Only half of China’s provinces have finalised new rules for pricing wind and solar power, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Local governments are required to have published final plans to reform the way wind and solar power is priced in their jurisdiction before the end of this year.
This follows the release of a central government directive in February – known as “Document 136” (136号文) – that calls for developing a more “market-based” approach to pricing newly installed renewable projects.
The new rules will replace the previous pricing mechanism, which gave wind and solar generators guaranteed sales at a fixed price tied to the benchmark electricity price from coal.
The shift towards market-based pricing for wind and solar is seen as a key uncertainty for the sector, with implications for China’s wider energy and emissions targets.
Carbon Brief analysis finds that, as of 15 October 2025, only 18 provinces had issued finalised “Document 136” plans.
Another 10 have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet have yet to indicate what their strategies will be.
Central direction, local rules
In February this year, China’s central government issued a notice on “deepening market-based reform of feed-in tariffs for new energy”, also known as “Document 136”.
The document calls on local governments to develop plans for new pricing mechanisms for wind and solar power, applicable to projects completed on or after 1 June 2025.
Local governments are expected to develop “sustainable new-energy pricing mechanisms” (新能源可持续发展价格结算机制), in which they only offer a fixed price to a set amount of new wind and solar capacity each year.
The amount offered a fixed price is to be linked to each province’s annual clean-energy installation quotas. Moreover, the fixed price is to be determined at auction, through a mechanism resembling the UK’s contract for difference (CfD).
Any additional wind and solar projects, which are unable to secure contracts via the provincial auction mechanism, would need to find buyers for their electricity on the open market. This could be done through a “power purchase agreement” with a grid operator or a large industrial user, for example, or by selling their power in spot markets.
The move is part of wider efforts to shift China’s giant electricity system towards more market-based operation, rather than running on rules set by the government, including prices for coal-fired power plants determined by bureaucrats.
The shift towards market-based pricing for renewables has been attributed to both the falling costs of building new solar and windfarms, as well as to the grid challenges created by record renewable capacity additions.
At the time of the policy’s release earlier this year, analysts expected the rules to have a chilling effect on China’s wind and solar buildout in the short term, as developers adjust to the new rules and to lower – and more uncertain – prices set at auction.
The notice led to a rush of new capacity additions ahead of the June cut-off, with an estimated 100 solar cells being installed every second in the month of May.
However, a subsequent policy requiring cement, polysilicon and iron and steel manufacturers, as well as certain types of data centres, to use renewable power to fulfil a certain proportion of their overall consumption has been seen as a “backstop” that may buoy industry demand for new wind and solar capacity.
Furthermore, analysts believe that “Document 136” may strengthen China’s clean-energy industries in the long term, by forcing companies to become more innovative and competitive.
Below, Carbon Brief lists which provinces have published finalised “Document 136” pricing plans (green), which provinces have published a form of draft plan (yellow) and which provinces have yet not published their plans at all (white).
By default, provinces are listed in order of the size of their energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, based on a dataset for 2022 from the thinktank Institute of Global Decarbonization Progress.
New territory
So far, Carbon Brief finds, only just over half of provinces have issued finalised plans. Collectively, these provinces account for 61% of China’s energy-related emissions.
Another 10, representing 31% of emissions, have published draft plans, while Jiangsu, Tianjin and Tibet – the final 8% of CO2 – have yet to publish anything.
A few provinces published finalised rules in early June, including renewable-power heavyweights Shandong and Inner Mongolia.
(Inner Mongolia’s power grid is split into two zones – “Inner Mongolia East” and “Inner Mongolia West” – which are administered separately.)
In a nationwide conference call at the end of August, National Energy Administration officials urged provinces to “promptly promote” concrete plans.
Eleven provinces have published finalised rules since then, including major polluters Heilongjiang, Hebei and Guangdong, with a further eight publishing draft rules, according to Carbon Brief calculations.
The delay in provinces completing their plans can be attributed to the fact that local policymakers are trying to establish a completely new system of pricing power from scratch, says David Fishman, principal at energy consultancy the Lantau Group.
