The next round of “nationally determined contributions” (NDC) to the Paris Agreement, outlining countries’ climate goals to 2035, are due by February 2025.
They are also set to be an important agenda item at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan later this month.
China, as the world’s current largest emitter, has not yet confirmed when it will publish its next NDC. Its current NDC formalised the country’s “dual-carbon” targets of peaking emissions by 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality by 2060 – a pledge that has formed the cornerstone of China’s climate strategy since it was announced in 2020.
Despite the country already achieving some of its existing NDC targets early, such as wind and solar capacity reaching 1,200 gigawatts (GW), it is not on track to meet others.
In addition, China’s recent stimulus package to “promote economic recovery” may lead to energy-intensive growth, exacerbating its “lagging behind” on current energy intensity and carbon-intensity targets.
Several groups, including Climate Action Tracker, the International Energy Agency and the Centre for Research on Energy and Air, have set out what it would take to align China’s targets with the 1.5C limit or its existing national goals.
Below, Carbon Brief asks nine leading experts what they expect to see in China’s 2035 NDC.
These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full. They have been edited for clarity and length:
- Todd Stern: “If the Chinese come in with a 5-10% target, it will be very bad.”
- Yao Zhe: “Stronger climate action and more ambitious targets are unmistakably an economic boon for China.”
- Anders Hove: “China’s past NDCs have tended to reflect trends underway…rather than adopting ambitious new goals.”
- Byford Tsang: “Policy signals…suggest that China’s upcoming climate target is going to be conservative.”
- Li Shuo: “Some experts believe that China will adopt its emissions peak as the base year for its 2035 target.”
- Niklas Höhne and Bill Hare: “China needs to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030 and by 66% by 2035 from 2023 levels.”
- Hu Min and Chen Meian: “China’s new NDC is expected to reflect heightened domestic momentum for decarbonisation, as well as subnational and sector-specific initiatives.”
- Lauri Myllyvirta: “China needs to reduce emissions by at least 30% from 2023 to 2035…It seems more likely that the decision-makers will target a reduction that is a fraction of this.”
- Lu Lunyan: “We hope China will consider setting clear and ambitious targets for total greenhouse gas emissions, including non-CO2 gases such as methane.”
Todd Stern
Senior fellow (former US special envoy for climate change and Barack Obama’s chief climate negotiator), in response to Carbon Brief at a Chatham House event
The Brookings Institution
There was an agreement back at the time of Paris that countries would put their [NDC] proposals in early enough in the year, and this was actually our [the US’s] idea, so there would be enough time for the press, other countries, analysts to criticise [targets] – and countries, knowing that they would be criticised, would do their best. That was the theory.
The new NDC targets are supposed to be put in February…It is going to be tremendously important that those [represent] a big step forward because…what happens in these upcoming targets is enormously important for the mid-century goals [net-zero emissions by 2050]…If the NDCs announced in 2025 to last until 2035 come up really short, if they’re effectively pretty weak, then you’ve just killed your chance to get anything done that you needed to get done by 2050 because you’re only 15 years away by 2035…
[China is] the most important country in the world right now, with respect to their target. I think that other major players – the US, EU, Japan, Canada, Korea, Australia – are…going to put in pretty ambitious, pretty strong targets of the kind that you want to see. China now [accounts for] 30% of global emissions, and China is basically peaking [carbon emissions] about now…if not this year then next year. At 30% of emissions, people [at the Asia Society and elsewhere] have done analysis…basically saying that in order to be where we need to be we need to see something like a 30% reduction from China [by 2035]. I am sure [this] is certainly not what the Chinese are thinking of at the moment, but we’ll see how much of a chance there is to move. If the Chinese come in with a 5-10% target, it will be very bad.
Yao Zhe
Global policy advisor
Greenpeace East Asia
I think it’s time for a mindset shift in designing the new NDC. So far, Chinese policy makers have taken a cautious approach, obviously constrained by the challenges in the domestic economy. But, in fact, stronger climate action and more ambitious targets are unmistakably an economic boon for China.
