Nearly a decade on from the Paris Agreement, there is still not an agreed way to measure progress towards its “global goal on adaptation” (GGA).
Yet climate impacts are increasingly being felt around the world, with the weather becoming more extreme and the risk to vulnerable populations growing.
At COP30, which takes place next month, negotiators are set to finalise a list of indicators that can be used to measure progress towards the GGA.
This is expected to be one of the most significant negotiated outcomes from the UN climate summit in Belém, Brazil.
In a series of open letters running up to the summit, COP30 president-designate André Corrêa do Lago wrote that adaptation was “no longer a choice” and that countries needed to seize a “window of opportunity”:
“There is a window of opportunity to define a robust framework to track collective progress on adaptation. This milestone will…lay the groundwork for the future of the adaptation agenda.”
However, progress on producing an agreed list of indicators has been difficult, with nearly 90 experts working over two years to narrow down a list of almost 10,000 potential indicators to a final set of just 100, which is supposed to be adopted at COP30.
Below, Carbon Brief explores what the GGA is, why progress on adaptation has been so challenging and what a successful outcome would look like in Belém.
What is the GGA?
The GGA was signed into being within the Paris Agreement in 2015, but the treaty included limited detail on exactly what the goal would look like, how it would be achieved and how progress would be tracked.
The need to adapt to climate change has long been established, with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in 1992, noting that parties “shall…cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change”.
In the subsequent years, the issue received limited focus, however. Then, in 2013, the African Group of Negotiators put forward a proposed GGA, setting out a target for adaptation.
This was then formally established under article 7.1 of the Paris text two years later. The text of the treaty says that the GGA is to “enhanc[e] adaptive capacity, strengthen…resilience and reduc[e] vulnerability to climate change”.
According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), the GGA was designed to set “specific, measurable targets and guidelines for global adaptation action, as well as enhancing adaptation finance and other types of support for developing countries”.
However, unlike the goal to cut emissions – established in article 4 of the Paris Agreement – measuring progress on adaptation is “inherently challenging”.
Emilie Beauchamp, lead for monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) for adaptation at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), tells Carbon Brief that this challenge relates to the context-specific nature of what adaptation means. She says:
“The main [reason] it’s hard to measure progress on adaptation is because adaptation is very contextual, and so resilience and adapting mean different things to different people, and different things in different places. So it’s not always easy to quantify or qualify…You need to integrate really different dimensions and different lived experiences when you assess progress on adaptation. And that’s why it’s been hard.”
Beyond this, attribution of the impact of adaptive measures remains a “persistent challenge”, according to Dr Portia Adade Williams, a research scientist at the CSIR-Science and Technology Policy Research Institute and Carbon Brief contributing editor, “as observed changes in vulnerability or resilience may result from multiple climatic and non-climatic factors”. She adds:
“In many contexts, data limitations and inconsistent monitoring systems, particularly in developing countries, constrain systematic tracking of adaptation efforts. Existing monitoring frameworks tend to emphasise outputs, such as infrastructure built or trainings conducted, rather than outcomes that reflect actual reductions in vulnerability or enhanced resilience.”
Despite these challenges, the need for increased progress on adaptation is clear. Nearly half of the global population – around 3.6 billion people – are currently highly vulnerable to these impacts. This includes vulnerability to droughts, floods, heat stress and food insecurity.
However, for six years following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the GGA did not feature on the agenda at COP summits and there was limited progress on the matter.
This changed in 2021, at COP26 in Glasgow, when parties initiated the two-year Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work program to begin establishing tangible adaptation targets.
This work culminated at COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, with the GGA “framework”.
Agreeing the details of this framework and developing indicators to measure adaptation progress has been the main focus of negotiations in recent years.
What progress has been made?
Following the establishment of the GGA, there was – for many years – only limited progress towards agreeing how to track countries’ adaptation efforts.
COP28 was seen as a “pivotal juncture” for the GGA, with the creation of the framework and a new two-year plan to develop indicators, which is supposed to culminate at COP30.
Negotiations across the two weeks in Dubai in 2023 were tense. It took five days for a draft negotiating text on the GGA framework to emerge, due to objections from the G77 and China group of developing countries around the inclusion of adaptation finance.
Within the GGA – as with many negotiating tracks under the UNFCCC – finance to support developing nations is a common sticking point. Other disagreements included the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR–RC).
Ultimately, a text containing weakened language around both CBDR-RC and finance was waved through at the end of COP28 and a framework for the GGA was adopted.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Ana Mulio Alvarez, a researcher on adaptation at thinktank E3G, said that the framework was the “first real step to fulfilling” the adaptation mandate laid out in the Paris Agreement, adding:
“The GGA is the equivalent of the 1.5C commitment for mitigation – a north star to guide efforts. It will be hugely symbolic if the GGA indicators are agreed at COP and the GGA can be implemented.”
