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The past three years have been exceptionally warm globally.

In 2023, global temperatures reached a new high, after they significantly exceeded expectations.

This record was surpassed in 2024 – the first year where average global temperatures were 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.

Now, 2025 is on track to be the second- or third-warmest year on record.

What has caused this apparent acceleration in warming has been subject to a lot of attention in both the media and the scientific community.

Dozens of papers have been published investigating the different factors that could have contributed to these record temperatures.

In 2024, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) discussed potential drivers for the warmth in a special section of its “state of the global climate” report, while the American Geophysical Union ran a session on the topic at its annual meeting.

In this article, Carbon Brief explores four different factors that have been proposed for the exceptional warmth seen in recent years. These are:

Carbon Brief’s analysis finds that a combination of these factors explains most of the unusual warmth observed in 2024 and half of the difference between observed and expected warming in 2023.

However, natural fluctuations in the Earth’s climate may have also played a role in the exceptional temperatures, alongside signs of declining cloud cover that may have implications for the sensitivity of the climate to human-caused emissions.

An unusually warm three years

Between 1970 and 2014, average surface temperatures rose at a fairly steady rate of around 0.18C per decade.

Set against this long-term trend, temperature increases during the period from 2015 to 2022 were on the upper end of what would be expected.

The increases seen in 2023, 2024 and 2025 were well outside of that range.

The high temperatures of the past three years reflect a broader acceleration in the rate of warming over the past decade.

However, the past three years were unusually warm, even when compared to other years in the 2010s and 2020s.

Record-breaking warmth in 2023 meant that it beat the prior warmest year of 2016 by 0.17C – the largest magnitude of a new record in the past 140 years.

The year 2024 then swiftly broke 2023’s record, becoming the first year where average global temperatures exceeded 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.

The 10 months of data available for 2025 indicates that the year is likely to be slightly cooler than 2023 – though it is possible it may tie or be slightly warmer.

The figure below shows global surface temperatures between 1970 and 2025. (The figures for 2025 include uncertainty based on the remaining three months of the year.)

It includes a smoothed average based on temperature data for 1970-2022 that takes into account some acceleration of warming – and then extrapolates that smoothed average forward to 2023-25 to determine what the expected temperature for those years would have been. (This follows the approach used in the WMO’s “state of the global climate 2024” report.)

Chart showing annual global surface temperatures and the long-term average warming
Global average surface temperature changes between 1970 and 2024 using the WMO average of six groups that report global surface temperature records (dark blue), estimated 2025 temperatures and uncertainties (red) based on the first nine months of the year and a long-term average locally linear smooth (light blue).

This approach calculates how much warmer the past three years were than would be expected given the long-term trend in temperatures.

It shows that 2023 was around 0.18C warmer than expected, 2024 was a massive 0.25C warmer and 2025 is likely to be 0.11C warmer.

Researchers have identified a number of potential drivers of unexpected warmth over 2023-25. Here, Carbon Brief looks at the evidence for each one.

A weirdly behaving El Niño event

El Niño is a climate pattern of unusually warm sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the tropical Pacific that naturally occurs every two to seven years. Strong El Niño years generally have warmer global temperatures, with the largest effect generally occurring in the months after El Niño conditions peak (when SSTs reach their highest levels in the tropical Pacific).

A relatively strong El Niño event developed in the latter half of 2023, peaking around November before fading in the spring of 2024.

This event was the fourth-strongest El Niño ever recorded, as measured according to SSTs in the Niño 3.4 region in the central tropical Pacific. However, it was notably weaker than the El Niño events in both 1998 and 2016.

This can be seen in the chart below, which shows the strength of El Niño events (red shading) since the 1980s. (The blue shading indicates La Niña events – the opposite part of the cycle to El Niño, which results in cooler SSTs in the tropical Pacific.)

Char showing El Niño and La Niña Index (Niño 3.4 region)
NOAA’s Niño 3.4 region Oceanic Niño Index using detrended data from ERSSTv5.

(It is worth noting that measuring the strength of El Niño events is not entirely straightforward. Other tools used by scientists to monitor changes to El Niño – such as the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) multivariate ENSO index – show the 2023-24 event was much weaker than indicated in the Niño 3.4 dataset.)

Global surface air temperatures tend to be elevated by around 0.1-0.2C in the six months after the peak of a strong El Niño event – defined here as when SSTs in the Niño 3.4 region reach 1.5C above normal.

The figure below shows the range of global temperature change for the 12 months before and 22 months after the peak of all 10 strong El Niño events since 1950. The light line represents the average of past strong El Niño events, the dark blue line the temperature change observed during the 2023-24 event and the shaded blue area the 5-95th percentile range.

