Prof Penny Endersby has been chief executive of the UK Met Office since December 2018.
She took the reins at the UK’s climate and weather service after more than two decades working in the science and technology department of the Ministry of Defence.
Endersby has led the Met Office during a critical period which has seen record-breaking heat in the UK, an intensification of extreme weather around the world and a resurgence in attacks on climate science.
At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have started to transform climate modelling and the Met Office has switched on a cloud-based “supercomputer” dedicated to improving weather and climate science.
- On how working on defence is like climate change: “There are more scientific parallels than you would think. Armour modelling is computational fluid dynamics modelling, like weather modelling.”
- On her previous interest in climate change: “I am naturally a sort of geeky, evidence-based person. I actually had kept 10 years of rain gauge records in Wiltshire – just because I was interested – before I ever thought about this job.”
- On how the Met Office informs UK climate-change preparations: “Our core bit is on preparing other people to make the decisions on what to expect. So we do the science of the climate projections that says: ‘Where might we be in 2030, 2050, 2100 under different emission scenarios?’”
- On the aspect of UK climate change that concerns her most: “The one that probably keeps me awake at night is the flash flooding – the surface water flooding from very localised torrential rainfall events, because those are the hardest to model.”
- On the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C temperature limit: “It is theoretically possible we stay within 1.5C, but it’s going to require action that’s never been seen and doesn’t look like it’s coming.”
- On geoengineering: “There’s nothing regulating [it] globally. So other people may do it – whether we advocate [for] it or not. So, we do think it is the right thing to do to understand what the impacts of it could be [so as] to be able to detect it if other people do it.”
- On carbon removal techniques: “The best way to get carbon out of the atmosphere is still a tree…The next easiest thing is direct carbon capture…The other techniques – I think they’re worth investigating, but they’re not going to be available at scale in the times that we need.”
- On budget cuts to the US weather and climate service: “I think the actual impact on funding, so far, has not been as severe as some of the news stories have said – because their role is just as fundamental to the operation of the state as ours is.”
- On the reach of the IPCC’s big assessment reports: “I think, in many ways, our best hope now lies in the global financial system. They’re not very altruistic, but they are very rational and they do use the best evidence… And, if the money sends them into different investments or different insurance strategies – that is still going to be based on the evidence that comes out of the IPCC.”
- On the evolution of climate misinformation: “I think the climate data is now so stark, that anyone who looks at the data at all can see that we’re in unprecedented times. [But] what has happened, to my grief and distress, has been people now attacking the trusted sources of data. And in the UK – that’s us.”
- On how the Met Office deals with misinformation: “We have had to become – per force – experts in countering misinformation and disinformation, and, really, to an extent, quite thought-leading in government and in convening cross-government networks to deal with this.”
- On social media attacks on the Met Office: “The aggression that some of our media-facing people face online [and] the really vile hostility which often quite junior staff are dealing with – that definitely is something where we have to take care of and look after people.”
- On personal attacks on social media: “It can be painful, but you really have to rise above it. And when it’s a woman, there’s always a generous salting of misogyny in there as well.”
- On claims about the inaccuracy of Met Office temperature readings: “Just to be clear, the claims are baseless…Everything we do is to the required standards.”
- On potential applications for AI in climate science: “AI for climate change is relatively new – and the challenge is always, what’s the training data set? Because you don’t have the training data set for climate that hasn’t happened yet.”
- On the Met Office’s work with AI: “Our strategy is to go for the best blend of conventional and AI modelling – but we’re still working out what we think that best blend will be.”
- On the Met Office’s first cloud-based supercomputer: “It needs to be [in the cloud], because the amazing, fantastic, wonderful data that we have – [and] on which all of these products and AI is built – is now so big you can’t move it. We have about half an exabyte of data.”
Carbon Brief: Hi Penny. Thanks for joining us. To start off, I wanted to ask: previous to becoming the chief executive of the Met Office, you worked for the science and technology arm of the Ministry of Defence. How did that role prepare you for your current position – and in what ways is working on climate change like defence?
Penny Endersby: I think the whole of that 25-year career as a scientific civil servant prepared me for my current position. And I started off being a researcher myself in armour and explosives, and then leading scientists in larger and larger chunks. My final role was as head of the cyber information division of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). I was on the board of DSTL as well.
