrofluorocarbon emissions by an average of 117m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO2e) every year since 2017 | Nature Geoscience
“Intensified forest management efforts” in China from 2010 onwards have been linked to an acceleration in carbon absorption by plants and soils | Communications Earth and Environment

Recently published on WeChat

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

The post China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK

Greenhouse Gases

Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025

Published

4 days ago

February 4, 2026

Alice Rush

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

Without clean-energy sectors, China would have missed its target for GDP growth of “around 5%”, expanding by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%.
Clean-energy industries are expanding much more quickly than China’s economy overall, with their annual growth rate accelerating from 12% in 2024 to 18% in 2025.
The “new three” of EVs, batteries and solar continue to dominate the economic contribution of clean energy in China, generating two-thirds of the value added and attracting more than half of all investment in the sectors.
China’s investments in clean energy reached 7.2tn yuan ($1.0tn) in 2025, roughly four times the still sizable $260bn put into fossil-fuel extraction and coal power.
Exports of clean-energy technologies grew rapidly in 2025, but China’s domestic market still far exceeds the export market in value for Chinese firms.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly for solar power, where growth has slowed in response to a new pricing system and where central government targets have been set far below the recent rate of expansion.

An ongoing slowdown could turn the sectors into a drag on GDP, while worsening industrial “overcapacity” and exacerbating trade tensions.

Yet, even if central government targets in the next five-year plan are modest, those from local governments and state-owned enterprises could still drive significant growth in clean energy.

This article updates analysis previously reported for 2023 and 2024.

Clean-energy sectors outperform wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy. This means that it is making an outsize contribution to annual economic growth.

The figure below shows that clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy overall in 2025 and more than 90% of the net rise in investment.

Contributions to the growth in Chinese investment (left) and GDP overall (right) in 2025 by sector, trillion yuan. Source: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) analysis for Carbon Brief.

In 2022, China’s clean-energy economy was worth an estimated 8.4tn yuan ($1.2tn). By 2025, the sectors had nearly doubled in value to 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn).

This is comparable to the entire output of Brazil or Canada and positions the Chinese clean-energy industry as the 8th-largest economy in the world. Its value is roughly half the size of the economy of India – the world’s fourth largest – or of the US state of California.

The outperformance of the clean-energy sectors means that they are also claiming a rising share of China’s economy overall, as shown in the figure below.

Share of China’s GDP contributed by clean-energy sectors, %. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

This share has risen from 7.3% of China’s GDP in 2022 to 11.4% in 2025.

Without clean-energy sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy thus made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

The table below includes a detailed breakdown by sector and activity.

Sector	Activity	Value in 2025, CNY bln	Value in 2025, USD bln	Year-on-year growth	Growth contribution	Value contribution	Value in 2025, CNY trn	Value in 2024, CNY trn	Value in 2023, CNY trn	Value in 2022, CNY trn
EVs	Investment: manufacturing capacity	1,643	228	18%	10.4%	10.7%	1.6	1.4	1.2	0.9
EVs	Investment: charging infrastructure	192	27	58%	2.9%	1.2%	0.192	0.122	0.1	0.08
EVs	Production of vehicles	3,940	548	29%	36.4%	25.6%	3.94	3.065	2.26	1.65
Batteries	Investment: battery manufacturing	277	38	35%	3.0%	1.8%	0.277	0.205	0.32	0.15
Batteries	Exports: batteries	724	101	51%	10.1%	4.7%	0.724	0.48	0.46	0.34
Solar power	Investment: power generation capacity	1,182	164	15%	6.3%	7.7%	1.182	1.031	0.808	0.34
Solar power	Investment: manufacturing capacity	506	70	-23%	-6.5%	3.3%	0.506	0.662	0.95	0.51
Solar power	Electricity generation	491	68	33%	5.1%	3.2%	0.491	0.369	0.26	0.19
Solar power	Exports of components	681	95	21%	4.9%	4.4%	0.681	0.562	0.5	0.35
Wind power	Investment: power generation capacity, onshore	612	85	47%	8.1%	4.0%	0.612	0.417	0.397	0.21
Wind power	Investment: power generation capacity, offshore	96	13	98%	2.0%	0.6%	0.096	0.048	0.086	0.06
Wind power	Electricity generation	510	71	13%	2.4%	3.3%	0.51	0.453	0.4	0.34
Nuclear power	Investment: power generation capacity	173	24	18%	1.1%	1.1%	0.17	0.15	0.09	0.07
Nuclear power	Electricity generation	216	30	8%	0.7%	1.4%	0.216	0.2	0.19	0.19
Hydropower	Investment: power generation capacity	54	7	-7%	-0.2%	0.3%	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Hydropower	Electricity generation	582	81	3%	0.6%	3.8%	0.582	0.567	0.51	0.51
Rail transportation	Investment	902	125	6%	2.1%	5.8%	0.902	0.851	0.764	0.714
Rail transportation	Transport of passengers and goods	1,020	142	3%	1.3%	6.6%	1.02	0.99	0.964	0.694
Electricity transmission	Investment: transmission capacity	644	90	6%	1.5%	4.2%	0.64	0.61	0.53	0.5
Electricity transmission	Transmission of clean power	52	7	14%	0.3%	0.3%	0.052	0.046	0.04	0.04
Energy storage	Investment: Pumped hydro	53	7	5%	0.1%	0.3%	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03
Energy storage	Investment: Grid-connected batteries	232	32	52%	3.3%	1.5%	0.232	0.152	0.08	0.02
Energy storage	Investment: Electrolysers	11	2	29%	0.1%	0.1%	0.011	0.009	0	0
Energy efficiency	Revenue: Energy service companies	620	86	17%	3.8%	4.0%	0.62	0.528003	0.52	0.45
Total	Investments	7,198	1001	15%	38.2%	46.7%	7.20	6.28	6.00	4.11
Total	Production of goods and services	8,216	1,143	22%	61.8%	53.3%	8.22	6.73	5.58	4.32
Total	Total GDP contribution	15,414	2144	18%	100.0%	100.0%	15.41	13.01	11.58	8.42

