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India’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions grew by 0.5% in the second half of 2025 and by just 0.7% in the year as a whole, the slowest rate in more than two decades.

This is a sharp slowdown from the growth of 4-11% in the preceding four years and marks the lowest rate of increase since 2001, excluding the impact of Covid in 2020.

This is the second in a new series of half-yearly analysis on India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, based on official data for fuel use, industrial production and power output.

Other key findings for 2025 as a whole include:

  • Emissions in the power sector fell by 3.8% as record clean-energy growth combined with weak electricity demand.
  • New clean-energy capacity in 2025 will add a record 90 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity output each year, double the previous record set in 2024.
  • The largest reductions in coal power were in the states leading on wind and solar.
  • Oil demand grew by 0.4% and gas fell by 4%, far behind recent growth rates.
  • Steel production surged by 8% and cement by 10%.
  • In total, CO2 emissions went up slightly year-on-year, as increases from steel and cement outweighed the falls in gas demand and coal power.
  • Consumption of imported coal at power plants fell by 20%, while gas imports fell by 6% and net oil imports were flat year-on-year, reducing India’s vulnerability to the impacts of the Iran war.

The analysis shows that India’s power sector is poised for a potential inflection point, where clean-energy additions can meet or exceed the growth in electricity demand.

If clean energy matches expectations, allowing this inflection point to take place, then coal-fired power output and the associated CO2 emissions would see sustained falls.

In addition, oil demand is falling in the petrochemical industry and is expected to slow down in the steel and cement sectors.

Despite these trends, which could signal a lasting slowdown in emissions, India is planning major expansions in its capacity for coal power, petrochemicals and coal-based steel.

The country’s Paris Agreement targets for 2035, which were published yesterday, did not reflect the potential for slower emissions increases or continued clean-energy growth.

The path of India’s CO2 emissions over the coming years depends on how it resolves these apparent contradictions regarding its future demand for fossil fuels.

Slowest growth since 2001

India’s CO2 emissions have been growing rapidly for decades, with annual increases averaging 4.9% per year since 1990 and 4-11% during 2021-24.

However, the recent pace of growth has been slowing down, as shown in the figure below. The 0.7% rise in 2025 was the slowest since 2001, excluding the impact of Covid in 2020.

Change in India’s annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, year-on-year %, 1990-2025.
Change in India’s annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, year-on-year %, 1990-2025. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by CREA. (See: About the data.)

Beneath the overall rise of just 0.7% in 2025, there were divergent trends in India’s key emitting sectors, with some seeing rapid rises in CO2 and others in historic decline.

This is shown in the figure below, which compares year-on-year changes in emissions during the first and second half of 2025 with the average for 2021-23.

Specifically, emissions fell by 3.8% year-on-year in the power sector, after the first drop in coal-power generation – outside Covid – since 1973. Oil products were more or less flat.

The small increase in 2025 overall was the result of strong growth from steel and cement.

Year-on-year change in India’s sectoral CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by CREA.
Year-on-year change in India’s sectoral CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by CREA. (See: About the data.)

The fall in power-sector emissions is particularly notable, given it was the largest driver of emissions increases in 2021-2023, responsible for half of the total growth.

Across the sectors, the reductions and weak growth in fossil-fuel consumption eased India’s vulnerability to the recent price and supply disruptions taking place in the wake of the attacks on Iran by the US and Israel, as well as Iran’s subsequent retaliation.

Notably, India’s fossil-fuel imports were disproportionately affected by falling demand overall. For example, consumption of imported coal at power plants fell by 20% in 2025.

(Coal imports continued to fall in early 2026. However, the government is reported to be considering the use of an emergency clause that “would force coal power plants that run on imported ​coal to maximise output ahead of the summer season”, due to the impact of the Iran war on gas supplies.)

According to data from consultancy Kpler, gas imports fell 6% and net oil imports were flat, for the first time since the Covid-induced drop in 2020. The only rise in imports was of coal for steelmaking, which were up by 11% year-on-year in 2025.

Record clean-power growth

There were two key reasons why emissions fell in India’s power sector in 2025.

First, the country added 38 gigawatts (GW) of solar, 6.3GW of wind, 4.0GW of hydropower and 0.6GW of nuclear power in 2025.