The cleantech industry is emerging as a new economic driver in China, and companies are continuing to invest and expand their production capacity in anticipation of strong future demand. The conventional “under-promise, over-deliver” style of target-setting is not enough for the industry.
An update of the renewable energy target is expected in China’s new NDC. A stronger target for the next 5-10 years will help expand the domestic market and give industry and investors the confidence they need. It will also lay the groundwork for an ambitious NDC, which will include an absolute emissions target for the first time, and its successful implementation.
However, China’s clean energy potential can only be fully realised with clearer plans to move away from fossil fuels. The continued expansion of the coal fleet is at odds with the historic development of renewables. The new NDC should address this contradiction by committing to no new coal power.
Anders Hove
Senior research fellow
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
China’s past NDCs have tended to reflect trends underway, and highlighted concrete targets that are already on track to be met, rather than adopting ambitious new goals. The “dual-carbon” targets represented an exception – albeit a critically important one – where China saw a benefit to taking a global leadership position and going beyond existing domestic policy.
A modest NDC would likely highlight targets related to renewable energy as a share of electricity production, continued steady growth in wind and solar capacity, and possibly electric vehicle adoption. Renewable capacity and electric vehicles are fields where China can showcase its success, scale and leadership without breaking new ground. China will almost certainly emphasise its steady roll-out of carbon trading to new sectors.
At times of economic softness, China’s leaders may see little benefit to setting ambitious public targets for reducing carbon emissions, especially if they also perceive other countries backing away from aggressive initiatives. A major transition to decreasing carbon emissions is more likely to require testing and experimentation domestically, as a first step.
Byford Tsang
Senior policy fellow
European Council on Foreign Relations
A reading of policy signals from the recent past suggest that China’s upcoming climate target is going to be conservative: coal plant approvals spiked in the years following a pledge to “strictly limit” coal power; official data showing that China is on track to miss its own 2025 carbon intensity targets; and the country’s top energy agency has proposed an annual installation target that would slow down clean-energy deployment. However, these developments contrast with the significant progress made in China’s energy transition, as the addition of renewable power capacity is on track to meet its annual increase in power demand.
The extent to which Beijing addresses this misalignment is both a climate policy decision and an economic one. The quest to find new growth drivers after the recent real estate slump is top priority for the government. How Beijing decides to rebalance its economy to drive growth, [and which] sectors it prioritises in the tried-and-tested approach to channel investment in infrastructure and manufacturing, will dictate China’s emission trajectory for years to come. Decisions that limit Beijing’s options – such as an emissions target that would constrain the sectors economic planners can leverage as drivers of growth, is likely to be a challenging argument to win in Zhongnanhai.
Li Shuo
Director of the China Climate Hub
Asia Society Policy Institute
China is developing its 2035 NDC under exceptional circumstances. China’s economic slowdown, its 2035 targets being its first post-2030-peaking international commitment and the transition from intensity-based targets to absolute emission targets bring both tremendous challenges and opportunities for ambition. One Chinese expert I spoke to recently reflected: “I wish China’s NDC setting was as simple as pinning down a midpoint in a straight line.”
At least three variables will determine the quality of China’s headline commitment. The first is the quantum [the minimum amount] of emissions reduction. The second is the base year from which emissions will be reduced. The third is the sectoral and greenhouse gas coverage of China’s target. Depending on political will, Chinese decision-makers could plant ambiguities in any, none, or all these variables. Commitment could, therefore, be as vague as “by 2035, China’s emissions will have peaked and seen a steady decline”, or as clear as “by 2035, China’s greenhouse gas emissions covering all economic sectors will be reduced by X% based on Y year”.