There are more scientific parallels than you would think. Armour modelling is computational fluid dynamics modelling, like weather modelling. I was responsible for big data and AI. I was responsible for space. So, there was lots of crossover. But the main thing was leading the experts and the people who are passionately committed to making lives better through science. That was the biggest crossover with what I do now.
CB: Why did you want to work for the Met Office?
PE: I have to say being chief executive of the Met Office was completely my dream job. I had actually applied to be chief executive of DSTL, very much on a punt, not long before. I got further than I expected – I got down to the last four, but I wasn’t successful. I had good feedback that went [along the lines of]: “Yeah, try again sometime.”
And then the Met Office [job] came up, and it had just had everything I wanted: a mission that I really cared about, doing something valuable, the scientific content, staying a civil servant and working for the government. [And] not being in London, because I am a great lover of the country. I moved from Wiltshire to Devon to take this job. [It was also] a promotion.
It just was the complete package. I gave getting the job everything.
CB: Why did you start becoming interested in climate change? I don’t know if you remember a particular moment or event?
PE: I was interested in [the] weather [and] the natural world from childhood. So I have always been a naturalist. I am naturally a sort of geeky, evidence-based person. I actually had kept 10 years of rain gauge records in Wiltshire – just because I was interested – before I ever thought about this job.
Although I was concerned about climate change and I knew the basics, I didn’t really study it until I got to this job and then was leading the organisation with the Hadley Centre [the Met Office’s climate research centre] in it, with amazing climate scientists and amazing climate science. So that seven years has been a journey of building my knowledge and my expertise.
CB: The Met Office has a mandate to help people make decisions and stay safe and thrive through its weather services. So could you just tell us a little bit about how the Met Office is equipping citizens for the current and future climate?
PE: You are right, that is our purpose – helping you make better decisions to stay safe and thrive. And it is weather and climate.
So on the “staying safe” side, that goes from everything from severe weather warnings in the shorter term, through to [longer-term] making decisions about what flood defences you are needing in the future. And that’s not [directed at] citizens – that’s [directed at] policymakers.
And on the “thrive” side, as well, it might be as simple as, “am I going to go for a run or hang washing out?” [when it comes to] weather timeframes. On climate timeframes, it is about making sure that we have got built infrastructure that enables us thrive in a changing climate, whether that is houses that don’t overheat or green spaces that cool down our urban centres – all those things.
CB: And in terms of preparing for that infrastructure, could you explain a bit more about how the Met Office actually does that?
PE: So our core bit is on preparing other people to make the decisions on what to expect. So we do the science of the climate projections that says: “Where might we be in 2030, 2050, 2100 under different emission scenarios?” [We ask] what does that look like globally and in the UK? We need to know that for our food security and border security and energy security – and nationally, in detail, in the UK.
And then, it is other people who will take that information and decide what to do with it. So, on the adaptation side, we’re really informing other people’s decisions.
CB: Other people being the government…?
PE: It could be local authorities. We have local authority climate dashboards for local authorities to look at how climate change is going to [impact them]. I did notice that Bermondsey, where we are right now, is right at the peak of the bit of London that is expected to be under water – the floodiest bit of London going forward and the hardest to protect.
And then it could be big national decision-makers. I’ll give you a completely different example. If we’re going to have a renewable energy system in the future, the weather we [are having] today is the worst possible weather for renewable energy. It could be cold as well, but it is dull and still. So, [there is] not much wind, not much solar. How long could that wind drought go on and how long could it persist when it’s also cold and there’s a high heating demand? So, we do the modelling that helps the National Energy System Operator plan for how much capacity they need in different weather scenarios and climate scenarios in the future.
CB: What aspects of current or projected climate change in the UK concern you most?
PE: I think the biggest concern is the flooding. And it’s all the sorts of flooding – [including] the coastal flooding from higher sea level [and] the river flooding from extreme rainfall.
The one that probably keeps me awake at night is the flash flooding – the surface water flooding from very localised torrential rainfall events, because those are the hardest to model. The smaller the scale of a phenomenon, the more difficult it is for us to model well in advance.
And yet we know – and we have seen – we have had a few very near misses in this country with the kind of things that affected Valencia or Germany, or that terrible Texas event – very rapid river rises from torrential downpours.