The annual electricity generation from this new capacity, calculated based on the average capacity utilisation of each technology, amounts to 90 terawatt hours (TWh). This is twice as much as the clean generation added in 2024, which in itself was a record.

Power generation from solar grew by 30TWh and from wind by 20TWh in 2025, exceeding the 18TWh increase in total output. Hydropower also performed strongly due to high rainfall and capacity additions, with generation growing 21TWh.

Second, growth in total power demand slowed down from 7.4% in 2019-23 to 1% in 2025, which obviously played a major role in the fall in power-sector emissions.

The slow growth was due to both weather – with milder temperatures after 2024 heatwaves reducing the demand for air conditioning – and a more sustained slowdown in demand that had already started in late 2023 and was initially masked by the heatwaves. This slowdown in electricity demand is related to slower growth in industrial output and GDP.

Notably, the increase in clean-power generation from newly added capacity in 2025 was sufficient to cover demand growth of up to 5%. This means that power-sector emissions growth would have slowed down sharply, even if demand had not been flagging.

State-level analysis, shown in the figure below, emphasises the role of clean-energy growth in reducing fossil-powered generation.

The largest reductions in coal-fired power generation took place in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan, the three states that also led the buildout of new solar and wind power.

State-level changes in power generation by source, TWh year-on-year in 2025. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by CREA. (See: About the data.)

Power demand is expected to pick up again, with Indian credit-rating agency ICRA projecting growth of 5.0-5.5% in the financial year starting in April 2026.

However, expected clean-energy additions should cover this level of growth.

BloombergNEF projects a 6% year-on-year increase in installed solar capacity in 2026. The government expects wind power capacity to reach 63GW by March 2027, a 10GW increase compared with the end of 2025, indicating a further acceleration of capacity additions compared with the 6GW added in 2025.

Indian utilities are also targeting the completion of construction on 6.8GW of new hydropower capacity, excluding pumped storage, and 1GW of nuclear capacity in 2026.

These capacity additions would deliver additional annual generation of more than 100TWh, enough to cover demand growth of up to 5.8%.

This means that India’s power sector could reach an inflection point this year, where clean-energy growth matches the expected average rise in demand, as shown below.

Newly added clean-power generation (bars) and annual electricity demand growth (line)
Newly added clean-power generation (bars) and annual electricity demand growth (line), TWh. Source: Analysis for Carbon Brief by CREA. (See: About the data.)

Over the next five years, ICRA forecasts annual average demand growth of 6.0 to 6.5%.

Yet India is also targeting 500GW non-fossil power generation capacity by the financial year 2029-2030. If achieved, this target would increase non-fossil power generation by enough to cover electricity demand growth of 6.6%, without needing to increase fossil-fuel generation, based on the Central Electricity Authority’s projected power generation.

If the actual growth rate for power demand is lower than this and if the non-fossil capacity target is still reached, then fossil-power generation – and the associated CO2 emissions – would fall in absolute terms from 2025 to financial year 2029-2030.

Battery energy storage is also increasingly affordable and will reduce the need for thermal power capacity in the system.

Oil slows on falling industrial demand

For oil demand, which slowed from 3.9% growth in 2024 to 0.4% in 2025, the key drivers came in the petrochemical and cement industry, where demand fell.

Specifically, demand fell for naphtha, petcoke and other oil products. Naphtha is used as chemical industry feedstock, while petcoke is used mainly in cement production.

Part of the fall in demand was due to an increase in India’s imports of plastics and precursors, which rose by 7% in volume terms, while exports fell.

The increase in imports came almost entirely from China, where the petrochemical industry is expanding, leading to complaints in India of price dumping. Mirroring the shift of plastics production to China, India began exporting large volumes of naphtha to the country.

India’s imports of nitrogen fertilisers also increased sharply, with most of the increase coming from China and Russia, while domestic production fell by 6% in April-September. Fertiliser production is the second-most important use of naphtha.

Petcoke use in cement production fell slightly, by 1%, even as cement production surged, as producers shifted to using more domestic coal in response to rising petcoke prices.

In the transport sector, petrol and diesel growth moderated in 2025, as the slow rebound to the pre-Covid trend in demand had finally played out. In addition, mobility was reduced in 2025 due to heavy monsoon rains in June to August.

