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Australian uranium mining giant Paladin Energy Ltd. has announced a C$1.14 billion ($833 million) all-stock offer to acquire Canadian mining firm Fission Uranium Corp. Using uranium in nuclear power significantly contributes to achieving climate goals by providing reliable energy that reduces the global carbon footprint. Thus, this deal can bring a paradigm shift in uranium mining.

Canada: A Beacon of Nuclear Excellence

The acquisition will grant Paladin control over a top-tier mining project, located in western Canada’s Athabasca Basin, situated in Saskatchewan. This region is rich in high-grade uranium. Fission’s asset is set to begin operations in 2029, with an expected annual production of 9.1 million pounds of uranium over 10 years.

According the Paladin’s press release, the Transaction is targeted to close in the September 2024 quarter on meeting all the conditions under the Agreement. Paladin CEO Ian Purdy, is highly optimistic, noting,

“The rationale is very compelling. We see this as a fantastic asset. Regardless of where the uranium cycle is or how the industry’s doing, the combination of these two companies just makes fundamental sense.”

He further added that Fission is a natural fit for Paladin’s portfolio with the shallow high-grade Patterson Lake South (PLS) project located in Canada’s Athabasca Basin. The addition of PLS creates a leading Canadian development hub alongside Paladin’s Michelin project, with exploration upside across all Canadian properties.

URANIUMsource: Bloomberg

Paladin and Fission Merger Advantages

The merger of Paladin and Fission will establish a leading clean energy company, providing these benefits to shareholders of both companies:

  • Enhanced project development pipeline.
  • Multi-asset production projected by 2029.
  • Diversified presence across top uranium mining regions in Canada, Namibia, and Australia.
  • Increased exposure to favorable long-term uranium market fundamentals.
  • Expanded scale and global profile for Paladin with a TSX listing.

Furthermore, Fission shareholders are poised to benefit directly from the JV. They will get an attractive 30% premium to Fission’s 20-Day Volume-weighted average price (VWAP) and the opportunity to participate in Paladin’s future expansion plans.

Uranium Powerhouse- Paladin’s Path to Global Leadership

Paladin, an ASX 200-listed premier uranium company based in Perth, Western Australia, holds a 75% stake in the Langer Heinrich Mine (LHM) in Namibia. This mine has generated over 43 Mlbs of U3O8 and is poised for a robust return to production. The initial volumes are scheduled to be processed on 30 March 2024. After the Transaction closes, Fission shareholders will hold a 24.0% stake in Paladin. It is expected to have a market value of around US$3.5 billion.

The company boasts a diversified, high-quality uranium exploration and development portfolio in top mining regions, including Canada and Australia.

Paladin is dedicated to reducing carbon emissions and adopting nuclear energy. It supports strong nuclear safeguards for the peaceful use of nuclear materials to generate zero-emissions electricity.

As the Langer Heinrich Mine (LHM) resumes production, it will measure, track and report its emissions. Paladin strongly emphasizes sustainability managing their Scope 1 and Scope 2 carbon emissions.

Notably, Paladin does not face the Scope 3 emissions challenge, as nuclear power plants produce no greenhouse gas emissions during operation. They also predict that LHM’s uranium production will prevent approximately 1.3 BT of CO2 emissions, compared to equivalent coal-fired electricity generation.

Ian Purdy has significantly highlighted that the price of uranium has spiked <3x in the past five years. It surged further following the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting the urgent need for alternative reactor fuel sources. Thus, he anticipates more uranium deals ahead.

Fission’s Athabasca Basin, a Geographical Bounty

Fission is among several junior mining companies, such as NexGen Energy Ltd. and Denison Mines Corp., developing projects in the Athabasca Basin. This area has become a mining hotspot due to rising supply concerns and increasing global interest in nuclear power as a sustainable alternative to fossil.

Located in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin, PLS is home to the Triple R deposit. It is recognized as the region’s largest high-grade uranium reserve close to the surface. We discovered from the company’s Feasibility Study that Triple R has the potential to become one of the lowest-cost uranium mines globally. It also unveils its unique strategic position along all-weather Highway 955. It traverses the UEX-AREVA Shea Creek deposits and leads to the historical Cluff Lake uranium mine. These advantages make it one of the world’s most productive uranium mining regions.

Fission UraniumSource: Paladin

Due to its shallow nature, the PLS project offers flexibility for development through underground mining, open pit mining, or a hybrid approach. Considering sustainability, , Fission has chosen to pursue an underground-only mining strategy after deep consultation with local communities. This approach allows the company to fully extract the deposit while benefiting from reduced CAPEX and a minimized environmental impact.

Fission CEO Ross McElroy said that while the region holds high concentrations of uranium. Only a few companies have the expertise to explore and develop such projects. Undoubtedly, Paladin is one of them.

He further commented,

Having worked the majority of my geology career in the Athabasca Basin, I can tell you that it takes a great deal of expertise to properly explore and make discoveries like this one.”

The post Paladin Energy Offers C$1.14 B to Canada’s Fission Uranium. What does it mean for Uranium Mining? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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