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China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
Floods killed 60 people after ‘year of rain in a week’
HUMAN TOLL: Heavy rainfall in late July killed at least 60 people across northern China, with flooding and landslides affecting Beijing and neighbouring Hebei province, Reuters reported, adding that “meteorologists link an increase in extreme weather…to climate change”. In some areas, a “year’s worth of rain fell in less than a week”, another Reuters article said. China’s “usually arid north has seen record rains in recent years”, but Beijing’s topography “amplif[ied] the deluge” that killed more than 30 people in the capital, the newswire added. Other affected regions included Shanxi, Shaanxi, Liaoning, Shandong, Tianjin and Inner Mongolia, according to various news outlets.
PERSISTENT HEAT: Five people were killed in southern Guangdong province due to “torrential rain”, said the state-run newspaper China Daily. Shanghai evacuated “around 280,000 people” as storm Co-may brought “strong winds and heavy rainfall”, Bloomberg said. Elsewhere, China Daily reported on “persistent high temperatures” in central China, adding that multiple regions faced intense heat or rainfall this week. The southern city of Chongqing “elevated its heatwave warning to the highest level” following temperatures “exceeding 40C for a week”, Reuters said.

RELIEF FUNDS: State broadcaster CGTN said China allocated more than one billion yuan ($139m) to areas across China for flood and drought relief efforts. Beijing and its neighbouring provinces received 550m yuan ($77m) for flood relief, reported the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP).
NEW OUTBREAK: Meanwhile, thousands of residents in southern China’s Guangdong province have contracted chikungunya, a mosquito-borne disease, Bloomberg reported, quoting an expert saying the “surge in chikungunya cases is likely due to favorable climatic conditions”. The outbreak “is the latest sign that tropical diseases…are expanding their reach, as climate change lets mosquitoes live in new territories”, it added.
Government tackled ‘Industrial Cthulhu’
OVERCAPACITY POLICIES: Regulators released a “draft amendment” to China’s pricing law that aims to “rein in price wars”, Reuters said. China will “name and shame” companies that continue to implement “ruinous competition”, said Bloomberg. Draft “guidance” was also issued on deploying government funds, SCMP reported, to prevent continued “overconcentrat[ion]” of local government investment in the “new three” and other sectors. China’s leadership also called for “reducing excess competition” and regulating “local government practices in attracting investment”, said Xinhua. According to Bloomberg, this showed “China’s leaders see the dangers” of China’s manufacturing strength “clearly”. (It added that some netizens had nicknamed the sector “Industrial Cthulhu”, in a “tongue-in-cheek” comparison that it said was meant to imply that “China’s manufacturing power is a beast”.)
SUPERCHARGING DEMAND: Domestic sales of new-energy vehicles (NEVs) between January and June 2025 rose 40% year-on-year to just under seven million units – 44% of total car sales – reported the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily, while exports “surged” by 75%. Energy news outlet International Energy Net quoted a National Energy Administration (NEA) official saying China expects 2025 power demand for EV charging alone to equal the “annual power generation of the Three Gorges dam”.
HIDDEN FIGURES: While the figures show that 2025 is “shaping up to be another stellar year” for China’s EV industry “on paper”, Caixin said, “overcapacity” and fierce price wars mean the industry’s mood is “far from celebratory”. Separately, Reuters found it is “increasingly common” for automakers in China, including EV manufacturers and foreign brands, to “inflate car sales”.
EV TARIFFS: Meanwhile, Chinese EVs exports to the EU have made a “full comeback from tariffs set in place last year”, with Chinese automakers’ share in Europe’s EV market surpassing 10%, according to Bloomberg. Elsewhere, Thailand has “adjusted” EV subsidies to encourage exports as surging Chinese investment creates excess domestic “capacity”, said finance news outlet Caixin. EV manufacturer BYD has been offered a “short-term tariff break” in Brazil, but will face aggressive “hikes…in the long run”, SCMP reported.