Meanwhile, compressed natural gas (CNG) and electric vehicles also cut into the markets for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles, eating into petrol and diesel demand, respectively. EV sales grew 16% in 2025 and made up 8% of auto sales, helped by a reduction in the goods and services tax (GST) on EVs from 12% to 5%.

GST reform also reduced diesel consumption in a more surprising way, by eliminating the need for manual inspection of cargoes and cutting long wait-times at interstate border posts.

Diesel demand growth was also moderated by a government scheme to replace diesel irrigation pumps, which consume 5% of all diesel in the country, with solar-powered models.

Air pollution rules also played a role in some cities, including the capital Delhi. There, regulations on diesel vehicles resulted in a 13% reduction in sales from a year earlier, continuing the trend observed over the past two years.

Experts attribute lower sales of diesel vehicles to changes in consumer behaviour, following the long-standing ban on diesel vehicles older than 10 years and petrol models of more than 15 years in the wider Delhi National Capital Region (NCR), as well as a Supreme Court order in August 2025 that stressed the need for vehicles to comply with newer emissions rules.

Finally, aviation fuel demand growth slowed from 10% in 2024 to 3% in 2025, as the return to the pre-Covid trend in rising traffic leveled off.

The most immediate effect of the oil and gas crisis caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has been on the supply of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), which in India is used almost solely as cooking fuel.

Shortages have affected households, restaurants and industries. LPG consumption had grown by 6% year-on-year in 2025, in line with the longer-term trend, but is responsible for only 3% India’s CO2 emissions.

The crisis has reportedly also prompted a shift to cooking with electricity, with the sales of induction stoves reportedly surging.

Steel and cement continue to surge

The overall rise in India’s emissions in 2025 was driven by strong growth in output for steel and cement, which went up by 8% and 10%, respectively. The two sectors were responsible for 21% of India’s total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial processes in 2025.

India’s steel sector is more polluting than elsewhere, with the CO2 per unit of production – its emissions intensity – being more than 20% higher than the global average.

Two-thirds of steel is used for construction. Strong steel demand in 2025 reflected growth in new housing construction in earlier years, as the market was rebounding from the mid-2010s crash and the Covid pandemic. However, new project launches and sales both declined in 2025.

Domestic steel output growth was attenuated in the first half of the year by increases in steel imports from China, Japan and South Korea. This resulted in the government enacting a temporary blanket tariff in April 2025 for 200 days to curb imports.

As a result, steel output growth accelerated from 6% in January to May to 10% in the rest of the year. In November 2025, when the earlier temporary tariff expired, the government imposed new tariffs on a more targeted list of countries.

It imposed a three-year step-down tariff – 12% in the first year, 11.5% in year two and 11% in year three – to curb imports from China, Vietnam and Nepal, as these countries were found to exceed the thresholds for imports for various steel products.

In spite of the tariffs, the industry is struggling with weak profitability. Output growth has “led to a situation of oversupply”, according to ICRA, resulting in falling profitability and capacity utilisation, particularly at smaller mills, which account for 41% of total steel production.

Delays in construction and infrastructure projects are also weighing down on India’s steel demand, leading to rising inventories and falling prices. This is likely to affect the demand for steel, cement and bitumen in 2026.

Meanwhile, government initiatives could encourage a shift in the type and emissions intensity of steel production. State-backed schemes – particularly programmes to build affordable urban and rural housing – are significant steel demand drivers.

The Ministry of Steel is working on mandates for “green steel” in public procurement as part of a broader Green Steel Mission aimed at decarbonising the sector.

The policy is expected to require government agencies and publicly funded projects to buy lower-emission steel, creating demand for greener production.

Power could be nearing an inflection point

The sharp slowdown in India’s overall CO2 emissions growth has now lasted 18 months, making it increasingly likely that it is not just a blip.

Electricity demand growth slowed down sharply in 2025, which could be taken to imply that the lower growth in CO2 last year was mainly down to fluctuations in power demand.

However, clean-energy growth in 2025 was large enough to have stabilised emissions in the power sector, even if demand growth had been at historical rates.

