Countries have agreed at the resumed COP16 talks in Rome to a strategy for “mobilising” at least $200bn per year by 2030 to help developing countries conserve biodiversity.
Nations also agreed for the first time to a “permanent arrangement” for providing biodiversity finance to developing nations, “future-proofing” the flow of funds past 2030.
Faced with a highly unstable geopolitical landscape and a previous set of talks that ended in disarray in Colombia, countries forged a path to consensus on a set of texts in what many nations celebrated as a win for multilateralism in uncertain times.
The agreement on finance comes despite the world’s largest biodiversity donor – the US, which has never been a formal party within these talks – recently deciding to withdraw most of its nature funding in a foreign-aid freeze under Donald Trump.
Many European countries who signed onto the agreement have also recently cut their aid budgets.
Nations also agreed on two texts for tracking their progress towards achieving the targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).
The GBF is a landmark deal first made in 2022 aiming to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030.
Colombian politician and COP16 president Susana Muhamad received a lengthy standing ovation for her role in guiding parties to consensus in the early hours of Friday morning in Rome.
But, amid celebrations, some countries cautioned that a vast amount of progress will be needed to have a chance of halting and reversing biodiversity loss in just five years.
Some three-quarters of nations have still not submitted their UN biodiversity plans for how they will achieve the targets of the GBF – four months after the deadline.
And a recent investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian revealed that more than half of nations that have submitted UN biodiversity plans do not commit to the GBF’s flagship target of protecting 30% of land and seas for nature by 2030.
- COP16’s back story
- Finance
- Global review
- Monitoring framework
- Cooperation with other conventions
- Around the COP
COP16’s back story
COP16 was the first UN biodiversity summit following the adoption in 2022 of a landmark agreement, known as the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), at COP15. The overall goal of the GBF is to “halt and reverse biodiversity” loss by 2030, through four goals and 23 targets.
At COP16, many issues centred around the “means of implementation” of the GBF. Initially, the conference was set to take place in Turkey, but the country withdrew from hosting it after a series of destructive earthquakes. Colombia took on the organisation of the summit and Cali was named as host city in February 2024.
In Cali, countries agreed on a new fund for the sharing of benefits from the use of genetic data, the creation of a dedicated subsidiary body for Indigenous peoples and local communities and a new process to identify ecologically and biologically significant marine areas.
However, the final plenary ran through the night, owing to disagreements over biodiversity finance. With many delegations needing to catch flights home, COP16 was suspended the following morning due to a lack of the “quorum” needed to reach consensus.
Later that month, the COP16 presidency stated that the negotiations would be resumed in the new year to “address outstanding issues on finance and complete the mandate of this COP”.
Among the pending items left over from Cali was a new strategy for “resource mobilisation”, aimed at allocating $200bn annually for biodiversity conservation “from all sources” by 2030.
Alongside that, countries needed to agree on the mechanism for distributing funds. Global-south countries urged the creation of a new global fund for biodiversity, to be under the control of the COP. Meanwhile, global-north countries argued for maintaining the current fund, which is housed under the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a multilateral fund set up in the early 1990s to “support developing countries’ work to address the world’s most pressing environmental issues”.
Countries also had to revisit the monitoring framework for the implementation of the GBF, which seeks to “provide the common yardsticks that parties will use to measure progress against the 23 targets” of the GBF, according to the CBD.
Parties also failed to agree on a new text outlining the process for a global review of national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) at COP17 in Armenia in 2026 and COP19, four years later.
The CBD took up the remaining issues in two “resumed” sessions of COP16.
The first of these meetings, to approve the budget, was held in December under “silence procedure” – meaning the text was circulated and parties given a period of time to respond with any objections. The second resumed session was held in person at the headquarters of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome, from 25 to 27 February 2025, to address all remaining decisions.
Finance
Post-2030 fund
The fight over a new, dedicated global biodiversity fund – the subject of fraught negotiations in Nairobi, Montreal and Cali – dominated the agenda at the resumed COP16 nature talks in Rome.
As a whole, COP16 was supposed to deliver a strategy for raising funds to assist countries in implementing the “ambitious” nature deal struck at COP15.