Chart showing that the recent El Niño was unusual compared with strong El Niño events
Global mean surface temperatures for the 12 months prior to peak El Niño conditions and the 22 months following for strong El Niño events. Calculations by Carbon Brief using data from Copernicus/ECMWF’s ERA5 and NOAA’s Oceanic Niño Index.

The figure shows the 2023-24 El Niño was quite unusual compared to other strong El Niño events since 1970. Global temperatures rose to around 0.4C above expected levels – which is on the high side of previous El Niños.

The heat also came early, with high temperatures showing up around four months before the El Niño event peaked. This early heat is unlike any other El Niño event in modern history and is one of the reasons why 2023’s global temperatures were so unexpectedly warm.

Global temperatures remained elevated for a full 18 months after the El Niño peaked, well after conditions in the tropical Pacific shifted into neutral conditions – and even after mild La Niña conditions developed at the end of 2024 and into early 2025.

This figure does not explain how much of this unusual heat was actually caused by El Niño, compared to other factors, but it does suggest that El Niño behaviour alone does not fully explain unusually high temperatures in recent years.

Based on the historical relationship between El Niño and global temperatures, Carbon Brief estimates that El Niño contributed a modest 0.013C to 2023 temperatures and a more substantial 0.128C to 2024 temperatures, albeit with large uncertainties. (See “methodology” section at the end for details.)

However, it is possible that this 2023 estimate is too low. There are some suggestions in the literature that 2023-24 El Niño’s early warmth may have been caused by the rapid transition out of a particularly extended La Niña event. There are indications that temperatures have spiked in similar situations further back in the historical temperature record.

Falling sulphur dioxide emissions

Sulphur dioxide (SO2) is an aerosol that is emitted into the lower atmosphere by the burning of coal and oil. It has a powerful climate cooling effect – Carbon Brief analysis shows that global emissions of SO2 have masked about one-third of historical warming.

Global SO2 emissions have declined around 40% over the past 18 years, as countries have increasingly prioritised reducing air pollution, including through the installation of scrubbers at coal plants.

These declines have been particularly concentrated in China, which has seen a 70% decline in SO2 emissions since 2007. In addition, a rule introduced for international shipping in 2020 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has resulted in an 80% decline in the sulphur content of shipping fuel used around the world.

The decline of SO2 emissions is shown in the figure below.

Chart showing that China and international shipping are large drivers of recent SO2 emissions decline
Annual SO2 emissions from China, international shipping and the rest of the world. Data from the Community Earth atmospheric Data System (CEDS).

Shipping in particular has been suggested as a potential culprit for recent temperatures, given that ships emit SO2 over oceans where the air tends to be cleaner and so emissions have a bigger effect.

Seven of the eight studies that have explored the temperature impact of the IMO regulations have suggested a relatively modest effect, in the range of 0.03-0.08C. However, one study – led by former NASA scientist Dr James Hansen – calculated a much stronger effect of 0.2C that would explain virtually all the unusual warmth of recent years.

The figure below shows Carbon Brief’s estimate of the global average surface temperature changes caused by the low-sulphur shipping fuel rules, using the estimates produced by all eight studies. The central estimate (dark blue line) is relatively low, at around 0.05C, but the uncertainty range (light blue shading) across the studies remains large.

Chart showing the range of estimated warming effects of the IMO 202 low sulphur shipping rules
Range (5th to 95th percentile) and central estimate (50th percentile) of simulated global average surface temperature responses to the IMO 2020 regulations across the radiative forcing estimates in the literature. Analysis by Carbon Brief using the FaIR model.

Overall, Carbon Brief’s analysis finds that around 0.04C of warming over 2020-23 and 0.05C of warming over 2020-24 can be attributed to SO2 declines from shipping and other sources.

However, this approach might slightly overstate the effects of SO2 on the exceptional temperatures of the past three years, as shipping and other SO2 declines would have had some effect on 2021 and 2022 as well.

It is also worth noting that the total effects of SO2 declines on global temperatures have been considerably larger and are estimated to be responsible for around one-quarter of all warming since 2007.

However, these SO2 decreases occurred over a long period of time and do not clearly explain the recent spike in temperatures.

An unusual volcanic eruption in Tonga

In early 2022, the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai underwater volcano erupted spectacularly, sending a plume 55km into the atmosphere. This was by far the most explosive volcanic eruption since Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991.

This was a highly unusual volcanic eruption, which vaporised vast amounts of sea water and lofted it high into the atmosphere. Overall, around 146m metric tonnes of water vapour ended up in the stratosphere, which is the layer of the atmosphere above the troposphere.