He tells Carbon Brief that, for some of the provinces that have issued finalised rules, “fairly meaningful differences” can be found between the final version and earlier drafts – indicating a high level of debate on the best path forward.
Shandong province was the first to issue draft rules, setting the tone for other local governments’ documents.
The eastern province is seen as a leader both in renewable energy additions and in undertaking power-market reforms. It is also the largest source of energy-related emissions in China.
Its plan saw notable policy innovations, such as setting an auction subscription threshold of 125% to encourage competition, by ensuring that not all bidders will be successful.
In September, it also became the first province in China to hold auctions for solar and wind power under the new rules, with the winning bidders securing prices of 0.319 yuan per kilowatt-hour (yuan/kWh) for wind and 0.225 yuan/kWh for solar.
These prices are equivalent to £33.8 per megawatt hour (MWh), or $44.8/MWh, for wind and £23.8/MWh, or $31.6/MWh, for solar.
While the wind prices are seen as high enough to be relatively acceptable to project developers, the price for solar is below the level thought to be needed to finance such developments. As such, it could “discourage” further solar investment in the province, Reuters reports.
Shortly afterwards, the southwestern province of Yunnan also held its first renewables auction, setting a price of 0.33 yuan/kWh for both wind and solar projects.
Effect on future additions
Analysts disagree about what impact the “Document 136” policy will have on the pace of China’s clean-energy additions.
The country installed a record 360 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar in 2024, followed by an even higher 212GW in the first half of 2025 for solar alone, as developers rushed to complete ahead of the June deadline.
In September, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a target of 3,600GW of wind and solar capacity by 2035 as part of the country’s new “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) to the Paris Agreement.
While hugely ambitious in the context of current global wind and solar capacity, which stood at 1,400GW at the end of 2024, this new goal is equivalent to just 200GW of new wind and solar per year. This would be a significant slowdown compared with China’s recent pace of expansion.
Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief that he does not see the pricing reforms as a “signal of a structural slowdown in clean capacity [additions]”. He adds:
“Adding panels and turbines is the easy part…China is rewiring the world’s largest power sector, with multiple layers of interests and legacy assets to manage. In navigating this complexity, pledge targets act as a floor, providing certainty to clean-energy developers and clean-tech manufacturers. The NDC goal reflects what decision-makers are confident China can deliver given these constraints.”
But Fishman, writing on LinkedIn, notes that the pricing reforms could make it “challenging” for China to hit Xi’s new 2035 target.
Renewables developers are not incentivised to sustain previous years’ high installation figures under the local rules that have been rolled out so far, he notes, adding: “We will be lucky to see 200GW in a single year again for a long time.”
In its Renewables 2025 report, published in October 2025, the International Energy Agency (IEA) shaved 5% off its outlook for wind and solar growth in China out to 2030, a reduction of 129GW. It attributes this downgrade to the country’s renewable pricing reforms “impacting project economics and lowering growth expectations”.
Nevertheless, it adds that China is still projected to add “nearly 2,660GW” of new renewable capacity between 2025 and 2030, meaning that it would reach its 2035 wind and solar target “five years ahead of schedule”.
Bolstering storage demand
Beyond wind and solar capacity, “Document 136” also signalled potentially disruptive changes for China’s energy storage sector. It removed requirements at the central level that wind and solar projects must include a storage component.
This led to concerns at the time that demand for battery energy storage facilities could drop substantially.
In practice, however, different provinces have designed their own approaches to commissioning energy storage under their “Document 136” plans.
Some, such as Shandong, have eliminated energy storage requirements, while others, such as Yunnan and Guizhou have kept them.
A recent analysis by consulting firm Infolink argues that a significant drop in demand for energy storage projects is, therefore, “unlikely”, due to expected ongoing demand for “renewable integration and grid flexibility”.
Pumped storage and gas-fired power capacity make up only 7% of China’s electricity system – compared to 34% in Spain and 50% in the US, according to analysis by NGO Greenpeace. As such, it says there will likely be ongoing demand for battery storage as a major contributor to power flexibility in China.