And it’s not just [about the Met Office] getting the rainfall [warnings] right. Our managing director for this area described [these preparations] as a “team sport”. So, we have to get the rainfall right, the hydrological people, jointly with us, have to get the flooding right, the whole of the response system has to respond to understand what’s going to happen. People have to get out and often in maybe only a couple of hours. Whereas for a great big winter storm, we might be giving seven or eight days notice.
CB: Thinking a bit more globally, a new report from a research group based at [the University of] Exeter suggests that a climate tipping point for warm water corals has already been crossed. What does the prospects of these tipping points mean for the work of climate scientists?
PE: It presents us with lots of new challenges, I think.
If there was one thing that shocked me most, going back to the beginning of my time at the Met Office, it was just how long we have known about the fundamentals of climate science – like, 150 years. I had not realised that our understanding of the greenhouse effect and the rough idea of climate sensitivity went back so far. And we have been really well able to understand and project that, really for my whole lifetime. The good climate modelling goes back to about 1970.
But tipping points changed the whole equation for climate science. And, of course, we’re only just beginning to observe them. So, there, we don’t have the track record of projecting it and checking back against what’s happened in reality. So they’re some of the hottest topics – I dare say you might come on to the AMOC [Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation]. But all of those areas are very, very active areas of research and areas where the science is not so settled.
CB: The 1.5C warming threshold of the Paris Agreement is looking more fragile than ever. 2024 was the first year-long breach of the limit. How likely is it, in your opinion, that [the rise in] temperatures are limited to 1.5C? And when do you think that could happen?
PE: Well, it is theoretically possible we stay within 1.5C, but it’s going to require action that’s never been seen and doesn’t look like it’s coming. So, we think the opportunity to stay within that first Paris threshold is vanishingly small now – and, if we continue at the current rate, we have only got a few years to go before we cross it long-term.
And, actually, the Met Office has done quite a bit of work looking at how you identify that threshold without waiting for 10 years of averages to go: “Yes, [the limit] was [breached] 10 years ago.”
So then we are into, well, how far can we limit it? Because obviously it’s not a cliff edge. That’s where we think – and I still think – that’s where the more dangerous impacts of climate change kick in. But between 1.5C and 2C – there’s a huge difference. And at 2C, 3C [and] God forbid 4C, all of those impacts multiply. So, it’s how we stay as close [to 1.5C of warming] as we can.
CB: There are growing calls for solar radiation modification and other forms of geoengineering to be considered to tackle climate change. I wanted to get your take on geoengineering as a climate strategy.
PE: The Met Office doesn’t take any particular stance on geoengineering. I need to make it really clear – because we get lots of conspiracy theories – and we do none. We have some very limited modelling to understand what it might look like and what it might do.
I think I might like to draw a distinction between my personal view and the Met Office here. But the only form of geoengineering that actually solves the problem is taking the carbon back out of the atmosphere. Solar radiation modification – it is a masking technique. It doesn’t stop ocean acidification. And once you start, you’ve got to go on, because if you stop, you can get catastrophic, very rapid, catching up.
So, in as much as we advocate anything, it would always be the mitigation techniques [actions that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases] we already know.
Having said that, there’s nothing regulating [geoengineering] globally. So, other people may do it – whether we advocate it or not. So, we do think it is the right thing to do to understand what the impacts of it could be [so as] to be able to detect it if other people do it and understand what they might be doing. It will be a political decision whether it’s a last resort thing to do.
CB: You mentioned carbon removals just now. Scientists at a recent conference on climate overshoot stressed that the 1.5C goal, if breached, needed to be “met from above” with the help of these technologies that remove emissions from the air. How feasible is that, in your view?
PE: The best way to get carbon out of the atmosphere is still a tree. So, some of these are nature-based solutions. And, then, the next easiest thing is the direct carbon capture – so, catch [the carbon] where it is, don’t try to get it back.
The other techniques – I think they’re worth investigating, but they’re not going to be available at scale in the times that we need. It is an entirely good and valid topic for research, but it shouldn’t be a substitution.
CB: Changing topic a bit. The US government has attacked climate science and is cutting national weather and climate services, including access to satellite data. How is this impacting both weather forecasting and climate research at the Met Office?
PE: So we retain a really close collaboration with NOAA [the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] who are important partners for us. We continue to have access to all of those US satellites that are gathering data. We exchange that through the World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO’s) data exchange.
And the EUMETSAT is the way we gather European satellite data – and the UK is a part of that, and that is all still exchanged.