Water vapour is a powerful greenhouse gas. While it is short-lived in the lower atmosphere, it can stick around for years in the stratosphere, where it has a significant warming effect on the climate.

The figure below shows the concentration of water vapour in the stratosphere between 2005 and mid-2025. It shows how the 2022 eruption increased atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gas by around 15%. More than half the added water vapour has subsequently fallen out of the upper atmosphere.

Chart showing upper atmosphere water vapour content
Upper atmosphere water vapor content from NASA’s Aura MLS satellite. Figure from Dr Robert Rohde.

Most early studies of the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai volcano focused specifically on the effects of stratospheric water vapour. These tended to show strong warming in the lower stratosphere and cooling in the middle-to-upper stratosphere, but only a slight warming effect on global surface temperatures of around 0.05C.

Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai had much lower sulphur emissions than prior explosive eruptions, such as Pinatubo and El Chichon. However it put 0.51.5m tonnes of sulphur into the stratosphere – the most from an eruption since Pinatubo.

Studies that included both sulphur and water vapour effects tend to find that the net effect of the eruption on surface temperatures was slight global cooling, concentrated in the southern hemisphere.

By using the estimates published in a 2024 study published in Geophysical Research Letters, which used the FaIR climate emulator model, Carbon Brief estimates that the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai eruption cooled global surface temperatures by -0.01C in 2023 and -0.02C in 2024.

This suggests that the eruption was likely only a minor contributor to recent global surface temperatures.

A stronger-than-expected solar cycle

The source of almost all energy on Earth is the sun. Over hundreds of millions of years, variations in solar output have a big impact on the global climate.

Thankfully, over shorter periods of time the sun is remarkably stable, helping keep the Earth’s climate habitable for life. (Big changes – such as ice ages – have more to do with variations in the Earth’s orbit than changes in solar output.)

However, slight changes in solar output do occur – and when they do, they can influence climate change over shorter periods of time. The most important of these is the roughly 11-year solar cycle, which is linked with the sun’s magnetic field and results in changes in the number of sunspots and amount of solar energy reaching Earth.

The figure below shows a best-estimate of changes in total solar irradiance since 1980, based on satellite observations. Total solar irradiance is a measure of the overall amount of solar energy that reaches the top of the Earth’s atmosphere and is measured in watts per metre squared.

Chart showing the recent solar cycle has been relatively strong
Total solar irradiance from the PMOD composite (blue) along with a smoothed average (red) from 1980 to 2025.

The 11-year solar cycle is relatively modest compared to the sun’s total output, varying only a few watts per metre squared between peak and trough – amounting to around 0.01% of solar output. However, these changes can result in variations of up to 0.1C in global temperatures within a decade.

The most recent solar cycle – solar cycle 25 – began around 2020 and has been the strongest solar cycle measured since 1980. It was stronger than most models had anticipated and likely contributed to around 0.04C global warming in 2023 and 0.07C in 2024.

Putting together the drivers

By combining earlier estimates of different factors contributing to 2023 and 2024 global surface temperatures, about half of 2023’s unusual warmth and almost all of 2024’s unusual warmth can be effectively explained.

This is illustrated in the figure below, which shows the five different factors discussed earlier – El Niño, shipping SO2, Chinese SO2, the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai volcano and solar cycle changes – along with their respective uncertainties.

The sum of all the factors is shown in the “combined” bar, while the actual warming compared to expectations is shown in red.

The upper chart shows 2023, while the lower one shows 2024.

Charts showing the components of 2023 and 2024's above-expected warmth
Attribution of 2023 and 2024 anomalous warmth. Blue bars show individual factors and their uncertainties, the orange bar shows the combined effects and combination of uncertainties and the green bar shows the actual warming compared with expectations. Adapted from Figure 12 in WMO’s state of the global climate 2024 report.

It is important to note that the first bar includes both El Niño and natural year-to-year variability; the height of the bar reflects the best estimate of El Niño’s effects, while the uncertainty range encompasses year-to-year variability in global temperatures that may be – at least in part – unrelated to El Niño.

The role of natural climate variability

Large natural variability to the Earth’s climate is one of the main reasons why the combined value of the different drivers of expected warmth in 2023 has an uncertainty range that exceeds the observed warming – even though the best-estimate of combined factors only explains half of temperatures.

Or, to put it another way, there is up 0.15C difference in global temperatures year-on-year that cannot be explained solely by El Niño, human-driven global warming, or natural “forcings” – such as volcanoes or variations in solar output.

The figure below shows the difference between actual and expected warming in the global temperature record for every year in the form of a histogram. The vertical zero line represents the expectation given long-term global warming and the other vertical lines indicate the warming seen in 2023, 2024 and 2025.

