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Rapidly rising emissions from China’s agricultural machinery could “hinder” the country’s push to net-zero, according to new research.

The study, published in Nature Food, finds that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from agricultural machinery have increased approximately seven-fold in the country since 1985.

Using government statistics on the quantity of farm equipment over time, researchers calculate the changes in CO2 emissions and other air pollutants between 1985 and 2020.

They find that CO2 emissions from farm equipment have grown, on average, by nearly 6% annually since 1985.

Based on “anticipated trends”, they say, increased mechanisation of agriculture could account for 21% of China’s total emissions in 2050, under a pathway to its 2060 net-zero goal.

This could make it harder for China to meet its emissions reduction goals, as well as “degrade” its air quality, the authors say.

However, the study also finds that widespread adoption of machinery powered with renewable energy could mitigate 65-70% of these emissions.

One expert, who was not involved in the research, tells Carbon Brief that the work is “valuable”, although she adds that farm machinery would likely not reach such a large proportion of total emissions:

“If China is making rapid progress in reducing emissions from other emitters…then I expect it will have made significant progress in the decarbonisation of agricultural machinery too.”

Machinery-related emissions

Food systems are responsible for around one-third of human-driven greenhouse gas emissions.

This figure includes everything associated with producing food – from the emissions caused by deforestation or other land-use changes to the methane belched by cows or off-gassed from manure.

In the new study, researchers rely on data from the China Statistical Yearbook, which provides annual statistics on a wide range of socioeconomic indicators. From the yearbook, the researchers use data on both the quantity and power of agricultural machinery in use in the country, as well as the properties of the fuel used in the machinery, cultivated land area, population and more.

In addition to CO2 emissions, the researchers calculate the machinery-related emissions of three types of air pollutants: fine particulate matter (PM2.5), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and total hydrocarbons (THC).

They divide the equipment into four categories: small tractors, large tractors, field-management machinery and harvest machinery. Then, they calculate the CO2, PM2.5, NOx and THC emissions for each type of machinery in each year.

The chart below shows the CO2 emissions for the study period of 1985 to 2020. The bars show emissions resulting from harvesting machinery (light blue), field-management machinery (pink), small tractors (light green) and large tractors (dark green).

Annual emissions of CO2 from farm machinery over 1985-2020. The colours indicate the type of machinery responsible for the emissions: small tractors (light green), large tractors (dark green), field-management machinery (pink) and harvesting machinery (light blue). Source: Zhuang et al. (2025)
Annual emissions of CO2 from farm machinery over 1985-2020. The colours indicate the type of machinery responsible for the emissions: small tractors (light green), large tractors (dark green), field-management machinery (pink) and harvesting machinery (light blue). Source: Zhuang et al. (2025)

They find that the total farm equipment CO2 emissions have increased from around 23m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) in 1985 to nearly 160MtCO2 in 2020, growing annually by a rate of 5.7%.

This is equivalent to around 1.5% of the country’s total emissions in 2020. While this is only a small percentage, the amount of CO2 actually exceeds the annual emissions of entire countries – such as the Netherlands, the Philippines and Nigeria, the authors note.

In particular, the emissions contribution of large tractors has increased steadily since 2005. The authors attribute this to a “series of policies to promote large-scale machinery”.

Disaggregating the emissions of agricultural machinery from food systems more broadly “provides a unique perspective”, says Prof Zhangcai Qin, from Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China. Qin, who was not involved in the new study, says that doing so “allow[s] policymakers to design targeted interventions without compromising agricultural productivity”.

Regional breakdown

The researchers also break the emissions down to the province level, finding a large range of agricultural machinery emissions – from 0.1MtCO2 for the lowest-emitting provinces to 17.5MtCO2 for the highest emitters.

They find that five provinces in eastern and north-eastern China – Shandong, Henan, Heilongjiang, Hebei and Anhui – account for more than 40% of agricultural machinery emissions. Together, those provinces contain one-third of the country’s cropland area and about 46% of the total engine power.

However, even between these high-emitting regions, the makeup of the machinery was different, with some provinces more dependent on large tractors and some more dominated by field-management machinery.