Forecast for solar growth in 2025 rose to 300GW
GENERATION SHARE: Renewable energy accounted for “almost 40% of total power generation” in the first half of 2025, NEA officials said at a press conference covered by BJX News. New solar and wind generation also covered “total growth in electricity demand”, the energy news outlet added. BJX News also added that, according to the NEA officials, non-fossil fuel sources now account for 60% of China’s electricity mix. Meanwhile, the China Photovoltaic Industry Association “raised its forecast for new domestic solar installations this year” to 270-300 gigawatts (GW), citing the “minimal impact” of “new policies such as document 136” on large-scale clean-energy bases, reported business news outlet Jiemian. China had already installed 212GW of new solar capacity in the first half of the year, said China Daily.
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INDUSTRY INSPECTIONS: The government will conduct “energy conservation inspections” on polysilicon manufacturers, Jiemian said. It quoted an anonymous “industry insider” as saying the targeted companies are “not all…polysilicon projects for photovoltaic use”, adding that the inspections likely aim to identify “projects that consume resources without creating actual value”. Meanwhile, Reuters found “China’s biggest solar firms shed nearly one-third of their workforces last year”, illustrating the “pain from the vicious price wars”, while “more than 40 solar firms have delisted, gone bankrupt or been acquired” since 2024.
‘ORDERLY’ DEVELOPMENT: China issued a new policy on “further regulating the use of farmland for solar projects”, calling for better management and strict supervision of “solar projects involving the use of farmland”, reported International Energy Net. The NEA also pledged to “guide the orderly development of distributed [solar] projects and ensure safe and efficient consumption”, said another International Energy Net article.
Central bank boosted finance for ‘future energy’
NEW ENERGY FINANCE: China’s central bank, alongside several government ministries, released guidance on financing “new industrialisation”, BJX News reported, adding that it encouraged supporting sectors such as “new energy” in “raising capital” and encouraged state-run investment funds to focus on “future energy” and other “future industries”. The guidance also called for more support for “green and low-carbon transformation” and clean-energy technologies. Separately, China will evaluate the energy consumption and potential carbon emissions of “fixed asset” investments over a certain threshold of energy or coal consumption, said International Energy Net.
‘CLIMATE THREATS’: The CMA launched a new “initiative” to “establish a global early warning service network in the face of escalating climate threats”, CGTN said. China also issued a plan to “create greener, safer and more livable environments” in the face of “intensifying global climate change”, said People’s Daily. China’s agriculture ministry also released a work plan to “ensure a bountiful autumn grain harvest” in the face of an “above-average number of extreme weather and climate events this year”, Xinhua reported.
NDRC ON HIGH DEMAND: The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, commented on recent high power demand, reported International Energy Net. It explained that the NDRC said China will “ensure an adequate and stable [power] supply” through effective management of coal production and will “integrate new energy’s supporting role” with coal’s role as a “bottom-line guarantee” (兜底保障) for power generation. Separately, the NDRC also highlighted “promoting…comprehensive transformation under dual-control of carbon mechanisms” as one of its “key tasks” for the rest of 2025, according to China Energy Net.
Spotlight
Guest spotlight: What an ‘ambitious’ 2035 electricity target looks like for China
A new study has found that China must at least double its wind and solar capacity by 2035 to align its power sector with a 2C global warming target.
In this issue, co-authors Zhenhua Zhang and Michael R Davidson, a PhD student and associate professor at the University of California, San Diego, respectively, explain how China could encourage climate ambition by setting power-sector targets.
The full article is available on Carbon Brief’s website.
China’s power sector is both the world’s largest emitter and the largest source of clean-energy growth.
This means it will be a key part of China’s next nationally determined contribution (NDC) – its climate pledge under the Paris Agreement for 2035.
In our new study, co-authored with experts from Tsinghua University, we model pathways for China’s power system up to 2035 that are consistent with its wider climate goals.