The framework agreed at COP28 includes 11 targets to guide progress against the GGA. Of these, four are related to what it describes as an “iterative adaptation cycle” – risk assessment, planning, implementation and learning – and seven to thematic targets.
These “themes” cover water, food, health, ecosystems, infrastructure, poverty eradication and cultural heritage.
Within these, there are subgoals for countries to work towards. For example, within the water theme, there is a subgoal of achieving universal access to clean water.
While this framework was broadly welcomed as a step forward for adaptation work, there remains concern from some experts about the focus of the programme.
Prof Lisa Schipper, a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) author and Carbon Brief contributing editor, tells Carbon Brief that without the framework there would likely have been continued delays, but there was still “significant scientific pushback against this approach to adaptation”.
She notes that the IPCC’s sixth assessment report (AR6) “didn’t necessarily provide any concrete inputs that could be useful for the GGA”. Beyond this, there are political challenges that the framework does not address, Schipper adds, continuing:
“There are also political reasons why global-north countries or annex-one countries don’t necessarily want specificity [in adaptation targets], because they also don’t want to be held accountable and to be forced to pay for things, right? So, the science was pathetic in one way, it was just not sufficient. And then you have a political agenda that’s fighting against clarity on this.
“So, even though [the framework] came together, it was still not very concrete, right? It was a framework, but it didn’t have a lot in it.”
As with the language around finance, thematic targets within the GGA were weakened over the course of the negotiations. Additionally, parties ultimately did not agree to set up a specific, recurring agenda item to continue discussing the GGA.
However, a further two-year programme was established at COP28. The UAE-Belém work programme was designed to establish concrete “indicators” that can be used to measure progress on adaptation going forward.
Why is it hard to choose adaptation indicators?
In the two years following COP28, work has been ongoing to narrow down a potential list of more than 9,000 indicators under the GGA to just 100.
At the UNFCCC negotiations in June 2024 in Bonn, parties agreed to ask for a group of technical experts to be convened to help with this process.
This led to a group of 78 experts meeting in September 2024. They were split into eight working groups – one for each of the seven themes and one for the iterative adaptation cycle – to begin work reviewing a list of more than 5,000 indicators, which had already been compiled from submissions to the UNFCCC.
In October 2024, a second workshop was held under the UAE-Belém work programme, at which the experts agreed that they should also consider an additional 5,000 indicators compiled by the Adaptation Committee, another body within the UN climate regime.
One key challenge, Beauchamp tells Carbon Brief, was that the group of experts had very limited time and a lack of resources. She expands:
“They had to finish their work by the end of the summer [of 2025]. This means they’ve not even had a year [and] they have no funding. So of the 78 experts, the number of whom could actually contribute was much lower, and it’s not by lack of desire and expertise. But [because] they have day jobs, they have families…And the lack of clear instructions from parties also didn’t help.”
COP29 formed the mid-way point in the work programme to develop adaptation indicators, with parties stressing it was “critical” to come away with a decision from the summit.
As with previous sessions, finance quickly became a sticking point in negotiations, however, alongside the notion of “transformational adaptation”.
This is a complex concept centred around the idea of driving systemic shifts – in infrastructure, governance or society more broadly – so as to address the root causes of vulnerability to climate change.
Ultimately, COP29 adopted a decision that made reference to finance as “means of implementation” (MOI), recognised transformational adaptation and launched the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR). The BAR is designed to advance progress towards the GGA, however, the details of how it will operate are still unclear.
Going into the Bonn climate negotiations in June 2025, the list of potential indicators had been “miraculously” refined to a list of 490 through further work by the group of experts. While this was a major step forward, it was still a long way off the aim of agreeing to a final set of just 100 indicators at COP30.
Once again, disagreement quickly arose in Bonn around finance and this dominated much of the two weeks of negotiations. As such, a final text did not get uploaded until mid-way through the final plenary meeting of the negotiations.
This was seen as contentious, as some parties complained that they did not have time to fully assess it, before it was gavelled through.
Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London, tells Carbon Brief:
“Adaptation finance has consistently lagged behind mitigation for decades, despite growing recognition of the urgent need to build resilience to climate shocks. The gap between the needs of countries and the funding provided is stark, with an adaptation financing gap in the hundreds of billions annually.
“Within the GGA negotiations, the implications of this finance issue are clear. Disagreements persist over how MoI [finance] should be measured in the indicator set, particularly around whether private finance should count, how support from developed countries is defined, and how national budgets are tracked versus international climate finance.”
