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Issues Facing US Lithium Projects and Battery Supply Chain Plans Amidst Price Decline

Financing for lithium projects in the United States is facing challenges due to sustained low lithium prices, posing a threat to the development pipeline and potentially hindering President Joe Biden’s ambition to bolster the domestic battery supply chain.

According to the S&P Global Market Intelligence report, there are about 100 lithium mine projects planned across the US. However, the allure of these projects is waning amidst a steep decline in lithium prices. 

US lithium mines and processing facilities

Navigating the Lithium Price Plunge

The sharp price decline has left many investors perplexed, particularly given the projected long-term demand for the mineral. Experts noted that it’s largely attributable to the slowdown in electric vehicle sales growth in China. This is also further compounded by the overall economic slowdown in the Chinese economy.

Market Intelligence data reveals an 81.7% drop in lithium prices from their 2022 peaks. This downturn made many projects less attractive to investors as the prolonged low prices persisted.

Existing US lithium producers, particularly those using brine extraction methods rather than hard rock resources, have managed to weather the price downturn to some extent. 

Current producers have learned to adapt to the changing market conditions. Some employed cost-cutting measures, like what Albemarle did, while others are scaling back on their expansion plans.

However, the impact of the market downturn has been felt more keenly within the pipeline of future lithium output projects.

Additionally, junior companies seeking to develop lithium projects in the US and elsewhere have encountered difficulties securing funding amidst bearish market sentiment due to the price decline.

The financing hurdles confronting US lithium projects underscore the delicate balance between market dynamics and the imperative to strengthen domestic supply chains for critical battery materials. 

Per Market Intelligence data, the price of lithium carbonate ex-works China battery stood at $14,750 per metric ton on March 6, down from its 2022 peak of $79,650/t on Nov. 30. Despite remaining 151.7% higher than the 2020 low of $5,850/t on July 31, current prices are not attractive for launching new projects.

lithium price since 2020 S&P Global

Industry Insights and Uncertainties

The impact of low commodity prices on US lithium projects is significant in project development, particularly among smaller operators. These companies are finding it increasingly difficult to access funding due to concerns over returns.

Still, a junior Canadian lithium company, Li-FT Power (LIFT: LIFFF), remains committed to advancing the exploration and development of high-quality lithium assets in the country. It consolidates and advances hard rock lithium pegmatite projects in known lithium districts in Canada. 

Keith Phillips, the CEO of Piedmont Lithium based in North Carolina, shared insights on lithium mining, describing it as a cyclical industry prone to fluctuations. In an interview, Phillips remarked on the significant downturn in lithium prices, saying:

“With lithium prices down by 90% from a peak 16 months ago, just about every new development project is slowing down, which will lead to another supply crunch.”

The uncertainty surrounding demand poses a significant challenge for the lithium industry. While increased demand for reliable lithium, spurred by the US Inflation Reduction Act, could provide some relief to the industry, there are concerns about the limited progress in the project development due to low prices. 

This issue could potentially undermine the Biden administration’s objectives of reshoring critical supply chains. The IRA’s incentives should be able to adequately address this with proper incentives to promote domestic mining. 

The Role of IRA and Investments

The law’s incentives have attracted massive investment into the US battery supply chain, which was largely underdeveloped before the bill’s passage. Electric vehicles (EVs) that meet specific requirements related to final assembly, critical mineral sourcing, and battery material processing may qualify for a $7,500 tax credit under the IRA.

The rule has led to a notable increase in investments in domestic critical mineral projects by both miners and automakers. For instance, Piedmont Lithium Inc., a US-based lithium producer, was motivated to establish a lithium processing plant in Tennessee. Moreover, its lithium project in North Carolina is also expected to start this year. 

Ford Motor has planned to allocate $3.5 billion to construct a battery plant in Michigan, citing the IRA as a significant factor influencing this decision. Ford has also entered into supply agreements with several lithium companies in countries with free trade agreements with the US. 

This strategic move enables the automaker to incorporate materials from these countries into its vehicle batteries while still qualifying for tax credits under the IRA. Similarly, Tesla Inc., the EV giant, has established supply agreements with multiple miners, including Piedmont and Albemarle. 

Below is the investments to EV supply chain since the IRA has been enacted.

EV supply chain investments since IRA passage

While there’s a strong demand for IRA-compliant material, the supply remains insufficient, according to Benchmark’s Williams. Albemarle CEO Kent Masters echoed this sentiment by expressing doubts about the effectiveness of the IRA in stimulating necessary investments. 

Masters emphasized that the law has not yet succeeded in bridging the pricing gap between China and North America. It means that further measures may be necessary to incentivize investment in domestic lithium production.

Challenges in the US lithium project pipeline amid price declines highlight the balance between market forces and policy incentives. Despite efforts like the Inflation Reduction Act, uncertainties linger. Addressing these challenges is vital for US competitiveness in the global energy transition.

The post Issues Facing US Lithium Projects and Battery Supply Chain Plans Amidst Price Decline appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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