There are days when the sulphur-like, toxic smell coming from the nearby oil facilities is so potent that Azuh Chinenye struggles to go outside her house early in the morning. “When you inhale, you as a person, your body system, and every other thing will change… you can’t stand the odour,” she said.

Chinenye lives in Oyigbo, a town less than 20 miles (32 km) from Port Harcourt, in the Niger Delta, the heart of Nigeria’s main oil-producing region.

Signs of the industry are everywhere in Oyigbo. Active flare stacks stand just metres from homes and businesses, whose walls are caked in soot. Close to a primary school, Climate Home News saw oil spilling from a corroded underground pipe.

The local oil field here was for many years owned and operated by Shell, until it was sold to a Nigerian firm for $533 million in early 2021. Since the sale, gas flaring has increased dramatically at Oyigbo, despite the new operator’s promise to “protect our planet” and the health of communities.

A local doctor and residents told Climate Home News that the opposite is happening in reality, as people struggle with the effects of noxious pollutants released by flaring at production facilities close to their homes.

Flaring worsens climate crisis

Fifteen times more gas was burned at the Oyigbo field in 2024 compared to 2020, according to an analysis of satellite data prepared for Climate Home News by SkyTruth, an environmental watchdog. This pattern is repeated at other fields previously owned by Shell across the Niger Delta, the data shows.

Flaring occurs when gas produced during oil drilling is burned off, instead of being utilised. The process releases vast amounts of carbon dioxide and methane, a potent planet-heating greenhouse gas, alongside toxic chemicals.

Failure to tackle gas flaring pushes global climate goals further out of reach, as cutting methane emissions from the oil and gas industry is widely seen by climate and energy experts as a quick win to slow global warming in the short term.

Shell claims to have significantly reduced its emissions and says it achieved zero routine flaring last year, but our analysis reveals that this was driven primarily by selling off high-emission assets – from the US to Nigeria – which are then free to continue polluting, albeit under different management.

After Shell divestments, flaring on the rise

A spokesperson for Shell told Climate Home News by email that, when the energy giant selects buyers for divestments, it assesses “a number of factors such as their financial strength, operating culture and environmental performance” and shares emissions reduction plans for the assets, where relevant.

But Shell does not monitor the performance of those assets once it has handed over control to the buyer, the spokesperson said, adding that regulation of operations by the new owner is carried out by governments.

After years of staying flat at the global level, flaring has risen again since 2023, including in Nigeria, where smaller home-grown firms have been ramping up production seeking to maximise oil revenues while lacking the expertise to prevent flaring, according to a World Bank report.

To understand more about how this wasteful and dangerous process continues to harm people’s lives, Climate Home News went to the Niger Delta, a part of the world unique for how many residents are forced to live in close proximity to flare stacks.

New owner promised sustainable production

“Gas flaring has increased in the years since Shell left,” said Chief Maduabuchi Felix Achiele, a community leader in Oyigbo. “In a week, we can observe two, three, four instances of flaring but when Shell was here, it was just once in a while.”

The field has been owned by Trans-Niger Oil and Gas (TNOG) since January 2021, along with the rest of the assets within the OML 17 oil block. The company that runs operations in the block – Lagos-based Heirs Energies – has boasted about turning an “underperforming asset” into an economic success after taking it over from Shell.

Heirs Energies said it has doubled production at OML 17 without that coming at the expense of environmental and climate integrity. “We can create a symmetry, a symbiotic relationship between oil and gas, the environment and people […] sustainability is infused in what we are doing,” its CEO Osayande Igiehon said in an interview late last year.

Heirs Energies announced an agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to capture and monetise gas from OML 17 in December, though the company did not give a timeframe for when this project would be completed. Heirs failed to respond to questions sent by Climate Home News for this story.

On its website, the company says it is “committed to eliminating routine flaring and greenhouse gas emissions by 2025”. But the emissions figures and experience of the local community tell a radically different story.

Jump in flaring volumes

In OML 17, the vast oil block that covers much of the urban area of Port Harcourt and its surrounding towns like Oyigbo, gas flaring volumes grew sevenfold between 2020 – the last year of Shell’s involvement – and 2024, according to data presented to Climate Home News by SkyTruth.

To conduct this analysis, we tracked sales of onshore Nigerian assets, determined the location of each site using open source data, and then worked with SkyTruth to monitor flaring from these locations using data from the Earth Observation Group at the Colorado School of Mines.

Within OML 17, at Agbada, about a 30-minute drive north of Port Harcourt city centre, flaring doubled immediately after the sale in 2021. The following year, it almost doubled again and has remained close to that mark since. In Nkali, another asset within OML 17, flaring was nearly four times higher in the year after the sale.

While SkyTruth’s analysis was only able to use figures up to 2024, flaring remained high at these oil blocks throughout 2025, according to publicly available data from the NNPC.

This pattern can be seen in other oil blocks. Shell lost its right to operate OML 11 in August 2021, a block that spans the Ogoniland region. This helped the company to record a drop in emissions from both greenhouse gases and volatile organic compounds, while flaring went up under the block’s new operator, a subsidiary of the government-owned NNPC.

“Catastrophic” for communities

Communities in Ogoniland are seeking reparations for the decades-long environmental devastation caused by oil drilling. When it took control of the assets in 2021, the NNPC said the firm’s operations would be driven by “a social contract that would put the people and environment of the Niger Delta above pecuniary considerations”. Nonetheless, gas flaring tripled between 2021 and 2024 across all OML 11 fields, according to the analysis prepared by SkyTruth.

It was a similar story at Nembe Creek, part of the OML 29 block sold by Shell to Nigerian firm Aiteo for $1.7bn in March 2015. That year, flaring rose by around a quarter and then doubled in 2016.