The final text produced in Bonn was split into two, with an agreed section capturing the GGA indicators and a separate “informal note” covering the BAR and transformation adaptation.
Importantly, the main text invited the experts to continue working on the indicators and to submit a final technical report with a list of potential indicators by August 2025.
As this work continued, one of the biggest challenges was “balancing technical rigour with political feasibility while ensuring ambition”, says Laughlin, adding:
“The scale and diversity of adaptation action means a diverse menu of indicators per target is needed, but this must not be so vast as to be unfeasible for countries to measure, especially those countries with limited resources and capacity.”
Meetings took place subsequently, within which experts focused on “ensuring adaptation relevance of indicators, reducing redundancy and ensuring coverage across thematic indicators”, according to a technical report.
Beauchamp notes the importance of these themes for continued work on adaptation, saying:
“The themes were really helpful to bring some attention and to communicate about the GGA. They echo more easily what adaptation results can look like, because people find it difficult to talk about processes. But they’re really important. Without the targets on the adaptation cycle, we can too easily forget that you need resilient processes to have resilient outcomes.”
The table below, from the same technical report, shows how nearly 10,000 adaptation indicators have been whittled down to a proposed final list of 100. The table also shows how the indicators are split between the themes (9a-g) and iterative adaptation cycle (10a-d) of the GGA framework.
Source: GGA technical report.
Further consultations took place in September and the final workshop under the UAE-Belém work programme took place on 3-4 October.
Following on from the numerous sessions held under the GGA, negotiators are now able to go into COP30 with a consolidated list of indicators to discuss, agree and bring into use, allowing progress towards the adaptation goal in Paris to be finally measured.
What to expect from COP30?
A final decision on the adaptation indicators is expected at COP30, potentially marking a significant milestone under the GGA.
In his third letter, COP30 president-designate Correa do Lago noted that a “special focus” was to be given to the GGA indicators at the summit.
He wrote that adaptation is “the visible face of the global response to climate change” and a “central pillar for aligning climate action with sustainable development”.
Therefore, he said COP30 should focus on “delivering tangible benefits for societies, ecosystems and economies by advancing and concluding the key mandates in this agenda”. These “key mandates” are the GGA and the related topic of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).
Correa do Lago’s letter added:
“There is a window of opportunity to define a robust framework to track collective progress on adaptation. This milestone will also lay the groundwork for the future of the adaptation agenda.”
Indeed, adaptation has moved up the political agenda this year, with the topic being discussed during the “climate day” at the UN general assembly in September. This included a “leaders’ dialogue” on the sidelines of the assembly, where Carbon Brief understands that leaders of climate-vulnerable nations pushed for specific adaptation targets.
Elsewhere, nearly three-quarters (73%) of new country climate pledges include adaptation components, further emphasising the increased focus the topic is now receiving.
Despite the increased attention, there are still likely to be challenges at COP30, including the continued fight over finance. This will likely be felt particularly keenly, given that the COP26 commitment to double adaptation finance comes to an end this year.
This was part of the “Glasgow dialogue”, which saw parties commit to “at least double” adaptation finance between 2019 and 2025.
Adade Williams tells Carbon Brief:
“A major expectation [at COP30] is that parties will tackle the gaps in adaptation finance, consider how to link MoI – finance, technology, capacity‐building – with the GGA indicators and possibly set new finance ambitions or roadmaps. The emphasis on MoI means capacity building, data systems, technology transfer and institutional strengthening will gain more traction.”
Adaptation finance was also a key topic during pre-COP meetings in Brasilia in October, with E3G noting that it is a “political litmus test for success in Belém, with vulnerable countries signalling urgency and demanding greater clarity that finance will flow”.
Laughlin tells Carbon Brief that she expects discussions on finance to “dominate in Belém” – in particular, given the legacy of the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) for climate finance agreed at COP29, which many developing countries were “starkly disappointed” by.
Additionally, there may be challenges around the process of negotiations on the GGA indicators, notes Beauchamp, adding:
“We’ve not agreed yet if it is acceptable to open up text of some indicators [to negotiation]. We have 100 of them and, as a technical expert, on one hand [it] is quite worrying, because changing one term in an indicator can change its entire methodology, right? But, at the same time, there is definitely more work that can be done on the indicators.
“So, are we only keeping indicators that can work or that everybody is happy with now, and then we review the set later, for example, with the review of the UAE framework in 2028? Or do we open the whole Pandora’s box and then we start hashing out some new indicators? That’s the first big challenge parties need to grapple with at COP30.”