It was also expected to deliver a financial mechanism under the COP to provide developing countries with the means to meet biodiversity goals and targets.
At the resumed COP16 talks in Rome, countries made history by agreeing to set up a “permanent arrangement for the financial mechanism” under the COP by 2030 – a decision that is decades in the works.
While the decision does not establish a brand new fund immediately, it is “future proofing” global biodiversity finance beyond 2030, Georgina Chandler from the Zoological Society of London told a press briefing. The text leaves open the form that the finance will take – either under a new entity, or as part of existing funding instruments that biodiverse countries have been seeking to reform.
A permanent financial mechanism is the “unfinished business of the COP, 30 years in the making”, said Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network. While there is much to be debated at successive COPs, “at least the mechanism is locked in”, she told Carbon Brief.
The resumed COP16 also saw countries agree on a roadmap to develop the financial mechanism, reform existing financial institutions and mobilise funding from “all sources” to close the $200bn per year biodiversity funding gap.
To speed up raising these resources, the text asks the executive secretary of the CBD to “facilitate an international dialogue” of ministers of environment and finance from developing and developed countries.
This was a “highlight” of the outcome in Rome, Brian O’Donnell, director of the Campaign for Nature, said in a statement.
Per the roadmap, countries will have to decide on criteria for the mechanism by COP17 next year in Armenia. By COP18, they will have to decide whether this will take the form of a new fund and, if so, make it operational by COP19 in 2030.
At the same time, the COP has tasked its expert subsidiary body to look into “opportunities for broadening the contributor base”, accommodating a key ask from developed countries.
This means including more countries, such as China, as formal biodiversity finance providers, according to Laetitia Pettinotti from development finance thinktank ODI. Pettinotti told Carbon Brief:
“Countries have agreed to look into the contributor base. But, actually, many developing countries already contribute biodiversity finance via their funding to multilateral entities – the GEF, WB [World Bank], UN agencies, etc. So part of this discussion will need to look at recognising those contributions.”
Resource mobilisation: from Cali to Rome
The Rome talks were expected to pick up where Cali left off – with an ambitious, but divisive, draft decision on resource mobilisation issued by Muhamad in the early hours of 2 November last year.
That document contained a proposal to establish a new global biodiversity fund under the COP’s governance, to be ready by COP30.
This had been a key demand of developing countries in the run-up to the previous talks in Montreal. Instead, the final nature deal for this decade – gavelled through at COP15 in a hurry – gave the world an interim fund with a mandate to operate only until 2030.
Without enough countries in the room to pass the decision in Cali, the fight for a new fund had to wait until COP16 resumed in Rome.
Between the Cali and Rome talks, Muhamad held regional consultations and bilateral meetings with countries and ministers from around the world in an effort to find agreement.
On 14 February, Muhamad released a “reflection note” laying out the state of play in the finance negotiations. In this, she discussed some of the “important differences” remaining between countries on the resource mobilisation draft and areas of “broad agreement” that emerged in her consultations.
Some of these disagreements, she said, were partly rooted in “different interpretations of terms used”. To address this, the note contained a glossary defining terms used within the finance texts.
Muhamad put forward a roadmap towards improving global biodiversity finance architecture, which, she said, countries “broadly support[ed]” at that stage.
In an updated note on 21 February, the president issued “textual suggestions” on the most contentious paragraphs of the resource mobilisation text.
At the opening plenary on 25 February, minister Muhamad said the discussions at this COP were “not technical decisions”, but rather “political decisions”. She questioned whether countries were able to “transcend…old and outdated” institutional structures and move towards something new.
Some countries broadly supported the president’s suggestions, but were clear that more discussions were needed. Others, such as India, were sceptical and favoured the explicit language in the draft text from Cali.
Most developing countries called for establishing a dedicated financial instrument at the Rome talks, opposed expanding the donor base and highlighted the need to “honour” existing financial commitments.
In turn, most developed countries wanted to improve – not replace – existing funding instruments and broaden the list of donor countries and funding sources. They also favoured a process leading up to COP19 that would not “prejudge the outcome”.
