From the latest news from CarbonCredits, you can see that the lithium market has entered a period of price decline. This is mainly because of weaker demand conditions and an oversupply of lithium carbonate in key regions. However, this trend doesn’t favor the top lithium miners and producers across the globe. Recently Albemarle and Pilbara have taken some drastic steps to counter the lithium market lows.
Let’s see how they are navigating the challenges…
Albemarle’s Strategy for Surviving the Lithium Market Slump
As a consequence of dropping lithium prices, Albemarle Corporation is set to reduce its global workforce by between 6% and 7%, which will save around $300 million to $400 million annually as reported by S&P Global Commodity Insights.
Despite being the world’s largest lithium producer, the company reported a net loss of $1.07 billion for the third quarter. The company released its earnings report on November 6.
Kent Masters, Albemarle’s president and CEO expressed himself by saying,
“Right now we’re focused on making sure that we put the cost structure in place to compete through the bottom of the cycle. We’re trying to create the flexibility to pivot up if the market returns.”
The New Approach
The earning report revealed how the company is planning to streamline its organization by adopting a more integrated and functional model. In purview, it will reduce its 2025 capital expenditures by about 50% compared to 2024 to bring spending down to between $800 million and $900 million.
The company noted that this quarter’s results sharply contrast with the $302 million net income earned in the same period last year.
CEO Kent Masters emphasized that China has scaled back high-cost lepidolite production, while Australian miners have reduced output and laid off employees in response to market conditions. Still, these trimming measures are insufficient to stabilize lithium prices.
According to him, the surprising factor is that “African supply has filled Chinese cuts.”
On the demand side, CFO Neal Sheorey highlighted a 36% increase in demand for lithium in grid storage this year, driven by U.S. and Chinese projects, along with a 23% rise in global electric vehicle registrations.
Albemarle estimates that around 25% of the lithium industry is currently operating at a loss. The reason is again the oversupplied market. However, the top lithium producer wants to stay competitive over the long term. This is why they have conducted a thorough review of their costs and operating structure.

Broadly speaking, they revealed their potential future actions to address ongoing market challenges. Masters said that, while rising demand could help restore balance further production cuts will be essential to stabilize prices effectively. In response to the lingering low lithium prices, the company plans to adopt a conservative growth strategy to ensure long-term reliance.
Notably, In July, Albemarle halted expansion plans at its Kemerton lithium hydroxide refinery in Australia to manage costs more effectively.
Li-FT Power: Exploring & Developing Hard Rock Lithium Deposits In Canada
Li-FT Power Ltd. (TSXV: LIFT) recently announced its first-ever National Instrument 43-101 (NI 43-101) compliant mineral resource estimate (MRE) for the Yellowknife Lithium Project (YLP), located in the Northwest Territories, Canada.
An Initial Mineral Resource of 50.4 Million Tonnes at Yellowknife.
This maiden estimate is a major milestone for the company and marks a significant step forward in the project’s development. Li-FT Power’s upcoming mineral resource is expected to further solidify Yellowknife as one of North America’s largest hardrock lithium resources.
Click to learn more about lithium and Li-FT Power Ltd. >>
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Pilbara’s Strategic Move to Overcome Lithium Price Dip
On October 30, Pilbara Minerals announced its decision to pause construction of their Mid-Stream Demonstration Plant Pilgangoora lithium mine in Western Australia citing weak lithium prices as the main reason. The project is a JV with environmental technology company Calix Ltd formed in November 2022.
The smaller Ngungaju plant will be placed on temporary care and maintenance from December 1 which will allow the company to manage current price pressures more efficiently.
Pilbara Minerals highlighted that spodumene concentrate prices, ranging from US$750 to $800 per ton, remain below the sustainable industry benchmark of US$1,400 per ton.
- In the September quarter, the company sold lithium at an average of US$682 per ton, a decrease from US$840 per tonne in the previous quarter.
The demonstration plant at Pilgangoora that would produce lithium salts using Calix’s advanced calcination technology was 60% completed by the end of September this year. Pilbara anticipates these measures will contribute about A$200 million in cash flow improvements for fiscal 2025.

Cutting Capital Expenditure
- MINING.com reported: Pilbara Minerals also revised its production guidance for fiscal 2025 to a range of 700,000 to 740,000 dry metric tonnes (dmt). It’s down from an earlier target of 800,000 to 840,000 dmt.
Meanwhile, it has cut its capital expenditure forecast to between A$565 million and A$610 million, down from a previous estimate of A$615 million to A$685 million.
Managing Director and CEO Dale Henderson,
“Given current lithium price environment, this pause enables the joint venture to time expenditure with improved market conditions. We remain fully supportive of the midstream strategy and our joint venture, recognising the Project’s potential to transform the lithium supply chain through lower emissions and value-added processing. Our commitment to our joint venture with Calix remains. We will assess with Calix resuming the Project as market conditions improve or further government support is received.”
Lithium Glut Lingers, Even as Demand Surges
According to S&P Global Commodity Insights, the lithium market is expected to face a supply surplus until at least 2027. However, this excess supply will maintain low lithium prices until demand rises to balance out the excess.

Data Source: S&P Global
Analyzing the market condition further, the lithium scenario is quite vivid. This rapidly growing demand has attracted new lithium players, but major producers are yet to make significant production cuts.
Explore here to learn everything about what’s happening with lithium now: The Lithium Paradox: Price Plummet, Supply Surge, and Demand Dip – What’s Happening Now?
The post Lithium Market Lows: How Are Albemarle and Pilbara Minerals Adapting? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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