Despite the challenges, Mulio Alvarez says she would expect a final list of indicators to be adopted at COP30, even if some change during the negotiation process. She adds:
“The Brazilian presidency knows that this is the biggest negotiated outcome of COP30 and they want it to go through smoothly. The adoption of the list would officially launch the UAE framework so that it can begin to track and guide efforts.”
While agreement on indicators would be seen as a political win at COP30, several experts highlighted that it is only a step towards enabling further adaptation work, with Beauchamp noting that parties “need to see this as an opportunity”.
Laughlin adds:
“Although finalising the indicator list is a core deliverable, it is also important that COP30 makes progress on the next steps for the GGA following COP30, including the expectations for reporting, and regular updates to the indicator list so it keeps up with the latest science.”
What will the GGA mean for vulnerable communities?
COP30 kicks off on 10 November and negotiators are hoping to hit the ground running with the condensed list of indicators to discuss.
There remain key questions about what the GGA could mean for adaptation around the world – in particular, for those most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Mulio Alvarez notes:
“In the short term, the GGA metrics [indicators] will likely paint a very challenging picture of the needs for adaptation. In the medium to long term, we hope the GGA will be embedded in policy planning and implementation – supporting risk assessments, helping identify gaps, driving planning and resources and even unlocking investments.”
Others are more cautious about the potential impact of the GGA, the associated framework and its indicators, in terms of driving real progress for adaptation.
Schipper notes that, while the GGA indicators are welcome from a political perspective, “from a scientific perspective, and I think from a development perspective, I think there’s a sort of a high risk that this ends up making people worse off in the end”.
She adds that the incremental approach currently being taken for adaptation is not working and that the indicators can “at best” show us incremental progress.
Schipper notes that there is a risk that the indicators narrow the approach to adaptation to the extent that they are either ineffective or actually produce maladaptive outcomes. She adds:
“I’m not saying that we should abandon the indicators, but I think it’s important to recognise that this is not enough. This is nowhere near enough.”
Others are more optimistic about the long-term potential of the GGA. Laughlin suggests that the indicators could help build systemic resilience, adding that if they were successfully implemented it could mean adaptation is integrated into national development and planning, “making sure that climate resilience becomes a core part of policymaking”. She says:
“For vulnerable populations, this means moving from a reactive approach to a proactive one – embedding resilience into development planning, restoring ecosystems and empowering local communities.
“The success of the GGA in delivering for vulnerable populations hinges on political will, finance and inclusive governance – many of which are currently lacking.”
Beyond COP30, the GGA framework agreed at COP28 includes a number of overarching targets to help guide countries in developing and implementing their NAPs, although these targets are not quantified.
The targets include countries conducting risk assessments to identify the impact of climate change and areas of particular vulnerability, by 2030. The framework says this would inform a country’s NAP and that “by 2030 all parties have in place” adaptation planning processes or strategies, as shown in the image below.
Adade Williams tells Carbon Brief that if the GGA is “effectively implemented” it could help develop systemic resilience in the long term, helping to address “not just climate hazards but also underlying structural vulnerabilities”. She adds:
“However, this long-term potential depends heavily on the extent of political will, sustained finance and capacity support available to developing countries. Without these, the GGA risks becoming a reporting framework rather than a transformative mechanism for resilience.”
The post Q&A: COP30 could – finally – agree how to track the ‘global goal on adaptation’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: COP30 could – finally – agree how to track the ‘global goal on adaptation’
Climate change could lead to half a million more deaths from malaria in Africa over the next 25 years, according to new research.
The study, published in Nature, finds that extreme weather, rising temperatures and shifting rainfall patterns could result in an additional 123m cases of malaria across Africa – even if current climate pledges are met.
The authors explain that as the climate warms, “disruptive” weather extremes, such as flooding, will worsen across much of Africa, causing widespread interruptions to malaria treatment programmes and damage to housing.
These disruptions will account for 79% of the increased malaria transmission risk and 93% of additional deaths from the disease, according to the study.
The rest of the rise in malaria cases over the next 25 years is due to rising temperatures and shifting rainfall patterns, which will change the habitable range for the mosquitoes that carry the disease, the paper says.
The majority of new cases will occur in areas already suitable for malaria, rather than in new regions, according to the paper.
The study authors tell Carbon Brief that current literature on climate change and malaria “often overlooks how heavily malaria risk in Africa is today shaped by climate-fragile prevention and treatment systems”.
The research shows the importance of ensuring that malaria control and primary healthcare is “resilient” to the extreme weather, they say.
Malaria in a warming world
Malaria kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 610,000 people died due to the disease in 2024.
In 2024, Africa was home to 95% of malaria cases and deaths. Children under the age of five made up three-quarters of all African malaria deaths.