China has already surpassed its 2030 renewable deployment target, due to recent record-breaking annual additions.
However, new coal-power developments and rapid growth in electricity demand pose a threat to meeting China’s other targets.
Our research looks at the rate of growth from clean energy that would be required to not only meet China’s rapidly rising demand for electricity, but also to push down its coal generation and squeeze emissions from the power sector.
Staying below 2C
We simulate a range of scenarios for 2035, based around two different scenarios for China that are compatible with a global limit of 2C warming this century.
The basic 2C trajectory would see China’s power-sector emissions fall to 36% below 2024 levels by 2035, whereas the more ambitious 2C trajectory has a 42% decline.
It shows wind and solar energy would need to supply around 40% of China’s electricity by 2030, if the country aims to remain on track for 2C of global warming.
Solar and wind power generation would need to then rise to 50% by 2035, up from 17.9% in 2024.
This growth would substantially reduce the system’s reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, which would decrease to 35% of generation in 2030 and 25% in 2035.
The more ambitious scenario, which targets limiting global warming since the pre-industrial period to 1.5-2C, would see even higher wind and solar generation shares of 44% by 2030 and 54% by 2035.
Under the different scenarios, China’s wind and solar capacity would rise from around 1,700GW today to 2,350-2,780GW by 2030 and 2,910-3,800GW by 2030, requiring annual additions of 120-220GW.
Recent wind and solar additions have already exceeded this pace.
Challenges with grid integration and supporting infrastructure could slow future large-scale buildouts, meaning battery and grid capacity would need to rise by 6% and 5% per year to 2035, respectively to better integrate renewables into the grid.
The NDC and beyond
Due to the rapidly evolving economic and geopolitical situation, there are good reasons to expect that China’s topline emissions number in its NDC may be underwhelming. But there is an opportunity to emphasise and expand ambition within the power sector through additional sectoral targets.
While China has previously set a target for the absolute capacity of wind and solar, a goal for the share of electricity generation would set a narrower range for future power sector emissions.
Given current uncertainties around the pace of power demand growth, for example, a target for clean energy share might provide greater confidence than a capacity target alone.
Regardless of what targets are set, achieving the growth of clean energy modelled in our study would support China’s long-term climate commitments and demonstrate the nation’s intent to be a clean-energy powerhouse.
Watch, read, listen
‘UNSHAKEABLE’ GOAL: President Xi Jinping told attendees of the 2023 National Conference on Ecological and Environmental Protection that China’s commitment to its “dual-carbon” goals is “unshakeable”, according to a speech published in full, for the first time, by top ideological journal Qiushi.
CLIMATE REFUGEES: The United Nations Refugee Agency assistant high commissioner Raouf Mazou spoke with China Daily about China’s role in addressing “climate change-linked displacement”.
FINANCE FLOWS: The Environment China podcast explored what impact China’s push to develop “green finance” has had on the country’s energy transition.
PROVINCIAL PROGRESS: The Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs published a report assessing different provinces’ progress in reaching China’s “dual-carbon” goals.
1.35 billion
In tonnes per annum, the amount of coal-mine capacity that is “at various stages of development” in China, according to updated data from thinktank Global Energy Monitor – more capacity than “all other countries combined”.
New science
Communications Earth & Environment
A new study found a “significant increase” in both dry-hot and wet-hot extremes in China during the May-September warm season. The authors investigated changes in hot extremes in 136 Chinese cities over 1981-2022. They found that wet-hot extremes accounted for 36% of all hot days, while dry-hot days accounted for only 4%. The authors said their findings “underscore the urgent need for adaptive urban strategies to mitigate the growing risk of compound temperature-humidity extremes under ongoing urbanisation and climate change”.
China’s nationwide streamflow decline driven by landscape changes and human interventions
Science Advances
The amount of water running through rivers, or “streamflow”, has declined at more than 70% of Chinese hydrological stations over the past six decades, according to a new study. The authors combined data from more than 1,000 hydrological stations with climate models to produce a “comprehensive national assessment” of streamflow across China. They found that decreases in streamflow were mainly in northern China and were driven by changes in land use, but that increases in streamflow were found in the south, mainly driven by “climate change and variability”.
