Battery energy storage has entered a new era. Costs have fallen to historic lows, and deployments are accelerating across major markets. According to BloombergNEF’s (BNEF) Levelized Cost of Electricity 2026 report, the economics of grid storage shifted dramatically in 2025 — even as other clean energy technologies became more expensive.
- The global benchmark cost for a four-hour battery storage project dropped 27% year-on-year to $78 per megawatt-hour (MWh) in 2025.
That marks the lowest level since BNEF began tracking the data in 2009. As a result, batteries are now reshaping how power systems balance renewable energy and meet rising electricity demand.
At the same time, solar and wind projects faced cost pressures. Supply chain constraints, weaker resource quality in some regions, and policy reforms in mainland China pushed up benchmark costs. However, despite these short-term headwinds, BNEF expects long-term clean energy costs to continue declining through 2035.

Battery Storage Breaks Records While Solar and Wind Stall
In 2025, battery storage clearly stood out. The $78/MWh benchmark for a four-hour system reflected a steep and rapid decline. Lower battery pack prices, stronger competition among manufacturers, and better system design all helped drive the drop.
By contrast, solar and wind moved in the opposite direction. The global benchmark cost for a fixed-axis solar farm rose 6%, reaching $39/MWh. Onshore wind increased to $40/MWh. Offshore wind climbed sharply to $100/MWh due to tight supply chains and financing challenges.
Thermal power also became more expensive. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for new combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants jumped 16% to $102/MWh — the highest level recorded. Equipment price increases and strong demand for gas turbines, partly fueled by data center expansion, kept costs elevated. Coal plants also faced higher capital expenses.
Yet even with solar and wind costs rising in 2025, BNEF projects that innovation and scale will push prices down again over the next decade. By 2035, the firm expects:
- Solar LCOE to fall 30%
- Battery storage to decline 25%
- Onshore wind to drop 23%
- Offshore wind to decrease 20%
These projections suggest the current cost increases are temporary rather than structural.
China’s Cost Advantage
Wind energy told a more mixed story.
Mainland China retained a cost advantage. However, projects built in lower wind-speed regions pushed up the global benchmark. Onshore wind projects outside mainland China saw a 4% cost decline, but the global average rose 2% due to Chinese market dynamics.
Offshore wind faced deeper challenges. Supply chain bottlenecks increased turbine and installation costs across major markets. In the United Kingdom, recently financed offshore wind projects now cost 69% more than they did five years ago. BNEF expects offshore wind costs to remain elevated until at least 2030.
Still, in the United States, wind power regained its position as the cheapest source of new electricity generation in 2025. Rising gas turbine costs pushed wind ahead of gas for the first time since 2023.
EV Overcapacity Slashes Battery Prices
One major factor behind the storage cost collapse is manufacturing overcapacity in the electric vehicle (EV) sector.
China’s lithium-ion battery production capacity surpassed 2 terawatt-hours in 2024. That was about 60% higher than total battery demand. As a result, manufacturers competed aggressively on price, which benefited grid-scale storage buyers.
Battery pack prices for EVs fell 8% in 2025 to a record low of $108 per kilowatt-hour, according to BNEF’s December survey. Lower pack prices directly reduced the cost of large storage projects. Meanwhile, system-level improvements — including better integration and optimized engineering — improved performance and reduced overall project expenses.
According to Amar Vasdev, senior energy economics associate at BNEF and lead author of the report, manufacturing overcapacity and better system designs are transforming the economics of large energy storage projects. In six markets, the LCOE of a four-hour battery system has already dropped below $100/MWh.
That threshold is critical. At those levels, battery storage becomes highly competitive with fossil fuel peaking plants.
- RELATED: China’s One Month Lithium Battery Energy Storage Installations Beat America’s One Whole Year
Lower Battery Costs Drive Renewables Plus Storage Boom Worldwide
Lower battery costs are accelerating hybrid renewable development. In 2025 alone, developers added 87 gigawatts of co-located solar and storage projects worldwide. These combined systems delivered electricity at an average cost of $57/MWh.
This model solves one of solar’s biggest challenges — intermittency. Batteries allow solar farms to store excess daytime generation and dispatch it later when demand peaks. As storage becomes cheaper, solar-plus-storage projects become more financially attractive and reliable.
BNEF expects annual global energy storage additions to reach 220 GW by 2035, growing at a compound annual rate of nearly 15%. If that projection holds, batteries will become central to grid balancing worldwide.

