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A “resurgence” in construction of new coal-fired power plants in China is “undermining the country’s clean-energy progress”, says a new joint report by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) and Global Energy Monitor (GEM).

The country began building 94.5 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-power capacity and resumed 3.3GW of suspended projects in 2024, the highest level of construction in the past 10 years, according to the two thinktanks.

The accelerated buildout, fuelled by investment from the coal-mining sector, “raises critical concerns” about China’s ability to transition away from the fossil fuel, the report warns.

Analysts expect China’s huge clean-energy capacity additions to slowly squeeze coal’s share of electricity generation, as China works towards its “dual-carbon” goals of peaking carbon emissions by 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality by 2060.

As things stand, rapid coal-power expansion is posing a “challenge” to China’s high-level climate commitments, including on reducing coal use, CREA and GEM argue.

They point to a range of policies that could help China get back on track, including ending new coal plant approvals, as well as power market and grid reform.

Construction fever

Construction started on 94.5GW of new coal-fired power plants in 2024, according to the study. It says this is a sign of continued momentum in developing new coal projects, despite government pledges to “strictly” control the use of the fossil fuel. The report adds that 3.3GW of suspended projects also resumed construction in 2024.

Approvals for new coal construction rebounded in the second half of the year to 66.7GW, after permitting only 9GW in the first half.

Taken altogether, the report says this signals a substantial amount of new capacity will come online in the next few years, “solidifying” coal’s place as a major source of electricity.

As shown in the chart below, China’s new or resumed construction of coal-power plants declined steadily from 84.3GW in 2015 to 32.1GW in 2021. However, it has since risen from 2022, driven by a wave of new projects.

New and resumed construction of coal capacity in China between 2015-2024, gigawatts. Credit: GEM and CREA.
New and resumed construction of coal capacity in China between 2015-2024, gigawatts. Credit: GEM and CREA.

From 2022 onwards, new and revived proposals to initiate coal-power projects also surged, reaching 146GW in 2022 and 117GW in 2023 – well above pre-pandemic levels.

However, the report notes, new proposals fell to 68.9GW in 2024, which could point to “potential cooling in project initiation”. In 2023, China accounted for 95% of the world’s new coal construction.

Meanwhile, retirement and mothballing of old coal plants remains “low”, the report says. This is particularly pronounced in recent years, with the amount of capacity being closed down each year dropping sharply from around 13GW in 2020 to 2.5GW in 2024.

All of this stands in “direct conflict” with Chinese president Xi Jinping’s pledge in 2021 to “strictly limit the increase in coal consumption” between 2021 and 2026, the report says, as well as China’s 2030 carbon-peaking action plan. It adds:

“The policy direction set in China’s updated climate targets for 2035 under the Paris Agreement and the upcoming 15th five-year plan [2026-2030] will be critical to determining the trajectory of China’s coal-power sector and with that, its emissions trajectory.”

This echoes recent analysis published by Carbon Brief.

Fuelled by industry interests

The renewed coal drive is largely being pushed by the mining industry, according to the report, with coal-mining companies increasingly investing in coal-power projects.

More than three-quarters of all newly approved coal power projects were financed by “coal mining companies or energy groups with coal-mining operations”, the study says.

It suggests this may be partly driven by China’s “dual-carbon” goals, which have pushed those companies to diversify in order to “secure stable demand for their output through 2030 and beyond”.

These investments include integrated coal mine-to-power and “pithead” plants, as well as typical coal-fired power plants developed by energy groups with coal-mining operations.

The report notes that many regional coal and energy companies have “intensified” coal-power investments, “aligning their strategies to sustain coal’s dominance at the provincial level”.

It adds that major coal-producing provinces – such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Gansu – were also commissioning and building the most new coal power, as shown in the map below. However, China’s biggest coal-producing province, Shanxi, was not among the provinces with the most activity around new coal power in 2024.

By province, Chinese coal plants that have been commissioned, begun construction, permitted and retired in 2024. Credit: GEM and CREA.
By province, Chinese coal plants that have been commissioned, begun construction, permitted and retired in 2024. Credit: GEM and CREA.

‘Undermining’ the energy transition

The rapid buildout of coal could combine with structural features of the power system that favour the coal industry, the report says, to limit renewables’ ability to become China’s main provider of electricity.

China installed record amounts of renewable energy capacity in 2024, bringing total solar and wind capacity up to 890GW and 520GW, respectively. Coal capacity in 2024 was 1,200GW.

The growing amount of low-carbon electricity in China’s mix was expected to cover new demand and reduce coal’s importance in the system, in a policy known as “establish [new systems] before breaking [old ones]” (先立后破).

However, the report notes, the flurry of new coal construction “makes it increasingly difficult to achieve” this. Instead, it says there is a risk that renewable energy will be treated as a supplementary power source “layered on top” of coal.

This is partly due to several policy structures that prioritise the use of coal power and protect the industry’s interests, it explains.

Most power grids lock in coal-power supply through mechanisms such as medium- to long-term contracts for purchasing power and long-term coal supply agreements, obligating provinces to use a certain amount of the fuel, even when other sources of electricity are more cost-effective.

