- Formal negotiations
- Finance
- Global review
- Global report
- Digital sequence information
- Harmful subsidies
- Marine biodiversity
- Planning, monitoring, reporting and review
- Article 8(j) implementation
- Biodiversity and climate change
- Links with other bodies
- Around the COP
- Armenian presidency
- Protests
- Lobbying and influence
- Carbon and biodiversity markets
Rachel Santarsiero is the director of the National Security Archive’s Climate Change Transparency Project in Washington, D.C.
The U.S. intelligence apparatus has long monitored how climate change will affect U.S. national security interests in the coming decades.
Relying on a broad consensus of open-source scientific studies, modeling, and forecasts, the spy community has intermittently let the public in on its climate change agenda. In large part, however, its work on climate has been kept secret, leading to the disproportionate harm of the most vulnerable populations living in developing countries.
Last month, the Climate Change Transparency Project, an effort dedicated to tracking U.S. climate policy at the National Security Archive, a government watchdog nonprofit, reported on a climate change intelligence assessment that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has kept classified for 17 years.
“Forgotten” fragile states unite to end climate-finance blind spot
In 2008, a panel of intelligence officers produced a National Intelligence Assessment (NIA) which evaluated the “National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030,” and was one of the intelligence community’s first ever climate-focused assessments, a departure from its usual research on more “traditional” national security threats like state violence and terrorism.
Despite the assessment’s reliance on open-source resources, as outlined in a testimony given to Congress by lead study author Dr. Thomas Fingar, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) mandated its classification. In Fingar’s testimony to Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike advocated for the assessment’s declassification, with Democrats arguing that the report could inform government agencies and private industries about the risks of climate change, and Republicans arguing that its reliance on open-source information didn’t contribute anything new to the body of knowledge on climate change.
At the time, several representatives of key House select committees also pushed for declassification on grounds beyond the impacts to U.S. national security: “Information about the likely impact of climate change in other countries should be made available to help those countries prepare and direct their resources appropriately.”
The power of climate intelligence
Reports generated by intelligence agencies like the NIC and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) help predict specific vulnerabilities of various regions around the world – like which cities are most at risk from flooding or which agricultural zones may soon face extreme heatwaves. If made available to all nations, this information could help governments and humanitarian organizations take proactive steps, design better policies, and protect these more vulnerable populations.
Unfortunately, classified reports like the 2008 NIA are still shrouded in secrecy- in part, at least, to maintain strategic U.S. advantage. Intelligence officials who worked on the report, like Fingar, maintain that the 2008 NIA should remain classified because it calls out countries most vulnerable to climate change: if specific countries were named in the report, what would stop them from using it to press the U.S. and other developed countries to provide additional aid and assistance for climate-related threats?
But this argument is moot given the level of climate intelligence already out in the open. Specifically, the NIC released a National Intelligence Estimate in 2021 that names two specific regions and 11 countries as particularly vulnerable to climate change through 2040. It predicted that these countries – Afghanistan, Burma, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Iraq – will experience climate-related and exacerbated events that will strain governments and civil societies.
Despite the age of the 2008 National Intelligence Assessment, it is imperative that this report is declassified to complement the already available climate data. In interviews with other former top intelligence officials, we heard the 2008 NIA is “far superior” to the 2021 NIE and could potentially provide a better roadmap for countries to mitigate against the worst impacts than the available data does.
Why developing countries suffer the most
It is troubling that much of this intelligence remains classified and out of reach for policymakers, scientists, and citizens alike in places where the impacts of climate change are being felt most acutely.
Take, for example, small island states in the Pacific, which are already seeing the impacts of sea level rise yet remain unsure of how quickly these changes will accelerate or what measures they can take to mitigate future risks. Similarly, countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where agriculture is heavily dependent on climate conditions, face the double threat of droughts and unpredictable rainfall patterns.
At-risk nations have limited capacity to produce or analyze their own climate data, and access to accurate global climate intelligence would enable them to understand shifts happening in their regions and to secure funding for adaptive infrastructure.
The case for climate transparency
U.S. national security concerns must be weighed against the global nature of climate change, which affects all nations regardless of geopolitical standing. By withholding key climate data, wealthy countries are not only perpetuating environmental inequality but also undermine global efforts to curb the impacts of climate change. Providing developing nations with the same level of climate intelligence that wealthier ones receive would enable them to make better-informed decisions, prioritize resources, and act more swiftly in response to emerging climate threats.
Trump’s aid cuts make Malawians more vulnerable to climate change
Declassifying the 2008 National Intelligence Assessment could also strengthen regional cooperation between mentioned nations, which developing countries may increasingly look to as the current Trump administration continues to withdraw from previous environmental international commitments, including the Paris Agreement and the new Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. As the United States abdicates its responsibility as a global climate leader, countries like China and India will most likely step up – and developing countries may choose to rely more heavily on them as a partner in mitigation and adaptation measures.
Climate change is a global issue that demands a coordinated response. If certain nations hoard climate intelligence, they not only hinder the adaptation efforts of developing countries but also undermine the collective action necessary to lessen future climate impacts. The sharing of climate data can foster trust and collaboration, enabling countries to work together to create a more resilient global climate framework.
The post Hidden cost: How keeping climate data classified hurts developing countries appeared first on Climate Home News.
Hidden cost: How keeping climate data classified hurts developing countries
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Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.
The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.
It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.
Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.
Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.
This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.
It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.
The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.
During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.
Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later.
Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.
Formal negotiations
Finance
Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.
At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.
The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.
As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.
The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.
Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.
Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya.
Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.
Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.
However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.
Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.
The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.
Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature.
The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.
The list was last amended in 2006.
(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)
Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.
The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.
By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.
Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.
By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.
At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:
“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”
The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.
Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:
“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”
On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.
Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.
While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.
At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.
At the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance.
China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”
While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries.
The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent.
Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter.
At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.
A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary:
“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”
The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries.
However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18.
Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.
The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.
“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever COP-commissioned report on debt and biodiversity.
Global review
In Yerevan, countries agreed on the first stocktake of progress towards the 2030 nature targets – known as the “global review”.
The review was one of the keenly anticipated outcomes from COP17 and was seen as less controversial than some of the other major negotiation strands.
It was swiftly signed off by countries at the start of the final COP17 plenary, with just one last-minute addition.
The concept of carrying out a global review on “collective progress” was set out in the GBF and its underlying documents.
The details of how this review would be carried out were supposed to be agreed at COP16, but it was not discussed before the plenary in Cali was suspended for loss of “quorum”. It was instead adopted at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome in February 2025.
The global review was based largely on the findings of the global report and other information provided by countries.
The final text “welcomes” and also “notes with deep concern” the findings of the global report. It then homes in on various ways countries can increase their biodiversity action to get on track to meet the targets.
As of 19 October, when COP17 officially began, the non-paper contained 152 brackets, which indicate areas of disagreement in UN texts.
Smaller “contact group” discussions took place to try and reduce the number of brackets throughout the first week. This group was co-chaired by Sanne Kruid from the Netherlands and Sivendra Michael from Fiji.
A few days into the talks, Kruid told Carbon Brief that the progress on the global review was “relatively positive”, with countries “engaging quite well”.
One contentious section of the 11-page text was paragraph 15, which “urges” countries to accelerate