The height of each blue bar represents the number of years over 1850-2024 when the average global temperature was that far (above or below) the expected level of warming. 

Chart showing that the difference from expected warming shows year-to-year variability
Histogram of residuals between actual and expected warming for all years since 1850, with the values for the past three years highlighted. Expected warming based on a 20-year locally linear smooth of the data.

Based on the range of year-to-year variability, temperatures would be expected to spike as far above the long-term trend as they did in 2023 once every 25 years, on average. The year 2024 would be a one-in-88 year event, whereas 2025 would be a less-unusual, one-in-seven year event.

These likelihoods for the past three years are sensitive to the approach used to determine what the longer-term warming level should be.

In this analysis, Carbon Brief used a local smoothing approach (known as locally estimated scatterplot smoothing) to determine the expected temperatures, following the approach used in the WMO “state of the climate 2024” report.

This approach results in a warming of 1.28C in 2023 and 1.30C in 2024, against which observed temperatures are compared.

Other published estimates put the longer-term warming in 2024 notably higher.

Earlier this year, the scientists behind the “Indicators of Global Climate Change” (IGCC) report estimated that human activity caused 1.36C of recent warming in 2024. They also found a slightly lower overall warming level for 2024 – 1.52C, as opposed to the WMO’s 1.55C – because they looked exclusively at datasets used by IPCC AR6. (This meant estimates from the Copernicus/ECMWF’s ERA5 dataset were not included.)

Based on climate simulations, the IGCC report finds the likelihood of 2024’s warmth to be a one-in-six year event and 2023’s a one-in-four event.

Using the same assumptions as the IGCC, Carbon Brief’s approach calculates that 2024 would be a less-common, one-in-18 year event.

However, the IGCC estimate of current human-induced warming is based on the latest estimates of human and natural factors warming the climate. That means that it already accounts for additional warming from low-sulphur shipping fuel, East Asian aerosols and other factors discussed above.

Therefore, the results from these two analyses are not necessarily inconsistent: natural climate variability (including El Niño) played a key role – but this came in addition to other factors. Natural fluctuations in the Earth’s climate alone would have been unlikely to result in the extreme global temperatures seen in 2023, 2024 and 2025.

A cloudy picture

Even if unusual recent global warmth can be mostly attributed to a combination of El Niño, falling SO2 emissions, the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai volcano, solar cycle changes and natural climate variability, there are a number of questions that remain unanswered.

Most important is what the record warmth means for the climate going forward. Is it likely to revert to the long-term average warming level, or does it reflect an acceleration in the underlying rate of warming – and, if so, what might its causes be?

As explained by Carbon Brief in a 2023 article, climate models have suggested that warming will speed up. Some of this acceleration is built into the analysis presented here, which includes a slightly faster rate of warming in recent years than has characterised the period since 1970.

But there are broader questions about what – beyond declining SO2 and other aerosols – is driving this acceleration.

Research recently published in the journal Science offered some potential clues. It found a significant decline in planetary reflectivity – known as albedo – over the past decade, associated with a reduced low-level cloud cover that is unprecedented in the satellite record.

The authors suggest it could be due to a combination of three different factors: natural climate variability, changing SO2 and other aerosol emissions and the effects of global warming on cloud reflectivity.

Natural climate variability seems unlikely to have played a major role in reduced cloud cover, given that it was relatively stable until 2015. However, it is hard to fully rule it out given the relatively short satellite record.

Reductions in SO2 emissions are expected to reduce cloud reflectivity, but the magnitude of the observed cloud reflectivity changes are much larger than models simulate.

Models might be underestimating the impact of aerosols on the climate. But, if this were the case, it would indicate that climate sensitivity might be on the higher end of the range of model estimates, because models that simulate stronger aerosol cooling effects tend to have higher climate sensitivity.

Finally, cloud cover might be changing and becoming less reflective as a result of warming. Cloud responses to climate change are one of the largest drivers of uncertainty in future warming. One of the main reasons that some climate models find a higher climate sensitivity is due to their simulation of less-reflective clouds in a warming world.

The Science study concludes that the 2023 heat “may be here to stay” if the cloud-related albedo decline was not “solely” caused by natural variability. This would also suggest the Earth’s climate sensitivity may be closer to the upper range of current estimates, it notes.

Methodology

Carbon Brief built on work previously published in the IGCC 2024 and WMO state of the global climate 2024 reports that explores the role of different factors in the extreme temperatures in 2023, 2024 and 2025.