Now, power-sector emissions could be about to reach an inflection point, with clean-energy additions projected to overtake average rate of electricity demand growth in 2026, for the first time. This already happened in 2025 in Gujarat, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, the highly populated states leading solar and wind development.

If clean-energy growth rates continue and if demand growth stays at expected levels, then clean energy will cover all of the growth in electricity demand. This would mean that electricity generation from fossil fuels would level off or decline.

Given that the power sector was the largest driver of emissions increases in 2021-2023, peaking coal-fired power generation and emissions from the sector would have a major impact on India’s overall fossil-fuel consumption and emissions.

The other significant emitting sector where emissions have been falling in India is the petrochemical industry.

In contrast, the steel industry has continued to increase output, even though it is struggling with profitability and concerns about overcapacity, while demand for steel and cement is expected to cool down this year due to lower growth in construction volumes.

Despite these trends, the country is planning for a major expansion of all of these industries. The government plans to add 85GW of new coal-fired power capacity over the next seven years. The country is also targeting $1tn of investment in the petrochemical industry by 2040, a 50% increase in steel production capacity from 2025 to 2031 and a 25% increase in cement production capacity in the three years from 2026 to 2028.

The planned investment in steelmaking is overwhelmingly coal-based capacity. This will increase the sector’s reliance on metallurgical coal, which is almost entirely imported, as well as running against government ambitions to increase lower-carbon steelmaking.

India’s Cabinet approved new 2035 climate pledges for the country yesterday. The targets are a reduction in carbon intensity – the emissions per unit of GDP – of 47% from 2005 level by 2035 and a non-fossil energy share of 60% in power generation capacity.

The 60% target would already be achieved by 2030, under the Central Electricity Authority’s recent projections. The carbon-intensity target would allow the country’s CO2 emissions growth to accelerate in the next 10 years, compared with the preceding decade, even as the recent clean-energy growth suggests that a substantial slowdown is possible.

If GDP growth averages 7.8%, the rate needed to meet India’s 2047 economic goals, then CO2 emissions could increase at 6% per year from 2025 to 2035 while still meeting the carbon-intensity target, compared with less than 4% growth from 2015 to 2025.

India’s energy and emissions trajectory over the next 5-10 years will depend heavily on how these apparent contradictions are resolved. This is particularly true in the power sector, where clean energy and storage are already set to cover future growth.

About the data

This analysis is based on official monthly data for fuel consumption, industrial production and power generation from different ministries and government institutes.

Coal consumption in thermal power plants is taken from the monthly reports downloaded from the National Power Portal of the Ministry of Power. The data is compiled for the period January 2019 until June 2025. Power generation and capacity by technology and fuel on a monthly basis are sourced from the NITI data portal.

Coal use at steel and cement plants, as well as process emissions from cement production, are estimated using production indices from the index of eight core industries released monthly by the Office of Economic Adviser, assuming that changes in total fossil fuel use follow production volumes.

These production indices were used to scale fuel use by the sectors in 2022. To form a basis for using the indices, monthly coal consumption data for 2022 was constructed for the sectors using the annual total coal and petcoke consumption reported in IEA World Energy Balances and monthly production data in a paper by Robbie Andrew, on monthly CO2 emission accounting for India. Monthly petcoke consumption was available from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, and coal consumption by the cement industry was calculated by subtracting petcoke use from total fossil fuel use.

Annual cement process emissions up to 2024 were also taken from Robbie Andrew’s work and scaled using the production indices. This approach better approximated changes in energy use and emissions reported in the IEA World Energy Balances, than did the amounts of coal reported to have been dispatched to the sectors, showing that production volumes are the dominant driver of short-term changes in emissions.

For other sectors, including aluminium, auto, chemical and petrochemical, paper and plywood, pharmaceutical, graphite electrode, sugar, textile, mining, traders and others, coal consumption is estimated based on data on despatch of domestic and imported coal to end users from statistical reports and monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal, as consumption data is not available.

Coal consumption by “captive” coal power plants – those supplying power to industrial sites, not to the public electricity network – was calculated based on capacity changes from Global Energy Monitor, assuming constant utilisation, as utilisation has been very stable year-to-year, as calculated from Central Electricity Authority data.