Fiji noted in the opening plenary that adopting a clear and comprehensive resource mobilisation strategy is “critical” to the success of the GBF. They added that the future process and roadmap must be “efficient and streamlined”, given the urgency of financing needs.
Informal consultations on resource mobilisation took place on the evening of 25 February. The next morning, Muhamad thanked delegates for the “very open and frank discussion” on their various positions on the text.
The negotiations moved slowly for most of the three days. A third of the morning plenary on 26 February, for example, was taken up by a back-and-forth over a request from the DRC to change the agenda.
A revised resource mobilisation document was released by the presidency on the evening of 26 February. Minutes later, countries were invited to give their thoughts on the significantly updated text in plenary.
Many expressed their surprise at the revisions and requested more time to review the text, which was only available in English as it had not yet been translated into the other five UN languages.
Egypt and the DRC’s request to give the African Group a few minutes to consult on the text was denied by Muhamad, with countries instead encouraged to discuss the text and present their concerns as regional groupings the next morning.
“This is becoming a precedent that a region cannot ask for regional consultations,” said Daniel Mukubi Kikuni of the DRC at the evening plenary, adding that the draft resembled Muhamad’s “informal” reflection note more than its predecessor that was negotiated by all countries in Cali. Kikuni added:
“[This document has been] deeply changed, transformed and modified. We cannot accept it as a foundational document for our discussion.”
Panama said that it was concerned by a “lack of ambition” in the revised document. Other countries, including Ivory Coast and Egypt, expressed concern that the pace of the document’s proposed roadmap was “missing urgency” and was too “process-heavy”, given that 2030 is five years away.
While the EU, Norway and the UK appreciated the text as a “balanced package” and said it was “very close to the landing zone”, they were caught off-guard by text that suggested “possible direct allocation” of funds to countries.
The next morning, another plenary took place for regional groupings to provide consolidated feedback on the updated draft. Several blocs and countries suggested alternative text, including a “compromise” proposal submitted by Brazil on behalf of BRICS countries and Zimbabwe articulating Africa’s position.
With the clock ticking and much to accomplish before midnight, Muhamad adjourned the plenary and asked up to five representatives from regions to work with her in a small group towards a consensus text to bring to the plenary.
After a six-hour closed door session, a new resource mobilisation non-paper emerged around 7pm on the final evening of talks.
The non-paper referred to the establishment of a “permanent arrangement for the financial mechanism”, mirroring text suggested by Brazil on behalf of BRICS countries earlier in the day. Instead of promising a new fund, the text said that the mechanism could be “entrusted to one or more entities, new, reformed or existing” – suggesting that a compromise had been struck between developed and developing countries
The non-paper had just one bracket in place (which, in UN documents, signals disagreement), stating that the final structure of the mechanism had to be “non-discriminatory”, which some delegates feared could potentially rule out certain funds that were limited by sanctions.
Bernadette Fischler Hooper, the head of international advocacy at WWF, told the press that this was a “make or break moment” to determine the levels of trust between countries, but that the text “showcased the high art of diplomacy”. She added:
“It doesn’t sound very exciting, but the fact that there will be [an instrument] from 2030 onwards is actually a huge step forward, because they haven’t managed to do that for the last five years. That was what nearly brought the COP15 in Montreal to fall.”
The presidency released a final revised document on resource mobilisation at 10:40pm, when the final plenary was already long-delayed.
This contained the same text as the non-paper, but with the final bracket removed. With no interventions, countries agreed and the final resource mobilisation text was gavelled through amid applause, cheers and tears in the plenary hall.
Minutes later, after interventions from the EU and Japan, Brazil cautioned against last-ditch changes to the closely related financial mechanism text, saying that “if we start to blow too close to [a castle of] cards, then everything starts to fall off”.
After a show of support from former COP-hosts Canada, the COP adopted the decision on the financial mechanism.
Juliette Landry of the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) described the finance outcome to Carbon Brief as “a delicate balance” struck between “reluctant parties”. She added that countries had “agreed to lift polarised opposition” around a new fund in order to fix “systemic” gaps in existing biodiversity funding.
The figure below illustrates the development of language around a new financial instrument, in each iteration of the resource mobilisation text.