Some experts believe that China will adopt its emissions peak as the base year for its 2035 target. For example, [they could say]: “By 2035, China emissions will be reduced by X% based on emissions peak.” This formulation could see China not specifying when and at what level its emissions will peak, extending the ambiguity in its updated 2030 NDC – to peak CO2 emission before 2030 – to 2035. If such a formulation is chosen, it will make the question of when, and based on what conditions, Beijing will confirm its emission peak ever more important. Currently, Beijing’s policymakers do not believe China’s emissions have peaked.
Citing poor baseline data, experts also believe that it is hard to expect gas-specific targets for non-CO2 gases in China’s upcoming NDC. This risks perpetuating a “chicken-and-egg” question, namely: should China wait until it has enough data to start cutting emissions, or should it impose reduction targets so as to accelerate better data gathering?
Part of the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) and NewClimate Institute &
Co-founder and CEO, Climate Analytics, and part of CAT
In order to align with 1.5C, China would need to increase the ambition of its 2030 NDC as well as putting forward a 1.5C aligned 2035 set of targets. Alignment of a countries’ NDC with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal was an agreed outcome of the global stocktake last year.
In terms of total greenhouse gases emissions, excluding LULUCF (land use, land-use change and forestry), China’s emissions…reached a record high in 2023. According to CAT projections, emissions could peak before 2025, with the possibility that 2023 marked the peak. However, without additional commitments, emissions may rise again before 2030. Amid discussions on China setting a percentage reduction target from peak emission levels, CAT recommends basing the 2035 NDC on a historical baseline. The uncertainties surrounding peak emissions make it challenging to evaluate the level of ambition in future targets.
China, like all countries, must also raise the ambition of its 2030 target. CAT’s modelled domestic pathways indicate that China needs to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030 and by 66% by 2035 from 2023 levels (excl. LULUCF) to align with the Paris Agreement. A minimum 28% reduction in total GHG emissions (excl. LULUCF) from 2023 levels by 2035 is crucial for China to stay on track for its 2060 domestic net-zero target, assuming a linear decline in emissions from the peak to 2060.
China is on track to meet its previous NDC target of a 25% share of non-fossil fuels in total primary energy consumption by 2030: CAT’s modelled domestic pathways suggest that China should increase its non-fossil energy share to 73-84% by 2030 and 76-91% by 2035 to align with the Paris Agreement.
Hu Min and Chen Meian
Director and co-founder, Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress (iGDP) & Senior program director and senior analyst, iGDP
Regardless of its performance in various sectoral targets set in its current NDC, China is on track to fulfil its economy-wide overarching commitment of peaking CO2 emissions before 2030.
China’s new NDC is expected to reflect heightened domestic momentum for decarbonisation, as well as subnational and sector-specific initiatives, which have advanced the country’s specific climate targets beyond its initial international commitments, especially in renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs).
The new NDC might also reflect ongoing domestic adjustments to the mitigation indicator system evaluating mitigation progress, such as by including a carbon budget system. This would be an encouraging move to address absolute carbon mitigation instead of the intensity target.
Incorporating mitigation measures for non-CO2 gas emissions could bridge the nation’s short-term CO2 peaking target for 2030 with its 2060 long-term carbon neutrality ambitions. China’s newly issued policies addressing methane and other non-CO2 emissions across agriculture, waste, and industry demonstrate China’s broadened climate strategy beyond CO2. This comprehensive approach enhances its ability to meet multi-gas mitigation goals, reinforcing the strength of its NDC as a commitment to tackling climate change across all greenhouse gases.
The new NDC would need to take into account the huge diversity of regional and subnational mitigation pathways and the desire to achieve a just-transition goal within China. Furthermore, international collaboration will have to balance the challenges posed by geopolitical shifts.
Lauri Myllyvirta
Lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA)
and senior fellow at Asia Society Policy Institute
China is in the unique position of being able to single-handedly scupper the goals of the Paris Agreement, if it allows emissions to grow until just before 2030 and pursues slow and gradual emission reductions thereafter. In this scenario, China alone would use up almost the entire global carbon budget for 1.5C.