The difference between coal consumption and dispatch is stock changes, which are estimated by assuming that the changes in the amount of coal stored at end user facilities mirror those at coal mines, with end user inventories excluding power, steel and cement assumed to be 70% of those at coal mines, based on comparisons between our data and the IEA World Energy Balances.

Stock changes at mines are estimated as the difference between production at and dispatch from coal mines, as reported by the Ministry of Coal.

Coal consumption is estimated in two ways, for sectors beyond power, steel and cement. Consumption of domestic coal in these other sectors is taken from the monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal. Their consumption of imported coal is estimated from the total imports of thermal coal reported by consultancy Kpler, by subtracting demand for imports at coal-power plants. The basis for this assumption is that steel and cement industries use little imported thermal coal, according to Ministry of Coal data.

Product-by-product consumption data for petroleum products, as well as gas use by sector, is from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

As the fuel dispatch and consumption data is reported as physical volumes – such as tonnes or litres – calorific values are taken from IEA’s World Energy Balance and CO2 emission factors from 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.

Calorific values are assigned separately to different fuel types, including domestic and imported coal, anthracite and coke, as well as to petrol, diesel and several other oil products.

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Analysis: India’s CO2 emissions in 2025 grew at slowest rate in two decades

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‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak

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Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals.

Provisional data from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) shows that Antarctic sea ice hit its annual winter peak on 14 September, with an extent of 17.59m square kilometres (km2).

The organisation notes that the data is still preliminary, adding that “large fluctuations in extent are typical of Antarctic sea ice near the seasonal maximum”.

One expert tells Carbon Brief that it is “concerning to see these low values persisting”, but says that scientists need more time to determine whether this represents a “structural shift” in Antarctic sea ice extent.

Meanwhile, at the Earth’s other pole, Arctic sea ice reached its annual minimum on 12 September, ranking as the joint-10th lowest in the satellite record.

The NSIDC notes that the last 20 years have seen the lowest 20 Arctic sea ice extents in the satellite record.

Antarctic peak

Dr Lettie Roach, a polar climate scientist at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, tells Carbon Brief that this year’s Antarctic sea ice maximum was “well below average for the season”. She warns that, “after several decades of stable or increasing winter Antarctic sea ice conditions, it is concerning to see these low values persisting”.

She adds:

“Compared with the Arctic, it’s less clear how recent changes in Antarctic sea ice are attributable to human-caused warming vs natural variability. We need more years of observations to better understand whether this is truly a structural shift.”

Dr Clare Eayrs, a postdoctoral researcher at the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), tells Carbon Brief that, since recording a “near-average February minimum” extent, Antarctic sea ice has “returned to unusually low winter coverage”.

She notes that Antarctic sea ice extent in July and August this year were the fifth and fourth lowest on record, respectively, adding that “all five of the lowest July extents have occurred since 2022 and all four of the lowest August extents since 2023”.

The chart below shows Antarctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2023 (mid blue), the year of the smallest winter sea-ice maximum on record.

Antarctic sea ice peak in 2026 is third smallest on record. Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026, 2025, and 2023, as well as decadal averages, million km2. Source: NSIDC. Line chart showing 2026 peak in September remaining below 1980s-2010s averages but above Sep 2023's lowest record. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Eayrs tells Carbon Brief that the regional pattern of Antarctic sea ice cover “changed substantially during the growth season”.

For example, she says that “in April, the Bellingshausen Sea remained almost entirely ice-free, while the neighbouring Amundsen Sea had more ice than usual”.

However, by late August, changes in atmospheric pressure and wind meant that “the Bellingshausen deficit had largely recovered, while ice was unusually scarce in the Amundsen Sea and across much of East Antarctica”.

Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic.
Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Arctic minimum

Meanwhile, the Arctic recorded its minimum summer sea ice extent on 12 September. At 4.60m km2, this year ties with 2025, 2010 and 2008 as the 10th-lowest sea ice extent on record.

The chart below shows Arctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2012 (mid blue), the year of the smallest summer sea-ice minimum on record.

Arctic sea ice minimum in 2026 is tied for 10th smallest on record. Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026, 2025 and 2012, as well as decadal averages, million km2. Source: NSIDC. The line graph shows annual ice extent reaching September lows, with 2026 far below 1980s-2000s averages. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Roach tells Carbon Brief that although this minimum is not “record setting”, it is still “lower than any sea ice minimum before 2007”. She adds:

“Human-caused climate change has reduced Arctic sea ice cover and thickness, so the region is fundamentally different compared to a few decades ago.”