The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from mosquitoes infected with the malaria parasite. The insects thrive in high temperatures of around 29C and need stagnant or slow-moving water in which to lay their eggs. As such, the areas where malaria can be transmitted are heavily dependent on the climate.
There is a wide body of research exploring the links between climate change and malaria transmission. Studies routinely find that as temperatures rise and rainfall patterns shift, the area of suitable land for malaria transmission is expanding across much of the world.
Study authors Prof Peter Gething and Prof Tasmin Symons are researchers at the Curtin University’s school of population health and the Malaria Atlas Project from the The Kids Research Institute, Australia.
They tell Carbon Brief that this approach does not capture the full picture, arguing that current literature on climate change and malaria “often overlooks how heavily malaria risk in Africa is today shaped by climate-fragile prevention and treatment systems”.
The paper notes that extreme weather events are regularly linked to surges in malaria cases across Africa and Asia. This is, in-part, because storms, heavy rainfall and floods leave pools of standing water where mosquitoes can breed. For example, nearly 15,000 cases of malaria were reported in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai hitting Mozambique in 2019.
However, the study authors also note that weather extremes often cause widespread disruption, which can limit access to healthcare, damage housing or disrupt preventative measures such as mosquito nets. These factors can all increase vulnerability to malaria, driving the spread of the disease.
In their study, the authors assess both the “ecological” effects of climate change – the impacts of temperature and rainfall changes on mosquito populations – and the “disruptive” effects of extreme weather.
Mosquito habitat
To assess the ecological impacts of climate change, the authors first identify how temperature, rainfall and humidity affect mosquito lifecycles and habitats.
The authors combine observational data on temperature, humidity and rainfall, collected over 2000-22, with a range of datasets, including mosquito abundance and breeding habitat.
The authors then use malaria infection prevalence data, collected by the Malaria Atlas Project, which describes the levels of infection in children aged between two and 10 years old.
Symons and Gething explain that they can then use “sophisticated mathematical models” to convert infection prevalence data into estimates of malaria cases.
Comparing these datasets gives the authors a baseline, showing how changes in climate have affected the range of mosquitoes and malaria rates across Africa in the early 21st century.
The authors then use global climate models to model future changes over 2024-49 under the SSP2-4.5 emissions pathway – which the authors describe as “broadly consistent with current international pledges on reduced greenhouse gas emissions”.
The authors also ran a “counterfactual” scenario, in which global temperatures do not increase over the next 25 years. By comparing malaria prevalence in their scenarios with and without climate change, the authors could identify how many malaria cases were due to climate change alone.
Overall, the ecological impacts of climate change will result in only a 0.12% increase in malaria cases by the year 2050, relative to present-day levels, according to the paper.
However, the authors say that this “minimal overall change” in Africa’s malaria rates “masks extensive geographical variation”, with some areas seeing a significant increase in malaria rates and others seeing a decrease.
Disruptive extremes
In contrast, the study estimates that 79% of the future increase in malaria transmission will be due to the “disruptive” impacts of more frequent and severe weather extremes.
The authors explain that extreme weather events, such as flooding and cyclones, can cause extensive damage to housing, leaving people without crucial protective equipment such as mosquito nets.
It can also destroy other key infrastructure, such as roads or hospitals, preventing people from accessing healthcare. This means that in the aftermath of an extreme weather event, people face a greater risk of being infected with malaria.
The climate models run by the study authors project an increase in “disruptive” extreme weather events over the next 25 years.
For example, the authors find that by the middle of the century, cyclones forming in the Indian Ocean will become more intense, with fewer category 1 to category 4 events, but more frequent category 5 events. They also find that climate change will drive an increase in flooding across Africa.
The study finds that without mitigation measures, these disruptive events will drive up the risk of malaria – especially in “main river systems” and the “cyclone-prone coastal regions of south-east Africa”.
Between 2024 and 2050, 67% of people in Africa will see their risk of catching malaria increase as a result of climate change, the study estimates.
The map below shows the percentage change in malaria transmission rate in the 2040s due to the disruptive impacts of climate change alone (left) and a combination of the disruptive and ecological impacts (right), compared to a scenario in which there is no change in the climate. Red and yellow indicate an increase in malaria risk, while blue indicates a reduction.
Colours in lighter shading indicate lower model confidence, while stronger colours indicate higher model confidence.
The maps show that the “disruptive” effects of climate change have a more uniform effect, driving up malaria risk across the entire continent.
However, there is greater regional variation when these effects are combined with “ecological” drivers.