I think what we are finding is that any government – irrespective of its political stance – needs the fundamentals of what a national meteorological agency can do. Everybody needs a weather forecast, everybody needs warnings, everybody needs aviation, transport, everybody needs defence.
And, so, there’s certainly been a lot of instability in NOAA, while these things work through. And, obviously there’s a government shutdown at the moment. But I think the actual impact on [NOAA] funding, so far, has not been as severe as some of the news stories have said – because their role is just as fundamental to the operation of the state as ours is.
CB: And, a secondary question to that is, are these events or geopolitics impacting the morale at all at the Met Office? And, as a boss, how do you address that, or try to mitigate that if so?
PE: I think the general Met Office staff are really very interested in their science and the mission and not so politically focused. I spent a lot of time thinking about what are the things that we do that will have value under any government and into the future and how we make sure that we can continue to deliver our great services to the government. And we do that with our executive and board.
What does impact morale is some of the misinformation we’ve seen, where we get people attacking the integrity of our observations or the integrity of our scientists. The aggression that some of our media-facing people face online [and] the really vile hostility which often quite junior staff are dealing with – that definitely is something where we have to take care of and look after people.
CB: In the UK, we’ve seen the Conservatives and Reform describe the UK’s net-zero target as “arbitrary”. And, in the US, we’ve seen the president describe climate change as a “con”. So, I wanted to ask you, do you feel that the Met Office and other influential climate science centres have a responsibility to publicly rebut or respond to these claims?
PE: No, absolutely not. The Met Office is a civil service organisation, so we have a very strong mandate to remain impartial and serve the government of the day. We have a government that is really committed to net-zero and being a green energy superpower and we will do everything we can for that. If a democratically elected government comes with a different mandate, our role is to provide that government with the best science to make the best policy decisions they can. It is not to tell them that their policies are wrong.
CB: I want to talk a bit about the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] now and the seventh assessment cycle. The IPCC has appointed five Met Office scientists to its newest cycle. What would you like to see the cycle focus on?
PE So I’m not sure I’m really the best person to answer this. Clearly, they are going to be focused on what happens between and above 1.5C. How do we replace that Paris threshold if it has gone? And therefore, increasingly, the adaptation [topic].
Where I actually get more involved is, as a delegate to the WMO and on the Early Warning for All [initiative]. And obviously, the more extreme climate-driven weather events we see, the more crucial early warning is to protect populations. And that will come out of the projections from the IPCC.
CB: I wondered if you had any thoughts on the IPCC’s big assessment reports. Is this model the best way for it to be effective? Or do you think there’s a better option?
PE: I do firmly believe that good decisions have to be based on good evidence. And the IPCC is as good a gold standard as you could have for benchmark evidence in any field.
So that whole process of collecting all the evidence from across researchers across the globe, factoring in what’s effectively a multi-model ensemble, looking at the error bars coming to consensus – it is too slow, right? Because consensus always lags. What the best guess would be – the consensus was always behind it. But I think it is an important model. I’m reminded of Simon Sharpe’s book Five Times Faster [which states that] it is not just [about] the scientists, it is then all the other, the other responses, as well, that need to respond.
I think, in many ways, our best hope now lies in the global financial system. They’re not very altruistic, but they are very rational and they do use the best evidence. They are actually not remotely interested in the politics, because they will look at where the money sends them. And if the money sends them into different investments or different insurance strategies – that is still going to be based on the evidence that comes out of the IPCC.
CB: After the US pulled its officials from attending the last IPCC meeting in China, how could a reduced US contribution impact the work of the IPCC in the upcoming cycle?
PE: I really can’t speak to that. I don’t know enough about it to give you a sensible answer.
CB: All right, let’s come on to misinformation. You mentioned it already. To start off: how is climate misinformation changing in your view?
PE: I’ve really seen this change in the course of this job. I think I was naive when I took this job. One of the things I said in my pitch for the job was: I believe I will be in post in the period when the person in the street in the UK becomes aware of the impact of climate change.
And I think I was right – we have had the first 40C and extreme wildfire events, extreme floods. People have seen it. But, I thought that that would lead to a rational response of people going: “Oh, gosh, they were right all along – we need to do something about it.”
That didn’t happen. What I have seen, therefore, is it was still more or less possible to go “meh, you’ve got the science wrong and you don’t really understand it” seven years ago.