For blighted Niger Delta communities, oil spill clean-ups are another broken promise

Production at the facility fell dramatically following a huge oil spill in 2021 that dumped 20,000 barrels of oil per day into local creeks for a month. Gas flaring at Nembe Creek spiked again in 2024, to an annual volume 54% higher than in 2014, when Shell still ran the field. In June 2024, another spill forced Aiteo to halt production.

Andrew Baxter, senior director for business and energy transition at the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), told Climate Home News: “Flaring and spills harm human health. Flaring is not just a climate menace, it’s catastrophic to the communities that live around these facilities.”

It also wastes energy, he said. “This is a depressing waste of resources when there are still significant challenges around energy access,” he added.

Q&A: “False” climate solutions help keep fossil fuel firms in business

Given the need to address climate change, it’s important that when majors sell fossil fuel assets, buyers have comparable green targets and operating standards, according to organisations like EDF.

Baxter argued that the way Shell managed its troubled oil operations in the Niger Delta over decades had limited its options when selling them on.

“When operators have a poor environmental record and substandard record of community engagement, it should come as little surprise when they cannot attract many interested buyers for those assets. This rule applies globally,” he said.

Big Oil’s “paper decarbonisation”

Between 2016 and 2023, more than 60% of Shell’s emissions reductions came from divestments. That matters because, despite these emissions no longer being Shell’s responsibility, they are still heating up the Earth’s climate.

Krista Halttunen, a visiting researcher at Imperial College London who focuses on the future of the oil industry, told Climate Home News that companies like Shell are practising “paper decarbonisation”, reducing emissions in their annual reports rather than the real world.

“This story shows the limits of company-driven emissions reduction,” she said. “Very few companies are reducing real-world emissions. Fossil fuel companies can’t meaningfully decarbonise without changing their business model, because their whole reason for being is digging up material that will add more carbon to the atmosphere.”

Shell did not reply to Climate Home News’ questions about how it had achieved its emission reductions.

It also appears that Shell’s achievement of reaching zero routine flaring in 2025 was achieved in large part through the sale of its Nigerian assets. In March of that year Shell sold its onshore Nigerian assets to a consortium of companies called Renaissance Africa. Earlier, in 2023, Shell had stated that its remaining Nigerian assets accounted for around half of total routine and non-routine flaring in its integrated gas and upstream facilities.

Removing Nigerian assets from its portfolio, whether in the Renaissance deal or earlier transactions, may have helped transform Shell’s flaring emissions, but for people living in the Niger Delta life has stayed the same.

“Flaring is not new in this community,” explained Theodore Ike Ogu, a 60-year-old smallholder farmer who lives in Oyigbo. “We are suffering and flaring is increasing.”

Here, temperatures regularly hover around 35 degrees Celsius during the day, with humidity often exceeding 50%. When the flares are going full blast, the heat for those living and working nearby can be unbearable, locals said. At night, when the town is quiet, the noise from the flares keeps people awake.

Chief Maduabuchi recalled that residents used to collect water during the rainy season to drink and wash. “You can’t even use it to wash because, as it comes down, it is dirty because of the smoke,” he complained.

Health risks from toxic chemicals

Gas flaring releases harmful chemicals, and numerous studies, including some conducted in the Niger Delta, have linked living close to flares with being more likely to contract forms of cancer and respiratory illnesses.

Complaints from local communities about health issues and unexplained deaths have been rising in oil-producing communities such as Oyigbo as gas flaring intensifies, according to Dr Bieye Renner Briggs, a Port Harcourt-based public health physician and environmental advocate.

While he cautions that a direct link has not yet been scientifically proven in the Niger Delta, Dr Briggs says the connection is “probable”, given similar findings in other oil regions worldwide. He recommended performing routine autopsies in the local communities to establish clear evidence of whether deaths are caused by gas flaring or oil pollution.

Dr Briggs warned that people living near flare sites face a wide range of serious health hazards, from hypertension and cardiomyopathy, which can increase the risk of heart failure, to asthma, chronic bronchitis and kidney disease.

Soot particles released by flaring represent a particularly acute health risk, he warned. These are small enough to bypass the body’s natural defences and enter the bloodstream, increasing the risk of cancers and other conditions, he told Climate Home News. “Everything a smoker will suffer and more is what somebody that is exposed to soot will suffer,” he said, noting that, unlike smokers, residents can do little to limit their constant exposure.

The oil companies contacted by Climate Home News for this article, including Shell, did not respond to requests for comment on the health effects of flaring.

“I have different health issues: incessant lung pains, at times a cough, all those things, catarrh,” said Theodore Ike Ogu, adding there are “so many things that we notice health-wise which we believe are due to flaring”.

Azuh Chinenye’s husband, Kelechi Prince Azuh, died in May last year after suffering from breathing difficulties and frequent asthma attacks. “He was 49 years old,” she said, fighting back tears. “You see his poster outside there and three of the children are in university. He didn’t even see them complete their first year.”

“Nowhere else to go”

Oil production, meanwhile, has increased at former Shell fields. Extracting oil from mature fields like those in Nigeria produces a significant amount of associated gas and, in the absence of funding and infrastructure to make use of this, it is often flared.

Last May, Heirs Energies CEO Igiehon told the Financial Times that Nigerian firms could build better relationships with locals, after years of tension with oil majors over frequent spills and the destruction of local livelihoods. “We’re able to move around unfettered because we have a robust relationship with the communities,” he argued.

The increase in flaring in blocks like OML 17 has tested that idea.