The Chinese government set a target in a recent action plan for 180GW of new-energy storage by 2027, up from just over 100GW at the end of June 2025.
The target “directly addresses the issue of low short-term economic viability” of the energy storage sector caused by “Document 136”, economic news outlet Jiemian reports, although it notes that “uncertainties” still remain.
However, unnamed industry participants tell financial news outlet Yicai that the pricing reform has removed the storage sector’s “fig leaf”, meaning it is likely to result in the number of energy storage companies falling from the current figure of more than 200,000.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that the reforms will likely lead to “more storage-paired and hybrid projects” that better meet province-specific needs and “prioritise reliability and integration over headline [megawatts]”.
The post Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Only half of Chinese provinces finalise key ‘Document 136’ renewable rules
SYDNEY, Thursday 30 October 2026 — In response to reports that the Albanese government is set to introduce draft legislation this year that would seek to ban data centres in Australia’s suburbs, Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said:
“These reports are a testament to the growing community opposition to these completely inappropriate AI factories that have sprung up across our suburbs, and Big Tech corporations should take heed — the data centre build-out must not happen without the endorsement of the Australian people.
“But the government can’t simply ship this problem out to regional Australia without addressing the fundamental issues with this extractive new industry.
“We’re already seeing a trend of AI data centre proposals moving to the regions, in areas that are more water-scarce, more environmentally sensitive, and next to sources of fracked and coal seam gas to support their massive BYO gas-fired power plans — a pattern we’ve seen play out in the United States.
“From the Beetaloo Basin in the NT to the Western Downs in Qld, we’re seeing a wave of AI data centre proposals that would see new gas fast-tracked to support their massive energy demand, and threaten to completely derail Australia’s energy transition.
“Just as suburban Australians are asking, “what for?”, regional communities like Berry Springs and Dalby do not want dirty data centres setting up shop with absolutely no benefit to their communities. Greenpeace is calling for a moratorium on AI data centre developments until strict and enforceable safeguards are in place to protect our climate and our communities.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Kate O’Callaghan on +61 406 231 892 or kate.ocallaghan@greenpeace.org
AI data centre ban in suburbs would not address fundamental issues: Greenpeace
In the thick of the COP29 climate summit in Azerbaijan in 2024, the UN climate talks were rattled by what can only be described as a major PR disaster. The BBC, Reuters and The Guardian all carried headlines, attributed to leading climate policy experts, that the COPs were “no longer fit for purpose”.
The articles outlined a series of reforms called for in an open letter signed by 22 eminent scientists and politicians, including a former UN secretary-general and previous UN climate chief, with a further 150 lending their support. The headlines shook confidence in the COP process, just as governments were wrestling over a new climate finance goal.
The Club of Rome – which handled the media relations for the letter – hurried to say that its “constructive, supportive ideas” had been “misinterpreted”. Negotiators kept calm(ish) and carried on, in the end landing the finance goal after some high-stakes drama on the final day.
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Early speakers’ list suggests few powerful leaders will attend COP31
Just 77 heads of state or government are scheduled to address the COP31 climate summit in Antalya, a third less than the COP28 peak -
Africa wants adaptation finance on COP31 agenda, raising risk of a fight
The African Group wants dedicated space on tripling adaptation finance, the Green Climate Fund and trade, setting up a possible clash
To my surprise, when I went back this week to read the letter again, I could not find the offending line about the COPs not being fit for purpose. The Club of Rome has yet to respond to my query about its disappearance.
Whatever happened to the wording, that sentiment has been widely shared. COPs have ballooned in size while the importance of their outcomes seems to have diminished since the 2015 Paris Agreement (with the exception of the 2023 COP in Dubai where countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems).
The same on the surface
Two years on from those painful headlines in Baku, has anything changed for the better? You might be forgiven for thinking not. Official decisions are still made by consensus rather than the majority voting some have called for to stop blockers.
Tens of thousands of officials, activists and business execs still scurry around the halls to an ever-growing list of side events, roundtables and dialogues, while deals still come down to rows, all-nighters and jargon-filled texts adopted to rounds of applause.