I think the data is now so stark, that anyone who looks at the data at all can see that we’re in unprecedented times. [But] what has happened, to my grief and distress, has been people now attacking the trusted sources of data. And in the UK – that’s us.
We see increasingly statements about all kinds of rubbish, everything from, “you’re hiding the sensors in aircraft jets exhaust to show fake heating – you’ve gone back and changed the past” [to] “you’re measuring temperatures on the ground instead of properly in the Stevenson screen”. [There are] just a raft of things that take us a lot of time and taxpayers money to rebut.
There’s a name for this law and I’ve forgotten it [Brandolini’s law] – but there’s a law that says that, basically, misinformation can be produced in seconds, but takes days to rebut. And this is very, very true.
And, so, we have had to become – per force – experts in countering misinformation and disinformation and, really, to an extent, quite thought-leading in government and in convening cross-government networks to deal with this.
And although I guess I’m speaking to the converted and I’m offering you some rebuttal. That isn’t the best way; the people who firmly believe these things, they’re not remotely interested in your rebuttal.
The best way to maintain the extraordinary trust the Met Office currently enjoys is actually to be putting out the good stories. Here is the plethora of amazing ways we collect weather observations, from deep ocean buoys to space to marine gliders to measurements in the Arctic – whatever it is. Put out the positive stories, alongside the people stories. At your weather station – wherever you are in the UK – some expert person from the Met Office comes along and checks all the instruments and takes them back for calibration and makes sure the grass is the regulation height and assesses the surrounding area to make sure that things aren’t encroaching and so on.
Putting out those positive stories of how we do it, is a better use of our time and energy and more effective, we think, than rebutting the people who are not acting in good faith.
CB: My next question was going to be about your strategy for dealing with online climate misinformation. And you’ve talked about focusing on the positive story…
PE: Preinoculation in misinformation terms.
CB: I wondered if there was anything else you could share about your strategy and perhaps how it’s evolving as climate misinformation is?
PE: The other thing we found is it’s really useful to get independent voices in. So now, when we do put out stories, particularly when we put one up that we know it’s going to be a red rag. [For instance] it has been the hottest UK year in history. It has been the warmest summer. This was the first year that was above 1.5C for the average globally – which was something we forecast, by the way. We also do the WMO state of the climate and the annual to decadal five-year projections.
Whereas we might have just put those out with the WMO, now we tend to pre-share that information with other trusted parties – whether that is in academia or the Royal Met Soc [the Royal Meteorological Society], or whether it is NOAA or NASA or whoever – and have quotes nicely lined up for journalists, so that they can take them. That kind of independence is useful. I think all the UK scientific bodies are looking at how we can strengthen that network across government, so that we can speak to our areas of expertise when they cross over with other people’s.
CB: I wanted to ask you about AI-generated content as well. Is that something that you’ve seen specifically?
PE: Obviously, we do lots of good work in AI, which we might also come to.
CB: I was talking still in the context of climate misinformation – do you have a strategy for addressing that particular type of content?
PE: Yes. We have even seen Met Office deepfakes. So our presenters [as] deepfakes put out misleading information. And I’m not sure we do have a strategy for this.
The other thing we do, but it’s not so much for the AI, is deal with the clickbait. You know [for example]: “Exact date UK to be wiped out by a wall of snow.” And we do put quite a lot of stories out going: “Have you seen a thing that goes, it’s going to be a heatwave and a wall of snow?” [We] try to help people understand how to tell [a] good source from a bad source. But the level of protection you have, legally, against those things is not very strong.
CB: And striking that balance between, as you were saying earlier, responding to certain claims, but not giving them more air…
PE: We don’t want to make them more salient.
CB: How do you judge, essentially, when it is worth a public response and when it isn’t?
PE: Partly on how much is in its echo chamber versus where it has widened out. Generally, we find that within the echo chambers, it is just not worth a public response. The Met Office has a million followers on the main social media platforms and we have people putting out things who have 20, so if you rebut the 20[-follower] person with your million, everybody sees the 20-person story. That’s not the right thing.
And we have had to change our blocking policy as well, which is a shame, because we had a really [light-touch] blocking policy. We only blocked the obscene and threatening, but we found that our big audiences are being used to gain a platform for misinformation, particularly around geoengineering. And we have had to say we can’t, we can’t live with that. So we block more liberally than we did.
