Published

1 year ago

May 9, 2025

Alice Rush

Disseminated on behalf of SolarBank Corporation

SolarBank Corporation (NASDAQ: SUUN; Cboe CA: SUNN; FSE: GY2) is growing its solar footprint in the U.S. It has signed a new deal with a California-based renowned real estate and infrastructure investor, CIM Group. This deal provides project-based funding of up to $100 million and will support solar projects with a combined capacity of 97 megawatts (MW) across the country.

Dr. Richard Lu, President and CEO of SolarBank, said,

“The financing is another major milestone in SolarBank’s plans to grow its status as an independent power producer. Assuming full funding, SolarBank will retain a majority ownership interest in what is expected to be 21 solar energy projects with a total capacity of 97 MW. The Transaction has been structured such that SolarBank does not have to issue any new shares, as the financing is being completed at the project company level.”

SolarBank’s Joint Venture Structure and Financing Details

CIM is a real estate and infrastructure firm focused on community development with ESG goals intact. Since 1994, it has invested over $60 billion to improve neighborhoods across the U.S. The company manages all stages of a project. From research and planning to daily operations and final sale.

Kyle Hatzes, Managing Director, Infrastructure & Impact Investments, CIM Group, further confirmed,

“CIM Group has a long history of developing and investing in essential infrastructure projects that seek to benefit communities and the environment. This transaction with SolarBank to grow its portfolio of solar projects underscores our ongoing commitment to the renewable energy sector and our focus on supporting innovative companies leading the energy transition across North America.”

The funding will be structured through a joint venture called “New HoldCo,” formed by CIM and Abundant Solar Power Inc. (ASP), a fully owned subsidiary of SolarBank.

Under the agreement, CIM will invest in non-convertible preferred equity in the newly created entity. Importantly, SolarBank is not issuing any shares or securities as part of this transaction.

New HoldCo is set to acquire project companies from ASP that collectively own 97 MW of solar capacity. The purchase will occur in two phases:

20% of the purchase price will be paid when a project reaches mechanical completion.
The remaining 80% will be provided upon substantial completion.

Tax Credit Transfers and Financial Returns

Each solar project will earn Investment Tax Credits (ITCs). These credits will be sold to qualified buyers. These sales will follow Section 6418 of the Internal Revenue Code. Tax credit transfer agreements (TCTAs) will formalize these transactions. CIM will keep 100% of the revenue from these tax credit sales.

CIM will earn a 3% annual coupon on its investment. This payment is made twice a year. After this payment, the remaining cash flow from the projects will go to ASP.

SEE MORE: Latest Solar Price Chart

Exit Strategy and Redemption Terms

New HoldCo can redeem CIM’s preferred equity 180 days after the fifth anniversary of the last project’s launch. The redemption value will be the higher of the fair market value or a set multiple of CIM’s initial investment.

Additionally, if New HoldCo decides not to redeem, CIM can request redemption at the lower value of the fair market price or the same investment multiple.

If a project is liquidated, damaged, or faces similar events, proceeds will be split according to the original contributions made by each party.

Challenges and Conditional Requirements

Despite the positive outlook, the deal comes with several risks. SolarBank must secure interconnection approvals, sign solar contracts, and obtain all required permits. The company also needs to secure third-party financing to keep the projects moving. Construction delays or cost overruns could pose further challenges.

Most importantly, if the government changes or removes solar incentives, the projects may no longer remain financially viable.

Moreover, the funding from CIM is subject to the signing of final agreements. If these aren’t finalized or key conditions fail, funds won’t be released. SolarBank also needs to secure capital for important construction milestones. The CIM funding comes only after achieving mechanical and substantial completion.

However, this deal with CIM Group shows great trust in SolarBank’s U.S. projects and growth plans. The $100 million financing will work if it gets regulatory approval. It also depends on construction moving forward and government policies supporting solar energy.

MUST READ:

Community Solar: Current Market Landscape and Growth Projections

As of June 2024, the United States has about 7.87 gigawatts (GW) of community solar capacity. This capacity is spread across 44 states and the District of Columbia.

In the third quarter of 2024, the community solar segment installed 291 megawatts direct current (MWdc). This is a 12% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. This growth underscores the sector’s resilience and expanding appeal.

Solar Bank’s community solar achievements include:

community solar

SolarBank: Opportunities Amid Tariff Hikes

With rising tariffs on solar products from Southeast Asia, U.S.-based companies like SolarBank Corporation could seize new opportunities. SolarBank, which focuses on solar energy, battery storage, and EV charging solutions, does not manufacture solar panels but imports them for its projects. Notably, the company does not source from the Southeast Asian nations affected by the new tariffs, minimizing immediate impact.

These tariffs are expected to drive up the cost of imported panels, potentially increasing demand for domestic solar products. SolarBank, with a strong U.S. presence, may benefit by sourcing panels locally. U.S. solar stocks have already seen a rise since the tariff announcement, strengthening the business case for companies like SolarBank, which can reduce supply chain risks by focusing on domestic production.

Regarding the recent tariffs, Dr. Richard Lu, President and CEO of SolarBank, commented:

“We continue to execute on our development pipeline of community solar projects. I also want to comment on the recent announcement of increased tariffs on south-east Asia solar cells and SolarBank’s plans to manage its supply chain.

SolarBank has not been importing solar panels from any of the four countries that are subject to the tariffs announced by the U.S. Department of Commerce on April 21, 2025. As a result its present operations are not affected by this announcement. In addition, SolarBank has been exploring sourcing solar panels from other jurisdictions such as the Middle East and North America, where (domestic assembled) solar panels are becoming cost competitive with the panels imported from Asia. SolarBank also has significant development opportunities in Canada where solar panels are not subject to the same tariffs. Finally, I am expecting that electricity costs will increase in response to these tariffs which will further mitigate the financial impact on projects.

Overall, SolarBank is well positioned to manage this risk.”

solarbank

SolarBank’s growth strategy in North America positions the company to capitalize on emerging clean energy markets in both the U.S. and Canada. By focusing on regions with high demand for renewable energy infrastructure, SolarBank is strategically aligning its operations to meet the growing need for community solar, energy storage, and sustainable energy solutions. This approach not only strengthens its market presence but also ensures the company is well-positioned to benefit from the ongoing transition toward green energy.

This report contains forward-looking information. Please refer to the SolarBank press release entitled “US$100 Million Transformative, Project Financing Announced by SolarBank and CIM Group to Fund 97 MW of Renewable Energy Assets in the United States” for details of the information, risks and assumptions.

Disclosure: Owners, members, directors, and employees of carboncredits.com have/may have stock or option positions in any of the companies mentioned: None.

Carboncredits.com receives compensation for this publication and has a business relationship with any company whose stock(s) is/are mentioned in this article.

Additional disclosure: This communication serves the sole purpose of adding value to the research process and is for information only. Please do your own due diligence. Every investment in securities mentioned in publications of carboncredits.com involves risks that could lead to a total loss of the invested capital.

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The post SolarBank and CIM Group Announce $100M to Power 97 MW of U.S. Renewable Energy Projects appeared first on Carbon Credits.

Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

Published

5 days ago

August 12, 2026

Alice Rush

The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

Carbon Footprint

Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

Published

6 days ago

August 11, 2026

Alice Rush

Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

Published

7 days ago

August 10, 2026

Alice Rush

Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?