EVs and batteries were the largest drivers of GDP growth

The contribution to nominal GDP growth – unadjusted for inflation – was even larger, as EV prices held up year-on-year while the economy as a whole suffered from deflation. Investment in battery manufacturing rebounded after a fall in 2024.

The major contribution of EVs and batteries is illustrated in the figure below, which shows both the overall size of the clean-energy economy and the sectors that added the most to the rise from year to year.

Contribution of clean-energy sectors to China’s GDP and GDP growth, trillion yuan, 2022-2025. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year. This was in line with the government’s efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition in the sector.

Finally, rail transportation was responsible for 12% of the total economic output of the clean-energy sectors, but saw relatively muted growth year-on-year, with revenue up 3% and investment by 6%.

Note that the International Energy Agency (IEA) world energy investment report projected that China invested $627bn in clean energy in 2025, against $257bn in fossil fuels.

For the same sectors as the IEA report, this analysis puts the value of clean-energy investment in 2025 at a significantly more conservative $430bn. The higher figures in this analysis overall are therefore the result of wider sectoral coverage.

Electric vehicles and batteries

EVs and vehicle batteries were again the largest contributors to China’s clean-energy economy in 2025, making up an estimated 44% of value overall.

Of this total, the largest share of both total value and growth came from the production of battery EVs and plug-in hybrids, which expanded 29% year-on-year. This was followed by investment into EV manufacturing, which grew 18%, after slower growth rates in 2024.

Investment in battery manufacturing also rebounded after a drop in 2024, driven by new battery technology and strong demand from both domestic and international markets. Battery manufacturing investment grew by 35% year-on-year to 277bn yuan.

The share of electric vehicles (EVs) will have reached 12% of all vehicles on the road by the end of 2025, up from 9% a year earlier and less than 2% just five years ago.

The share of EVs in the sales of all new vehicles increased to 48%, from 41% in 2024, with passenger cars crossing the 50% threshold. In November, EV sales crossed the 60% mark in total sales and they continue to drive overall automotive sales growth, as shown below.

Production of combustion-engine vehicles and EVs in China, million units. EVs include battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. Source: China Association of Automobile Manufacturers data via Wind Financial Terminal.

Electric trucks experienced a breakthrough as their market share rose from 8% in the first nine months of 2024 to 23% in the same period in 2025.

Policy support for EVs continues, for example, with a new policy aiming to nearly double charging infrastructure in the next three years.

Exports grew even faster than the domestic market, but the vast majority of EVs continue to be sold domestically. In 2025, China produced 16.6m EVs, rising 29% year-on-year. While exports accounted for only 21% or 3.4m EVs, they grew by 86% year-on-year. Top export destinations for Chinese EVs were western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

The value of batteries exported also grew rapidly by 41% year-on-year, becoming the third largest growth driver of the GDP. Battery exports largely went to western Europe, north America and south-east Asia.

In contrast with deflationary trends in the price of many clean-energy technologies, average EV prices have held up in 2025, with a slight increase in average price of new models, after discounts. This also means that the contribution of the EV industry to nominal GDP growth was even more significant, given that overall producer prices across the economy fell by 2.6%. Battery prices continued to drop.