Successive iterations of language around the new financial instrument from Cali (left) to Rome (centre and right). Source: UN CBD (2024, 2025a, 2025b)
One of the drivers behind finance reform is that developing countries say they can struggle to access biodiversity finance. Ramson Karmushu from the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity told a press conference that submitting a funding proposal can be complicated and time-consuming.
He further noted that proposals which ask for data can be difficult for Indigenous peoples when the data is “in our minds, not in computers”.
Lim Li Ching from TWN, meanwhile, told Carbon Brief that despite the financial goals for 2025 and 2030 not being discussed in Rome, they remain “incredibly important”. She concluded:
“There’s still a long road ahead, but we live to fight another day.”
Global review
Another text that was adopted in Rome was on mechanisms for planning, monitoring, reporting and review (PMRR), including a global review of progress due to be conducted at COP17 in Armenia in 2026.
This is document outlines the schedule for how countries will assess their progress towards meeting the targets of the GBF in the coming years.
It is the first time in the history of biodiversity talks that countries have agreed to a text specifically on tracking their own progress. The groundwork for this was laid out in the GBF itself, which includes a section on “responsibility and transparency” from countries.
“Planning” refers to countries submitting national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs). Countries were meant to submit new NBSAPs by October 2024, but, so far, three-quarters of countries have yet to do so.
“Monitoring” refers to countries using indicators set out in the monitoring framework (see below) to assess their progress towards meeting biodiversity targets.
“Reporting” refers to the need for countries to produce national reports detailing this progress by early 2026. Shortly after this, a “global report” will be produced, assessing NBSAPs and national targets to track whether countries are on track for the targets of the GBF.
“Review” refers to a global review of progress, which is due to take place at COP17.
In Cali, countries managed to produce a bracket-free version of the PMRR text.
At the time, observers said it was generally positive that nations had managed to agree to a way for tracking their own progress, but noted that the text lacked a clear follow-up procedure to ensure countries increase their efforts accordingly after the global review.
Some also lamented the lack of opportunities for all stakeholders, including civil society, to participate in the PMRR process.
Despite countries finalising the text, it was not adopted at the end of the Cali talks. This is because it was scheduled for adoption after the texts on finance, which countries ultimately failed to find consensus on.
In Rome, the CBD secretariat presented a new version of the PMRR text during a plenary on 25 February. This included an adjusted timeline reflecting that work towards the report and review will start following the end of the resumed talks, rather than December 2024 as previously set out.
A representative of the secretariat said the timeline for ensuring all the work is completed is now extremely “tight”, but still achievable.
Many nations expressed their support for the PMRR text and urged other countries to accept it without making any further changes.
However, Russia and Zimbabwe both raised concerns with small details of the text. COP16 president Susana Muhamad said she would consult privately with parties that were not yet happy to accept the PMRR text.
In plenary on the following day, countries turned to the PMRR text again.
At this point, Zimbabwe suggested adding in a new footnote.
Zimbabwe’s specific concern was around a section of the text that invites non-state actors, such as NGOs and companies, to voluntarily contribute what they are doing to meet the targets of the GBF to the CBD’s online portal.
Zimbabwe called for a footnote noting that these submissions shall be subject to the consent and approval of the country that the non-state actor is based in.
This call was backed by Cameroon, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, the DRC and Russia, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. It was opposed by the European Union and Norway.
Explaining the possible motivations of including such a footnote in the text, one observer told Carbon Brief that, from a “positive” perspective, it might allow countries to block “greenwashing” from companies, adding:
“If you want to be a little bit more cynical about it, it gives countries an opportunity to be less open to hearing from voices they don’t necessarily want to hear criticism from.”
The next day, all nations agreed to include this new footnote – leaving no outstanding issues.
During the summit’s final plenary session, the PMRR text was gavelled through with no objections.
Monitoring framework
The monitoring framework is a document that lays out how countries will measure their progress towards the individual targets of the GBF, using four types of indicators: headline; binary; component; and complementary:
- Headline indicators: used to measure quantifiable progress towards a given target, such as the pledge to restore 30% of degraded ecosystems by 2030.