The authors find that warming will increase malaria risk in regions where the temperature is currently too low for mosquitoes to survive. This includes the belt of lower latitude southern Africa, including Angola, southern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, as well as highland areas in Burundi, eastern DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda.
Meanwhile, they find that warming will drive down malaria transmission in the Sahel, as temperatures rise above the optimal range for mosquitoes.
Rising risk
The combined “disruptive” and “ecological” impacts of climate change will drive an additional 123m “clinical cases” of malaria across Africa, even if the current climate pledges are met, the study finds.
This will result in 532,000 additional deaths from malaria over the next 25 years, if the disease’s mortality rate remains the same, the authors warn.
The graph below shows the increase in clinical cases of malaria projected across Africa over the next 25 years, broken down into the different ecological (yellow) and disruptive (purple) drivers of malaria risk.
However, the authors stress that there are many other mechanisms through which climate change could affect malaria transmission – for example, through food insecurity, conflict, economic disruption and climate-driven migration.
“Eradicating malaria in the first half of this century would be one of the greatest accomplishments in human history,” the authors say.
They argue that accomplishing this will require “climate-resilient control strategies”, such as investing in “climate-resilient health and supply-chain infrastructure” and enhancing emergency early warning systems for storms and other extreme weather.
Dr Adugna Woyessa is a senior researcher at the Ethiopian Public Health Institute and was not involved in the study. He tells Carbon Brief that the new paper could help inform national malaria programmes across Africa.
He also suggests that the findings could be used to guide more “local studies that address evidence gaps on the estimates of climate change-attributed malaria”.
Study authors Symons and Gething tell Carbon Brief that during their study, they interviewed “many policymakers and implementers across Africa who are already grappling with what climate-resilient malaria intervention actually looks like in practice”.
These interventions include integrating malaria control into national disaster risk planning, with emergency responses after floods and cyclones, they say. They also stress the need to ensure that community health workers are “well-stocked in advance of severe weather”.
The research shows the importance of ensuring that malaria control and primary healthcare is “resilient” to the extreme weather, they say.
The post Climate change could lead to 500,000 ‘additional’ malaria deaths in Africa by 2050 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate change could lead to 500,000 ‘additional’ malaria deaths in Africa by 2050
Greenhouse Gases
Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter. Subscribe for free here. This is the last edition of Cropped for 2025. The newsletter will return on 14 January 2026.
Key developments
High Seas Treaty enters force
OCEAN BOOST: The High Seas Treaty – formally known as the “biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction”, or “BBNJ” agreement – entered into force on 17 January, following its ratification by 60 states, reported Oceanographic Magazine. The treaty establishes a framework to protect biodiversity in international waters, which make up two-thirds of the ocean, said the publication. For more, see Carbon Brief’s explainer on the treaty, which was agreed in 2023 after two decades of negotiations.
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DEEP-SEA MINING: Meanwhile, the US – which is not a party to the BBNJ’s parent Law of the Sea – is pushing on with an effort to accelerate permitting for companies wanting to hunt for deep-sea minerals in international waters, reported Reuters. The newswire described it as a “move that is likely to face environmental and legal concerns”.
UK biodiversity probe
SECURITY RISKS: The global decline of biodiversity and potential collapse of ecosystems pose serious risks to national security in the UK, a report put together by government intelligence experts has concluded, according to BBC News. The report was due to be published last autumn, but was “suppressed” by the prime minister’s office over fears it was “too negative”, said the Times.
COLLAPSE CONCERNS: Following a freedom-of-information (FOI) request, the government published a 14-page “abridged” version of the report, explained the Times. A fuller version seen by both the Times and Carbon Brief looked in detail at the potential security consequences of ecosystem collapse, including shifting global power dynamics, more migration to the UK and the risk of “protests over falling living standards”.
News and views
- OZ BUSHFIRES: Bushfires continued to blaze in Victoria, Australia, amid record-breaking heat, said the Guardian. A recent rapid attribution analysis found that the “extreme” Australian heat in early January was made around five times more likely by fossil-fuelled climate change.
- MERCO-SOURED: On 17 January, the EU signed its “largest-ever trade accord” with the Mercosur bloc of countries – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – after 25 years of negotiations, per Reuters. On 21 January, amid looming new US sanctions, EU lawmakers voted to send the pact to the European Court of Justice, which could delay the deal by almost two years, according to the New York Times.
- SOY IT ISN’T SO: Meanwhile, the Guardian reported that UK and EU supermarkets have “urged” traders who had “abandoned” the Amazon soya moratorium to stick to its core principles: “not to source the grain from Amazon land cleared after 2008”.