China’s emissions are stabilising at the moment, and if the rapid rate of clean energy additions is maintained, it will begin pushing the country’s emissions down.
However, recent policies and statements from China’s top policymakers show that they are still expecting emissions to keep rising until just before 2030 and to then fall very gradually. As long as the policymakers think in terms of a late 2020s peak, there is also little time to reduce emissions from that peak by 2035.
While China needs to reduce emissions by at least 30% from 2023 to 2035, and such reductions are achievable building on current positive trends, it seems more likely that the decision-makers will target a reduction that is a fraction of this, also falling short of the rate of reductions needed to get to carbon neutrality before 2060.
In addition to the 2035 headline target, updating 2030 targets is important. China is severely off track to some of the country’s key 2030 commitments…Reinforcing these targets in the new NDC is essential.
Since the target for wind and solar capacity was already, and entirely predictably, met, this leaves an obvious placeholder for a new target. Maintaining current rates of wind and solar additions would take total capacity to 3,000GW by 2030, and would align with the global goal of tripling renewable energy capacity. Current discussions reference numbers below 2,500GW, however, so it will be important to set an “at least” target or a range. [Such] expansionary targets…could also have more traction amid concerns about the economy.
There is a long list of other sectoral targets that could be included [to] shore up ambition, such as targets for [uptake of] EVs, rail freight and electric steelmaking and for the share of buildings retrofitted to meet energy efficiency standards.
Lu Lunyan
CEO
WWF China
A robust NDC is critical not only for achieving China’s climate goals but also for solidifying its role as a global leader in sustainability. While China has achieved notable progress, including advancing clean technologies and exceeding renewable energy targets ahead of schedule, challenges remain in reducing carbon intensity, transition away from coal, and fully meeting all NDC commitments.
Looking forward to the 2035 NDC, we hope China will consider setting clear and ambitious targets for total greenhouse gas emissions, including non-CO2 gases such as methane, alongside increasing the share of non-fossil fuels, and aligning with the Paris Agreement on the path to net-zero. In addition, sector-specific decarbonisation strategies, particularly for heavy industries, transportation and power generation, will be crucial to achieving meaningful emission reduction.
We also want to encourage stronger alignment between climate and biodiversity agendas by proposing the establishment of a climate and nature workstream within the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement negotiations, aligned with the Global Biodiversity Framework. This initiative could be advanced through the coordinated national plans required by both the climate and biodiversity conventions, fostering synergies between the two agendas. By integrating these efforts, the effectiveness of climate action can be enhanced while safeguarding ecosystems. We encourage China to initiate the discussion as the COP15 presidency.
The post Experts: What to expect in China’s climate pledge for 2035 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
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Amid reports that the government could weaken the UK’s electric vehicle (EV) targets, Carbon Brief analysis reveals the nation’s EV drivers are saving more than £1,100 a year in fuel costs, compared with running a petrol car.
Battery EVs (BEVs) are roughly four times more efficient than combustion-engine cars, making them far cheaper to run – particularly since the Iran crisis caused a spike in fossil-fuel prices.
The savings from driving BEVs are also more than three times higher than for “plug-in” hybrids (PHEVs), which evidence shows are mostly driven with their combustion engines.
In total, the more than 2m BEVs, 1m PHEVs and 100,000 electric vans on UK roads are saving drivers around £3bn a year, Carbon Brief’s analysis shows, as illustrated in the figure below.
In addition, these EVs are avoiding the need for nearly 2.5bn litres of fuel and cutting carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by nearly 7m tonnes each year.
Despite recent news that EVs are now cheaper to buy than petrol cars, as well as having far lower running costs, BBC News says the government is “set to water down” its EV sales targets.
The broadcaster explains that the current goal, under the UK’s “zero-emissions vehicle” (ZEV) mandate, is for 80% of new car sales to be BEVs by 2030.
