Tariffs can encourage companies to invest in domestic production and create jobs. At the same time, they can also spark trade wars, leading to job losses in affected industries. Their economic impact is certainly complicated. At present, the U.S. is in a major tariff conflict with Canada, Mexico, and China after President Trump raised tariffs significantly.
He imposed a 25% duty on imports from Mexico and Canada and doubled tariffs on Chinese goods to 20%. This led to new trade disputes with important partners. Industry experts say these tariffs could affect $2.2 trillion in annual trade, impacting many industries.
But Trump firmly believes these tariffs aim to reduce the trade deficit. By making imported goods costlier, they are pushing Americans to buy local products.
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As per nbcnews, in 2024, Mexico, China, and Canada account for 42% of U.S. imports, making them key players in any trade conflict.
How Canada, China, and Mexico Fired Back
Canada reacted quickly. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced 25% tariffs on $20.7 billion worth of U.S. goods. He plans to expand these tariffs if the current ones remain. This mainly affects energy and minerals.
Similarly, China responded with 15% tariffs on some U.S. farm products like cotton, wheat, corn, and chicken. They added a 10% tariff on other goods, including dairy, fruits, vegetables, pork, beef, and soybeans. These tariffs will start on March 10. As per credible news sources, China’s commerce ministry also limited exports to 15 U.S. companies and added 10 U.S. firms to its “unreliable entity list.”
These trade barriers follow a pattern from earlier administrations. Last year, the White House decided to raise tariffs on Chinese semiconductors to 50%, while duties on Chinese electric vehicles quadrupled to over 100%. A new set of 25% tariffs on aluminum and steel will take effect soon, escalating tensions further.
Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum stated the country has backup plans to handle U.S. tariffs.
U.S. Dependence on Imported Critical Minerals
A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies highlights the U.S.’s reliance on imports for critical minerals. The U.S. relies entirely on imports for 12 of the 50 identified critical minerals and for over 50% of another 29.
Consequently, tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China could raise costs for the U.S. These nations supplied 41% of U.S. metal and mineral imports in 2023. China leads the global production of 29 critical minerals and controls processing for rare earths, graphite, lithium, cobalt, and copper and is a major supplier for the U.S.
Doug Ford Warns of Nickel Cutoff Over U.S. Tariffs
Ontario Premier Doug Ford ripped off Trump’s exorbitant tariff rates on Canada. He threatened to halt nickel and electricity exports to the U.S. in response to the 25% tariffs on Canadian goods set to take effect tomorrow.
In an interview with NBC News NOW on Monday, Ford called the tariffs an “absolute disaster” for both nations, warning they would create “massive problems” for residents on both sides of the border.
Ford said,
“We will respond strongly and we don’t want to. “On the critical minerals I will stop shipments going into the U.S. for nickel. I will shut down manufacturing because 50 per cent of the nickel you use is coming from Ontario.”
He further opined,
”You need our uranium, you need our potash, you need our high-grade nickel. I will stockpile our high-grade nickel, that 50 percent of your military and manufacture needs. Your aluminum, your steel, your lumber. It will be an absolute disaster and this is all due to one person. That is President Trump.”
- READ MORE: Trump’s Tactic to Make America Great Again: Expanding Domestic Oil, Gas, and Critical Minerals
U.S. Aluminum Imports and Tariffs: Impact on Costs and Supply Chains
Domestic production of aluminum is just one third of its needs. According to Statista, the United States imported about 4.8 million metric tons of aluminum for consumption in 2024.
Mexico and Canada supply around 90% of U.S. aluminum scrap imports. The U.S. heavily relies on aluminum and steel imports, with Canada providing 58% of aluminum and 23% of steel imports.
Meanwhile, the apparent consumption of aluminum totaled about 4.3 million metric tons. Canada is a top aluminum supplier to the U.S., sending most of its primary aluminum for use in American manufacturing.
Imports of aluminum for consumption in the United States from 2010 to 2024 (in 1,000 metric tons)
Disrupting these supply chains will raise costs for industries such as automotive manufacturing. In this industry, parts often cross borders several times before the final assembly.
Tariff History Repeats Itself
The U.S. aluminum sector has faced trade measures before. In 2018, then-President Donald Trump imposed a 10% tariff on imported aluminum and 25% on steel to boost domestic production. These tariffs later extended to the EU, Canada, and Mexico.
In August 2024, under President Joe Biden, aluminum tariffs rose to 25%, increasing the U.S. Midwest premium by over 30%. Trump’s potential re-election could lead to further tariff hikes, creating market uncertainty.
Increased Aluminum Prices
The U.S. Midwest premium, a key indicator of aluminum tariff risk, has risen since Trump’s election win. S&P Global revealed the current price (as of February 25, 2024) for the US Aluminum P1020 Midwest Transaction Premium is 41.75 cents per pound.
Midwest Transaction Premium (MWP) Price History
The U.S. and Canada both want to secure critical mineral supply chains, even with trade tensions. This is because collaborating in mineral exploration, processing, and production boosts long-term stability and economic security.
However, building new domestic processing facilities and securing alternative mineral sources will take years. Thus, short-term reliance on Canadian and Mexican metals is unavoidable.
Winners and Losers: The Effects of New Tariffs on U.S. Industries
The latest tariffs will have mixed effects across industries. Some domestic producers will benefit from less foreign competition, while others will face rising production costs. Goldman Sachs has recently rolled out an evaluation report that highlights the potential winners and losers of Trump tariffs.
Winners: Industries producing aluminum, steel, and oil and gas extraction will likely benefit the most. Higher tariffs on imports in these sectors will protect domestic producers. As these industries compete with imports, new tariffs will make foreign goods pricier, boosting demand for U.S.-made products.
Losers: The biggest losers will be secondary steel and aluminum producers and petroleum product manufacturers. These sectors rely heavily on imported raw materials. Higher tariffs on steel, aluminum, and oil will significantly raise their production costs. Midstream manufacturers of products like auto parts, beverage cans, and window frames will also feel the pressure.
Tariffs on Canadian and Chinese aluminum could disrupt global supply chains, raising costs for U.S. manufacturers. Supply shortages may arise as producers redirect exports to other markets. The long-term fix is to boost North American supply chains. We need to invest in local processing. Also, the U.S. and Canada must work together for steady access to key materials.
Can the U.S. Really Be Self-Reliant with Trump’s Tariffs?
Trade tensions are shaking up industries and slowing investments. Tariffs on key imports like steel, semiconductors, oil, gas, and medicine could hurt U.S. businesses more than those on Chinese goods.
Many American companies rely on these imports to stay competitive. If tariffs keep changing, businesses may hold back on investing due to rising costs and supply issues.
Industry experts speculate higher tariffs on critical imports could do more damage than those targeting China. The last trade war (2018-2019) showed how foreign retaliation can hit U.S. exports hard. More significantly the U.S. National security could also at risk—China has already cut off supplies of key minerals like gallium and germanium, which are essential for defense.
However, a possible solution lies in stronger U.S.-Canada ties with favourable tariffs. A stable North American supply chain for critical minerals can reduce reliance on foreign sources and protect both the economy and national security.
- FURTHER READING: Trump’s Tariffs and Climate Rollbacks: How 2025 is Shaking Copper Markets and Clean Energy Goals
The post Trump’s Tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico: A Risky Bet for U.S. Critical Minerals and Aluminum? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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