Clean-power generation

The solar power sector generated 19% of the total value of the clean-energy industries in 2025, adding 2.9tn yuan ($41bn) to the national economy.

Within this, investment in new solar power plants, at 1.2tn yuan ($160bn), was the largest driver, followed by the value of solar technology exports and by the value of the power generated from solar. Investment in manufacturing continued to fall after the wave of capacity additions in 2023, reaching 0.5tn yuan ($72bn), down 23% year-on-year.

In 2025, China achieved another new record of wind and solar capacity additions. The country installed a total of 315GW solar and 119GW wind capacity, adding more solar and two times as much wind as the rest of the world combined.

Clean energy accounted for 90% of investment in power generation, with solar alone covering 50% of that. As a result, non-fossil power made up 42% of total power generation, up from 39% in 2024.

However, a new pricing policy for new solar and wind projects and modest targets for capacity growth have created uncertainty about whether the boom will continue.

Under the new policy, new clean-power generation has to compete on price against existing coal power in markets that place it at a disadvantage in some key ways.

At the same time, the electricity markets themselves are still being introduced and developed, creating investment uncertainty.

Investment in solar power generation increased year-on-year by 15%, but experienced a strong stop-and-go cycle. Developers rushed to finish projects ahead of the new pricing policy coming into force in June and then again towards the end of the year to finalise projects ahead of the end of the current 14th five-year plan.

Investment in the solar sector as a whole was stable year-on-year, with the decline in manufacturing capacity investment balanced by continued growth in power generation capacity additions. This helped shore up the utilisation of manufacturing plants, in line with the government’s aim to reduce “disorderly” price competition.

By late 2025, China’s solar manufacturing capacity reached an estimated 1,200GW per year, well ahead of the global capacity additions of around 650GW in 2025. Manufacturers can now produce far more solar panels than the global market can absorb, with fierce competition leading to historically low profitability.

China’s policymakers have sought to address the issue since mid-2024, warning against “involution”, passing regulations and convening a sector-wide meeting to put pressure on the industry. This is starting to yield results, with losses narrowing in the third quarter of 2025.

The volume of exports of solar panels and components reached a record high in 2025, growing 19% year-on-year. In particular, exports of cells and wafers increased rapidly by 94% and 52%, while panel exports grew only by 4%.

This reflects the growing diversification of solar-supply chains in the face of tariffs and with more countries around the world building out solar panel manufacturing capacity. The nominal value of exports fell 8%, however, due to a fall in average prices and a shift to exporting upstream intermediate products instead of finished panels.

Hydropower, wind and nuclear were responsible for 15% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2025, adding some 2.2tn yuan ($310bn) to China’s GDP in 2025.

Nearly two-thirds of this (1.3tn yuan, $180bn) came from the value of power generation from hydropower, wind and nuclear, with investment in new power generation projects contributing the rest.

Power generation grew 33% from solar, 13% from wind, 3% from hydropower and 8% from nuclear.

Within power generation investment, solar remained the largest segment by value – as shown in the figure below – but wind-power generation projects were the largest contributor to growth, overtaking solar for the first time since 2020.

Value of new clean-power generation capacity, billion yuan, by year added. Source: CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

In particular, offshore wind power capacity investment rebounded as expected, doubling in 2025 after a sharp drop in 2024.

Investment in nuclear projects continued to grow but remains smaller in total terms, at 17bn yuan. Investment in conventional hydropower continued to decline by 7%.

Electricity storage and grids

Electricity transmission and storage were responsible for 6% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2025, accounting for 1.0 tn yuan ($140bn).

The most valuable sub-segment was investment in power grids, growing 6% in 2025 and reaching $90bn. This was followed by investment in energy storage, including pumped hydropower, grid-connected battery storage and hydrogen production.

Investment in grid-connected batteries saw the largest year-on-year growth, increasing by 50%, while investments in electrolysers also grew by 30%. The transmission of clean power increased an estimated 13%, due to rapid growth in clean-power generation.

China’s total electricity storage capacity reached more than 213GW, with battery storage capacity crossing 145GW and pumped hydro storage at 69GW. Some 66GW of battery storage capacity was added in 2025, up 52% year-on-year and accounting for more than 40% of global capacity additions.

Notably, capacity additions accelerated in the second half of the year, with 43GW added, compared with the first half, which saw 23GW of new capacity.

The battery storage market initially slowed after the renewable power pricing policy, which banned storage mandates after May, but this was quickly replaced by a “market-driven boom”. Provincial electricity spot markets, time-of-day tariffs and increasing curtailment of solar power all improved the economics of adding storage.

By the end of 2025, China’s top five solar manufacturers had all entered the battery storage market, making a shift in industry strategy.