The impact of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) on the temperatures was estimated using a linear regression of the annual mean global temperature anomaly on the Feb/Mar Niño 3.4 index. This resulted in an impact of −0.07C, 0.01C and 0.13C for 2022, 2023 and 2024 respectively (with a 95% confidence interval of ±0.13 ºC).

It is important to note that the uncertainties in the ENSO response estimated here also incorporate other sources of unforced internal (modes of variability in other basins such as AMV), and potentially some forced variability. The bar in the combined figure is labelled “El Niño and variability” to reflect this.

For details on calculations of the temperature impact of shipping and Chinese SO2 declines, see Carbon Brief’s explainer on the climate impact of changing aerosol emissions.

Solar cycle 25 was both slightly earlier and slightly stronger than prior expectations with a total solar irradiance anomaly of 0.97 watts per metre squared in 2023 relative to the mean of the prior 20 years. This resulted in an estimated radiative forcing of approximately 0.17 watts per metre squared and an estimated global surface temperature increase of 0.07C (0.05C to 0.10C) with a one- to two-year lag based on a 2015 study. Thus, the impact on 2023 and 2024 is around 0.04C and 0.07C, respectively (+/- 0.025C). This is a bit higher warming than is given by the FaIR model, as the 2015 study is based on global models that have ozone responses to the UV changes, which amplifies the temperature effects a bit.

The Hunga Tonga-Hunga Haʻapai volcanic eruption added both SO2 and water vapour to the stratosphere (up to 55km in altitude). The rapid oxidation of SO2 to sulphate aerosol dominated the radiative forcing for the first two years after the eruption. As a result, the net radiative forcing at the tropopause was likely negative; −0.04 watts per metre squared and −0.15 watts per metre squared in 2022 and 2023, respectively, implying a temperature impact of -0.02C (-0.01C to -0.03C) calculated using the FaIR model.

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Analysis: World’s biggest historic polluter – the US – is pulling out of UN climate treaty

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The US, which has announced plans to withdraw from the global climate treaty – the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – is more historically responsible for climate change than any other country or group.

Carbon Brief analysis shows that the US has emitted a total of 542bn tonnes of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) since 1850, by burning fossil fuels, cutting down trees and other activities.

This is the largest contribution to the Earth’s warming climate by far, as shown in the figure below, with China’s 336GtCO2 significantly behind in second and Russia in third at 185GtCO2.

Chart showing that the US is more responsible for climate change than anyone else
Top 10 countries in terms of their cumulative historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, cement, land use, land use change and forestry, 1850-2025, billion tonnes. Source: Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from Jones et al (2023), Lamboll et al (2023), the Global Carbon Project, CDIAC, Our World in Data, the International Energy Agency and Carbon Monitor.

The US is responsible for more than a fifth of the 2,651GtCO2 that humans have pumped into the atmosphere between 1850 and 2025 as a result of fossil fuels, cement and land-use change.

China is responsible for another 13%, with the 27 nations of the EU making up another 12%.

In total, these cumulative emissions have used up more than 95% of the carbon budget for limiting global warming to 1.5C and are the predominant reason the Earth is already nearly 1.5C hotter than in pre-industrial times.

The US share of global warming is even more disproportionate when considering that its population of around 350 million people makes up just 4% of the global total.

On the basis of current populations, the US’s per-capita cumulative historical emissions are around 7 times higher than those for China, more than double the EU’s and 25 times those for India.

The US’s historical emissions of 542GtCO2 are larger than the combined total of the 133 countries with the lowest cumulative contributions, a list that includes Saudi Arabia, Spain and Nigeria. Collectively, these 133 countries have a population of more than 3 billion people.

See Carbon Brief’s previous detailed analysis of historical responsibility for climate change for more details on the data sources and methodology, as well as consumption-based emissions.

Additionally, in 2023, Carbon Brief published an article that looked at the “radical” impact of reassigning responsibility for historical emissions to colonial rulers in the past.

This approach has a very limited impact on the US, which became independent before the vast majority of its historical emissions had taken place.

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Our strategy for 2026 and beyond

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Our strategy for 2026 and beyond

During his Fall Conference opening remarks last fall, CCL Executive Director Ricky Bradley outlined the next chapter of CCL’s work — one that is firmly rooted in our values, but guided by a sharper strategy. Now that 2026 is getting underway, we’re entering that next chapter in earnest.

“Today’s political landscape, and our country, desperately needs our respectful approach and our bridge-building ethos — and the climate needs our efforts to be more effective than ever,” Ricky said in November.

“Over the past few months, CCL’s leadership team and I have been hard at work on a strategic planning process to achieve that. We’ve drilled down on everything, getting clear about CCL’s mission, our contributions to the overall goal of solving climate change, and the training and programs necessary to get us there.”

