Tesla may be getting ready for one of the biggest solar manufacturing moves in America. Reuters reports that the company is looking at buying about $2.9 billion worth of equipment from Chinese suppliers to make solar cells and solar panels in the United States.
If the plan moves forward, it could help Tesla build up to 100 gigawatts of solar manufacturing capacity on American soil by the end of 2028. That is a huge number. It also shows how serious Elon Musk may be about turning solar into a much bigger part of Tesla’s future.
But the report also reveals a bigger problem for the U.S. clean energy sector. Even when companies want to manufacture in America, they still often depend on Chinese tools, machinery, and supply chains to make it happen.
Tesla’s Solar Dream Is Getting Bigger
According to Reuters, Tesla is in talks with several Chinese companies that make solar manufacturing equipment. Suzhou Maxwell Technologies is one of the main names in the discussion. The company is known as the world’s biggest maker of screen-printing equipment used in solar cell production.
Other possible suppliers include Shenzhen S.C New Energy Technology and Laplace Renewable Energy Technology, Reuters said, citing people familiar with the matter.
Some of the equipment may need export approval from China’s commerce ministry before it can be shipped. Reuters reported that the companies were asked to deliver the machinery before autumn, and two sources said the equipment would likely head to Texas.
These details suggest Tesla’s plan is not just an idea or a long-term goal. The company seems to be preparing for a major manufacturing buildout in the U.S. However, the company has not publicly confirmed the reported order. The Chinese suppliers and China’s commerce ministry also did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment, according to the report.
In January, Musk said solar power could meet all of America’s electricity needs, including rising demand from data centers. Reuters also noted that Tesla job postings said the company wants to deploy 100 GW of “solar manufacturing from raw materials on American soil before the end of 2028.”
The Cost Gap Keeps China in Charge of Solar Supply Chains
After years of heavy investment, China controls most of the world’s solar manufacturing chain. According to Wood Mackenzie, China is expected to hold more than 80% of global polysilicon, wafer, cell, and module manufacturing capacity from 2023 to 2026.
Wood Mac also said a solar module made in China is about 50% cheaper than one made in Europe and 65% cheaper than one made in the United States. That price gap makes it hard for U.S. factories to compete, especially in the early stages.
So even when U.S. companies want to build locally, they still often need Chinese equipment and expertise. Reuters pointed out that the Biden administration excluded solar manufacturing equipment from tariffs in 2024 after U.S. solar companies said they had no real alternative source for the machines needed to launch domestic factories. That exemption has since been extended by the Trump administration.
In other words, America’s solar manufacturing push still depends, at least in part, on Chinese technology.
- READ MORE: Two Solar Stories, Two Different Directions: Why China Builds Faster as the U.S. Hits Pause
Why Tesla May Be Making This Move Now
Tesla’s reported plan is about much more than one company. It highlights a major challenge for the United States as it tries to build a stronger clean energy economy.
U.S. electricity demand is rising again, and solar is growing fast. The Energy Information Administration said U.S. power use hit its second straight record high in 2025. It also expects demand to keep rising in 2026 and 2027.
At the same time, solar is becoming one of the country’s fastest-growing power sources. In its latest outlook, the EIA said utility-scale solar generation in the U.S. is expected to grow from 290 billion kilowatt-hours in 2025 to 424 billion kilowatt-hours by 2027.
The EIA also said nearly 70 GW of new solar capacity is scheduled to come online in 2026 and 2027. That would increase U.S. solar operating capacity by 49% compared with the end of 2025.
Texas Solar Capacity Supports Tesla and SpaceX
Texas is expected to lead much of that growth. Solar generation in the ERCOT grid is forecast to rise from 56 billion kilowatt-hours in 2025 to 106 billion kilowatt-hours by 2027. Battery storage is also growing to help balance solar power throughout the day.
This helps explain why Texas is such an important part of Tesla’s reported plan. The state already plays a big role in Tesla’s manufacturing footprint. It is also one of the hottest solar markets in the country.
For Tesla, building solar equipment or solar products in Texas could support more than just the grid. Reuters said Musk plans to use much of the capacity for Tesla itself, while some could also help power SpaceX satellites.
That would turn solar into a strategic asset across Musk’s wider business empire. It would also tie clean power more closely to Tesla’s long-term growth story, especially as energy demand from artificial intelligence and data infrastructure keeps rising across the country.
Snapshot of US Solar Imports
Even with more local manufacturing, the U.S. solar market still depends heavily on imported parts. Solar Power World reviewed U.S. International Trade Commission data and found that the United States imported 33 GW of silicon solar panels in 2025. It also imported 21 GW of silicon solar cells.
That cell figure is especially important because it shows that U.S. panel assembly is growing faster than domestic cell production. America may be building more panels at home, but it still imports many of the core components needed to make them.
The report said the U.S. has around 50 GW of silicon panel assembly capacity, but less than 5 GW of domestic cell manufacturing output. That means plenty of cells still have to be imported. Notably, most imported cells came from Indonesia and Laos in 2025, while South Korea was also a major supplier.
This is where Tesla could make a difference. If it builds large-scale solar cell and panel manufacturing in the U.S., it could help close one of the biggest gaps in the domestic solar supply chain.
Still, there is an irony here. To reduce America’s dependence on foreign solar products, Tesla may first need to buy Chinese machines.
A Massive Opportunity, But Also a Huge Challenge
If the deal happens, it would be a major win for Chinese solar equipment companies. Many of them have faced weak domestic demand because China has already built too much manufacturing capacity.
For Tesla, the order could lay the foundation for a giant U.S. solar platform. It could support the company’s long-term energy strategy at a time when America needs more electricity, more solar, and more battery storage.
But the challenge is enormous.
Building 100 GW of solar manufacturing capacity in just a few years would be a staggering task. Tesla would need factories, workers, permits, raw materials, logistics, and smooth equipment delivery. It would also need stable trade rules and a supportive policy environment.
The company has already faced supply chain setbacks before. Reuters previously reported that production preparations for the Cybertruck and Semi in the U.S. were disrupted last year after component shipments from China were suspended following higher tariffs on Chinese goods. This history shows how exposed U.S. manufacturing can still be to trade tensions.
If speculations are true, Musk appears to be thinking far beyond electric vehicles, i.e., building a larger clean energy system around solar, batteries, manufacturing, and power demand from new technologies like AI.
For now, Reuters’ report shows a simple reality. The U.S. wants a homegrown solar industry. Tesla may want to help build one. But China still holds many of the tools needed to make that goal real.
The post Is Tesla Building a 100 GW U.S. Solar Giant With Chinese Equipment? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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