Colombia aims to launch fossil fuel transition platform at first global conference

“Shell was great,” said Chief Maduabuchi, who explained that the company provided healthcare and food to the local community. The new operator, he says, “only gives us a small amount of rice, unlike Shell which used to give us each 50kg”.

Asked why she has chosen to stay in Oyigbo after her husband’s death, Azuh Chinenye explains that it’s much cheaper to live here than in the centre of Port Harcourt. She uses her inhaler when she struggles to breathe and tries not to go outside when the soot gets bad.

“I can easily pack up, but this is my compound, this is my community, and there is nowhere else I will go,” she said.

Cover photo: A woman empties a plastic bowl filled with tapioca, which is derived from cassava paste, on sewn sacks laid on the ground close to a gas flaring furnace in Ughelli, Delta State, Nigeria September 17, 2020. (Photo: REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde)

The post Gas flaring soars in Niger Delta post-Shell, afflicting communities   appeared first on Climate Home News.

Gas flaring soars in Niger Delta post-Shell, afflicting communities  

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures, industry data and analyst reports, shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

• Without clean-energy sectors, China would have missed its target for GDP growth of “around 5%”, expanding by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%.
• Clean-energy industries are expanding much more quickly than China’s economy overall, with their annual growth rate accelerating from 12% in 2024 to 18% in 2025.
• The “new three” of EVs, batteries and solar continue to dominate the economic contribution of clean energy in China, generating two-thirds of the value added and attracting more than half of all investment in the sectors.
• China’s investments in clean energy reached 7.2tn yuan ($1.0tn) in 2025, roughly four times the still sizable $260bn put into fossil-fuel extraction and coal power.
• Exports of clean-energy technologies grew rapidly in 2025, but China’s domestic market still far exceeds the export market in value for Chinese firms.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly for solar power, where growth has slowed in response to a new pricing system and where central government targets have been set far below the recent rate of expansion.

An ongoing slowdown could turn the sectors into a drag on GDP, while worsening industrial “overcapacity” and exacerbating trade tensions.

Yet, even if central government targets in the next five-year plan are modest, those from local governments and state-owned enterprises could still drive significant growth in clean energy.

This article updates analysis previously reported for 2023 and 2024.

Clean-energy sectors outperform wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy. This means that it is making an outsize contribution to annual economic growth.

The figure below shows that clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy overall in 2025 and more than 90% of the net rise in investment.

In 2022, China’s clean-energy economy was worth an estimated 8.4tn yuan ($1.2tn). By 2025, the sectors had nearly doubled in value to 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn).

This is comparable to the entire output of Brazil or Canada and positions the Chinese clean-energy industry as the 8th-largest economy in the world. Its value is roughly half the size of the economy of India – the world’s fourth largest – or of the US state of California.

The outperformance of the clean-energy sectors means that they are also claiming a rising share of China’s economy overall, as shown in the figure below.

This share has risen from 7.3% of China’s GDP in 2022 to 11.4% in 2025.

Without clean-energy sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy thus made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

The table below includes a detailed breakdown by sector and activity.

EVs and batteries were the largest drivers of GDP growth

In 2024, EVs and solar had been the largest growth drivers. In 2025, it was EVs and batteries, which delivered 44% of the economic impact and more than half of the growth of the clean-energy industries. This was due to strong growth in both output and investment.

The contribution to nominal GDP growth – unadjusted for inflation – was even larger, as EV prices held up year-on-year while the economy as a whole suffered from deflation. Investment in battery manufacturing rebounded after a fall in 2024.

The major contribution of EVs and batteries is illustrated in the figure below, which shows both the overall size of the clean-energy economy and the sectors that added the most to the rise from year to year.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Within the electricity sector, the largest drivers were growth in investment in wind and solar power generation capacity, along with growth in power output from solar and wind, followed by the exports of solar-power equipment and materials.

Investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year. This was in line with the government’s efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition in the sector.

Finally, rail transportation was responsible for 12% of the total economic output of the clean-energy sectors, but saw relatively muted growth year-on-year, with revenue up 3% and investment by 6%.

Note that the International Energy Agency (IEA) world energy investment report projected that China invested $627bn in clean energy in 2025, against $257bn in fossil fuels.

For the same sectors as the IEA report, this analysis puts the value of clean-energy investment in 2025 at a significantly more conservative $430bn. The higher figures in this analysis overall are therefore the result of wider sectoral coverage.

Electric vehicles and batteries

EVs and vehicle batteries were again the largest contributors to China’s clean-energy economy in 2025, making up an estimated 44% of value overall.

Of this total, the largest share of both total value and growth came from the production of battery EVs and plug-in hybrids, which expanded 29% year-on-year. This was followed by investment into EV manufacturing, which grew 18%, after slower growth rates in 2024.

Investment in battery manufacturing also rebounded after a drop in 2024, driven by new battery technology and strong demand from both domestic and international markets. Battery manufacturing investment grew by 35% year-on-year to 277bn yuan.

The share of electric vehicles (EVs) will have reached 12% of all vehicles on the road by the end of 2025, up from 9% a year earlier and less than 2% just five years ago.

The share of EVs in the sales of all new vehicles increased to 48%, from 41% in 2024, with passenger cars crossing the 50% threshold. In November, EV sales crossed the 60% mark in total sales and they continue to drive overall automotive sales growth, as shown below.

Electric trucks experienced a breakthrough as their market share rose from 8% in the first nine months of 2024 to 23% in the same period in 2025.

Policy support for EVs continues, for example, with a new policy aiming to nearly double charging infrastructure in the next three years.