It says that the government is set to consult on weakening this to between 50% and 70%, following “lobbying” by carmakers and trade unions.
According to the Sunday Times, prime minister Keir Starmer “is understood to have overruled the energy secretary [Ed Miliband] after sustained pressure from industry, the Unite union and Peter Kyle, the business secretary”.
The car industry has consistently claimed there is insufficient demand for BEVs to meet the targets under the ZEV mandate, yet the government says manufacturers have “over-complied” to date. Independent analysts say the industry is on track to continue beating the ZEV mandate goals.
The industry has been able to beat its targets by using a wide range of “flexibilities”, which were introduced after a previous round of lobbying. These allow carmarkers to meet part of their EV targets by selling more efficient combustion cars, such as hybrids and plug-in hybrids.
The ZEV mandate is the single-largest part of the government’s plans to meet its legally binding climate goals over the next decade.
The advisory Climate Change Committee (CCC) previously warned that the extra flexibilities would result in a larger number of hybrids being sold, at the expense of battery EVs.
When it consulted on the ZEV mandate in 2023, the then-Conservative government noted that PHEVs do not deliver the cost and CO2 savings they are advertised with.
It pointed to “dramatic” differences between the performance of PHEVs in test cycles and what they deliver under real-world conditions.
In practice, less than a third of miles driven in PHEVs are fuelled by electricity, with petrol making up the rest. As a result, cost and CO2 savings from BEVs are three times larger than for PHEVs.
The post Analysis: UK’s EV drivers are now saving £1,100 each a year – and £3bn in total appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK’s EV drivers are now saving £1,100 each a year – and £3bn in total
Civil society groups have called for an investigation into the first carbon credits approved under a new UN mechanism, alleging the project is linked to Myanmar’s military junta – which the UN says is guilty of human rights abuses – and has “massively” overstated its climate impact.
The programme, which aims to cut emissions by distributing efficient cookstoves across Myanmar, received approval to issue around 650,000 carbon credits from the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body in February, in a landmark moment for the Paris Agreement’s carbon market. Only two projects have been given the green light by the mechanism’s regulator so far.
But two reports published last week, led by the Global Forest Coalition and Brussels-based NGO Carbon Market Watch, raised serious concerns about the project’s implementation in conflict zones where civilians have faced airstrikes and mass displacement as well as its emission-reduction calculations.
Project continued after military coup
Myanmar has been ravaged by a brutal civil war since the country’s military overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d’état in February 2021. The military regime has attacked civilian populations, persecuted ethnic minorities and committed widespread sexual violence, among other serious human rights violations, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar said in April.
The cookstove programme started in 2018 under the previous UN-run carbon offsetting scheme – the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – as a partnership between Myanmar’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) and the Climate Change Center (CCC), a South Korean NGO, with investment from private South Korean firms.
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The project continued operating after the coup. For most of the period between 2021 and 2022 in which the issued credits were generated, MONREC was led by Colonel Khin Maung Yi, who was sanctioned by the European Union in 2021 for supporting the military regime, the Global Forest Coalition report said.
CCC acknowledged engaging with government authorities after the coup but said this “should not be interpreted as political endorsement” of the junta. The South Korean NGO added that abandoning the programme when political circumstances changed “would not necessarily have been the most responsible outcome for the households involved”.
Conflict prevents on the ground verification
The Global Forest Coalition report raised particular concerns about the project’s implementation in Myanmar’s central Dry Zone, including Sagaing Region, an anti-junta resistance stronghold that has been most heavily affected by the conflict and routinely targeted by airstrikes and violent attacks. The region accounts for more than a third of Myanmar’s 3.8 million internally displaced people.
The NGOs said that, in addition to ethical concerns about carbon credits being produced by the military government in an area actively affected by its attacks, this raises questions over the ability to effectively verify the climate integrity of the projects.