CB: You already brought up the attacks we’ve seen on the accuracy of Met Office temperature readings and data. I wanted to ask, have you been surprised by those stories and what is your general response to those claims?
PE: Just to be clear, the claims are baseless. We’ve dealt particularly with the ones that say the WMO is critiquing our data. You may have seen now the statement from the secretary general of the WMO going “we have the highest confidence in the quality and validity of Met Office data”. So, that was one [claim] where we did source a deliberate rebuttal.
But, generally, I’d just like to reassure you that everything we do is to the required standards, the WMO to ISO9001 [quality management] standards, assured externally and internally. And then the [Met Office] independent public weather service customer group also assures the quality of the science and the outputs [and] the accuracy of the warnings.
The worst thing is if people start to believe [the claims] – and then they don’t take action on warnings when [they are] there to protect their lives.
CB: You have been the subject of quite a lot of attacks on social media. I wanted to ask how you manage that on a personal level?
PE: It can be painful, but you really have to rise above it. And when it’s a woman, there’s always a generous salting of misogyny in there as well. I have tended now not to go and read these things, because they prey on your mind and there’s nothing you can do. We do monitor for actual threats, which we would have to act on.
CB: And you mentioned a lot of colleagues as well were facing [attacks on social media]?
PE: Yes. The personal attacks tend to be on the most senior people, [on] me or the chief scientist [Prof Stephen Belcher]. But, obviously, the person who is managing our social media feed still gets a mouthful of abuse when they’re reading and responding. It is not aimed at them personally, but they are still a human being – and maybe not a very senior or experienced one.
CB: And moving on from social media, I wanted to talk a bit about the media more generally. So have you seen a change in the way that the media covers climate change?
PE: It is around the fringes. I expect you know that we’ve just signed a new partnership deal with the BBC, who are extremely rigorous in how they cover climate change. And one of the things…we’re really excited to work on them. Last time we worked with the BBC, Verify [a service where journalists share their evidence-gathering] didn’t exist. They, too, have had to invest a whole lot of effort in how you counter misinformation – and they have some really leading thinking. We’re excited to work with Verify on weather and climate information.
But, I think it’s the “wilding” of the social media landscape that’s changed.
CB: What climate change topics would you like to see the media cover more?
PE: I think there is lots of coverage across all the topics. I can’t say the information isn’t out there. It is how it is picked out and the way that our social algorithms segregate it. [For] anyone who wants to find out, there is good information out there on almost any topic – because media is always looking for stories, right?
The problem is once you’ve moved yourself into a bubble where you don’t want to see it. And you can see [this] if you watch US media coverage of a weather disaster. Even when it’s highly likely to be climate change-related, they don’t say so. The people presumably watching those channels don’t make that link.
CB: I wanted to talk a bit about AI in a different way now. So, how is AI transforming climate forecasting at the Met Office?
PE: The Met Office has been working with AI for several years – and before the big generative AI shift. We do that in many aspects of our work. AI for climate change is relatively new – and the challenge is always “what’s the training data set”? Because you don’t have the training data set for climate that hasn’t happened yet.
But we are using it to look at some of the opportunities. For example, in what we would call downscaling, which is a technical term, but basically going from a coarse-resolution model – which climate change tends to be, because we need to run them over such a long time and they’re very computer hungry – to see if we can use AI to replicate something that is more like the fine scale of our weather models.
And, more generally, we are enthusiastic, but not naive, adopters of AI, I would like to say. We do now have our own AI weather model, FastNet, which we developed jointly with the Turing Institute. We’re looking at the opportunities for AI and our products and services – so could you fuse it with, say, transport data to say: “Well, the weather’s here and the trains or the planes are there – where are the impacts going to be?” And go straight to the results.
And we use it quite widely in our everyday work as well. So, increasingly, I think 1,000 people in the Met Office are using [Microsoft] Copilot and 97% of people who have a licence use it for just making our everyday work more efficient.
I expect you’re going to come on and ask about the challenges of validation and trust, and if you’re not, I’ll go on that way.
CB: Can you tell me a bit about the challenges that come with using AI?