Exports grew even faster than the domestic market, but the vast majority of EVs continue to be sold domestically. In 2025, China produced 16.6m EVs, rising 29% year-on-year. While exports accounted for only 21% or 3.4m EVs, they grew by 86% year-on-year. Top export destinations for Chinese EVs were western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

The value of batteries exported also grew rapidly by 41% year-on-year, becoming the third largest growth driver of the GDP. Battery exports largely went to western Europe, north America and south-east Asia.

In contrast with deflationary trends in the price of many clean-energy technologies, average EV prices have held up in 2025, with a slight increase in average price of new models, after discounts. This also means that the contribution of the EV industry to nominal GDP growth was even more significant, given that overall producer prices across the economy fell by 2.6%. Battery prices continued to drop.

Clean-power generation

The solar power sector generated 19% of the total value of the clean-energy industries in 2025, adding 2.9tn yuan ($41bn) to the national economy.

Within this, investment in new solar power plants, at 1.2tn yuan ($160bn), was the largest driver, followed by the value of solar technology exports and by the value of the power generated from solar. Investment in manufacturing continued to fall after the wave of capacity additions in 2023, reaching 0.5tn yuan ($72bn), down 23% year-on-year.

In 2025, China achieved another new record of wind and solar capacity additions. The country installed a total of 315GW solar and 119GW wind capacity, adding more solar and two times as much wind as the rest of the world combined.

Clean energy accounted for 90% of investment in power generation, with solar alone covering 50% of that. As a result, non-fossil power made up 42% of total power generation, up from 39% in 2024.

However, a new pricing policy for new solar and wind projects and modest targets for capacity growth have created uncertainty about whether the boom will continue.

Under the new policy, new clean-power generation has to compete on price against existing coal power in markets that place it at a disadvantage in some key ways.

At the same time, the electricity markets themselves are still being introduced and developed, creating investment uncertainty.

Investment in solar power generation increased year-on-year by 15%, but experienced a strong stop-and-go cycle. Developers rushed to finish projects ahead of the new pricing policy coming into force in June and then again towards the end of the year to finalise projects ahead of the end of the current 14th five-year plan.

Investment in the solar sector as a whole was stable year-on-year, with the decline in manufacturing capacity investment balanced by continued growth in power generation capacity additions. This helped shore up the utilisation of manufacturing plants, in line with the government’s aim to reduce “disorderly” price competition.

By late 2025, China’s solar manufacturing capacity reached an estimated 1,200GW per year, well ahead of the global capacity additions of around 650GW in 2025. Manufacturers can now produce far more solar panels than the global market can absorb, with fierce competition leading to historically low profitability.

China’s policymakers have sought to address the issue since mid-2024, warning against “involution”, passing regulations and convening a sector-wide meeting to put pressure on the industry. This is starting to yield results, with losses narrowing in the third quarter of 2025.

The volume of exports of solar panels and components reached a record high in 2025, growing 19% year-on-year. In particular, exports of cells and wafers increased rapidly by 94% and 52%, while panel exports grew only by 4%.

This reflects the growing diversification of solar-supply chains in the face of tariffs and with more countries around the world building out solar panel manufacturing capacity. The nominal value of exports fell 8%, however, due to a fall in average prices and a shift to exporting upstream intermediate products instead of finished panels.

Hydropower, wind and nuclear were responsible for 15% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2025, adding some 2.2tn yuan ($310bn) to China’s GDP in 2025.

Nearly two-thirds of this (1.3tn yuan, $180bn) came from the value of power generation from hydropower, wind and nuclear, with investment in new power generation projects contributing the rest.

Power generation grew 33% from solar, 13% from wind, 3% from hydropower and 8% from nuclear.

Within power generation investment, solar remained the largest segment by value – as shown in the figure below – but wind-power generation projects were the largest contributor to growth, overtaking solar for the first time since 2020.

In particular, offshore wind power capacity investment rebounded as expected, doubling in 2025 after a sharp drop in 2024.

Investment in nuclear projects continued to grow but remains smaller in total terms, at 17bn yuan. Investment in conventional hydropower continued to decline by 7%.

Electricity storage and grids

Electricity transmission and storage were responsible for 6% of the total value of the clean-energy sectors in 2025, accounting for 1.0 tn yuan ($140bn).

The most valuable sub-segment was investment in power grids, growing 6% in 2025 and reaching $90bn. This was followed by investment in energy storage, including pumped hydropower, grid-connected battery storage and hydrogen production.

Investment in grid-connected batteries saw the largest year-on-year growth, increasing by 50%, while investments in electrolysers also grew by 30%. The transmission of clean power increased an estimated 13%, due to rapid growth in clean-power generation.

China’s total electricity storage capacity reached more than 213GW, with battery storage capacity crossing 145GW and pumped hydro storage at 69GW. Some 66GW of battery storage capacity was added in 2025, up 52% year-on-year and accounting for more than 40% of global capacity additions.

Notably, capacity additions accelerated in the second half of the year, with 43GW added, compared with the first half, which saw 23GW of new capacity.

The battery storage market initially slowed after the renewable power pricing policy, which banned storage mandates after May, but this was quickly replaced by a “market-driven boom”. Provincial electricity spot markets, time-of-day tariffs and increasing curtailment of solar power all improved the economics of adding storage.

By the end of 2025, China’s top five solar manufacturers had all entered the battery storage market, making a shift in industry strategy.

Investment in pumped hydropower continued to increase, with 15GW of new capacity permitted in the first half of 2025 alone and 3GW entering operation.

Railways

Rail transportation made up 12% of the GDP contribution of the clean-energy sectors, with revenue from passenger and goods rail transportation the largest source of value. Most growth came from investment in rail infrastructure, which increased 6% year-on-year

The electrification of transport is not limited to EVs, as rail passenger, freight and investment volumes saw continued growth. The total length of China’s high-speed railway network reached 50,000km in 2025, making up more than 70% of the global high-speed total.