China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel, with contributions from Svetlana Onye. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 7 August 2025: Deadly floods; ‘Industrial Cthulhu’; Higher solar forecast appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China Briefing 7 August 2025: Deadly floods; ‘Industrial Cthulhu’; Higher solar forecast
Climate Change
“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos
SYDNEY, Wednesday 22 July 2026 — Beetaloo Energy has secured land from the NT Government for a massive $40 billion “hyperscale” AI data centre near Darwin, which would be powered by 2 gigawatts (GW) of gas power fracked directly from the Beetaloo basin, prompting calls from Greenpeace for urgent federal legislation.
The proposal marks a dangerous escalation in the AI data centre industry’s expansion, which threatens to entrench fossil fuel infrastructure for decades and put immense pressure on the region’s fragile water resources — while continuing to be unregulated.
Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “This disaster proposal for a 2GW gas-powered AI data centre in the NT is a shocking example of the unchecked expansion of hyperscale data centres in Australia. It is also, critically, more evidence for the urgent need for a moratorium on all new data centres until strong, binding regulations are put in place to protect our communities and climate.
“This proposal mirrors the frenzied, unchecked expansion currently wreaking havoc on communities in the US. We are seeing cowboy data centre operators treat Australia like a playground, steam-rolling ahead with projects that would lock down precious water resources and spike emissions, despite the overwhelming community opposition.
“Every day, more councils, communities and environmental groups are joining Greenpeace’s call for a moratorium on data centres, yet as of today there is still no system of safeguards or rules in place to regulate these companies.
“While Beetaloo Energy and the NT Government prepare to bulldoze ahead with this climate and water disaster, the Prime Minister is asleep at the wheel, promising to legislate a vague set of standards next year.
“Next year is too late, and anything less than mandating data centres cover their own energy demand, and then some, with new renewable energy is not enough.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Lucy Keller on 0491 135 308 or lucy.keller@greenpeace.org
Climate Change
Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise
Reports of human rights and environmental abuses linked to Chinese companies’ overseas investments in the mining and refining of minerals needed for the clean energy transition are on the rise, research by a monitoring group has found.
The number of recorded allegations of harm at projects tied to Chinese firms have increased every year since 2021, rising to 148 in 2025, according to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC). On Wednesday it released new data showing that a total of 434 allegations of abuse were made against Chinese-backed projects over the five-year period in projects across the world.
The world’s top cleantech manufacturer, China is also the leading financier of critical minerals projects worldwide. The country has committed more than $120 billion in foreign direct investment into mineral mining and processing since 2023, Australian think-tank Climate Energy Finance recently found.
“China plays a central role in global transition mineral supply chains, and as such has a unique opportunity to raise the bar on human rights and community engagement at every stage of mining,” said Michael Clements, BHRC’s executive director.
“While there have been encouraging developments, from stronger regulations to more company engagement, there remains a gap between human rights commitment and action,” he said.
The report comes as communities affected by Chinese-backed mineral projects have filed the first two cases to a Beijing-based mediation mechanism intended to bring willing Chinese companies to the discussion table with affected communities.
Allegations of harms on the rise
BHRC’s latest analysis – including data for the period 2023-2025 – covered mining, smelting and refining projects for 11 minerals considered key to manufacturing clean energy technologies such as batteries, EVs and solar panels needed to move away from climate-heating fossil fuels.
The highest number of abuses was recorded in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, which is used to make EV batteries. After the Indonesian government banned exports of raw nickel, Chinese firms invested billions of dollars to develop a large-scale nickel smelting and processing industry in the Southeast Asian country, largely powered by coal.