Our work identified three elements that we think are crucial to advancing climate solutions in Congress. For members of Congress to pass climate policy, they need to see climate as a salient issue — in other words, they need to think it matters to people, including the people they listen to most. They need to see climate action as feasible. And engaging on the issue needs to be politically safe. Satisfying these conditions is how we’re going to achieve the legislative action necessary to solve climate change.

Part of getting there is making sure that our volunteers have the skills they need to transcend partisanship, build trust across divides, and forge the relationships and alliances that lead to enduring climate action. Enter: Our new BRIDGE Advocacy Program. Launching this weekend during our January Monthly Meeting, this robust new program will strengthen your communication skills and deepen your relationships with congressional offices in the year ahead.

All of this and more is outlined in CCL’s 2026 Strategic Plan document. Dive into the strategic plan to see CCL’s objectives for the new year and beyond, and learn more on Saturday during our first monthly meeting of 2026. We can’t wait to enter this next chapter with you!

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Our strategy for 2026 and beyond

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Analysis: UK renewables enjoy record year in 2025 – but gas power still rises

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The UK’s fleet of wind, solar and biomass power plants all set new records in 2025, Carbon Brief analysis shows, but electricity generation from gas still went up.

The rise in gas power was due to the end of UK coal generation in late 2024 and nuclear power hitting its lowest level in half a century, while electricity exports grew and imports fell.

In addition, there was a 1% rise in UK electricity demand – after years of decline – as electric vehicles (EVs), heat pumps and data centres connected to the grid in larger numbers.

Other key insights from the data include:

  • Electricity demand grew for the second year in a row to 322 terawatt hours (TWh), rising by 4TWh (1%) and hinting at a shift towards steady increases, as the UK electrifies.
  • Renewables supplied more of the UK’s electricity than any other source, making up 47% of the total, followed by gas (28%), nuclear (11%) and net imports (10%).
  • The UK set new records for electricity generation from wind (87TWh, +5%), solar (19TWh, +31%) and biomass (41TWh, +2%), as well as for renewables overall (152TWh, +6%).
  • The UK had its first full year without any coal power, compared with 2TWh of generation in 2024, ahead of the closure of the nation’s last coal plant in September of that year.
  • Nuclear power was at its lowest level in half a century, generating just 36TWh (-12%), as most of the remaining fleet paused for refuelling or outages.

Overall, UK electricity became slightly more polluting in 2025, with each kilowatt hour linked to 126g of carbon dioxide (gCO2/kWh), up 2% from the record low of 124gCO2/kWh, set last year.

The National Energy System Operator (NESO) set a new record for the use of low-carbon sources – known as “zero-carbon operation” – reaching 97.7% for half an hour on 1 April 2025.

However, NESO missed its target of running the electricity network for at least 30 minutes in 2025 without any fossil fuels.

The UK inched towards separate targets set by the government, for 95% of electricity generation to come from low-carbon sources by 2030 and for this to cover 100% of domestic demand.

However, much more rapid progress will be needed to meet these goals.

Carbon Brief has published an annual analysis of the UK’s electricity generation in 2024, 2023, 2021, 2019, 2018, 2017 and 2016.

Record renewables

The UK’s fleet of renewable power plants enjoyed a record year in 2025, with their combined electricity generation reaching 152TWh, a 6% rise from a year earlier.

Renewables made up 47% of UK electricity supplies, another record high. The rise of renewables is shown in the figure below, which also highlights the end of UK coal power.

While the chart makes clear that gas-fired electricity generation has also declined over the past 15 years, there was a small rise in 2025, with output from the fuel reaching 91TWh. This was an increase of 5TWh (5%) and means gas made up 28% of electricity supplies overall.

The rise in gas-fired generation was the result of rising demand and another fall in nuclear power output, which reached the lowest level in half a century, while net imports and coal also declined.

UK electricity supplies by source 2010-2025
UK electricity supplies by source 2010-2025, terawatt hours (TWh). Net imports are the sum of imports minus exports. Renewables include wind, biomass, solar and hydro. The chart excludes minor sources, such as oil, which makes up less than 2% of the total. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from NESO and DESNZ.

The year began with the UK’s sunniest spring and by mid-December had already become the sunniest year on record. This contributed to a 5TWh (31%) surge in electricity generation from solar power, helped by a jump of roughly one-fifth in installed generating capacity.

The new record for solar power generation of 19TWh in 2025 comes after years of stagnation, with electricity output from the technology having climbed just 15% in five years.

The UK’s solar capacity reached 21GW in the third quarter of 2025. This is a substantial increase of 3 gigawatts (GW) or 18% year-on-year.