Energy efficiency

Investment in energy efficiency rebounded strongly in 2025. Measured by the aggregate turnover of large energy service companies (ESCOs), the market expanded by 17% year-on-year, returning to growth rates last seen during 2016-2020.

Total industry turnover has also recovered to its previous peak in 2021, signalling a clear turnaround after three years of weakness.

Industry projections now anticipate annual turnover reaching 1tn yuan in annual turnover by 2030, a target that had previously been expected to be met by 2025.

China’s ESCO market has evolved into the world’s largest. Investment within China’s ESCO market remains heavily concentrated in the buildings sector, which accounts for around 50% of total activity. Industrial applications make up a further 21%, while energy supply, demand-side flexibility and energy storage together account for approximately 16%.

Implications of China’s clean-energy bet

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars into clean-energy manufacturing represents a gigantic economic and financial bet on a continuing global energy transition.

In addition to the domestic investment covered in this article, Chinese firms are making major investments in overseas manufacturing.

The clean-energy industries have played a crucial role in meeting China’s economic targets during the five-year period ending this year, delivering an estimated 40%, 25% and 37% of all GDP growth in 2023, 2024 and 2025, respectively.

However, the developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar power generation, with the new pricing system for renewable power generation leading to a short-term slowdown and creating major uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year, while investment in generation clocked growth for the full year, showing the risk to the industries under the current power market set-ups that favour coal-fired power.

The reduction in the prices of clean-energy technology has been so dramatic that when the prices for GDP statistics are updated, the sectors’ contribution to real GDP – adjusted for inflation or, in this case deflation – will be revised down.

Nevertheless, the key economic role of the industry creates a strong motivation to keep the clean-energy boom going. A slowdown in the domestic market could also undermine efforts to stem overcapacity and inflame trade tensions by increasing pressure on exports to absorb supply.

A recent CREA survey of experts working on climate and energy issues in China found that the majority believe that economic and geopolitical challenges will make the “dual carbon” goals – and with that, clean-energy industries – only more important.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector. Their previous five-year plans played a key role in creating the gigantic wind and solar power “bases” that substantially exceeded the central government’s level of ambition.

Provincial governments also have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will therefore be of major importance.

About the data

Reported investment expenditure and sales revenue has been used where available. When this is not available, estimates are based on physical volumes – gigawatts of capacity installed, number of vehicles sold – and unit costs or prices.

The contribution to real growth is tracked by adjusting for inflation using 2022-2023 prices.

All calculations and data sources are given in a worksheet.

Estimates include the contribution of clean-energy technologies to the demand for upstream inputs such as metals and chemicals.

This approach shows the contribution of the clean-energy sectors to driving economic activity, also outside the sectors themselves, and is appropriate for estimating how much lower economic growth would have been without growth in these sectors.

Double counting is avoided by only including non-overlapping points in value chains. For example, the value of EV production and investment in battery storage of electricity is included, but not the value of battery production for the domestic market, which is predominantly an input to these activities.

Similarly, the value of solar panels produced for the domestic market is not included, as it makes up a part of the value of solar power generating capacity installed in China. However, the value of solar panel and battery exports is included.

In 2025, there was a major divergence between two different measures of investment. The first, fixed asset investment, reportedly fell by 3.8%, the first drop in 35 years. In contrast, gross capital formation saw the slowest growth in that period but still inched up by 2%.

This analysis uses gross capital formation as the measure of investment, as it is the data point used for GDP accounting. However, the analysis is unable to account for changes in inventories, so the estimate of clean-energy investment is for fixed asset investment in the sectors.

The analysis does not explicitly account for the small and declining role of imports in producing clean-energy goods and services. This means that the results slightly overstate the contribution to GDP but understate the contribution to growth.

For example, one of the most important import dependencies that China has is for advanced computing chips for EVs. The value of the chips in a typical EV is $1,000 and China’s import dependency for these chips is 90%, which suggests that imported chips represent less than 3% of the value of EV production.

The estimates are likely to be conservative in some key respects. For example, Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates “investment in the energy transition” in China in 2024 at $800bn. This estimate covers a nearly identical list of sectors to ours, but excludes manufacturing – the comparable number from our data is $600bn.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics says that the total value generated by automobile production and sales in 2023 was 11tn yuan. The estimate in this analysis for the value of EV sales in 2023 is 2.3tn yuan, or 20% of the total value of the industry, when EVs already made up 31% of vehicle production and the average selling prices for EVs was slightly higher than for internal combustion engine vehicles.

分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一

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The post Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025

2025年，太阳能、电动汽车及其他清洁能源技术对中国经济增长的贡献已超过三分之一，并拉动超过九成的投资增长。

中国清洁能源行业产值在2025年达到创纪录的15.4万亿元人民币（约合2.1万亿美元），约占国内生产总值（GDP）的11.4%，该数字相当于巴西或加拿大的经济规模。

Carbon Brief基于官方数字、行业数据及分析师报告进行的最新分析显示，2022年至2025年间，中国清洁能源行业的实际规模几乎翻了一番；若将其视为一个独立经济体，其规模可位列全球第八。

该分析的其他主要成果包括：

• 清洁能源行业支撑中国实现了“5%左右”的GDP增长目标，若排除清洁能源行业，2025年GDP实际增速仅为3.5%。
• 清洁能源产业的扩张速度持续快于整体经济，其年增长率从2024年的12%提升至2025年的18%。
• 电动汽车、电池和光伏“新三样”仍是中国清洁能源经济贡献的核心，创造了约三分之二的增加值，并吸纳了一半以上的行业投资。
• 2025年，中国在清洁能源领域的投资达7.2万亿元人民币（约1万亿美元），约为同期化石燃料开采与煤电投资（2600亿美元）的四倍。
• 尽管2025年清洁能源技术出口保持了快速增长，但对中国企业而言，国内市场在价值规模上仍显著大于出口市场。