Provincial governments are also moving away from requiring power purchase agreements (PPAs) to include a minimum share of solar and wind, the report says, resulting in “an uneven playing field where coal power remains insulated from risk while wind and solar developers face price fluctuations and uncertain demand”.

The development of new coal-power plants will “further limit grid space for renewables”, it adds, making it harder for solar and wind power generators to gain significant market share.

Coal’s predominance in the system may have also led to a substantial recent uptick in curtailment of renewable energy. According to calculations in the report, the final quarter of 2024 likely saw a curtailment rate of around 5.5%, rather than the officially reported 3.2%.

The report attributes this to “structural constraints”, rather than weather-driven availability of solar and wind resources.

Opportunity for change in 2025

Forecasts by the coal industry signal that it expects the coal-power sector to continue growing, causing “increasingly unsustainable conflict” between China’s energy security and low-carbon policies, the report notes.

The report suggests strong policy direction in 2025 would be needed to counteract coal’s dominance in the energy system.

This could be achieved, firstly, by reducing the amount of coal in the energy system, such as by setting “ambitious and measurable” targets for reducing coal consumption, phasing down coal plants, utilisation of coal plants in operation and uptake of renewables.

Other potential levers could include ending new coal-power plant approvals and accelerating the retirement of older units.

Secondly, the report points to reform of the mechanisms that steer power providers towards coal – including reducing the amount of coal covered in long-term PPAs and coal supply agreements – and prioritising grid reform and the development of spot markets.

These steps, it argues, would “help implement China’s ambition to phase down coal, create space for renewables, and drive a cleaner, more efficient energy system”.

The post China’s construction of new coal-power plants ‘reached 10-year high’ in 2024 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China’s construction of new coal-power plants ‘reached 10-year high’ in 2024

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For proof of the energy transition’s resilience, look at what it’s up against

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Al-Karim Govindji is the global head of public affairs for energy systems at DNV, an independent assurance and risk management provider, operating in more than 100 countries.

Optimism that this year may be less eventful than those that have preceded it have already been dealt a big blow – and we’re just weeks into 2026. Events in Venezuela, protests in Iran and a potential diplomatic crisis over Greenland all spell a continuation of the unpredictability that has now become the norm.

As is so often the case, it is impossible to separate energy and the industry that provides it from the geopolitical incidents shaping the future. Increasingly we hear the phrase ‘the past is a foreign country’, but for those working in oil and gas, offshore wind, and everything in between, this sentiment rings truer every day. More than 10 years on from the signing of the Paris Agreement, the sector and the world around it is unrecognisable.

The decade has, to date, been defined by a gritty reality – geopolitical friction, trade barriers and shifting domestic priorities – and amidst policy reversals in major economies, it is tempting to conclude that the transition is stalling.

Truth, however, is so often found in the numbers – and DNV’s Energy Transition Outlook 2025 should act as a tonic for those feeling downhearted about the state of play.

While the transition is becoming more fragmented and slower than required, it is being propelled by a new, powerful logic found at the intersection between national energy security and unbeatable renewable economics.

A diverging global trajectory

The transition is no longer a single, uniform movement; rather, we are seeing a widening “execution gap” between mature technologies and those still finding their feet. Driven by China’s massive industrial scaling, solar PV, onshore wind and battery storage have reached a price point where they are virtually unstoppable.

These variable renewables are projected to account for 32% of global power by 2030, surging to over half of the world’s electricity by 2040. This shift signals the end of coal and gas dominance, with the fossil fuel share of the power sector expected to collapse from 59% today to just 4% by 2060.

    Conversely, technologies that require heavy subsidies or consistent long-term policy, the likes of hydrogen derivatives (ammonia and methanol), floating wind and carbon capture, are struggling to gain traction.

    Our forecast for hydrogen’s share in the 2050 energy mix has been downgraded from 4.8% to 3.5% over the last three years, as large-scale commercialisation for these “hard-to-abate” solutions is pushed back into the 2040s.

    Regional friction and the security paradigm

    Policy volatility remains a significant risk to transition timelines across the globe, most notably in North America. Recently we have seen the US pivot its policy to favour fossil fuel promotion, something that is only likely to increase under the current administration.

    Invariably this creates measurable drag, with our research suggesting the region will emit 500-1,000 Mt more CO₂ annually through 2050 than previously projected.

    China, conversely, continues to shatter energy transition records, installing over half of the world’s solar and 60% of its wind capacity.

    In Europe and Asia, energy policy is increasingly viewed through the lens of sovereignty; renewables are no longer just ‘green’, they are ‘domestic’, ‘indigenous’, ‘homegrown’. They offer a way to reduce reliance on volatile international fuel markets and protect industrial competitiveness.

    Grids and the AI variable

    As we move toward a future where electricity’s share of energy demand doubles to 43% by 2060, we are hitting a physical wall, namely the power grid.

    In Europe, this ‘gridlock’ is already a much-discussed issue and without faster infrastructure expansion, wind and solar deployment will be constrained by 8% and 16% respectively by 2035.