These are the latest figures available from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ). The DESNZ timeseries has been revised to reflect previously missing data.

UK wind power also set a new record in 2025, reaching 87TWh, up 4TWh (5%). Wind conditions in 2025 were broadly similar to those in 2024, with the uptick in generation due to additional capacity.

The UK’s wind capacity reached 33GW in the third quarter of 2025, up 1GW (4%) from a year earlier. The 1.2GW Dogger Bank A in the North Sea has been ramping up since autumn 2025 and will be joined by the 1.2GW Dogger Bank B in 2026, as well as the 1.4GW Sofia project.

These sites were all awarded contracts during the government’s third “contracts for difference” (CfD) auction round and will be paid around £53 per megawatt hour (MWh) for the electricity they generate. This is well below current market prices, which currently sit at around £80/MWh.

Results from the seventh auction round, which is currently underway, will be announced in January and February 2026. Prices are expected to be significantly higher than in the third round, as a result of cost inflation.

Nevertheless, new offshore wind capacity is expected to be deliverable at “no additional cost to the billpayer”, according to consultancy Aurora Energy Research.

The UK’s biomass energy sites also had a record year in 2025, with output nudging up by 1TWh (2%) to 41TWh. Approximately two-thirds (roughly 27TWh) of this total is from wood-fired power plants, most notably the Drax former coal plant in Yorkshire, which generated 15TWh in 2024.

The government recently awarded new contracts to Drax that will apply from 2027 onwards and will see the amount of electricity it generates each year roughly halve, to around 6TWh. The government is also consulting on how to tighten sustainability rules for biomass sourcing.

Rising demand

The UK’s electricity demand has been falling for decades due to a combination of more efficient appliances and lightbulbs, as well as ongoing structural shifts in the economy.

Experts have been saying for years that at some point this trend would be reversed, as the UK shifts to electrified heat and transport supplies using EVs and heat pumps.

Indeed, the Climate Change Committee (CCC) has said that demand would more than double by 2050, with electrification forming a key plank of the UK’s efforts to reach net-zero.

Yet there has been little sign of this effect to date, with electricity demand continuing to fall outside single-year rebounds after economic shocks, such as the 2020 Covid lockdowns.

The data for 2025 shows hints that this turning point for electricity demand may finally be taking place. UK demand increased by 4TWh (1%) to 322TWh in 2025, after a 1TWh rise in 2024.

After declining for more than two decades since a peak in 2005, this is the first time in 20 years that UK demand has gone up for two years in a row, as shown in the figure below.

Annual UK electricity demand 2000-2025
Annual UK electricity demand 2000-2025, terawatt hours (TWh). The truncated y-axis shows recent changes more clearly. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from NESO and DESNZ.

While detailed data on underlying electricity demand is not available, it is clear that the shift to EVs and heat pumps is playing an important role in the recent uptick.

There are now around 1.8m EVs on the UK’s roads and another 1m plug-in hybrids. Of this total, some 0.6m new EVs and plug-in hybrids were bought in 2025 alone. In addition, around 100,000 heat pumps are being installed each year. Sales of both technologies are rising fast.

Estimates from the NESO “future energy scenarios” point to an additional 2.0TWh of demand from new EVs in 2025, compared with 2024. They also suggest that newly installed heat pumps added around 0.2TWh of additional demand, while data centres added 0.4TWh.

By 2030, NESO’s scenarios suggest that electricity use for these three sources alone will rise by around 30TWh, equivalent to around 10% of total demand in 2025.

EVs would have the biggest impact, adding 17TWh to demand by 2030, NESO says, with heat pumps adding another 3TWh. Data-centre growth is highly uncertain, but could add 12TWh.

Gas growth

At the same time as UK electricity demand was growing by 4TWh in 2025, the country also lost a total of 10TWh of supply as a result of a series of small changes.

First, 2025 was the UK’s first full year without coal power since 1881, resulting in the loss of 2TWh of generation. Second, the UK’s nuclear fleet saw output falling to the lowest level in half a century, after a series of refuelling breaks and outages, which cut generation by 5TWh.

Third, after a big jump in imports in 2024, the UK saw a small decline in 2025, as well as a more notable increase in the amount of electricity exported to other countries. This pushed the country’s net imports down by 1TWh (4%).

The scale of cross-border trade in electricity is expected to increase as the UK has significantly expanded the number of interconnections with other markets.

However, the government’s clean-power targets for 2030 imply that the UK would become a net exporter, sending more electricity overseas than it receives from other countries. At present, it remains a significant net importer, with these contributions accounting for 109% of supplies.

Finally, other sources of generation – including oil – also declined in 2025, reducing UK supplies by another 2TWh, as shown in the figure below.