Scientists have been tracking Arctic sea ice thickness using a reanalysis produced called the Pan-Arctic Ice Ocean Modeling and Assimilation System (PIOMAS) since 1979.

In March 2026, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) terminated a global dataset of air pressure that scientists relied upon to produce PIOMAS, forcing both datasets to stop publishing updates.

The PIOMAS website says it will take “considerable effort and time” to find alternative data to use in their reanalysis. It adds that “we don’t yet have a good sense if that’s possible with available funds and if so, when we will be able to resume production of a new PIOMAS timeseries”.

Roach also notes that August saw record-breaking heat sweep across much of the world, explaining that high temperatures “extended into Arctic coastal regions, close to regions with substantial sea ice loss – particularly the Barents-Kara and East Siberian seas”.

Dr Zack Labe, a scientist at Climate Central, tells Carbon Brief that the absence of a new record does not mean that ice cover is becoming more “resilient”. He says:

“Local weather patterns across the Arctic play a really important role in year-to-year sea-ice extent, even as the long-term trend is clearly downward.”

Labe tells Carbon Brief that weather in the Arctic this summer was “influenced mainly by lower pressure toward the central Arctic, which brought cloudier and cooler conditions that limited surface melt and delayed the start of the melt season”.

He explains that this “was most obvious across parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where the melt season didn’t really kick off until after early July, which was more than two weeks later than normal”.

In contrast, he says, the Atlantic side of the Arctic “had a much more extreme summer”, with sea ice in the Barents Sea recording its “earliest melt-out on record”.

This was partly due to “unusually warm air and ocean temperatures”, Labe says. He notes, for example, that parts of western Siberia saw unusually persistent temperatures more than 5C above the 1981-2010 average for much of the summer, which extended out over the Kara Sea and contributed to substantial ice melt in this area”.

Map showing main regions of the Arctic.
Map showing main regions of the Arctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Labe tells Carbon Brief that, going forward, scientists need “more data and observations of other sea-ice metrics, like ice thickness, which may give us better insight into the overall condition of the ice pack, especially during years like 2026 when it is very fragmented”.

(In March 2026, Arctic sea ice reached its peak extent for this winter, clocking in as the joint-smallest in a satellite record going back almost half a century.)

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COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”

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Participants at COP31 in Antalya will have a “duty” not to interfere in Türkiye’s internal affairs under the country’s hosting deal with the UN, reviving a clause dropped for last year’s climate summit in Brazil that human rights groups warn could put activists at risk.

Türkiye has faced growing criticism from human rights groups over the jailing of opposition figures, journalists and activists and imposed a blanket protest ban around July’s summit of the NATO military alliance in Ankara.

The contested provision is included in the binding agreement between the UN climate secretariat and the Turkish government that sets out responsibilities over logistical arrangements and details participants’ rights and obligations.

The document, signed in June but only made public on Wednesday, gives accredited COP31 attendees immunity from legal action over what they say, write or do in connection with the conference. Climate Home News understands that this safeguard can be applied to what takes place both inside and, in certain circumstances, outside of the UN-controlled COP “Blue Zone”. For the first time, this protection explicitly continues after the summit ends.

Turkish riot police arrested protesters during the anti NATO protest on July 7, 2026 in Ankara, Turkey. (Photo by Sedat Suna/Getty Images)

But participants enjoying these “privileges and immunities” also have a duty to respect Türkiye’s laws and regulations and not to interfere in its internal affairs, the agreement states. Rights groups fear its wide-ranging formulation could be used to discourage criticism of the host government.

Climate Home News understands that whether an action is covered by the immunity or infringes on the host’s internal affairs would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with close coordination between the country’s authorities and the UN climate change body.

A separate provision states that immunity shall be waived where the UN believes it would “impede the course of justice”.

‘Chilling effect’

Those same provisions featured in the host country agreements for COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP29 in Azerbaijan, both regarded as authoritarian regimes, before being dropped for COP30 in Brazil.