The U.S. Storage Boom Accelerates
The United States is emerging as a key growth engine for battery deployment.
According to the February 2026 Electric Power Monthly report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 86 GW of new utility-scale capacity is expected to come online in 2026. Of that total, 26.3 GW will come from battery storage.
That represents the largest single-year capacity expansion in more than two decades. Solar and battery storage together account for nearly 79% of planned additions.
Texas has become a hotspot for battery development. As of July 2025, the state had 12.2 GW of storage capacity operating. Developers rushed projects online ahead of summer peak demand, including nearly 1 GWh brought online by esVolta across three projects.
California continues to lead nationally, with more than 12 GW of operational storage capacity. Projects such as the Rexford solar-plus-storage facility in Tulare County strengthened the state’s position as a grid storage pioneer.

Meanwhile, New England expanded its footprint with large-scale additions to the ISO New England grid. These projects demonstrate that battery storage is no longer confined to a few early-adopter markets.
Australia’s Breakout Year
Australia also delivered a major milestone in 2025. The country commissioned 4.9 GWh of utility-scale battery storage during the year — more than the combined total installed between 2017 and 2024.
In the fourth quarter alone, over 1,000 MW of new capacity came online. Large projects, including the 500 MW Liddell battery system in New South Wales, highlighted the rapid pace of expansion.
Australia’s experience shows how quickly storage can scale once policy support, market design, and financing align.
Data Centers Drive the “Race for Electrons”
A powerful new demand driver is reshaping electricity markets: data centers.
The rapid expansion of AI and cloud computing has triggered strong demand for reliable power. Gas turbine orders surged as operators sought firm capacity. This demand doubled U.S. turbine capital costs in just two years.
However, higher gas costs are improving the competitiveness of renewables and storage. In regions like California and parts of Texas, co-located solar and four-hour battery systems can already meet a significant share of data center demand at lower cost than new gas plants.
Grid interconnection queues and gas turbine supply constraints are also slowing fossil fuel projects. In contrast, solar and storage systems can often deploy more quickly.

As Vasdev explained, the world is in a “race for electrons” to meet rising demand from electrification and data centers. In many markets, renewables are not only cheaper for new builds — they are now undercutting the operating costs of existing fossil fuel plants.
Solar beats new coal and gas across most Asia-Pacific markets. Wind is the lowest-cost new generation source in the U.S. and Canada. Solar consistently outcompetes fossil fuels in Southern Europe, while wind dominates in Northern Europe.
From Niche Technology to Grid Backbone
Battery storage has moved beyond its early-stage niche. It is now central to power system planning.
As storage costs fall, batteries strengthen renewable energy revenues, stabilize grids, and reduce reliance on fossil-fuel peaking plants. Instead of building new gas capacity for short-duration peaks, operators can increasingly rely on storage-led balancing.
BNEF’s annual LCOE report analyzed more than 800 recently financed projects across over 50 markets and 28 technologies. Its expanded coverage of the Middle East and Africa highlights how storage economics are improving globally, not just in mature markets.
The broader message is clear. While 2025 delivered mixed signals for clean power costs, battery storage emerged as the clear winner. Manufacturing overcapacity, technological learning, and intense competition have driven prices to record lows.
Looking ahead, continued cost declines could accelerate the global shift toward renewable-dominated grids supported by flexible storage. In that transition, batteries are no longer optional. They are becoming the backbone of a reliable, low-carbon electricity system.
The post Renewables Plus Storage Surge as Battery Costs Drop Record Low, BNEF Reports appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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