- WATER ‘BANKRUPTCY’: A new UN report warned that the world is facing irreversible “water bankruptcy” caused by overextracting water reserves, along with shrinking supplies from lakes, glaciers, rivers and wetlands, Reuters reported. Lead author Prof Kaveh Madani told the Guardian that the situation is “extremely urgent [because] no one knows exactly when the whole system would collapse”.
- KRUGER UNDER WATER: Flood damages to South Africa’s Kruger National Park could “take years to repair” and cost more than $30m, said the country’s environment minister, quoted in Reuters. Rivers running through the park “burst their banks” and submerged bridges, with “hippos seen…among treetops”, it added.
- FORESTS VS COPPER: A Mongabay report examined how “community forests stand on the frontline” of critical-minerals mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s copper-cobalt belt.
Spotlight
Nature’s coast guard, with backup
This week, Cropped speaks to the lead author of a new study that looks at how – and where – mangrove restoration can be best supported across the world.
Along Mumbai’s smoggy shoreline, members of the city’s Indigenous Koli community wade through the mangroves at dawn to catch fish. Behind their boats, giant industrial cranes whir to life, building new stretches of snaking coastal highway that blot out the horizon.
Mumbai’s mangrove cover is possibly the highest for any major city. With their tangled, stilt roots, mangrove species serve as a natural defence for a city that experiences storm surges and urban flooding every year. These events disproportionately affect the city’s poor – particularly its fishing communities.
This mangrove buffer is being increasingly threatened, as the city chooses coastal roads and other large development projects over green cover, despite protests. But can green and grey infrastructure coexist to protect vulnerable communities in a warming world?
A new global-scale assessment published last week tallied the benefits of mangrove restoration for flood risk reduction, factoring in future climate change, development and poverty.
It advanced the idea of “hybrid” coastal defence measures. These combine pairing tropical ecosystems with modern, engineered defences for sea level rise, such as dykes and levees.
When Carbon Brief contacted lead author and climate scientist Dr Timothy Tiggeloven of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, he was in Kagoshima in Japan, home to the world’s northernmost mangrove forests. Why combine mangroves and dykes? Tiggeloven explained:
“Mangroves are like active barriers: they reduce incoming energy from waves, but they will not stop the water coming in from storms, because water can flow through the branches. But wave energy can still be overtopped. So if you reduce wave energy via mangroves and have dykes behind this, they very much have a synergy together and we wanted to quantify the benefits for future adaptation.”
According to the study, if mangrove-dyke systems were built along flood-prone coastlines, mangrove restoration could reduce damages by $800m a year, with an overall return-on-investment of up to $125bn.
It could also protect 140,000 people a year from flood risk – and 12 times that number under future climate change and socioeconomic projections, the study said.
According to the study, south-east Asia could reap the “highest absolute benefits” from mangrove restoration under current conditions. Countries that could see the “highest absolute potential risk reduction” – considering future climate damages in 2080 – are Nigeria ($5.6bn), Vietnam ($4.5bn), Indonesia ($4.3 bn), and India ($3.8bn), it estimated.
Maharashtra – which Mumbai serves as the state capital for – is one of two subnational regions globally that could reap the largest benefits of restoration.
Tiggeloven emphasised that the goal of the study was to examine how restoration impacts people, “because if we’re looking only at monetary terms, we’re only looking at large cities with a lot of assets”, he told Carbon Brief.
A pattern that his team found across multiple countries was that people with lower incomes are disproportionately living in flood-prone coastal areas where mangrove restoration is suitable. He elaborated:
“Wealthier areas might have higher absolute damages, but poor communities are more vulnerable, because they lack alternatives to easily relocate or rebuild, so the relative impact on their wellbeing is much greater.”
Poorer rural coastal communities with fewer engineered protections, such as sea walls, could benefit the most from restoration as an adaptive measure, the study found. But as the study’s map showed, there are limits to restoration. Tiggoloven concluded:
“We also should be very careful, because mangroves cannot grow anywhere. We need to think ‘conservation’ – not only ‘restoration’ – so we do not remove existing mangroves and make room for other infrastructure.”
Watch, read, listen
DU-GONE: A feature in the Guardian examined why so many dugongs have gone missing from the shores of Thailand.
WILD LONDON: Sir David Attenborough explored wildlife wonders in his home city of London. The one-off documentary is available in the UK on BBC iPlayer.
GREAT BARRIER: A Vox exclusive photo-feature looked at the “largest collective effort on Earth ever mounted” to protect Australia’s Great Barrier Reef.
‘SURVIVAL OF THE SLOWEST’: A new CBC documentary filmed species – from sloths to seahorses – that “have survived not in spite of their slowness, but because of it”.
