Sibanye-Stillwater, the multinational mining and metals giant entangled in a major legal battle with Appian Capital Advisory. This case stems from a deal worth $1.2 billion that was abruptly terminated in January 2022.
The ongoing proceedings, which are being heard in the High Court of England and Wales, revolve around the acquisition of two Brazilian mines: Santa Rita, a nickel mine, and Serrote, a copper mine. Notably, the former is one of the rare nickel sulfide mines that is still operating. It also produces copper, cobalt, and platinum group metals as by-products.
Sibanye’s decision to withdraw from the deal has led to accusations and legal claims for compensation by Appian. As both sides prepare for the next phase of the case in November 2025, the stakes are high, with claims that could exceed $600 million, as reported by MINING.COM
The Massive $1.2B Deal and Its Collapse
Going back in time, in October 2021, Sibanye-Stillwater struck a $1.2 billion deal with Appian to acquire the Santa Rita and Serrote mines. These assets are owned by Atlantic Nickel and Mineração Vale Verde. Appian’s funds were meant to strengthen Sibanye’s stock of critical metals. The latter was looking to shift its focus from platinum and gold to new opportunities.
Notably, Sibanye-Stillwater had robust plans to expand into battery metals like nickel and copper which are the most essential for the fast-growing electric vehicle (EV) market.
However, just three months later, Sibanye-Stillwater terminated the share purchase agreements (SPAs), citing a “geotechnical event” at the Santa Rita mine as the primary reason. The mining company cited the event as significantly impacting future operations and used it to justify backing out of the deal. Appian, however, claimed that the event was minor and did not justify the termination of the agreements, leading to the start of legal proceedings in 2022.
The Legal Battle and Initial Rulings
The first stage of the legal battle began in June 2024 and centered on whether the geotechnical event could be reasonably expected to have a material and adverse impact on Santa Rita’s operations. After a five-week trial, Justice Butcher ruled in October 2024 that Sibanye was not justified in terminating the SPAs.
The press release revealed that, according to the judgment, the geotechnical event at Santa Rita was neither as material nor as adverse as Sibanye claimed, meaning the company had no right to withdraw from the deal based on this event.
However, Sibanye achieved a partial victory in the ruling. The court dismissed Appian’s claim of “wilful misconduct”, with the judge acknowledging that Sibanye’s management genuinely believed they were acting in the company’s best interest. This ruling suggests that while Sibanye’s reasoning was flawed, the company did not act with malicious intent.
Appian’s Compensation Claims and Initiation of the Quantum Trial
Appian is now pursuing compensation for the failed deal. The company initially sought $522 million in damages but has indicated that the total claim could exceed $600 million, including interest and legal costs. These figures represent the difference between the agreed purchase price and the mines’ current market value, alongside expenses incurred during the resale process.
Appian further pressed that Sibanye’s termination caused substantial financial losses, and they aimed to recover the full amount.
The legal battle is far from over, as the case now moves into the second phase—a trial scheduled for November 2025. This trial, known as the Quantum Trial, will determine the exact amount of damages Sibanye will be required to pay, if any. Appian argues that they would have sold the mines to another buyer for a similar price if the deal had not fallen through.
However, Sibanye maintains that Appian received multiple offers for the mines after the deal’s collapse and, therefore, cannot claim that they suffered a significant financial loss.
Sibanye’s position in the Quantum Trial is that Appian failed to mitigate its losses. Under English contract law, a party seeking compensation is required to take reasonable steps to reduce the damages they incur. Sibanye argues that Appian could have, and should have, sold the mines at fair market value soon after the deal was terminated. The company also asserts that Appian’s continuing ownership of the mines may have resulted in profits, which would reduce the overall damages they could claim.
High Stakes for Sibanye-Stillwater, Will Nickel Pay Off?
The legal battle with Appian comes at a difficult time for Sibanye-Stillwater. Leading media agencies reported that CEO Neal Froneman is already grappling with declining prices for platinum group metals, which has put additional pressure on the company’s financial performance.
As Sibanye seeks to diversify its portfolio and reduce its reliance on these traditional metals, the outcome of the trial could have significant implications for the company’s strategic direction.
Sibanye-Stillwater’s expansion into battery metals is a crucial part of its growth strategy. The company has made several moves in recent years to acquire assets in this sector, including its initial attempt to purchase Appian’s Brazilian mines.
However, the collapse of this deal has forced Sibanye to explore other opportunities. Analysts have noted that the prices of nickel, copper, and other battery metals have risen sharply in recent years, making it more challenging to find affordable assets.
Nickel, in particular, is increasingly important for the production of lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles. However, miners and market experts predict that the demand for nickel and other critical metals will certainly surge with the EV boom.
This leads to the most inevitable scrutiny- can Sibanye-Stillwater’s ability to secure access to these materials propel its growth in the battery metals market in the future?
Image: Nickel Demand from EV and Other Applications, 2022-2030

Source: IRENA report
Appian vs. Sibanye: The Final Verdict Looms
In the meantime, the Brazilian mines in question continue to operate, with Santa Rita transitioning from open-pit to underground operations. This transition to high-grade nickel can potentially extend the mine’s life by over 20 years. Alternatively, it significantly highlights the ongoing value of these assets and the high stakes involved in this legal battle.
Sources:
- Court judgment handed down in legal proceedings commenced by Appian Capital
- Sibanye liable for damages to Appian in $1.2 billion claim – MINING.COM
The post Sibanye-Stillwater in Legal Limbo: Will a $600M Penalty Follow the Canceled Brazilian Mines Deal? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
![]()
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy10 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits

