Holding the line on climate: DOE
This post is Part 2 in a series recapping some of the Trump administration and Congress’s interactions on climate, what CCL has done in response, and what we plan to do in the future. Catch up on the series introduction and Part 1 about funding at staffing cuts at NOAA.
In May, Politico reported that “the president’s fiscal 2026 proposal would ax billions from clean energy and climate programs” at the Department of Energy (DOE). These DOE programs are currently funded by the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which passed Congress and became law in 2021.
One example is the DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, which the White House proposed slashing by roughly $2.5 billion. “EERE is currently funded at $3.46 billion, meaning the program would be cut by over 70 percent if Trump’s budget plan is adopted,” Politico reported.
The administration also proposed cuts to nuclear energy, carbon capture efforts, DOE’s Office of Science, and other areas with significant bipartisan support.
It’s normal for a presidential administration to propose a budget, and Congress will have the ultimate say over what to actually fund and at what levels. What’s notable here — and unusual — is just how huge the White House’s proposed cuts are to climate and clean energy.
Supporting bipartisan pushback for energy appropriations
As the DOE faced these budget pressures around clean energy funding, CCL’s Government Affairs team recognized yet another new threat — and saw a new opportunity. Because so many of these energy programs have bipartisan support (and, indeed, were originally funded by a bipartisan law), it seemed likely that a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers could push back.
Sure enough, after CCL’s Government Affairs staff had conversations with many offices on Capitol Hill about funding concerns, we learned that the bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus was interested in speaking up on this.
The caucus penned a letter to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water, which is a subcommittee in the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations. The letter began, “As you prepare to draft the FY26 House Energy and Water Appropriations bill, we write, as members of the House bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus, to request robust funding for programs focused on energy innovation, resilience, and security at the Department of Energy (DOE).”
The letter goes on to name the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, and many others, as programs that “help ensure the long-term security and prosperity of the U.S. energy economy” as they “lower energy costs, increase manufacturing jobs, and ensure that U.S. manufacturers can thrive in global markets.” The letter wraps up, “Accordingly, we request robust funding and sufficient staffing levels for these programs.”
Because of CCL’s long relationship with the bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus, the caucus co-chairs approached CCL’s Government Affairs staff with a request to help circulate the letter. CCL liaisons to caucus members sprang into action, reaching out to their offices to encourage them to sign on to the letter.
The letter was ultimately signed by 22 members of the bipartisan caucus and delivered on May 1 to the subcommittee. We’re proud of the role our liaisons played in generating more signatories for this letter, which speaks to the value of these important energy programs and encourages Congress to continue funding them.
As with the NOAA mobilization covered in Part 1, we used our voice and our grassroots power to help ensure that Congress retains its power over funding of these critical programs, instead of ceding that power to the executive branch. We leaned on our long-standing relationships with the Climate Solutions Caucus, and from our nonpartisan stance, we were able to bolster an important bipartisan effort on behalf of climate and clean energy programs.
Catch up on the introduction and Part 1 of this blog series, or keep reading:
The post Holding the line on climate: DOE appeared first on Citizens' Climate Lobby.
India’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from its power sector fell by 1% year-on-year in the first half of 2025 and by 0.2% over the past 12 months, only the second drop in almost half a century.
As a result, India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement grew at their slowest rate in the first half of the year since 2001 – excluding Covid – according to new analysis for Carbon Brief.
The analysis is the first of a regular new series covering India’s CO2 emissions, based on monthly data for fuel use, industrial production and power output, compiled from numerous official sources.
(See the regular series on China’s CO2 emissions, which began in 2019.)
Other key findings on India for the first six months of 2025 include:
- The growth in clean-energy capacity reached a record 25.1 gigawatts (GW), up 69% year-on-year from what had, itself, been a record figure.
- This new clean-energy capacity is expected to generate nearly 50 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity per year, nearly sufficient to meet the average increase in demand overall.
- Slower economic expansion meant there was zero growth in demand for oil products, a marked fall from annual rates of 6% in 2023 and 4% in 2024.
- Government infrastructure spending helped accelerate CO2 emissions growth from steel and cement production, by 7% and 10%, respectively.
The analysis also shows that emissions from India’s power sector could peak before 2030, if clean-energy capacity and electricity demand grow as expected.
The future of CO2 emissions in India is a key indicator for the world, with the country – the world’s most populous – having contributed nearly two-fifths of the rise in global energy-sector emissions growth since 2019.
India’s surging emissions slow down
In 2024, India was responsible for 8% of global energy-sector CO2 emissions, despite being home to 18% of the world’s population, as its per-capita output is far below the world average.
However, emissions have been growing rapidly, as shown in the figure below.
The country contributed 31% of global energy-sector emissions growth in the decade to 2024, rising to 37% in the past five years, due to a surge in the three-year period from 2021-23.
More than half of India’s CO2 output comes from coal used for electricity and heat generation, making this sector the most important by far for the country’s emissions.
The second-largest sector is fossil fuel use in industry, which accounts for another quarter of the total, while oil use for transport makes up a further eighth of India’s emissions.
India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement grew by 8% per year from 2019 to 2023, quickly rebounding from a 7% drop in 2020 due to Covid.
Before the Covid pandemic, emissions growth had averaged 4% per year from 2010 to 2019, but emissions in 2023 and 2024 rose above the pre-pandemic trendline.
This was despite a slower average GDP growth rate from 2019 to 2024 than in the preceding decade, indicating that the economy became more energy- and carbon-intensive. (For example, growth in steel and cement outpaced the overall rate of economic growth.)
A turnaround came in the second half of 2024, when emissions only increased by 2% year-on-year, slowing down to 1% in the first half of 2025, as seen in the figure below.
The largest contributor to the slowdown was the power sector, which was responsible for 60% of the drop in emissions growth rates, when comparing the first half of 2025 with the years 2021-23.
Oil demand growth slowed sharply as well, contributing 20% of the slowdown. The only sectors to keep growing their emissions in the first half of 2025 were steel and cement production.
Another 20% of the slowdown was due to a reduction in coal and gas use outside the power, steel and cement sectors. This comprises construction, industries such as paper, fertilisers, chemicals, brick kilns and textiles, as well as residential and commercial cooking, heating and hot water.
This is all shown in the figure below, which compares year-on-year changes in emissions during the second half of 2024 and the first half of 2025, with the average for 2021-23.
Power sector emissions fell by 1% in the first half of 2025, after growing 10% per year during 2021-23 and adding more than 50m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) to India’s total every six months.
Oil product use saw zero growth in the first half of 2025, after rising 6% per year in 2021-23.
In contrast, emissions from coal burning for cement and steel production rose by 10% and 7%, respectively, while coal use outside of these sectors fell 2%.
Gas consumption fell 7% year-on-year, with reductions across the power and industrial sectors as well as other users. This was a sharp reversal of the 5% average annual growth in 2021-23.
Power-sector emissions pause
The most striking shift in India’s sectoral emissions trends has come in the power sector, where coal consumption and CO2 emissions fell 0.2% in the 12 months to June and 1% in the first half of 2025, marking just the second drop in half a century, as shown in the figure below.
The reduction in coal use comes after more than a decade of break-neck growth, starting in the early 2010s and only interrupted by Covid in 2020. It also comes even as the country plans large amounts of new coal-fired generating capacity.
In the first half of 2025, total power generation increased by 9 terawatt hours (TWh) year-on-year, but fossil power generation fell by 29TWh, as output from solar grew 17TWh, from wind 9TWh, from hydropower by 9TWh and from nuclear by 3TWh.
Analysis of government data shows that 65% of the fall in fossil-fuel generation can be attributed to lower electricity demand growth, 20% to faster growth in non-hydro clean power and the remaining 15% to higher output at existing hydropower plants.
Slower growth in electricity usage was largely due to relatively mild temperatures and high rainfall, in contrast to the heatwaves of 2024. A slowdown in industrial sectors in the second quarter of the year also contributed.
In addition, increased rainfall drove the jump in hydropower generation. India received 42% above-normal rainfall from March to May 2025. (In early 2024, India’s hydro output had fallen steeply as a result of “erratic rainfall”.)
Lower temperatures and this abundant rainfall reduced the need for air conditioning, which is responsible for around 10% of the country’s total power demand. In the same period in 2024, demand surged due to record heatwaves and higher temperatures across the country.
The growth in clean-power generation was buoyed by the addition of a record 25.1GW of non-fossil capacity in the first half of 2025. This was a 69% increase compared with the previous period in 2024, which had also set a record.
Solar continues to dominate new installations, with 14.3GW of capacity added in the first half of the year coming from large scale solar projects and 3.2GW from solar rooftops.
Solar is also adding the majority of new clean-power output. Taking into account the average capacity factor of each technology, solar power delivered 62% of the additional annual generation, hydropower 16%, wind 13% and nuclear power 8%.
The new clean-energy capacity added in the first half of 2025 will generate record amounts of clean power. As shown in the figure below, the 50TWh per year from this new clean capacity is approaching the average growth of total power generation.
(When clean-energy growth exceeds total demand growth, generation from fossil fuels declines.)
India is expected to add another 16-17GW of solar and wind in the second half of 2025. Beyond this year, strong continued clean-energy growth is expected, towards India’s target for 500GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030 (see below).
Slowing oil demand growth
The first half of 2025 also saw a significant slowdown in India’s oil demand growth. After rising by 6% a year in the three years to 2023, it slowed to 4% in 2024 and zero in the first half of 2025.
The slowdown in oil consumption overall was predominantly due to slower growth in demand for diesel and “other oil products”, which includes bitumen.
In the first quarter of 2025, diesel demand actually fell, due to a decline in industrial activity, limited weather-related mobility and – reportedly – higher uptake of vehicles that run on compressed natural gas (CNG), as well as electricity (EVs).
Diesel demand growth increased in March to May, but again declined in June because of early and unusually severe monsoon rains in India, leading to a slowdown in industrial and mining activities, disrupted supply-chains and transport of raw material, goods and services.
The severe rains also slowed down road construction activity, which in turn curtailed demand for transportation, construction equipment and bitumen.
Weaker diesel demand growth in 2024 had reflected slower growth in economic activity, as growth rates in the industrial and agricultural sectors contracted compared to previous years.
Another important trend is that EVs are also cutting into diesel demand in the commercial vehicles segment, although this is not yet a significant factor in the overall picture.
EV adoption is particularly notable in major metropolitan cities and other rapidly emerging urban centres and in the logistics sector, where they are being preferred for short haul rides over diesel vans or light commercial vehicles.
EVs accounted for only 7.6% of total vehicle sales in the financial year 2024-25, up 22.5% year-on-year, but still far from the target of 30% by 2030.
However, any significant drop in diesel demand will be a function of adoption of EV for long-haul trucks, which account for 32% of the total CO2 emissions from the transport sector. Only 280 electric trucks were sold in 2024, reported NITI Aayog.
Trucks remain the largest diesel consumers. Moreover, truck sales grew 9.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2025, driven in part by India’s target of 75% farm mechanisation by 2047. This sales growth may outweigh the reduction in diesel demand due to EVs. Subsidies for electric tractors have seen some pilots, but demand is yet to take off.
Apart from diesel, petrol demand growth continued in the first half of 2025 at the same rate as in earlier years. Modest year-on-year growth of 1.3% in passenger vehicle sales could temper future increases in petrol demand, however. This is a sharp decline from 7.5% and 10% growth rates in sales in the same period in 2024 and 2023.
Furthermore, EVs are proving to be cheaper to run than petrol for two- and three-wheelers, which may reduce the sale of petrol vehicles in cities that show policy support for EV adoption.
Steel and cement emissions continue to grow
As already noted, steel and cement were the only major sectors of India’s economy to see an increase in emissions growth in the first half of 2025.
While they were only responsible for around 12% of India’s total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement in 2024, they have been growing quickly, averaging 6% a year for the past five years.
The growth in emissions accelerated in the first half of 2025, as cement output rose 10% and steel output 7%, far in excess of the growth in economic output overall.
Steel and cement growth accelerated further in July. A key demand driver is government infrastructure spending, which tripled from 2019 to 2024.
In the second quarter of 2025, the government’s capital expenditure increased 52% year-on-year. albeit from a low base during last year’s elections. This signals strong growth in infrastructure.
The government is targeting domestic steel manufacturing capacity of 300m tonnes (Mt) per year by 2030, from 200Mt currently, under the National Steel Policy 2017, supported by financial incentives for firms that meet production targets for high quality steel.
The government also imposed tariffs on steel imports in April and stricter quality standards for imports in June, in order to boost domestic production.
Government policies such as Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna – a “housing for all” initiative under which 30m houses are to be built by FY30 – is further expected to lift demand for steel and cement.
The automotive sector in India is expected to grow at a fast pace, with sales expected to reach 7.5m units for passenger vehicle and commercial vehicle segments from 5.1m units in 2023, in addition to rapid growth in electric vehicles. This can be expected to be another key driver for growth of the steel sector, as 900 kg of steel is used per vehicle.
Without stringent energy efficiency measures and the adoption of cleaner fuel, the expected growth in steel and cement production could drive significant emissions growth from the sector.
Power-sector emissions could peak before 2030
Looking beyond this year, the analysis shows that CO2 from India’s power sector could peak before 2030, having previously been the main driver of emissions growth.
To date, India’s clean-energy additions have been lagging behind the growth in total electricity demand, meaning fossil-fuel demand and emissions from the sector have continued to rise.
However, this dynamic looks likely to change. In 2021, India set a target of having 500GW of non-fossil power generation capacity in place by 2030. Progress was slow at first, so meeting the target implies a substantial acceleration in clean-energy additions.
The country has been laying the groundwork for such an acceleration.
There was 234GW of renewable capacity in the pipeline as of April 2025, according to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. This includes 169GW already awarded contracts, of which 145GW is under construction, and an additional 65GW put out to tender. There is also 5.2GW of new nuclear capacity under construction.
If all of this is commissioned by 2030, then total non-fossil capacity would increase to 482GW, from 243GW at the end of June 2025, leaving a gap of just 18GW to be filled with new projects.
When the non-fossil capacity target was set in 2021, CREA assessed that the target would suffice to peak demand for coal in power generation before 2030. This assessment remains valid and is reinforced by the latest Central Electricity Authority (CEA) projection for the country’s “optimal power mix” in 2030, shown in the figure below.
In the CEA’s projection, the share of non-fossil power generation rises to 44% in the 2029-30 fiscal year, up from 25% in 2024-25. From 2025 to 2030, power demand growth, averaging 6% per year, is entirely covered from clean sources.
To accomplish this, the growth in non-fossil power generation would need to accelerate over time, meaning that towards the end of the decade, the growth in clean power supply would clearly outstrip demand growth overall – and so power generation from fossil fuels would fall.
While coal-power generation is expected to flatline, large amounts of new coal-power capacity is still being planned, because of the expected growth in peak electricity demand.
The post-Covid increase in electricity demand has given rise to a wave of new coal power plant proposals. Recent plans from the government target an increase in coal-power capacity by another 80-100GW by 2030-32, with 35GW already under construction as of July 2025.
The rationale for this is the increase in peak electricity loads, associated in particular with worsening heatwaves and growing use of air conditioning. The increase might yet prove unneeded.
Analysis by CREA shows that solar and wind are making an increasing contribution to meeting peak loads. This contribution will increase with the roll-out of solar power with integrated battery storage, the cost of which fell by 50-60% from 2023 to 2025.
The latest auction held in India saw solar power with battery storage bidding at prices, per unit of electricity generation, that were lower than the cost of new coal power.
This creates the opportunity to accelerate the decarbonisation of India’s power sector, by reducing the need for thermal power capacity.
The clean-energy buildout has made it possible for India to peak its power-sector emissions within the next few years, if contracted projects are built, clean-energy growth is maintained or accelerated beyond 2030 and demand growth remains within the government’s projections.
This would be a major turning point, as the power sector has been responsible for half of India’s recent emissions growth. In order to peak its emissions overall, however, India would still need to take further action to address CO2 from industry and transport.
With the end-of-September 2025 deadline nearing, India has yet to publish its international climate pledge (nationally determined contribution, NDC) for 2035 under the Paris Agreement, meaning its future emissions path, in the decades up to its 2070 net-zero goal, remains particularly uncertain.
The country is expected to easily surpass the headline climate target from its previous NDC, of cutting the emissions intensity of its economy to 45% below 2005 levels by 2030. As such, this goal is “unlikely to drive real world emission reductions”, according to Climate Action Tracker.
In July of this year, it met a 2030 target for 50% of installed power generating capacity to be from non-fossil sources, five years early.
About the data
This analysis is based on official monthly data for fuel consumption, industrial production and power generation from different ministries and government institutes.
Coal consumption in thermal power plants is taken from the monthly reports downloaded from the National Power Portal of the Ministry of Power. The data is compiled for the period January 2019 until June 2025. Power generation and capacity by technology and fuel on a monthly basis are sourced from the NITI data portal.
Coal use at steel and cement plants, as well as process emissions from cement production, are estimated using production indices from the Index of Eight Core Industries released monthly by the Office of Economic Adviser, assuming that changes in emissions follow production volumes.
These production indices were used to scale coal use by the sectors in 2022. To form a basis for using the indices, monthly coal consumption data for 2022 was constructed for the sectors using the annual total coal consumption reported in IEA World Energy Balances and monthly production data in a paper by Robbie Andrew, on monthly CO2 emission accounting for India.
Annual cement process emissions up to 2024 were also taken from Robbie Andrew’s work and scaled using the production indices. This approach better approximated changes in energy use and emissions reported in the IEA World Energy Balances, than did the amounts of coal reported to have been dispatched to the sectors, showing that production volumes are the dominant driver of short-term changes in emissions.
For other sectors, including aluminium, auto, chemical and petrochemical, paper and plywood, pharmaceutical, graphite electrode, sugar, textile, mining, traders and others, coal consumption is estimated based on data on despatch of domestic and imported coal to end users from statistical reports and monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal, as consumption data is not available.
The difference between consumption and dispatch is stock changes, which are estimated by assuming that the changes in coal inventories at end user facilities mirror those at coal mines, with end user inventories excluding power, steel and cement assumed to be 70% of those at coal mines, based on comparisons between our data and the IEA World Energy Balances.
Stock changes at mines are estimated as the difference between production at and despatch from coal mines, as reported by the Ministry of Coal.
In the case of the second quarter of the year 2025, data on domestic coal has been taken from the monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal. The regular data releases on coal imports have not taken place for the second quarter of 2025, for unknown reasons, so data was taken from commercial data providers Coal Hub and mjunction services ltd.
Product-wise petroleum product consumption data, as well as gas use by sector, was downloaded from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell of the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas.
As the fuel dispatch and consumption data is reported as physical volumes, calorific values are taken from IEA’s World Energy Balance and CO2 emission factors from 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
Calorific values are assigned separately to different fuel types, including domestic and imported coal, anthracite and coke, as well as petrol, diesel and several other oil products.
The post Analysis: India’s power-sector CO2 falls for only second time in half a century appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: India’s power-sector CO2 falls for only second time in half a century
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 29 August 2025: Record wildfires; Solar myths factchecked; Climate veteran on COP reform
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Broken records
FIRES: Wildfires have burned through more than 1m hectares of land across the EU, making 2025 the worst year on record, the Guardian reported. Blazes in the EU have burned four times as much land this year as the average over the past two decades, according to data from the European Forest Fire Information System, the outlet said. Meanwhile, the UK has “almost certainly” faced its hottest summer on record, according to provisional Met Office data covered by BBC News.
FLOODS: At least 34 people have been killed as heavy rainfall across India and Pakistan continued to cause flash floods and landslides in Indian-controlled Kashmir, the Associated Press reported. Continuing extreme rainfall in China has caused more than $2bn in damages since July, noted Reuters. Typhoon Kajiki has killed at least eight people in Vietnam and Thailand, with more flash floods and mudslides expected, Channel News Asia reported.
Turbine turbulence
POWER SHOCK: Shares in the Danish wind-power developer Ørsted dropped to a record low after the Trump administration ordered the firm to stop work on a near-complete project, the Financial Times reported. The $1.5bn Revolution Wind project is four-fifths complete and was due to power 350,000 homes in Rhode Island and Connecticut, the newspaper said.
‘WINDFARM WASTE’: In the UK, the energy regulator Ofgem announced that energy bills will rise by 2% for millions of households in October, with the Times reporting that part of the increase is due to the rising cost of “paying wind farms to switch themselves off”. The news sparked a wave of critical editorials and comment pieces in right-leaning and climate-sceptic UK newspapers. A Carbon Brief factcheck previously explained how gas prices, rather than “balancing costs” associated with wind farms, are the largest driver of high electricity prices in the UK.
Around the world
- FORESTS FOREVER: At a summit in Colombia, Brazil won the backing of other Amazon nations for its $125bn “Tropical Forests Forever Facility”, a fund first launched at COP28 in 2023, Bloomberg reported.
- CHINA CAP: China’s cabinet announced that the country will “tighten its carbon trading market by introducing absolute emissions caps in some industries for the first time starting by 2027”, Reuters said.
- RECORD RENEWABLES: Global renewables investment increased by 10% in the first half of the year, when compared to last year, to a record $386bn, according to new data from BloombergNEF covered by BusinessGreen.
- BANKING BREAK: The Net-Zero Banking Alliance has “paused” its activities “after losing top European and Wall Street members amid Trump’s ongoing crusade against climate change”, reported the Financial Times.
- STAFF SUSPENDED: The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (Fema) has suspended more than 20 members of staff who signed an open letter warning that Trump’s cuts to the body could risk a “national catastrophe” on the scale of Hurricane Katrina, according to BBC News.
87%
The percentage of new coal-power capacity located in China or India that came online globally in the first half of 2025, as revealed in a guest post for Carbon Brief written by Global Energy Monitor researchers.
Latest climate research
- Exposure to heatwaves may cause people to age faster | Nature Climate Change
- The number of supercell thunderstorms – the “most hazardous thunderstorm category” – could increase by an average of 11% in Europe under 3C of global warming | Science Advances
- Sea level rise projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) second assessment in 1995 were “strikingly close to what transpired over the next 30 years” | Earth’s Future
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
Carbon Brief published an in-depth factcheck debunking 16 of the most commonly heard false and misleading myths about solar power. One such claim is that solar power poses “a serious threat to agriculture and food security” by taking up land. The chart above, adapted from the factcheck, puts such a claim in perspective using the land-use of golf courses as a comparison.
Spotlight
How to reform the UN’s climate COPs
This week, Carbon Brief highlights a short extract from a new autobiography written by the late Peter Betts, who was the UK and EU lead negotiator at various COPs, including 2015’s pivotal COP21 in Paris. Betts, who died of brain cancer in October 2023, used his book to lay out his views on how to reform COPs – a topic Carbon Brief recently asked a range of experts about, too.
Of course, the UNFCCC and COP process has its shortcomings. For example, I would be the first to acknowledge that progress on finance, adaptation and loss and damage has been too slow. But I would argue that it would not have happened at all without the central global discussion afforded by the COPs, at which vulnerable countries always have a strong voice.
The alternative to COPs – often put forward by big and powerful countries – is to do everything within the G20, perhaps complemented by plurilateral cooperation between big states. No one would be more pleased to see the end of the COP process than big oil and gas interests in the US who sought to undermine COPs throughout my decade or more in negotiations.
My experience was that excluding the vulnerable countries led to lower-ambition outcomes which the US and emerging economies were comfortable with. The vast bulk of vulnerable countries would be horrified to lose the COPs, since it guarantees them a voice.
Overall, then, I believe that the case for keeping a global forum, where all have a seat at the table and, therefore, the most vulnerable have a voice, is overwhelming, and this is the UNFCCC. It is an indispensable political moment every year to rally the forces of ambition for climate change (and, to paraphrase Voltaire, if we didn’t have it, we would need to invent it). There are, however, two improvements that could be made to the way COPs operate.
1: The second stocktake
Formal stocktakes occur every five years, at a point two years before the next five-yearly ambition cycles of the COPs (such as Paris and Glasgow). But there is almost no focus by the media or NGOs on the announcements of NDCs [nationally determined contributions], especially those of “developing countries”, despite the importance of NDCs’ impact on climate goals.
In the run-up to the five-yearly stocktakes there should be a moment, perhaps a third of the way through the year, where we can see where we stand, individually and collectively, following the NDCs that have been announced. If some countries’ proposals are weak, those countries should be pressured to do more; if some have not submitted a proposal at all, then that should be highlighted.
It seems unlikely that the big economies would agree a formal process change, as when I have suggested such a second stocktake “moment” to various partners they have expressed concerns that it would be controversial. However, civil society should look to create this moment outside the formal process with analysis and media-friendly events which would provide an opportunity to assess (and put pressure on) relative, proposed contributions.
2: Annex membership
Second, we should review membership of the annexes to the convention, which set out who is “developed” and who is a “developing” country. We need a step change in support for emerging economies to help them make the transition to low carbon, which is increasingly affordable and will bring them other benefits. This means much more finance from Annex II countries, complemented by finance from China (the world’s biggest sovereign investor) and from Gulf states, who have grown rich on selling fossil fuels.
Sadly, however, I doubt whether it will be possible to negotiate changes to membership of the annexes, even though that was required by the convention to happen by 1998. But could countries such as China and the Gulf states not voluntarily step into Annex I and/or even Annex II?
Non-Annex I countries now constitute nearly two-thirds of global emissions and are likely to be a far higher proportion of emissions growth. So, if we want to limit climate change, it is these emissions we need above all to target. Of course, we must complement this by quicker action by Annex I countries, perhaps alongside negative emissions, and we must provide much more serious help to some non-Annex I countries.
Adapted from The Climate Diplomat: A Personal History of the COP Conferences by Peter Betts, published by Profile on 28 August and available now.
Watch, read, listen
KATRINA: Twenty years on from the category-five hurricane that devastated New Orleans, the Times had a lengthy feature about the “flood, failures and chilling aftermath”. Netflix also released a three-part series about the disaster.
SLOP: DeSmog investigated the websites using AI-generated content citing non-existent climate experts and institutions.
FAILED MODEL: Pakistani journalist Arifa Noor lamented in Dawn the “development model” being adopted by the nation’s “ruling elite” amid the “rage of climate change”.
Coming up
- 31 August-5 September: Africa Food Systems Summit, Dakar, Senegal
- 1 September: Guyana elections
- 3 September: Jamaica general election
- 5-10 September: Africa Climate Summit 2, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Pick of the jobs
- World Weather Attribution, media relations manager | Salary: £46,614-£56,345. Location: London/hybrid
- Wood Mackenzie, research analyst – solar supply chain, power & renewables | Salary: Unknown. Location: Shanghai
- Conservation Law Foundation, vice president for clean energy and climate change | Salary: $136,000-$175,000. Location: Boston, US
- London School of Economics, head of Climate and Growth Initiative | Salary: £53,949-£62,160. Location: London
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 29 August 2025: Record wildfires; Solar myths factchecked; Climate veteran on COP reform appeared first on Carbon Brief.
DeBriefed 29 August 2025: Record wildfires; Solar myths factchecked; Climate veteran on COP reform
Clean-energy growth helped China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fall by 1% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, extending a declining trend that started in March 2024.
The CO2 output of the nation’s power sector – its dominant source of emissions – fell by 3% in the first half of the year, as growth in solar power alone matched the rise in electricity demand.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that record solar capacity additions are putting China’s CO2 emissions on track to fall across 2025 as a whole.
Other key findings include:
- The growth in clean power generation, some 270 terawatt hours (TWh) excluding hydro, significantly outpaced demand growth of 170TWh in the first half of the year.
- Solar capacity additions set new records due to a rush before a June policy change, with 212 gigawatts (GW) added in the first half of the year.
- This rush means solar is likely to set an annual record for growth in 2025, becoming China’s single-largest source of clean power generation in the process.
- Coal-power capacity could surge by as much as 80-100GW this year, potentially setting a new annual record, even as coal-fired electricity generation declines.
- The use of coal to make synthetic fuels and and chemicals is growing rapidly, climbing 20% in the first half of the year and helping add 3% to China’s CO2 since 2020.
- The coal-chemical industry is planning further expansion, which could add another 2% to China’s CO2 by 2029, making the 2030 deadline for peaking harder to meet.
Even if its emissions fall in 2025 as expected, however, China is bound to miss multiple important climate targets this year.
This includes targets to reduce its carbon intensity – the emissions per unit of GDP – to strictly control coal consumption growth and new coal-power capacity, as well as to increase the share of cleaner electric-arc steelmaking in total steel output.
If policymakers want to make up for these shortfalls, then there will be additional pressure on China’s next “nationally determined contribution” (NDC, its international climate pledge for 2035) and its 15th five-year plan for 2026-30, both due to be finalised in the coming months.
The falling trend in CO2 emissions – and the clean-energy growth that is driving it – could give policymakers greater confidence that more ambitious targets are achievable.
Falling emissions from power, cement and steel
The reduction in emissions in the first half of 2025 was predominantly driven by the power sector, aided by the building materials, steel and heating industries.
Coal use in the power industry fell by 3.4% compared with the same period a year earlier, while gas use increased by 6%, resulting in a 3.2% drop in emissions for the sector overall.
The reduction in CO2 emissions from coal use in the power sector is shown at the bottom of the figure below, along with the small rise due to higher gas-fired electricity generation.
Other changes in CO2 emissions in the first half of 2025, compared with the same period in 2024, are broken down by source and sector in the rest of the figure.
Emissions from the building materials sector fell by 3% and from the metals industry by 1%, with cement falling 4% and steel output 3%. The reason for these reductions is the ongoing contraction in the construction sector, with real estate investment falling 11% and the floor area of new construction starts by 20%. Traditional targets of government infrastructure investment, such as transportation, also showed relatively slow growth.
CO2 reductions resulting from the drop in steel output were limited by a fall in the share of electric arc furnace (EAF) steelmaking, a much less emissions- and energy-intensive process than the coal-based production of primary steel.
The share of electric-arc output in total production fell from 10.2% in 2024 to 9.8% in the first half of 2025, despite a government target of 15% for this year.
Excess coal-based capacity and a lack of incentives for shifting production mean that electric arc steelmakers, rather than coal-based steel mills, tend to absorb reductions in output, as their operating costs are higher and costs of shutting down and starting up production lines are lower.
Shifting to EAF steel is one of the largest emission reduction opportunities in China over the next decade, according to an analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
Elsewhere, consumption of oil products increased by 1%. However, this growth did not come from transport fuel demand. The production of petrol, diesel and jet fuel all continued to fall, with electric vehicles eating into road-fuel demand. Instead, growth was driven by demand for naphtha from petrochemicals producers, including newly commissioned plants.
Gas use outside the power sector – mainly heating – dropped by 1%, after a fall in the first quarter due to mild winter temperatures and a smaller increase in the second quarter.
Solar boom covers power demand growth
The first half of 2025 saw a new record for the growth of clean power generation excluding hydro, made up of solar, wind, nuclear and biomass.
Clean power generation from solar, wind and nuclear power grew by 270 terawatt hours (TWh), substantially exceeding the 170TWh (3.7%) increase in electricity consumption. Hydropower generation fell by 3% (16TWh), moderating the fall in fossil fuel-fired power generation.
The rise in power generation from solar panels, on its own, covered all of the growth in electricity demand, increasing by 170TWh – equivalent to the national power output of Mexico or Turkey over the same period. Wind power output grew by 80TWh and nuclear by 20TWh.
As a result, the share of low-carbon sources reached 40% of the nation’s electricity generation overall in the first half of the year, up from 36% in the same period of 2024.
The figure below shows how clean-energy sources excluding hydro (columns) have started matching the recent increases in China’s electricity demand (solid line), as well as the average amount of growth in recent years (dashed line).
Strikingly, the record growth of solar and continued expansion of wind mean that both sources of electricity generation overtook hydropower for the first time in the first half of 2025, as shown in the figure below. Despite steady growth, nuclear power is a relatively distant fourth, at less than half of the power generation from each of the other three major non-fossil technologies.
The growth in solar power generation was driven by record capacity growth. China added 212GW of new solar capacity in the first half of the year, double the amount installed in the first half of 2024, which itself had been a new record.
For comparison, the world’s second-largest nation for solar capacity – the US – had only installed 178GW, in total, by the end of 2024, while third-ranked India had 98GW.
Some 93GW of new solar capacity was added to China’s grid in May alone, as the rush to install before a change in pricing policy culminated. This rate of installations translates to approximately 100 solar panels installed every second of the month.
The acceleration was due to a change in the policy on tariffs paid to new wind and solar generators, which started in June. Previously, new plants were guaranteed to receive the benchmark price for coal-fired power output in each province, for each unit of electricity they generate. Under the new policy, new generators have to secure contracts directly with electricity buyers, causing uncertainty and likely putting downward pressure on revenue.
The resulting surge in new capacity means that solar is poised to overtake wind this year – and hydro this year or next – to become the largest source of clean power generation in China.
This is despite solar capacity additions slowing down in June and projections diverging widely on how much growth to expect for the remainder of 2025 and into 2026, under the new policy.
The consensus among forecasters has been one of a sharp slowdown in installations.
After the new pricing policy was announced, the China Electricity Council (CEC) and China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) projected 210GW and 215-235GW for 2025 as a whole, respectively, implying plummeting additions in the second half of the year. In contrast, the State Grid Energy Research Institute expects 380GW to be added to the grid this year.
After data for May installations became available, the CEC upgraded its forecast for the whole year to 310GW and the CPIA to 270-300GW, implying that 60-100GW would be added in the second half of the year. This would still be a sharp deceleration compared with the second half of 2024, when 173GW was added.
For wind, the State Grid researchers expect 140GW and CEC 110GW, while 51GW was added in the first half of the year. Both numbers indicate larger capacity additions in the second half of 2025 and an increase for the full year compared with 2024.
The State Grid should have detailed knowledge of projects seeking to connect to the electricity grid, so its projections carry extra weight compared with others. If its expectations for wind and solar growth are realised, this would result in around 850TWh of annual clean power generation being added to the grid in 2025, as shown in the figure below.
This new clean power capacity would be more than enough to meet the entire electricity demand of Brazil (760TWh), or Germany and the UK combined (817TWh).
With the State Grid also projecting demand to grow by 400-640TWh (4.0-6.5%), clean-energy growth should push down CO2 from China’s power sector this year – and well into next year.
China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), is also taking steps to spur demand for contracts with solar and wind producers.
A new policy – published in July – requires for the first time that steel, cement and polysilicon factories, as well as some new data centres, meet a certain percentage of their demand using renewable electricity.
Previously, such requirements were only applied to provinces, power distribution companies and the aluminum industry. Their mandated renewable energy shares have also now increased.
These changes boost demand for contracts with renewable electricity suppliers, just as new solar and wind plants are having to secure contracts directly with buyers, under their new pricing policy.
The increase in demand for renewable power resulting from these measures broadly matches the low end of the growth projected in solar and wind this year. The renewable quotas therefore offer a backstop of support for the continued growth of clean power, which will be required to meet China’s wider climate and energy targets.
The increase in solar power generation from rising installations could be even larger, but is being limited by issues around grid management and capacity.
The share of potential solar power output that was not utilised rose to 5.7% in the first half of 2025, from 3.2% a year earlier. While technical issues such as uncompleted grid connections could play a role amid the boom, this also implies a significant increase in curtailment.
The average utilisation rate of solar panels fell by 12% in the first quarter of this year, compared with the 2020–2023 average, according to China Electricity Council data accessed through Wind Information. This is a much larger reduction than indicated by the reported curtailment rates. The flipside of this dip in utilisation is that improvements to grid operation and infrastructure will unlock even more generation from existing solar capacity.
Coal power capacity is expected to surge this year, even as demand for power generation from coal contracts. The State Grid predicts 127GW of thermal power added. Some of this will be gas, but based on non-coal thermal power additions expected by the CEC, around 90-100GW is coal, while the CEC projects 80GW of coal power added.
Data from Global Energy Monitor shows 93-109GW of coal-power projects under construction that could be completed this year, assuming a 2.5 to 3-year lead time from issuance of permits to grid connection. The largest amount of coal-fired capacity China has ever connected to the grid in one year is 63GW in 2008, so 2025 seems likely to set a new record by a large margin.
A former senior official at one of China’s largest power firms stated in an interview in June 2025 that companies are building coal power capacity due to central government pressure.
There is little enthusiasm to invest and the target to expand coal-power capacity to 1,360GW in this five-year plan period, covering 2021-2025, is unlikely to be met. Operating coal-power capacity was 1,210GW at the end of June, up from 1,080GW at the end of 2020.
The influx of coal-fired capacity will result in falling utilisation and profitability.
However, oversupply of coal power could also weaken demand for contracts with solar and wind producers, undermining clean-energy growth. This makes measures that offer a backstop of demand for clean power, such as the sector quotas, all the more significant.
Coal chemicals shooting up
The only major sector that saw growth in emissions in the first half of the year was the chemicals sector. Coal use in the sector, both as a fuel and a feedstock, increased by a dramatic 20% year-on-year, on top of a 10% increase in 2024.
Oil use in the chemicals sector increased as well, as reflected in a 9% increase in total consumption of naptha – a key petrochemicals feedstock – estimated from OPEC data.
The growth is driven by the coal-to-chemicals industry, which turns coal into synthetic liquid and gaseous fuels, as well as petrochemical products. This is a sector that China has developed aggressively, to reduce reliance on imported oil and gas, as well as to promote the exploitation of coal resources in the country’s far west – particularly Xinjiang – where coal and coal power exports to the rest of China are limited by transportation capacity and costs.
The sector consumed approximately 390m tonnes of coal in 2024, resulting in an estimated 690m tonnes CO2 emissions (MtCO2), making it responsible for 6% of China’s fossil CO2 emissions and 9% of the country’s coal use in 2024.
Coal use and emissions increased 10% from 2023 while total coal conversion capacity increased only 5%, implying that the utilisation of existing capacity increased as well.
The coal-to-chemicals industry used 155m tonnes of standard coal in 2020 and CO2 emissions were estimated at 320MtCO2. The coal-to-chemicals industry therefore added around 3% to China’s total CO2 emissions from 2020 to 2024, making it one of the sectors responsible for the recent acceleration in the country’s CO2 emissions growth and its shortfall against targets to control increases in CO2 emissions and coal use.
Output from the sector reportedly replaced 100m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) of oil and gas in 2024, which implies 250-280MtCO2 emissions avoided from oil and gas use, depending on how the avoided demand breaks down between oil and gas.
The net effect of the industry on CO2 emissions was therefore an increase of around 410-440MtCO2, or 4% of China’s total CO2, highlighting that coal-based chemical production is much more carbon-intensive than its already carbon-intensive oil- and gas-based equivalent.
The sector’s growth in coal use and emissions reflects drastically improved profitability in most segments in recent years. Its profitability depends heavily on the oil price, so the sharp increase in oil prices from the 2015-2020 level in 2021-24 supported output growth, whereas the recent fall in oil prices could temper it.
The chemical industry association still expects the sector to expand capacity for another decade, until 2035, even under China’s CO2 peaking target.
Analysis by Tianfeng Securities touts the years 2025-2030 as the “peak period” for investment in coal to chemicals, claiming that potential annual investment over the next five years could reach three times the 2021-23 level and that half of this potential investment is in Xinjiang province.
Sinolink Securities projects that an average of at least 37m tonnes of coal conversion capacity will be added in the coal-to-chemicals industry each year from 2025 to 2029, with coal-to-oil-and-gas and coal-to-methanol dominating these capacity additions.
This would mean a 40% increase in the industry’s capacity from 2024 to 2029, with the potential to add over 250MtCO2 per year of emissions, increasing total CO2 emissions by over 2%.
The figure below illustrates this potential increase, which would continue recent trends.
If this further expansion takes place – and assuming new chemicals plants are used at the same rate as the existing fleet is being used today – then it would complicate China’s carbon peaking target and make the CO2 intensity target for 2030 even more challenging to meet.
However, this is not the first time that the industry has been predicted to boom. In 2014, the China Coal Association issued a prediction that the coal-to-chemicals industry would be using 750Mt of coal per year by 2020, converting to about 540Mt of “standard” coal.
In reality, less than a third of this demand was realised – in large part due to low oil prices – and the sector was still only using half of this amount by the end of 2024.
New targets on the horizon
Given the major increase in solar capacity in the first half, as well as expected additions of wind and nuclear throughout the year, China is on track for a fall in emissions in 2025.
This would continue a declining trend that began in early 2024 and leaves open the possibility that China’s emissions could have peaked already, years ahead of its “before 2030” target.
The recent slide in China’s total CO2 emissions is shown in the figure below, with the shallow decline illustrating the potential that this trend could be reversed.
Even if China’s emissions fall by a few percent this year, however, this is unlikely to be sufficient to meet the carbon intensity target for 2025 in the current five-year plan. Still, it would make the country’s 2030 carbon intensity commitment under the Paris Agreement easier to meet.
A continuing fall in emissions, extending the fall that began in early 2024, could also affect target-setting for the next five-year plan – which is being prepared for release in early 2026 – by showing that China could peak and reduce its emissions well ahead of the 2030 deadline.
Yet, despite rapid progress in 2024 and 2025, China is bound to miss multiple emissions-related targets in the 2021-2025 period, due to rapid CO2 rises during and after the Covid pandemic.
These targets include improvements in carbon intensity, “strict” controls of the growth in coal consumption and new coal-fired power plants, as well as the share of cleaner electric arc steelmaking in total steel output.
If China’s policymakers want to make up the shortfall against these 2025 targets and get on track for their 2030 goals, then they would need to set out higher ambitions in the 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030. For example, this could include reducing the carbon intensity of China’s economy by more than 20% over the next five years.
China’s new pledge (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, with targets for 2035, is due to be published in the next few months and will provide important indications of their intentions.
The new pricing policy for wind and solar has also increased the importance of target-setting, by making “contracts for difference” available for the amount of capacity needed to meet the central government’s clean-energy targets. An ambitious clean-energy target for 2035 would be a significant new backstop for clean-energy growth, with both climate and economic relevance.
Another major question is how the government will react to the influx of coal-fired capacity, even as power generation from coal recedes. It could either move to close down older coal plants – or to limit clean-energy additions.
With respect to coal power plants, the key point remains, however, that as long as clean power generation keeps growing faster than electricity demand, then increases in coal and gas fired capacity will result in falling utilisation, rather than increased CO2 emissions.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.
Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.
The post Analysis: Record solar growth keeps China’s CO2 falling in first half of 2025 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
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