    Comment: To break its coal habit, China should look to California’s progress on batteries

    This pressure is compounded by the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI). While AI will represent only 3% of global electricity use by 2040, its concentration in North American data centres means it will consume a staggering 12% of the region’s power demand.

    This localized hunger for power threatens to slow the retirement of fossil fuel plants as utilities struggle to meet surging base-load requirements.

    The offshore resurgence

    Despite recent headlines regarding supply chain inflation and project cancellations, the long-term outlook for offshore energy remains robust.

    We anticipate a strong resurgence post-2030 as costs stabilise and supply chains mature, positioning offshore wind as a central pillar of energy-secure systems.

    Governments defend clean energy transition as US snubs renewables agency

    A new trend is also emerging in behind-the-meter offshore power, where hybrid floating platforms that combine wind and solar will power subsea operations and maritime hubs, effectively bypassing grid bottlenecks while decarbonising oil and gas infrastructure.

    2.2C – a reality check

    Global CO₂ emissions are finally expected to have peaked in 2025, but the descent will be gradual.

    On our current path, the 1.5C carbon budget will be exhausted by 2029, leading the world toward 2.2C of warming by the end of the century.

    Still, the transition is not failing – but it is changing shape, moving away from a policy-led “green dream” toward a market-led “industrial reality”.

    For the ocean and energy sectors, the strategy for the next decade is clear. Scale the technologies that are winning today, aggressively unblock the infrastructure bottlenecks of tomorrow, and plan for a future that will, once again, look wholly different.

    The post For proof of the energy transition’s resilience, look at what it’s up against appeared first on Climate Home News.

    For proof of the energy transition’s resilience, look at what it’s up against

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    Post-COP 30 Modeling Shows World Is Far Off Track for Climate Goals

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    A new MIT Global Change Outlook finds current climate policies and economic indicators put the world on track for dangerous warming.

    After yet another international climate summit ended last fall without binding commitments to phase out fossil fuels, a leading global climate model is offering a stark forecast for the decades ahead.

    Post-COP 30 Modeling Shows World Is Far Off Track for Climate Goals

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    IMO head: Shipping decarbonisation “has started” despite green deal delay

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    The head of the United Nations body governing the global shipping industry has said that greenhouse gases from the global shipping industry will fall, whether or not the sector’s “Net Zero Framework” to cut emissions is adopted in October.

    Arsenio Dominguez, secretary-general of the International Maritime Organization, told a new year’s press conference in London on Friday that, even if governments don’t sign up to the framework later this year as planned, the clean-up of the industry responsible for 3% of global emissions will continue.

    “I reiterate my call to industry that the decarbonisation has started. There’s lots of research and development that is ongoing. There’s new plans on alternative fuels like methanol and ammonia that continue to evolve,” he told journalists.

    He said he has not heard any government dispute a set of decarbonisation goals agreed in 2023. These include targets to reduce emissions 20-30% on 2008 levels by 2030 and then to reach net zero emissions “by or around, i.e. close to 2050”.

      Dominguez said the 2030 emissions reduction target could be reached, although a goal for shipping to use at least 5% clean fuels by 2030 would be difficult to meet because their cost will remain high until at least the 2030s. The goals agreed in 2023 also included cutting emissions by 70-80% by 2040.

      In October 2025, a decision on a proposed framework of practical measures to achieve the goals, which aims to incentivise shipowners to go green by taxing polluting ships and subsidising cleaner ones, was postponed by a year after a narrow vote by governments.

      Ahead of that vote, the US threatened governments and their officials with sanctions, tariffs and visa restrictions – and President Donald Trump called the framework a “Green New Scam Tax on Shipping”.

      Dominguez said at Friday’s press conference that he had not received any official complaints about the US’s behaviour at last October’s meeting but – without naming names – he called on nations to be “more respectful” at the IMO. He added that he did not think the US would leave the IMO, saying Washington had engaged constructively on the organisation’s budget and plans.

      EU urged to clarify ETS position

      The European Union – along with Brazil and Pacific island nations – pushed hard for the framework to be adopted in October. Some developing countries were concerned that the EU would retain its charges for polluting ships under its emissions trading scheme (ETS), even if the Net Zero Framework was passed, leading to ships travelling to and from the EU being charged twice.

      This was an uncertainty that the US and Saudi Arabia exploited at the meeting to try and win over wavering developing countries. Most African, Asian and Caribbean nations voted for a delay.

      On Friday, Dominguez called on the EU “to clarify their position on the review of the ETS, in order that as we move forward, we actually don’t have two systems that are going to be basically looking for the same the same goal, the same objective.”

      He said he would continue to speak to EU member states, “to maintain the conversations in here, rather than move forward into fragmentation, because that will have a very detrimental effect in shipping”. “That would really create difficulties for operators, that would increase the cost, and everybody’s going to suffer from it,” he added.

      The IMO’s marine environment protection committee, in which governments discuss climate strategy, will meet in April although the Net Zero Framework is not scheduled to be officially discussed until October.

      The post IMO head: Shipping decarbonisation “has started” despite green deal delay appeared first on Climate Home News.

      IMO head: Shipping decarbonisation “has started” despite green deal delay

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