But it would not be true to say that COPs have completely failed to respond to the very real need to translate the words of the Paris Agreement into action in the outside world.
Global warming is projected to be around 1.3C lower this century than it would have been if the world had not committed to tackle the climate crisis under that accord. Developing countries have a valued space at COPs in which their voices have equal weight in decision-making, unlike in many other international fora. And most importantly, perhaps, there has been a subtle shift, tipping the balance away from negotiating towards doing.
Brazil branded last year’s summit in Belém as the “COP of Implementation”, corralling the sprawling Action Agenda into six axes. This was a bid to impose some structure on the mushrooming efforts between governments, UN agencies, cities, businesses and civil society to set targets and spur faster results on their pet issues, from methane emissions to health and adaptation in conflict zones. COP30 alone saw the launch of 120 “plans to accelerate solutions”.
COP30 roadmaps off the cuff
Meanwhile, as the formal negotiations drew to a close, it was clear that consensus decision-making was evolving into something a little more improvised.
With only around half of all countries on board with the idea of a roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced his team would put one together over the coming year, along with another on how to meet a global goal to halt deforestation by 2030. Those roadmaps will be launched next week, presented and discussed at COP31, though it’s still unclear whether or how they’ll be incorporated into the formal negotiating agenda.
Some leading policy-makers don’t think that matters too much. Speaking to journalists before the Antalya summit, COP30 CEO Ana Toni and Dutch climate minister Stientje van Veldhoven said “coalitions of the willing” can move ahead without needing consensus from the COPs. This, they said, was evident this year at the first global conference on TAFF, co-chaired by van Veldhoven and attended by 60 countries.
“Consensus or no-consensus in the general COP doesn’t make a difference for the choices I have to make in my country to get my country to phase out fossil fuels,” said the Dutch minister. The Netherlands recently became one of the first to publish a national TAFF plan.
COP31 banks on flagship voluntary initiatives
This thinking has permeated the management and expected outcomes of this year’s COP too. Earlier this year, Türkiye, supported by international energy agencies, floated the idea of a voluntary goal to boost electrification to 35% of the world’s final energy consumption by 2035 – and this is now being touted as one of the main results to be expected from Antalya.
Türkiye is also championing a pledge on AI and climate, while co-host Australia is pushing to ease access to climate finance for least developed countries and small island states.
COP31 presidency announces AI pledge as UN climate chief says Big Tech ‘on thin ice’
None of these needs consensus. But with a political cover decision already in the works, as trailed by the COP presidents, they – and perhaps the fossil fuel roadmap – may find a home in the official text if language acceptable to most can be found, giving them them additional weight.
UNFCCC reform process in the shadows
Formal reform is underway too, if quietly. UN climate chief Simon Stiell is leading a review informed by ongoing consultations with a group of 15 well-respected climate policy experts, three of whom signed the open letter in 2024.
Among them is leading Swedish climate and sustainability scientist Johan Rockström who has strong ideas about how to make COPs function better, including a switch to majority voting. He told the same press briefing nothing stands in the way of this, because the rules of procedure for making decisions at COPs have never been formally agreed.
Still, to get away from the default setting of consensus would require agreement on a new system that may be impossible to achieve given the rise in bullying tactics by fossil fuel heavyweights.
Comment: The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation
The deliberations with the high-level policy gurus, as reflected in a summary of June’s session in Bonn, largely echo what’s already happening organically, calling for stronger partnerships and accountability both in and between the Action Agenda and negotiations. It doesn’t mention voting.
A general overview of the reform exercise says that “improving and optimizing the [UN climate] process over the medium to long term… will be critical to fostering trust, enhancing collaboration, and catalyzing increased ambition”.
In the short term, don’t hold your breath for anything concrete on reform at COP31 but watch for signs in what ends up dominating the headlines from Türkiye.
The post Editor’s Desk: COP reform is happening quietly, behind the headlines appeared first on Climate Home News.
Editor’s Desk: COP reform is happening quietly, behind the headlines