Ann Harrison, climate justice policy advisor at Amnesty International, said it is “extremely disappointing” that the COP31 agreement re-introduced clauses that could “hinder the ability of human rights defenders and civil society organisations to conduct their work safely”.

COP31 electrification pledge leaves out clean power commitment

She added the provisions could have a “wider chilling effect” on rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, given concerns over the human rights situation in Türkiye, including laws that “have shrunk civic space” and their “abusive” implementation by authorities.

The UN climate change body declined to comment.

Rights groups have documented blanket protest bans, unlawful use of force by the police and prosecutions of journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers across Türkiye in the last year.

Arrests and protest bans

Last July, environmental activist Esra Işık was sentenced to more than two years for “resisting” a public official over what Amnesty International described as a peaceful protest against an urgent expropriation order linked to the expansion of coal mining in south-western Türkiye. She is appealing the conviction.

Ahead of a summit of the NATO alliance in the capital Ankara in July, authorities put in place a 13-day blanket ban on demonstrations, citing “national security”, and arrested over 200 people. Human Rights Watch said the crackdown showed Türkiye’s “ruthless intolerance of freedom of speech and assembly”.

Earlier this month, Turkish police detained dozens of people as part of what rights groups described as the government’s widening crackdown on LGBTQ+ activists and venues.

Questioned by media as to how he would guarantee the right to protest at COP31, Kurum said earlier in September that his team would “try to meet” any request they receive from civil society and give them “a free space to express themselves”.

“Don’t worry, thinking you will not be able to voice your opinions or really share your thoughts,” he said in an attempt to reassure campaigners, adding that he had put former deputy environment minister Mehmet Birpinar in charge of liaising with civil society.

Civic space needed

Camilla Pollera, human rights and climate change campaigner at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), said meaningful participation at COP31 is fundamental to the legitimacy of climate action.

“At a climate summit, civil society participation necessarily includes being present, speaking out, scrutinising governments’ decisions and climate policies, and advocating for communities most vulnerable to climate change,” she added.

Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025.
Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. (Photo: Mariel Lozada/Climate Home News)

At last year’s COP30 summit, thousands of Indigenous people and climate activists peacefully marched through the Amazonian city of Belém in the first major demonstration outside the UN venue in four years. Smaller-scale demonstrations were largely confined to the “Blue Zone” at COP27 in Egypt, COP28 in the UAE and COP29 in Azerbaijan.

In two other separate incidents in Belém, members of the Munduruku tribe blocked access to the conference centre for hours, demanding an end to development projects in their ancestral land, and protesters stormed through the venue clashing with UN security officials.

The COP31 hosting agreement keeps some of the safeguards previously hailed by civil society groups. The government and the UN secretariat commit to upholding “the fundamental human rights” of all participants in the agreement’s preamble.

Under the deal, Türkiye also needs to ensure that security personnel follow “the highest ethical and professional standards and are expected to behave with integrity and respect”.

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COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”

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Threatened by rising seas, small islands secure right to keep their statehood

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As rising seas submerge growing swathes of land, countries that lose territory should still keep their national boundaries, sovereign rights and UN membership, according to a political declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly in New York on Thursday.

The declaration, which was championed by climate-vulnerable small island states, affirms “the presumption in favour of continued statehood” in the face of sea level rise fuelled by climate change, and urges countries to work together to assist communities affected by encroaching oceans.

Speaking at a high-level UN meeting to address the existential threats posed by sea level rise, Cabo Verde’s Prime Minister Francisco Carvalho, one of the initiative’s co-facilitators along with Australia, said the adoption of the text by consensus sends “a message of hope”.

“This declaration has a very special meaning. For us, sea level rise is neither a distant threat nor a theoretical concern,” he said, adding that rising seas put at risk key infrastructure, water resources and economic growth in small island states.

In the Pacific, sea levels have risen at twice the global rate, dramatically increasing coastal flooding events from two to 20 a year in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and from zero to 102 events per year in American Samoa, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Surangel Whipps Jr., president of the Pacific island of Palau, said the summit in New York represents a “moment of international solidarity”, and highlighted that small island states will remain permanent members of the UN.

    Declaration recognises statehood

    An advisory opinion by the world’s top maritime court, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), first upheld in 2024 that countries do not have to shrink their maritime borders even if they lose land territory due to sea level rise. This was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in last year’s landmark ruling on the climate obligations of states.

