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Cameco delivered strong fourth-quarter and full-year 2025 results, with uranium clearly driving the story. As global nuclear momentum accelerated, utilities increased long-term contracting and focused more on supply security. In this environment, Cameco’s disciplined uranium strategy supported stronger earnings and reinforced its long-term positioning.

Strong Uranium Strategy Boosts Cameco’s Results

Uranium remains the foundation of Cameco’s business. Management continues to match production with long-term contracts instead of chasing short-term spot market gains. By the end of 2025, the company had about 230 million pounds of uranium under long-term contracts, giving it strong revenue visibility for years.

In 2025, uranium segment earnings before income tax increased by $50 million compared to 2024. Adjusted EBITDA rose by $76 million year over year. Although fourth-quarter earnings dipped slightly due to the timing of sales, adjusted EBITDA still improved, showing stronger underlying pricing.

This performance reflects contracts signed in a better uranium price environment. As higher-priced deliveries continue, margins should gradually strengthen.

cameco uranium results earnings
Source: Cameco

Fuel Services and Westinghouse Support Solid Gains

  • While uranium leads the story, Cameco’s fuel services segment also posted solid gains. Annual earnings before income tax increased by $71 million, and adjusted EBITDA rose by $74 million. Deliveries under contracts signed at improved prices drove the growth.
  • Cameco’s investment in Westinghouse Electric Company further strengthens its nuclear exposure. For this segment, the adjusted EBITDA increased 30% compared to 2024. Cameco’s share of adjusted EBITDA rose by $297 million for the full year.
cameco
Source: Cameco

The company also received US$171.5 million from a cash distribution related to the Dukovany reactor expansion project in the Czech Republic. Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant is adding two new reactors, reflecting broader global nuclear expansion.

Although a similar distribution is not expected in 2026, Westinghouse continues to provide stable earnings and long-term value. Still, uranium production and contracting remain Cameco’s primary earnings engine.

Cameco (NYSE: CCJ) Stock Reflects Uranium Momentum

Cameco is trading around $116.50 USD per share, close to multi-year highs. Over the past year, the stock has surged roughly 140%, largely driven by rising uranium prices and renewed nuclear policy support.

Recent trading has shown normal volatility, typical of resource stocks. However, analysts say long-term sentiment remains bullish. They continue to maintain positive ratings, supported by strong uranium fundamentals, improving earnings, and structural growth in nuclear demand.

ccj cameco stock
Source: Yahoo Finance

Is Cameco Set to Ride the Nuclear and Uranium Boom?

As nuclear capacity expands globally, uranium demand is expected to rise steadily. However, supply growth remains measured and capital-intensive. This dynamic supports a constructive multi-year uranium cycle.

The International Atomic Energy Agency forecasts that global nuclear capacity could double by 2050, reaching 561–992 gigawatts. This expansion will require a reliable uranium supply for decades.

In 2025, the uranium market strengthened. Governments renewed support for nuclear energy, and utilities increased long-term contracting. Energy security and decarbonization goals made uranium a priority once again.

At the same time, supply remains tight. Secondary uranium sources are shrinking, and new mines face long development timelines, rising costs, and geopolitical risks. This supply-demand gap is pushing long-term uranium prices higher.

  • Analysis from Visible Alpha, part of S&P Global Market Intelligence, shows that uranium revenue across 11 major listed uranium producers could grow from $4.7 billion in 2023 to $14.9 billion by 2033.
  • Most of this growth is expected in the second half of the decade, as new mines come online.

Higher production and stronger prices will fuel industry growth. Average uranium prices are expected to rise from $59.6 per pound in 2023 to $98.7 by 2033, with the potential for further increases after that.

cameco uranium production

Cameco’s disciplined approach positions it well in this environment. The company avoids overproduction, protects its top-tier assets, and maintains financial strength. Rather than chasing volume, it focuses on long-term contracts and sustainable value creation.

Uranium Titans Face Off: Kazatomprom vs. Cameco in 2025

Despite rising interest in new uranium projects, the market remained highly concentrated in 2025. Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom and Cameco continued to dominate both revenue and production.

Consensus forecasts from Visible Alpha estimate Kazatomprom will generate around $3.3 billion in uranium revenue in 2025. In comparison, Cameco is projected to earn roughly $2.1 billion.

Uranium forms the core of both companies’ business models. It accounts for about 91% of Kazatomprom’s revenue and 83% of Cameco’s revenue. Therefore, both miners remain highly sensitive to uranium price movements and contract renewals.

Production and Revenue Show a Clear Divide

In production terms, Kazatomprom is expected to produce 29.1 million pounds of uranium in 2025, while Cameco is forecast to deliver around 21 million pounds. Together, they represent roughly 86% of total output among the seven largest uranium producers.

The comparison highlights Kazatomprom’s scale advantage in both revenue and output. However, Cameco maintains a strong position in Western markets, long-term utility contracts, and strategic supply agreements.

Looking ahead, competition may intensify after 2028. A new wave of uranium miners is projected to significantly expand supply, with total output forecast to rise from 58.5 million pounds in 2025 to 141.2 million pounds by 2033. This shift could gradually reshape the uranium market’s competitive balance.

Kazatomprom Cameco

Overall, with global nuclear expansion underway, uranium will remain a critical energy resource. Cameco (NYSE: CCJ) is strategically placed to benefit from rising uranium demand while navigating market volatility.

The post Uranium Rally Lifts Cameco Stock (CCJ) After Strong 2025 Results appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

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Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?

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