- Binary indicators: yes-or-no questions used to evaluate progress towards more qualitative goals, such as engagement with women and youth.
- Component indicators: used to measure progress towards specific parts of the targets of the GBF.
- Complementary indicators: used to measure progress towards related goals that are not made explicit in the GBF itself.
While headline and binary indicators are mandatory for countries to report, component and complementary indicators are optional.
During the Cali summit, Lim Li Lin, a senior legal and environment advisor at Third World Network, told Carbon Brief:
“Everyone’s doing a juggle, right? We want the good ones to go in the mandatory and we want the bad ones to go in the complementary, if we can’t get rid of them. And everyone’s doing the same thing from their own interest and perspective.”
Going into Rome, the entire monitoring framework was contained in brackets – meaning, in UN parlance, that the text had not been agreed. This was a result of manoeuvring by the DRC during Cali to ensure that the fate of the framework was tied to that of the finance deal.
Within the text, however, were two outstanding areas of disagreement: one on the indicator for target 7 on reducing harm from pollution, including pesticides; and one on the indicator for target 16 on enabling sustainable consumption.
On pesticide usage, parties were split between requiring countries to report their “pesticide environment concentration” and the “aggregated total applied toxicity”. The former was adopted as part of the monitoring framework during COP15, while the latter was proposed by the technical expert group that met in between COP15 and COP16.
In Colombia, parties converged on allowing both methods to be used as headline indicators, but could not reach agreement on an accompanying footnote explaining why both were being listed and how parties had to report.
In the plenary on 25 February, the UK proposed a compromise footnote text allowing parties to choose which headline indicator to use.
Although some countries suggested prioritising one indicator over the other, the proposal was approved “in the spirit of compromise”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported. A separate footnote explained that the FAO is working to “further develop and test the aggregated total applied toxicity headline indicator”.
On sustainable use, countries were split over non-binding component indicators on “global environmental impacts of consumption” and “ecological footprint”. Brazil suggested removing the indicator on global impacts of consumption, “noting that it cannot be validated at the national level”, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
Discussions on the sustainable-use indicators spilled over into the second day of the Rome talks. The compromise proposal, brought forward by the EU, was to remove the indicator on global environmental impacts of consumption, but retain the indicator on ecological footprint, along with a footnote on methodology and the availability of data.
The updated text was accepted with no objections during the final plenary on 27 February.
Cooperation with other conventions
A text highlighting the links between the Convention on Biological Diversity and other organisations was not discussed until the final hours of the Rome talks.
The text was not viewed as contentious near the start of the three-day summit. Amid the trickier negotiations, it was pushed down on the agenda until a dramatic finale in which the text was approved, un-approved and then gavelled through with last-minute amendments.
The Cook Islands and other countries expressed disappointment with the final tweaks, but said they agreed in order to get a deal over the line.
The agreement recognised, among other things, the ties between the three Rio Conventions – the UN treaties agreed in 1992 under which countries meet separately to negotiate on climate change, biodiversity and desertification.
The final COP16 cooperation decision “invites” countries to “strengthen synergies and cooperation in the implementation of each convention, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities”.
The presidency released a new version of the draft text on 27 February. Among the changes in this text from the previous December draft was the removal of two bracketed paragraphs stressing the importance of future collaboration between the CBD and the global treaty on governing the sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (“BBNJ”, or the “High Seas Treaty”).
In the closing plenary, Iceland opposed the deletion of these “two very important paragraphs” referring to the BBNJ treaty “without any discussion”. Russia, supported later by Brazil, stood by the deletion, adding that they were “not in a position to bring [those paragraphs] back”.
The negotiations on this draft went on until close to midnight on 27 February when Muhamad said, much like “Cinderella”, they were running out of time. (The UN translators were supposed to work only until midnight, although they ended up staying through the end of the plenary.) In light of this constraint – and amid disagreement on BBNJ’s inclusion – Muhamad withdrew discussions on the text, pushing its agreement to COP17.
However, Switzerland, the EU and Zimbabwe intervened to push for the approval of the “really important” text. Iceland withdrew its intervention on BBNJ and Muhamad moved to adopt the document.