PE: AI can hallucinate, right? The rule we have in the Met Office is you may use AI for any purpose that is efficient in your job, like to write your code for you. You must declare you’ve used it. So if I use it to summarise a board paper, it’s wonderful. I get a 10-page board paper – I’m not having that – [and use] Copilot [to get it] down to five pages and bring it back. But you must declare it and you are still responsible for the accuracy of what you produce. So, if there’s a bug in your code, or it has actually changed your board paper so it now says something different, that’s still your problem.
Where we are really exploring things is – we rigorously validate anything we use operationally and we’re not really using AI operationally yet. And we have extremely tried and trusted techniques to do that. And every time we upgrade a weather model, we put it through a whole series of checks and balances to make sure it really is better than the last one – and if it isn’t, we don’t implement it.
The techniques we use for conventional modelling have limitations for AI.
AI, you train to replicate. You optimise it for a particular thing [and] it will do that wonderfully. But then, if it has very low average errors, it may still miss the extremes. And if what you do is compare average error, it will look like it’s better than the conventional model. But if, actually, that’s because it smooths everything out and it has missed the extremes – when you really want to know, it’s going to be wrong.
So, what we’re increasingly working on is on running our own AI models. And we’re looking at the other market leaders – the European ones, the [Google] DeepMind one. And we’re continuously evaluating them against the leading conventional models and looking at what the full suite of metrics is you need, if we wanted to feed our app from an AI model, rather than from a numerical one – a physical model. What are the thresholds it would need to pass before we were confident to do that?
CB: That’s really interesting. I wanted to talk a bit more generally about climate modelling as well. We’ve talked about AI, but where are the other exciting innovations, and also perhaps where are the gaps that still need to be addressed?
PE: They are kind of two sides of the same coin, I think. We would love to be able to do the kind of kilometre-scale [modelling] we do for weather for climate. Computationally by conventional methods, it’s just unaffordable and it doesn’t even look close – and with Moore’s law breaking down, it almost looks like you’ll never get there. AI, potentially, could close that gap. And that’s where that downscaling problem that I gave you, came in.
Others of the exciting things, I think they are around particularly the tipping points and the adaptation and the attribution. Some of the live areas of research for us when you see
CB: When you say Moore’s law is breaking down, what do you mean?
PE: The amazing improvement of weather forecasting since the 50s has been built on the fact that computing power doubles every couple of years for the same cost. So you can get more and more transistors on a chip and the supercomputer gets more and more powerful. We can reduce the scale of our weather models and improve the resolution, and can give you more accurate weather. That’s gone on for basically – [it has] improved the weather forecast at a “day a decade” over that period.
We’ve reached about the physical limit of how many transistors you can fit on a chip and supercomputers are no longer basically giving us improved modelling accuracy for free. And, so, we have to use different techniques now to find a way to continue to improve the accuracy of the weather forecast and maintain that “day a decade” improvement. And we’re confident we can and AI will be part of that mix.
So, our strategy is to go for the best blend of conventional and AI modelling – but we’re still working out what we think that best blend will be.
CB: And I know the Met Office recently switched on its new supercomputer, so I wondered if you could just tell us a bit about what’s new and how it might impact your research.
PE: This is a big step up in [computing power] and it’s also… The Met Office, I think we’re on about our 14th supercomputer. The first one we blagged some time on a Lyons tea room computer back in the 50s. But, then, numbers two to 13 we’ve owned and they’ve been based in our headquarters – wherever we’ve been – and we’ve operated them ourselves.
This one is different. Microsoft owns and operates it for us. And that’s a step to the whole thing being fully in the cloud, fully in Azure Cloud. And it needs to be because the amazing, fantastic, wonderful data that we have – [and] on which all of these products and AI is built – is now so big you can’t move it. We have about half an exabyte of data. So, the data needs to be next to the computer to be processed.
And, so, this computer is really exciting. We’re about to implement the first, what we call a parallel suite, but the first big model upgrade. Using it will let us do finer-scale, better microphysics – particularly cloud microphysics – [and] better precipitation. Because we’re running the parallel suite – which isn’t live yet, that’s why it’s a parallel suite – we can see the improvement we’re getting just from that first step forward.
And, then, we’ve got a whole series of scientific upgrades planned over the next few years to continue to improve our forecasting in weather and climate.
CB: Brilliant. That’s everything. Thank you very much.
The post The Carbon Brief Interview: UK Met Office chief executive Penny Endersby appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The Carbon Brief Interview: UK Met Office chief executive Penny Endersby
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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