    The new declaration endorsed by all governments at the UN General Assembly stresses that sea level rise “is not a distant scenario but a real and lived experience for many”, and notes that international law must be implemented in global responses to rising seas.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the “milestone must now be translated into action”, adding that the declaration should encourage an “ongoing dialogue” at the “highest possible level” leading to practical outcomes. Pacific islands have proposed an international treaty on sea level rise that would provide more legal certainty.

    “Those on the frontlines must be front and centre on every decision. We cannot allow countries and cultures to vanish beneath the waves,” he said. “The SOS has gone out. The world must answer.”

    At regional summit, Pacific islands ask for COP31 support for clean energy and finance

    Goodwin Friday, prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, said measures to protect vulnerable states will require adequate finance. “Investing in resilience now is more cost-effective than paying the far greater price for loss and damage later,” he added.

    Championed by Australia’s COP31 co-presidency, Pacific islands have sought to put adaptation to sea level rise and ocean conservation at the top of the political agenda by inviting world leaders to attend the pre-COP31 summit co-hosted by Fiji and Tuvalu in October.

    Tuvalu will also host the second global fossil fuel phase-out summit in April 2027, after around 60 governments met this year in Santa Marta, Colombia, to discuss ending their dependence on coal, oil and gas.

    “Our coastlines, our reefs and our communities are living with the consequences of fossil fuel dependence every day, and our people have earned the right to help shape the way forward,” Lynda Tabuya, Fiji’s climate minister, said in a statement announcing details of the conference.

    Secretary-General António Guterres attending the meeting on addressing the existential threats posed by sea level rise at UN headquarters in New York.
    Secretary-General António Guterres attending the meeting on addressing the existential threats posed by sea level rise. (Photo: UN Photo/Manuel Elías)

    Ocean monitoring gets a boost in New York

    Amid record-breaking marine heat and seas rising at unprecedented speed, governments in New York announced new commitments to protect the world’s ocean, as efforts to bolster marine ecosystems and coastal communities rise up the political agenda.

    On Wednesday, the EU and Canada announced more funding for a new Europe-led ocean monitoring system called OceanEye, launched in the aftermath of a failed attempt by the Trump administration to dismantle the largest existing network of deep-sea observatories.

    During an event at UN headquarters in New York, EU President Ursula von der Leyen and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced around $163 million in new funding for the initiative, with the EU pledging €92 million ($105m) on top of existing seed funding and Canada pledging C$82 million (US$58m) over five years.

    According to an EU statement, while OceanEye will collaborate with the Global Ocean Observing System, that network “remains vulnerable to financial shortfalls and geopolitical disruptions”. A group of 30 countries from Europe, Africa and the Americas joined an international initiative in support of OceanEye, including large coastal nations like Brazil, Namibia and Mexico.

    Von der Leyen said OceanEye “can make us the leading ocean data provider in a matter of years”, including by launching new satellites and installing new observatories in the deep ocean. “From outer space to the deepest ocean, our funding helps us keep watch beneath the waves,” she added.

    Carney said the initiative would help protect Canada’s Arctic region with real-time monitoring operating year-round. “We can’t protect what we can’t see,” he said, also highlighting that Canada had expanded conservation of its ocean territory from 1% a decade ago to 15% now.

    In New York, a group of 19 countries said they are either developing or implementing plans to sustainably manage all of their ocean territory, with 12 new nations joining the initiative. In a joint communiqué, they called on more countries to sign up ahead of COP31.

    Warnings of El Niño-fuelled extreme heat

    Scientists and world leaders have raised the alarm over this year’s record-breaking marine temperatures, which have persisted above historical peaks for more than 100 days as the naturally occurring El Niño phenomenon intensifies in the Pacific.

    Extreme ocean heat could become a threat to coastal ecosystems and communities, experts fear. Water temperatures 1.5C above normal levels have also rapidly fuelled a strong hurricane in the Pacific in recent days.

    Despite scientific calls for additional ocean conservation efforts, a report launched this week in New York warned that efforts to protect ocean ecosystems are lagging behind, with only 10% of the global ocean covered by conservation areas and just 3.5% designated as “effectively protected”.

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