But Russia noted that the president had not addressed their proposal to delete paragraph 20, which discussed collaboration with the future UN plastic pollution treaty on the pollution-reducing target of the GBF.
After indications of support from India, Switzerland and the EU, the text was adopted by the plenary – now with paragraph 20 removed.
But it did not end there. Argentina took to the floor to suggest further amendments in three parts of the text. Muhamad said this interjection was too late, but Argentina argued that they requested to speak before the gavel fell.
Brazil backed Argentina and recalled the ending of COP15 in Montreal when the final GBF was gavelled through, despite objections by the DRC.
Brazil said this is a “wound that has not healed” for developing countries and that, while they disagree with Argentina’s position, they support their right to speak up.
Muhamad said she did not see Argentina’s request before dropping the gavel, but offered to postpone cooperation negotiations, if countries agreed. The EU did not want this and suggested deleting the paragraphs Argentina took issue with.
These included paragraph 7, referring to FAO work on a draft action plan on biodiversity for food and nutrition, and paragraph 12, discussing the rights of nature and other knowledge systems.
Georgia and Zimbabwe intervened to say that, while unfortunate to remove this text, they agreed with the EU. After more back-and-forth, the text was once again gavelled through, with the proposed amendments.
The final text also referenced outcomes from the UN Environment Programme, the World Health Organization and others.
Around the COP
The Rome COP was a more low-key affair than other summits. There were no side events, parallel meetings or working groups – just plenary sessions, followed by informal evening meetings between countries.
Around 1,000 people attended the talks, compared to 14,000 in Cali.
In the run-up to the summit, Muhamad’s COP16 presidency was called into question after she announced her resignation as Colombia’s environment minister on 9 February. The move was in protest of a controversial cabinet appointment by president Gustavo Petro, Reuters reported.
Muhamad asked Petro in her resignation letter to let her remain in the position until 3 March to allow her to conclude the COP16 talks, Climate Home News said.
In the end, she presided over the Rome talks, telling Carbon Brief in a press conference that she continued to have full capacity as environment minister.
Environment ministers and vice-ministers from Canada, Colombia, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Peru, Armenia, Fiji, Germany, Suriname confirmed they would attend the talks.
The Cali Fund – a mechanism where companies can contribute money if they use digitally accessed genetic resources from nature in their products – was officially launched at a press conference in Rome on Tuesday 25 February.
The fund – which was one of the major successes of the Cali talks – is currently empty.
A number of companies are already “actively considering” paying into the fund, Astrid Schomaker said at the launch of the fund. (She would not name specific companies when asked by Carbon Brief.)
The CBD chief said the convention has actively contacted companies and business groups to discuss paying into the fund. Muhamad added at the press conference that the fund is not for “charity from the companies”, but “fair payment for the use of global biodiversity”.
The resumed nature talks came at a volatile time in climate and nature diplomacy. The new administration of the US – a major donor to climate and nature funds – caused turmoil and uncertainty across the globe when Donald Trump announced moves to shut down the US Agency for International Development (USAid).
The UN confirmed to Carbon Brief that the US did not send a delegation to Rome.
This was a first for biodiversity talks. Despite not being party to the CBD, US officials usually still attend talks to contribute to negotiations as observers.
At the opening plenary of the talks, Susana Muhamad spoke about the need for agreement amid the current “polarised, fragmented, divisive geopolitical landscape”. She added:
“We have an important responsibility here in Rome. In 2025, we can send a light globally and be able to say that still, even with our differences, even with our tensions…we are able to collaboratively work together for something that transcends our own interests.”
At the sidelines of the talks, the UK made a snap decision to belatedly publish its NBSAP, Carbon Brief reported.
Some three-quarters of nations still have not published their NBSAPs, four months after the UN deadline.
On the summit’s final day, youth activists held a demonstration in the corridors of the conference, in protest of their lack of opportunities to speak at the event.
The post COP16: Key outcomes agreed at the resumed UN biodiversity conference in Rome appeared first on Carbon Brief.
COP16: Key outcomes agreed at the resumed UN biodiversity conference in Rome
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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