Other countries with a high number of recorded harms include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese firms dominate cobalt and copper production; Myanmar, where unregulated rare earths mining has caused widespread environmental destruction; Serbia, where Chinese-backed mining of some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits is swallowing land and homes, and Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments have turned the nation into Africa’s top lithium producer.
Growing risks for people and nature
Allegations tracked by BHRC included negative impacts on local livelihoods, health and land rights, workers’ health and safety and work-related deaths, as well as water pollution and environmental contamination. In addition, 18 people were attacked for raising concerns about Chinese transition mineral projects between 2023 and 2025.
The report shows that 10 Chinese companies, including Zijin Mining, Tsingshan Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, accounted for nearly two-thirds of all allegations recorded in the last five years. It found that some Chinese companies “still appear to turn a blind eye to these issues” but noted that several others have been more responsive to allegations of abuse. However, even among companies with human rights policies, implementation remains a challenge, BHRC warned.
Zijin Mining and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt repeatedly responded to the allegations of harm by saying they take environmental and social risks seriously and adhere to international standards. Tsingshan Group never responded to BHRC’s requests for comment.
Platform for dialogue between communities and Chinese firms
At the same time, Chinese authorities have made “significant progress” on introducing a more specific framework for managing environmental and social risks in overseas investment, BHRC said.
This includes global consultation on a draft Sustainable Mining Code, adherence to UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and greater emphasis on oversight of companies operating overseas.
The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) set up a mediation and consultation mechanism intended to provide a platform for dialogue between affected communities or civil society groups that have raised concerns and Chinese companies.
More than three years since its launch, the mechanism has now received its first two complaints from local communities and many more are considering filing a case, Margaux Day, executive director at the nonprofit Accountability Counsel, told an event hosted by Climate Home News last month.
“This is incredibly exciting in that it fills a governance and accountability gap where often communities who are seeking to protect their rights and the environment can’t reach someone who will respond to them,” she told the panel discussion at London Climate Action Week.
Climate Home News understands that the complaints were filed by communities in Latin America and Southeast Asia over labour rights and resettlement issues. No information about the cases has yet been made public. The mechanism’s secretariat did not respond to Climate Home News’ questions.
The mechanism was set up after the Chinese regulator for banks and insurers called on investor-level institutions to establish complaints bodies to hear from communities outside of China. But whether the new initiative will prove effective in tackling grievances remains an open question.
“Real potential” for better mining practices
Participation in the mechanism is voluntary for Chinese firms and it doesn’t have a fact-finding function, nor can it impose provisions for compensation or compliance with human rights standards.
But Day told Climate Home News that, if successful, it could bring companies to negotiate an outcome that is better for people and the planet and leads to more sustainable mining practice.
Chen Yu, an independent China advisor for campaign group Global Witness, agreed that the mechanism holds “real potential”.
“There exists nothing else at a similar level to promote dialogue between communities and Chinese mining companies in particular,” she said.
For companies, the mechanism opens “a channel for problem-solving and dialogue with communities”, she added, as “Chinese companies often remain cautious of approaching affected communities directly, afraid of making the problem bigger”.
However, Chen said the mechanism remains at an early stage of development, faces resourcing challenges and is not yet sufficiently understood by communities in mining areas or Chinese firms.
To help it address some of these challenges, the secretariat is currently seeking technical support from a range of organisations, including civil society groups. But, Chen said, “it will take time for the mechanism to show its value”.
The post Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise appeared first on Climate Home News.
Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise
Climate Change
Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture
Andreas Sieber is head of political strategy at 350.0g. Cat Abreu is director of the International Climate Politics Hub.
From the US abduction of Venezuela’s president at the start of this year to the Iran war which rumbles on, disruption is the new normal for global geopolitics, more often than not linked to conflict over supplies of oil and gas.
Events so far in 2026 – driven largely by the desire of the Trump administration to grab control of fossil fuels around the world – show that the climate community’s approach to energy diplomacy will have to evolve if we are to operate effectively and push for climate action in such a volatile landscape.