这些投向清洁能源制造业的资金，代表着对中国乃至全球能源转型的重大押注，也为政府和企业保持这一发展势头提供了动力。

然而，未来的长期走势仍然存在不确定性，尤其是在太阳能领域。受136号文件下的新定价机制影响，太阳能发电装机增速已有所放缓，而中央政府设定的相关目标也明显低于近几年的实际扩张水平。

如果放缓趋势持续下去，这些产业或将从经济增长的驱动力转变为拖累因素，同时加剧工业领域的“产能过剩”问题，并进一步恶化国际贸易摩擦。

但即便中央政府对清洁能源未来五年的目标设定较为谨慎，地方政府和国有企业的规划与投资力度，仍有可能推动清洁能源产业继续实现显著增长。

本文在此前对2023年和2024年清洁能源经济贡献分析的基础上进行了更新。

清洁能源行业表现优于整体经济

中国的清洁能源经济持续高速增长，远超整体经济增速。这意味着它对年度经济增长的贡献尤为显著。

下图显示，2025年，清洁能源技术贡献了中国超过三分之一的GDP增量，并推动了超过90%的新增投资增长。

2022年，中国清洁能源经济规模约为8.4万亿元人民币（1.2万亿美元）。到2025年，这一规模几乎翻了一番，达到15.4万亿元人民币（2.1万亿美元）。

这一体量相当于巴西或加拿大的经济总量，使中国的清洁能源产业堪比全球第八大经济体，产值约为世界第四大经济体印度经济总量的一般，也大致相当于美国加利福尼亚州经济规模的一半。

由于清洁能源产业持续跑赢整体经济，其在中国经济中的占比也在不断上升，从2022年占中国GDP的7.3%上升至2025年的11.4%。

如果没有清洁能源行业，中国2025年的GDP增速将仅为3.5%，因此，在经济稳定增长为中国首要目标之一的2025年，清洁能源做出了至关重要的贡献。

下表按行业和活动进行了详细分类。

电动汽车和电池是GDP增长的最大驱动力

2024年，电动汽车和太阳能是最大的增长驱动力。而到了2025年，电动汽车和电池则占据了主导地位，合计贡献了44%的经济效益，以及清洁能源行业一半以上的增长。这主要得益于产出和投资的同步强劲增长。

在未剔除通胀因素的名义GDP口径下，电动汽车的贡献甚至更为突出。这是因为电动汽车价格同比保持相对稳定，而整体经济仍处于通缩环境中。同时，电池制造投资在2024年下滑后于2025年出现反弹。

下图展示了电动汽车和电池的主要贡献，既反映了清洁能源经济的整体规模，也显示了各子行业对年度增量的具体贡献情况。

第二大子行业是清洁能源发电、输电和储能，在2025年占清洁能源对GDP贡献的40%，并贡献了清洁能源产业当年约30%的增长。

在电力领域内部，最主要的增长动力来自风电和太阳能发电装机投资的扩大，以及风电和太阳能发电量的增长；其次是太阳能设备及材料的出口。

作为2022–2023年的重要增长引擎，太阳能组件产业链投资在2025年连续第二年下降，这与政府遏制产能过剩和行业“非理性”价格竞争的政策导向一致。

此外，铁路运输约占清洁能源行业总经济产出的12%，但其同比增长相对温和，2025年其营业收入增长3%，投资增长6%。

需要指出的是，国际能源署（IEA）在其《世界能源投资报告》中估计，中国2025年清洁能源投资为 6270亿美元，而化石能源投资为 2570亿美元。

在采用与IEA一致的行业口径进行测算时，本研究对2025年中国清洁能源投资的估计为 4300亿美元，低于IEA的数值。而本文中所呈现的1万亿美元清洁能源投资总规模，并非源于更激进的单项假设，而是由于纳入了更为广泛的产业和活动范围，超出了IEA报告所覆盖的口径。

电动汽车和电池

2025年，电动汽车与动力电池成为中国清洁能源经济中最大的贡献部分，约占清洁能源行业总值的44%。

其中，纯电动汽车和插电式混合动力汽车的生产在价值规模和当年增长贡献两方面均居首位，产量同比增长29%。排在其后的是电动汽车制造领域的投资，在2024年增速放缓后，2025年投资规模同比增长 18%

电池制造投资在2024年出现下滑后也迎来反弹，这主要得益于电池新技术的涌现以及国内外市场的强劲需求。电池制造投资同比增长35%，达到2770亿元人民币。

到2025年底，电动汽车在全国汽车保有量中的占比预计达到12%，高于一年前的 9%，而在五年前这一比例还不足 2%。

在新车销售中，电动汽车占比进一步提升至 48%，高于2024年的 41%，其中乘用车电动汽车渗透率已突破50%。2025年11月，电动汽车在当月汽车总销量中的占比更是首次突破 60%，并持续成为拉动整体汽车销量增长的主要动力，如下图所示。

电动卡车市场取得突破性进展，其市场份额从2024年前九个月的8%，增长至2025年同期的23%。

政府对电动汽车的政策支持仍在持续，例如，一项最新政策提出，未来三年内充电基础设施规模将接近翻倍，以支撑电动汽车进一步普及。

在电动汽车市场中，出口增速快于国内销售增速，但整体销售仍以国内市场为主。2025年，中国电动汽车产量达到 1660万辆，同比增长 29%。其中，出口约340万辆，占总产量的 21%，但同比增速高达 86%。中国电动汽车的主要出口目的地包括西欧、中东和拉丁美洲。