Investment in pumped hydropower continued to increase, with 15GW of new capacity permitted in the first half of 2025 alone and 3GW entering operation.

Railways

Rail transportation made up 12% of the GDP contribution of the clean-energy sectors, with revenue from passenger and goods rail transportation the largest source of value. Most growth came from investment in rail infrastructure, which increased 6% year-on-year

The electrification of transport is not limited to EVs, as rail passenger, freight and investment volumes saw continued growth. The total length of China’s high-speed railway network reached 50,000km in 2025, making up more than 70% of the global high-speed total.

Energy efficiency

Investment in energy efficiency rebounded strongly in 2025. Measured by the aggregate turnover of large energy service companies (ESCOs), the market expanded by 17% year-on-year, returning to growth rates last seen during 2016-2020.

Total industry turnover has also recovered to its previous peak in 2021, signalling a clear turnaround after three years of weakness.

Industry projections now anticipate annual turnover reaching 1tn yuan in annual turnover by 2030, a target that had previously been expected to be met by 2025.

China’s ESCO market has evolved into the world’s largest. Investment within China’s ESCO market remains heavily concentrated in the buildings sector, which accounts for around 50% of total activity. Industrial applications make up a further 21%, while energy supply, demand-side flexibility and energy storage together account for approximately 16%.

Implications of China’s clean-energy bet

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars into clean-energy manufacturing represents a gigantic economic and financial bet on a continuing global energy transition.

In addition to the domestic investment covered in this article, Chinese firms are making major investments in overseas manufacturing.

The clean-energy industries have played a crucial role in meeting China’s economic targets during the five-year period ending this year, delivering an estimated 40%, 25% and 37% of all GDP growth in 2023, 2024 and 2025, respectively.

However, the developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar power generation, with the new pricing system for renewable power generation leading to a short-term slowdown and creating major uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year, while investment in generation clocked growth for the full year, showing the risk to the industries under the current power market set-ups that favour coal-fired power.

A recent CREA survey of experts working on climate and energy issues in China found that the majority believe that economic and geopolitical challenges will make the “dual carbon” goals – and with that, clean-energy industries – only more important.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector. Their previous five-year plans played a key role in creating the gigantic wind and solar power “bases” that substantially exceeded the central government’s level of ambition.

Provincial governments also have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will therefore be of major importance.

About the data

Reported investment expenditure and sales revenue has been used where available. When this is not available, estimates are based on physical volumes – gigawatts of capacity installed, number of vehicles sold – and unit costs or prices.

The contribution to real growth is tracked by adjusting for inflation using 2022-2023 prices.

All calculations and data sources are given in a worksheet.

Estimates include the contribution of clean-energy technologies to the demand for upstream inputs such as metals and chemicals.

This approach shows the contribution of the clean-energy sectors to driving economic activity, also outside the sectors themselves, and is appropriate for estimating how much lower economic growth would have been without growth in these sectors.

Double counting is avoided by only including non-overlapping points in value chains. For example, the value of EV production and investment in battery storage of electricity is included, but not the value of battery production for the domestic market, which is predominantly an input to these activities.

Similarly, the value of solar panels produced for the domestic market is not included, as it makes up a part of the value of solar power generating capacity installed in China. However, the value of solar panel and battery exports is included.

In 2025, there was a major divergence between two different measures of investment. The first, fixed asset investment, reportedly fell by 3.8%, the first drop in 35 years. In contrast, gross capital formation saw the slowest growth in that period but still inched up by 2%.

This analysis uses gross capital formation as the measure of investment, as it is the data point used for GDP accounting. However, the analysis is unable to account for changes in inventories, so the estimate of clean-energy investment is for fixed asset investment in the sectors.

The analysis does not explicitly account for the small and declining role of imports in producing clean-energy goods and services. This means that the results slightly overstate the contribution to GDP but understate the contribution to growth.

For example, one of the most important import dependencies that China has is for advanced computing chips for EVs. The value of the chips in a typical EV is $1,000 and China’s import dependency for these chips is 90%, which suggests that imported chips represent less than 3% of the value of EV production.

The estimates are likely to be conservative in some key respects. For example, Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates “investment in the energy transition” in China in 2024 at $800bn. This estimate covers a nearly identical list of sectors to ours, but excludes manufacturing – the comparable number from our data is $600bn.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics says that the total value generated by automobile production and sales in 2023 was 11tn yuan. The estimate in this analysis for the value of EV sales in 2023 is 2.3tn yuan, or 20% of the total value of the industry, when EVs already made up 31% of vehicle production and the average selling prices for EVs was slightly higher than for internal combustion engine vehicles.