Change in electricity supply by source between 2024 and 2025
Change in electricity supply by source between 2024 and 2025, TWh. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from NESO and DESNZ.

These losses in UK electricity supply were met by the already-mentioned increases in generation from gas, solar, wind and biomass, as shown in the figure above.

The government’s targets for decarbonising the UK’s electricity supplies will face similar challenges in the years to come as electrification – and, potentially, data centres – continue to push up demand.

All but one of the UK’s existing nuclear power plants are set to retire by 2030, meaning the loss of another 27TWh of nuclear generation.

This will be replaced by new nuclear capacity, but only slowly. The 3.2GW Hinkley Point C plant in Somerset is set to start operating in 2030 at the earliest and its sister plant, Sizewell C in Suffolk, not until at least another five years later.

Despite backing from ministers for small modular reactors, the timeline for any buildout is uncertain, with the latest government release referring to the “mid-2030s”.

Meanwhile, biomass generation is likely to decline as the output of Drax is scaled back from 2027.

Stalling progress

Taken together, the various changes in the UK’s electricity supplies in 2025 mean that efforts to decarbonise the grid stalled, with a small increase in emissions per unit of generation.

The 2% increase in carbon intensity to 126gCO2/kWh is illustrated in the figure below and comes after electricity was the “cleanest ever” in 2024, at 124gCO2/kWh.

Carbon intensity of UK electricity supplies
Carbon intensity of UK electricity supplies, gCO2/kWh. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from NESO and DESNZ.

The stalling progress on cleaning up the UK’s grid reflects the balance of record renewables, rising demand and rising gas generation, along with poor output from nuclear power.

Nevertheless, a series of other new records were set during 2025.

NESO ran the transmission grid on the island of Great Britain (GB; namely, England, Wales and Scotland) with a record 97.7% “zero-carbon operation” (ZCO) on 1 April 2025.

Note that this measure excludes gas plants that also generate heat – known as combined heat and power, or CHP – as well as waste incinerators and all other generators that do not connect to the transmission network, which means that it does not include most solar or onshore wind.

NESO was unable to meet its target – first set in 2019 – for 100% ZCO during 2025, meaning it did not succeed in running the transmission grid without any fossil fuels for half an hour.

Other records set in 2025 include:

  • GB ran on 100% clean power, after accounting for exports, for a record 87 hours in 2025, up from 64.5 hours in 2024.
  • Total GB renewable generation from wind, solar, biomass and hydro reached a record 31.3GW from 13:30-14:00 on 4 July 2025, meeting 84% of demand.
  • GB wind generation reached a record 23.8GW for half an hour on 5 December 2025, when it met 52% of GB demand.
  • GB solar reached a record 14.0GW at 13:00 on 8 July 2025, when it met 40% of demand.

The government has separate targets for at least 95% of electricity generation and 100% of demand on the island of Great Britain to come from low-carbon sources by 2030.

These goals, similar to the NESO target, exclude Northern Ireland, CHP and waste incinerators. However, they include distributed renewables, such as solar and onshore wind.

These definitions mean it is hard to measure progress independently. The most recent government figures show that 74% of qualifying generation in GB was from low-carbon sources in 2024.

Carbon Brief’s figures for the whole UK show that low-carbon sources made up a record 58% of electricity supplies overall in 2025, up marginally from a year earlier.

Similarly, low-carbon sources made up 65% of electricity generation in the UK overall. This was unchanged from a year earlier.

Methodology

The figures in the article are from Carbon Brief analysis of data from DESNZ Energy Trends, chapter 5 and chapter 6, as well as from NESO. The figures from NESO are for electricity supplied to the grid in Great Britain only and are adjusted here to include Northern Ireland.

In Carbon Brief’s analysis, the NESO numbers are also adjusted to account for electricity used by power plants on site and for generation by plants not connected to the high-voltage national grid.

NESO already includes estimates for onshore windfarms, but does not cover industrial gas combined heat and power plants and those burning landfill gas, waste or sewage gas.

Carbon intensity figures from 2009 onwards are taken directly from NESO. Pre-2009 estimates are based on the NESO methodology, taking account of fuel use efficiency for earlier years.

The carbon intensity methodology accounts for lifecycle emissions from biomass. It includes emissions for imported electricity, based on the daily electricity mix in the country of origin.

DESNZ historical electricity data, including years before 2009, is adjusted to align with other figures and combined with data on imports from a separate DESNZ dataset. Note that the data prior to 1951 only includes “major” power producers.

The post Analysis: UK renewables enjoy record year in 2025 – but gas power still rises appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK renewables enjoy record year in 2025 – but gas power still rises

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