电池出口额同样实现快速增长，同比上升 41%，成为推动GDP增长的第三大动力来源。电池出口主要流向西欧、北美和东南亚市场。

与许多清洁能源技术价格呈现的通缩趋势不同，2025年电动汽车的平均售价保持稳定，新车型在折扣后的平均加个甚至略有上涨。在全社会工业品出厂价格同比下降 2.6% 的背景下，这意味着电动汽车产业对名义GDP增长的贡献尤为突出。相比之下，电池价格仍延续下降趋势。

清洁能源发电

2025年，太阳能发电行业贡献了清洁能源产业总值的19%，为国民经济创造2.9万亿元人民币（约合410亿美元）的价值。

其中，新建太阳能发电厂的投资额达1.2万亿元人民币（约合1600亿美元），是清洁能源发电板块最大的驱动力；其次是太阳能技术出口额和太阳能发电本身创造的电力价值。太阳能制造业投资在2023年产能扩张浪潮结束之后持续下降，至0.5万亿元人民币（约合720亿美元），同比下降23%。

2025年，中国风电和太阳能发电新增装机容量再创新高。全国新增太阳能发电装机315吉瓦，新增风电装机119吉瓦，其中太阳能发电装机容量比全球其他地区总和还要多，而风电装机容量更是后者两倍之多。

在电力投资结构中，清洁能源占发电领域投资的90%，其中光伏一项就占到约50%。在此推动下，非化石能源发电量占全国总发电量的比重提升至42%，高于2024年的 39%。

不过，新出台的新能源定价政策以及相对谨慎的装机目标，也为这一轮增长能否持续带来了不确定性。在136号文件新政策框架下，新建风电和太阳能发电项目需要在电力市场中与既有煤电直接进行价格竞争，而在若干关键制度设计上仍处于相对不利的位置。

与此同时，电力市场本身仍处于建设和发展阶段，这也带来了投资的不确定性。

太阳能发电投资同比增长6%，但期间波动剧烈。开发商赶在新定价政策于6月生效前加速完成项目，第三季度放缓后，在年底再次赶工，以赶在“十四五”规划期内达成目标。

总体来看，太阳能产业整体投资规模与上一年大致持平：制造环节投资下降，被发电侧的增长所抵消。这在一定程度上支撑了制造产能利用率，也符合政府遏制行业“无序竞争”和价格内卷的政策目标。

2025年底，中国太阳能制造产能预计已达到每年1200吉瓦，远超2025年全球新增装机容量约650吉瓦的水平。目前，中国太阳能产业制造能力已显著超过全球市场吸收能力，激烈竞争导致行业盈利水平处于历史低位。

自2024年中期以来，中国的政策制定者已开始正面应对这一问题，包括警示“内卷式竞争”、出台监管措施，并召开行业会议向企业施压。相关举措已初见成效，2025年第三季度行业亏损有所收窄。

2025年，太阳能电池板及组件出口量再创历史新高，同比增长19%。其中，电池片和硅片出口量分别快速增长94%和52%，而电池板出口量仅增长4%。

这反映出，在关税压力上升、更多国家加快本土制造布局的背景下，全球太阳能供应链正日益趋向多元化。然而，由于平均出口价格下跌，以及出口产品结构从成品电池板向上游中间产品转移，出口名义价值反而同比下降了8%。

2025年，水能、风能和核能合计贡献了清洁能源行业总产值的约15%，为中国GDP带来约2.2万亿元人民币（3100亿美元）的增加值。

其中近三分之二（1.3万亿元人民币，1800亿美元）来自水电、风电和核电的发电价值，其余部分则来自新建发电项目的投资。

从发电量增速来看，2025年太阳能发电量增长33%，风电增长13%，水电增长3%，核电增长8%。

在发电投资领域，太阳能仍是价值规模最大的板块（如下图所示），但风电项目在2025年首次成为投资增长的最大贡献者，这是自2020年以来风电投资首次在增量上超过太阳能。

特别是海上风电装机投资如预期般反弹，在2024年大幅下降后，2025年实现翻倍增长，成为清洁电力投资中的一个亮点。

核电项目投资持续增长，但总体规模仍然较小，2025年投资额约为170亿元人民币。常规水电投资则延续下行趋势，同比下降7%。

储能和电网

2025年，输电和储能占清洁能源行业总产值的6%，规模达到1万亿元人民币（1400亿美元）。

其中，电网投资2025年增长了约6%，达到900亿美元。储能投资（涵盖抽水蓄能、新型储能和氢气制备）2025年达到约500亿美元。

新型储能投资同比增长幅度达50%，电解槽投资也增长了30%。受清洁能源发电快速增长推动，清洁能源输送规模预计增长13%。

中国电力储能总装机容量超过213吉瓦，其中新型储能容量超过145吉瓦，抽水蓄能容量为69吉瓦。预计2025年中国新增约66吉瓦新型储能装机容量，同比增长52%，占全球新增装机容量的40%以上。

值得注意的是，下半年新型储能装机增速加快，达43吉瓦，而上半年新增装机容量为23吉瓦。

在政策层面，136号文件规定在5月后取消了新能源配套储能的强制要求，曾一度导致新型储能市场增速放缓，但这一影响很快被“市场驱动型增长”所取代。省级电力现货市场的推进、分时电价机制以及太阳能弃光率上升，共同改善了储能项目的经济性。