Today’s climate and energy governance must be able to cope with trade wars, genocide, fascism, spiralling inequality and challenges to multilateralism. The increasingly dominant paradigms of economic competitiveness, energy security and green industrialisation can help drive the transition but they also challenge our collective mission to deliver an equitable green shift.
US-China rivalry dominates
Longer-term geopolitical trends that are seeing power move from West to East and North to South have fuelled a US–China “superpower rivalry”, which is pulling the global economy apart and reining in trade.
A key question will be how the fracture “lines” are drawn: by the US and China, or also by other countries or blocs? Many governments will try to remain “in the middle” between the two giants to capture economic gains from both sides. Yet despite the language of “strategic autonomy”, Washington and Beijing may be in a position to force choices via market access, export controls and sanctions.
At first glance, this may not seem particularly relevant for climate and energy politics. But Huawei’s exclusion from 5G operations across the political West and India following the so-called Clean Network Campaign by the US government serves as a warning of what could happen to climate green tech.
And the recent debate to cut out Chinese inverters from European markets follows the same pattern – US security forces perceive a risk and start encouraging their allies to drop Chinese technology.
The new drivers: competition and security
Despite this fracturing geopolitical and economic context, energy transition is still happening. To ensure it is effective and equitable, we need to understand what is driving it and how to adapt climate politics so that it better responds to these drivers.
Put simply, China is supplying the world with low-cost renewables (roughly 60% of critical wind and 80% of solar components), batteries, EVs and other key elements. Other countries now also want their piece of the green tech pie and are forming industrial policies to get it.
It is this new competitiveness-driven logic that will shape the quest for decarbonisation, which has shifted from cooperating around the cost of tackling climate change to rivalry for the benefits of climate action.
Over 90% of new renewables projects are now cheaper than fossil alternatives. Gas-fired power is 3–4 times more expensive than solar and wind. In 2015, most decarbonisation policies were “traditional” emissions-cutting strategies like carbon pricing or net zero dates, whereas green industrial policies now underpin the majority.
Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister
Meanwhile, security has become a central driver of energy politics. We are living through the second major fossil fuel crisis in just four years. Elevated oil and gas prices will impose up to $1 trillion in additional costs on the global economy by the end of the year if disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz. Fossil fuel supply chains have exposed countries to conflict, coercion and brutal price shocks.
Fossil fuel volatility destabilises whole economies – higher fuel costs drive up food prices, increase political instability, and push millions into poverty and hunger. This incentivises governments to shield themselves from global shocks, especially in countries that are net fossil fuel importers and home to roughly three-quarters of the world’s population.
Yet security fears can cut both ways. The same instability that makes fossil fuel dependence untenable is also sharpening concern over China’s dominance of critical clean technologies and supply chains.
Equity, cooperation and the opportunity for change
Developing countries benefit from the rapid uptake of renewables enabled by low-cost Chinese technologies. But significant fiscal space and public investment is needed for the electricity grids and infrastructure required to fully unleash the energy transition, as well as for green industrialisation to diversify revenue streams.
Despite this, industrial-scale domestic production and ownership often remain out of reach for too many countries that lack the fiscal space to allow green supply chains to flourish and compete with their traditional industrial base. But more just and diversified green tech supply chains could be achieved with concomitant support.
Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?
For the first time in decades, the international order is being substantially reshaped. If within this context, decarbonisation is increasingly driven by green industrial policy, energy security and competitiveness, the climate policy community must better anticipate where these debates are moving. We must speak the same language, and enter the forums where decisions are made, including security, trade and bilateral or trilateral spaces.
We should build on an enlightened self interest recognising that cooperation remains essential and beneficial. This includes using the UN climate process differently: less as an ever-expanding negotiation machine, and more as a space for norm-setting, political alignment and deal-making. In an age of fragmentation, effective cooperation must not only be framed as necessary but thought of as a strategically compelling source of resilience and shared advantage.
The post Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture appeared first on Climate Home News.
Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture
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