Before carbon credits are issued, external auditors need to validate the claims made by project developers and confirm that the emission reductions claimed are correct. This process usually includes site visits to a representative sample of households to check how the improved cookstoves are being used.
But, because of the “volatile political situation” in Myanmar, the auditing team was not able to leave the capital Yangon and could only speak to project participants remotely via Zoom, project documents show.
“Due to ongoing armed conflict on the ground, the data currently used to justify carbon credit issuance in Sagaing by the Burmese military junta is unverifiable and highly likely fraudulent,” said Zaw Tuseng, founder and president of the Myanmar Policy Institute, which contributed to the report, in a written statement. “This demands an immediate suspension of credit transfers until a neutral, conflict-sensitive audit can be conducted.”
“Exceptional circumstances”
CCC told Climate Home News that, although it recognises that on-site verification is “generally preferable, particularly in complex operating environments”, the decision to opt for remote controls was not taken “as a discretionary shortcut, but as an approved alternative under exceptional circumstances”.
The South Korean NGO added that it reviewed the feasibility of the project at community level “on an ongoing basis” and it “did not identify conflict-related incidents that directly affected project implementation activities in participating communities during the monitoring period”.
A spokesperson for the UN climate change body told Climate Home News that, when site access is not possible, the UN carbon credit mechanism allows for “alternative verification approaches while still maintaining conservative assumptions and environmental integrity safeguards”. “These provisions ensure that crediting can only proceed where evidence is reliable,” they added.
Contested methodology
Carbon markets are seen as an important channel to raise money to help low-income communities in developing countries switch to less polluting cooking methods, both reducing CO2 emissions and improving air quality. But several cookstove offsetting projects have faced criticism from researchers and campaigners who argue that climate benefits are often exaggerated and weak monitoring can undermine claims of real emission reductions.
The project in Myanmar uses a contested methodology developed under the earlier Kyoto Protocol that was rejected last year by The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM), a watchdog that issues quality labels to carbon credit types, because it found it “insufficiently rigorous”.
EU carbon credits could supercharge world’s clean cooking push, France says
After transitioning from the CDM to the new mechanism, the project was required to apply “more conservative” assumptions to calculate emission reductions, which resulted in 40% fewer credits being issued, according to the UN climate change body.
“The result is consistent with environmental integrity requirements and ensures that each credited tonne genuinely represents a tonne reduced and contributes to the goals of the Paris Agreement,” Mkhuthazi Steleki, the South African chair of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, which oversees the mechanism, said in February.
Too many credits issued
But Carbon Market Watch claimed in a second report last week that, despite the adjustment, the project is still likely to issue seven times more credits than its real climate impact justifies, comparing its calculations with values from peer-reviewed scientific literature.
The biggest driver of the credit inflation, the group said, is the failure to account for “stacking” – the widespread practice of households using multiple stoves at the same time, including more polluting ones the project does not monitor.
Peer-reviewed science considers a stacking rate of 68% a conservative assumption, but the methodology used by the Myanmar programme makes no allowance for it at all, the report said.
CCC disputed those findings. In a written response to Climate Home News, it said the project was developed under methodologies approved within the UN climate framework and that external recalculations by researchers are not “determinative of the level of crediting achieved”.
The credits are expected to be used primarily by major South Korean polluters to meet obligations under the country’s emissions trading system – a move that will also enable the government to count those units toward emissions reduction targets in its nationally determined contribution (NDC), the UN climate body told Climate Home News.
Myanmar will use the remaining credits to achieve in part the goals of its own national climate plan under the Paris Agreement.
“Over-crediting, at any magnitude, cannot be compatible with the climate ambition of a world striving to limit global warming to 1.5ºC,” said Isa Mulder, an expert at Carbon Market Watch.
The post UN’s first Paris Agreement carbon credits face human rights and climate concerns appeared first on Climate Home News.
UN’s first Paris Agreement carbon credits face human rights and climate concerns
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