The sub-national emissions analysis is one of the key advances of the new research, says Dr Hannah Ritchie, deputy editor at Our World in Data. Ritchie, who was not involved in the study, explains:

“This spatial resolution of emissions estimates is valuable, because there is such large [variety] across a country of China’s size. It also offers important insights into potential emissions pathways in the future, under different rates of mechanisation and low-carbon technology uptake.”

Growth factors

The researchers identify four socioeconomic factors contributing to the rise in emissions: population growth, changes in per-capita cropland area, level of mechanisation and emissions intensity.

The chart below shows the change in CO2 emissions (black) due to changes in emission intensity (dark blue), level of mechanisation (light blue), per-capita cropland area (yellow) and population (orange).

Total CO2 emissions (black) for the years 1985, 2000, 2010 and 2020. The emissions are broken down by four contributing factors: changes in emission intensity (dark blue), level of mechanisation (light blue), per-capita cropland area (yellow) and population (orange). Source: Zhuang et al. (2025)
Total CO2 emissions (black) for the years 1985, 2000, 2010 and 2020. The emissions are broken down by four contributing factors: changes in emission intensity (dark blue), level of mechanisation (light blue), per-capita cropland area (yellow) and population (orange). Source: Zhuang et al. (2025)

Of those, the increasing level of mechanisation “dominate[s]” the change in emissions, the paper says. It notes that these changes alone were responsible for around a 100% increase in emissions over 1985-2000.

Population growth was another large driver of increasing farm equipment emissions over the early part of the study period, the study notes, but it has been less of a factor since 2000.

In contrast, increasing emissions intensity uniformly acted to decrease emissions, the authors say, while “tillage pressure” increased emissions early on in the study period, but decreased emissions since 2000.

Carbon goals

Under current policies, China aims to “achieve comprehensive mechanisation in major crop production processes by 2035”, the authors note.

Therefore, unabated continued growth of agricultural mechanisation could compromise China’s efforts to achieve its “dual-carbon” goals, they warn.

(The term “dual-carbon” goals refers to the country’s pledge to reach peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.)

They write that effective mitigation of these emissions will require different strategies in the short- and long-term future, noting that near-term availability means that “biofuels and natural gas [will] play an important role over the coming decade”.

In the longer term, they say, renewable energy sources, as well as green hydrogen, “have the largest mitigation potential”. Previous work has shown that using automated equipment, electric tractors and renewable energy sources can reduce agricultural emissions by 90%.

Ritchie says she is “a bit sceptical that the relative contributions of agricultural machinery will be as high as 20% in 2050”. She adds:

“This rests on the assumption that these emissions go mostly unabated, while most other sectors rapidly decline. If China is making rapid progress in reducing emissions from other emitters, including larger on-road transport, such as trucks and other agricultural emissions…then I expect it will have made significant progress in the decarbonisation of agricultural machinery too.”

The post Rising emissions from farm equipment could ‘hinder’ China’s net-zero goals appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Rising emissions from farm equipment could ‘hinder’ China’s net-zero goals

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Climate Change

COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan

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Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.

The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.

It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.

Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.

Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.

This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.

It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.

The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.

During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.

Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later. 

Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.

Formal negotiations

Finance

Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.

At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.

The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.

As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.

The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.

Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.

Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya. 

Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.

Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.

However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.

Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.

The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.

BlueSky post by Aruna Chandrasekhar (@arunacsekhar.bsky.social): "COP17 was supposed to be a nature finance stocktake, ramping contributions to "at least $30bn/yr" and sketching the bones of post-2030 nature funding. "Broadening the contributor base" was an outlier, appearing exactly once in the COP16 decision. Now it's the headliner."

Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature. 

The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. The text says: "The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions and which costs are agreed between a developing country Party and the institutional structure referred to in Article 21, in accordance with policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility criteria and an indicative list of incremental costs established by the Conference of the Parties. Other Parties, including countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, may voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. For the purpose of this Article, the Conference of the Parties, shall at its first meeting establish a list of developed country Parties and other Parties which voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. The Conference of the Parties shall periodically review and if necessary amend the list. Contributions from other countries and sources on a voluntary basis would also be encouraged. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy, predictability and timely flow of funds and the importance of burden-sharing among the contributing Parties included in the list."
The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. Source: UN CBD

The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.

The list was last amended in 2006.

(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)

Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.

The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.

By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.

Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.

By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.

At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:

“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”

The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.

Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:

“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”

On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.

Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.

While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.

At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.