到2025年底，中国前五大太阳能制造商均进入了新型储能市场，标志着行业战略的重要转变。

与此同时，抽水蓄能投资保持增长，仅2025年上半年，就有15吉瓦的项目获批，新增3吉瓦抽水蓄能投入运营。

铁路

铁路运输占清洁能源行业GDP的12%，其中客货运输收入是最主要的价值来源。行业增长主要来自铁路基础设施投资，2025年同比增长6%。

交通电气化不仅限于电动汽车，铁路客运、货运及相关投资规模也持续增长。2025年，中国高铁总里程约达5万公里，占全球高速铁路总里程的70%以上。

节能服务

2025年，节能服务投资强劲反弹。以大型节能服务公司（ESCO）的产值衡量，市场规模同比增长17%，恢复至2016-2020年期间的增长水平。

行业产值也已恢复到2021年的峰值水平，这表明在经历三年低迷后，行业已明显回暖。

行业预测显示，节能服务行业年产值有望在2030年达到1万亿元人民币，而行业经历低迷前曾预期这一目标将在2025年实现。

中国已发展成为全球最大的节能服务公司市场。其投资高度集中于建筑领域，约占业务总量的50%；工业应用占21%，而能源供应、需求侧灵活性与储能相关业务合计约占16%。

中国清洁能源布局的影响

中国持续向清洁能源制造业投入数千亿美元，代表着对全球能源持续转型的一项规模巨大的经济与金融押注。

除本文所涵盖的国内投资外，中国企业还在海外制造业领域展开了大规模投资布局，进一步加深了这一押注的全球化属性。

在十四五规划期间，清洁能源产业对中国实现经济增长目标起到了关键作用，在2023年、2024年和2025年分别贡献了约40%、25%和37%的GDP增长。

然而，长期的发展前景仍存在不确定性，尤其是在太阳能发电领域。136文件下新的可再生能源发电定价机制已导致短期投资增速放缓，并显著增加了市场不确定性；与此同时，中央政府设定的清洁电力新增装机目标也相对保守，远低于当前实际增长水平。

2025年下半年，太阳能发电和光伏制造领域的投资均出现下降，尽管从全年来看，发电投资保持了增长。这反映出在当前电力市场制度仍偏向煤电的框架下，清洁能源产业面临结构性风险。

清洁能源技术价格下降幅度显著，以致在未来核算GDP时，这些行业对实际GDP（经通胀或通缩调整后的GDP）的贡献可能会被向下修正。

尽管如此，清洁能源产业在宏观经济中的关键地位，本身就构成了维持这一轮清洁能源发展势头的强烈政策和经济动机。如果国内市场增长出现明显放缓，不仅可能削弱遏制产能过剩的努力，或将迫使更多产能转向出口，从而加剧国际贸易摩擦。

能源与清洁空气研究中心近期针对中国气候与能源领域专家开展的一项调查显示，多数专家认为，在经济和地缘政治挑战加剧的背景下，“双碳目标”及其所依托的清洁能源产业，只会变得更加重要。

地方政府和国企同样将深刻影响该行业的发展前景。在十四五期间，正是地方政府和国企的积极推进，促成了规模空前、且显著超出预期的“风光大基地”建设。

同时，各省在落实新电力市场机制和可再生能源购电合同安排方面拥有较大的自主空间，因此，将于今年发布的十五五规划，将成为决定清洁能源产业中长期走势的关键。

关于数据

本文分析尽可能采用已公布的投资与销售数据。若数据不可得，则依据实际数量（如装机容量、汽车销量等）结合单位成本或价格进行估算。

为衡量实际增长贡献，相关数据已按2022-2023年价格进行通胀或通缩调整。全部计算过程与数据来源详见附表。

估算范围涵盖清洁能源技术对上游原材料（如金属、化学品）的需求贡献。

该方法不仅能够反映清洁能源行业对整体经济活动的拉动作用，也能提现其对相关产业活动的带动作用，因此可适用于估算：若该行业未曾增长，经济增速可能降低多少。

为避免重复计算，仅计入价值链中不重叠的环节。例如，电动汽车的生产产值与储能电池的投资额均予计入，但不包含作为上述活动中间投入的、面向国内市场的电池生产价值。

同理，国内市场的太阳能电池板产值已包含在中国光伏发电装机容量的价值中，故不重复统计；然而，太阳能电池板及电池的出口价值则纳入计算。

2025年，两项关键投资指标出现明显背离：据报道，固定资产投资下降3.8%，为35年来首次下滑；而同期资本形成总额虽增速放缓至近年最低，但仍保持2%的正增长。

本研究采用资本形成总额作为投资衡量指标，因其是GDP的组成部分。但由于无法全面追踪库存变动，对清洁能源投资的估算仍基于各行业的固定资产投资数据。

本分析未专门考虑进口因素——其在清洁能源产品与服务生产中所占比例较小且持续下降。这意味着结果可能略微高估对GDP的贡献，但同时低估了对GDP增量的贡献。

例如，中国在电动汽车中对高端计算芯片仍存在较高的进口依赖。一辆典型电动汽车的芯片价值约1000美元，而该类芯片的进口依赖度高达90%，但这仍进展整车生产价值的3%以内。

在某些方面，本研究的估算可能相对保守。例如，彭博新能源财经（BNEF）估计2024年中国“能源转型投资”规模约为8000亿美元。彭博估算的行业覆盖范围与本分析大致相当，但未包含制造业产值。在相同口径下，本研究对应的投资规模约为6000亿美元。

根据中国国家统计局数据，2023年全国汽车产业总产值与销售额合计约11万亿元人民币。本分析估算，同年电动汽车销售额约为2.3万亿元，约占行业总值的20%。当时，电动汽车产量已占汽车总产量的31%，且其平均售价略高于传统燃油汽车。

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The post 分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

分析：清洁能源2025年为中国GDP增长贡献超过三分之一