New science
- Including carbon emissions from permafrost thaw and fires reduces the remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5C by 25% | Communications Earth and Environment
- Penguins in Antarctica have radically shifted their breeding seasons in response to rising temperatures | Journal of Animal Ecology
- Increasing per-capita meat consumption by just one kilogram a year is “linked” to a nearly 2% increase in embedded deforestation elsewhere | Environmental Research Letters
In the diary
- 31 January: Deadline for inputs on food systems and climate change for a report by the UN special rapporteur on climate change
- 1 February: Costa Rica elections
- 2-6 February: First session of the plenary of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste and Pollution | Geneva
- 2-8 February: Twelfth plenary session of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services | Manchester, UK
- 5 February: Future Food Systems Summit | London
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
The post Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence
High gas prices are responsible for two-thirds of the rise in household electricity bills since before the global energy crisis, says the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC).
The new analysis, from one of the UK’s foremost research bodies on energy, flatly contradicts widespread media and political narratives that misleadingly seek to blame climate policies for high bills.
Kaylen Camacho McKluskey, research assistant at UKERC, tells Carbon Brief that despite “misleading claims” about policy costs, gas prices are the main driver of high bills. She says:
“While the story of what has driven up GB consumer electricity bills is often largely attributed to policy costs, our analysis shows that this is not the case. Volatile, gas-linked market prices – not green policies, as some misleading claims have suggested – dominate the real-terms increase in bills since 2021.”
In its 2025 review of UK energy policy, published today, UKERC says that annual electricity bills for typical households have risen by £166 since 2021.
It says that, after adjusting for inflation, some two-thirds of this increase (£112) is due to higher wholesale gas prices, as shown in the figure below.
(This analysis does not account for the recent surge in wholesale gas prices, which, in a matter of days, have jumped by around 40% in the UK and 140% in the US.)
UKERC estimates that, despite only supplying a third of the country’s electricity, gas-fired generators set the wholesale price of power around 90% of the time in 2025.
(This is slightly lower than widely cited earlier estimates, published in 2023 and covering 2021, which found gas was setting power prices 97% of the time.)
A surge of new clean power means that gas would only set wholesale power prices 60% of the time by 2029, UKERC says, adding that this would cut the nation’s exposure to “gas price shocks”.
It finds that new renewable projects set to come online over the next three years could cut wholesale power prices by 8% from current levels.
UKERC argues that the government could “strengthen…these downward trends” by shifting older renewable plants onto fixed-price “contracts for difference” (CfDs).
These older schemes, built under a policy known as the “renewables obligation”, are paid a top-up subsidy in addition to the wholesale power price, linking their receipts to high gas prices.
Newer renewable projects with CfDs get a fixed price, which is not linked to wholesale electricity prices or the price of gas power that drives it.
Prof Rob Gross, UKERC director says in a press release that “unpredictable global gas prices still dominate our power market”. He continues:
“The link between the wholesale price of gas and electricity prices continues to be the most significant factor in the price increases consumers have seen over the last few years. Government took action on some policy costs in [last year’s] budget and ongoing policies will weaken the link to gas prices. But more could be done to help ensure that the stable prices offered by renewables flow through to consumer bills.”
The UKERC analysis shows that rising network charges, linked to investments in expanding the electricity grid as well as balancing supply and demand in real time, were the second-largest contributor to the rise in bills since 2021.
Significant further grid investments are set to add further pressure on bills over the next few years. However, energy regulator Ofgem says these investments will cut bills relative to the alternative.
Policy costs are only the third-largest driver of current high bills, according to UKERC’s analysis. It says these were linked to just 12% of the rise for typical households, or £19 per year.
It is commonly argued that rising policy costs are certain to raise bills, but this tends to ignore the interplay between CfDs and wholesale power prices.
The record-breaking recent government auction for CfDs is expected to be roughly “cost neutral” for bills, potentially even generating consumer savings of £1bn a year by 2035.
As UKERC explains, this is because new renewable projects will receive CfD payments and may result in higher network costs, but they also cut wholesale power prices. A full analysis of the overall impact on bills must take all of these factors into account.
The UKERC report aligns with another recent analysis from thinktank Nesta, which said that, while there was a pressing need to look at future cost pressures from network and policy charges, “it is clear that gas is still the main source of our high energy bills to date”. It added:
“It is still true that higher gas prices are the main reason for higher energy bills for most British households when you look at the whole bill. Gas is not the only culprit, but it is still the biggest one.”
The post Expensive gas still biggest driver of high UK electricity bills, says UKERC appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Expensive gas still biggest driver of high UK electricity bills, says UKERC
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Cropped 28 January 2026: Ocean biodiversity boost; Nature and national security; Mangrove defence
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