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The COP30 climate summit – held in the city of Belém, on the edge of the Amazon rainforest – saw the Brazilian presidency launch a new forest fund and promise a “roadmap” to put an end to deforestation.

Almost every country in the world signed off on a final COP30 package called the “global mutirão” – meaning “collective efforts” – after two weeks of talks ran into overtime amid deepening divisions, compromises and even a fire in the conference venue.

Countries also agreed on a set of indicators for countries to track their efforts on climate adaptation, including within the food and agriculture sectors.

Brazil’s much-anticipated tropical forest fund, launched just before COP30 officially began, raised $6.6bn, more than half of which will come from Norway and Germany.

In the second week of the negotiations, dozens of countries backed plans to agree on roadmaps to guide the move away from fossil fuels and deforestation.

Although these roadmaps did not make it into the final negotiated text, COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago said they will be developed outside the formal UN process.

The final mutirão text mentioned biodiversity loss, land rights and deforestation, but did not feature food – which disappointed some observers, including one expert who said food systems had been “erased” from COP30. 

Meanwhile, the formal agriculture negotiations ended without a substantive outcome and talks are expected to continue next year.

Indigenous peoples featured strongly at COP30 and attended the summit in larger numbers than ever before. During the talks, $1.8bn was pledged for land rights and Brazil announced new Indigenous territories.

Below, Carbon Brief breaks down the main COP30 outcomes on food, forests, land and nature.

(See Carbon Brief’s coverage of key outcomes for food, forests, land and nature from COP29, COP28, COP27 and COP26.)

‘Global mutirão’

COP30 saw countries agree to a new “global mutirão” decision, a text calling for a tripling of adaptation finance by 2035 (later than some hoped), a new “Belem mission” to increase collective actions to cut emissions and – to the disappoint of many countries – no new “roadmaps” on transitioning away from fossil fuels and reversing deforestation. (See Carbon Brief’s snap analysis.)

Mutirão” is a Portuguese word originating in the Indigenous Tupi-Guarani language that refers to people working together towards a common aim with a community spirit – something the COP30 presidency was keen to emphasise.

The presidency was also keen to stress that the mutirão text was not a cover text (sometimes referred to as a “cover decision”). However, like a cover text, it sought to bring together important issues that were not on the formal agenda with negotiated targets, acting as the key agreement from COP30.

The first draft of the mutirão put forward by the Brazilian presidency on 18 November included optional text to create a “high-level ministerial round table”, aimed at supporting countries to develop their own national roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting and reversing deforestation. (See: Deforestation roadmap.)

The language around this was criticised as weak by some observers, but its inclusion was widely welcomed.

"Option 2: Encourages all Parties to cooperate for and contribute to the global efforts referred to in paragraphs 28 and 33 of decision 1/CMA.5 in a nationally determined manner, taking into account the Paris Agreement, and decides to convene a high-level ministerial round table on different national circumstances, pathways and approaches with a view to supporting countries to developed just, orderly and equitable transition roadmaps, including to progressively overcome their dependency on fossil fuels and towards halting and reversing deforestation;"
Option two for paragraph 35 of the first draft of the mutirão decision, published on 18 November. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

The final mutirão decision did not mention fossil fuel or deforestation roadmaps. It did mention deforestation once, “emphasising” the importance of boosting efforts to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030 to help achieve the Paris temperature goal.

It noted that this is “in accordance with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement”, which is a section of the landmark climate deal that calls for strengthening of the world’s carbon sinks, including forests. (Carbon Brief understands that a large group of rainforest nations, called the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, were particularly keen to have Article 5 referenced in the final mutirão decision.)

"Mindful of being in the heart of the Amazon and emphasizing the importance of conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystems towards achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through enhanced efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 in accordance with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and conserving biodiversity, while ensuring robust social and environmental safeguards,"
The final text of the global mutirão decision, referencing aims to reverse deforestation and forest degradation by 2030. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

The final mutirão decision makes multiple brief mentions of nature and the need to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss in a synergistic way.

Paragraph two of the agreement, in the section sometimes called the “preamble”, “emphasises” the importance of “conserving, protecting and restoring nature and ecosystem”.

Further down, in a section “recalling” the first global stocktake of climate action conducted at COP28 in Dubai in 2023, the text “underlines” the “urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, and land and ocean degradation in the broader context of achieving sustainable development”.

This inclusion likely reflects the presidency’s keenness to prioritise “synergies” between climate change, biodiversity loss and land degradation. (See: Climate and nature ‘synergies’.)

While the mutirão text included references to safeguarding Indigenous rights, conserving biodiversity and maintaining nature-based stores of carbon, no mention of food or agriculture appeared in any draft of the text.

Prof Raj Patel, a member of the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food), said in a statement that it was as if food systems were “erased” from the negotiations, adding:

“Two years ago, 160 countries signed a Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture with great ceremony. Today, they cannot bring themselves to mention the word ‘food’ in the mutirão decision.”

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Adaptation

One of the major negotiated outcomes of the Belém summit was the agreement of a set of indicators for countries to measure their progress towards the global goal on adaptation (GGA).

The GGA, agreed at COP28 in Dubai, sets out 10 targets for countries to measure their progress towards, including targets on water scarcity, climate-resilient food systems and reducing climate impacts on ecosystems.

The initial list of indicators for these targets numbered 10,000. These had been whittled down by experts since COP28 and, at COP30, negotiators were tasked with agreeing on just 100 for countries to use.

Divisions were apparent from the first day of COP30, with the African group and Arab group proposing a two-year period for refining the GGA indicators before formally adopting them in 2027, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin. This move was opposed by several other blocs, including the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) and the EU.

Disagreements arose between countries on the need for finance in order to implement the GGA, whether indicators infringed on countries’ sovereignty and indicators around domestic financing.

Richard Muyungi, African group chair, told Carbon Brief in the first week:

“We need to put guardrails or caveats on the adoption [of the indicators]. For example…the indicators should not infringe on the sovereignty of countries, asking countries to change their laws, their strategies. I mean, you cannot ask my country to change laws, because they want to address the global goal.”

Ultimately, countries adopted a set of 59 indicators and agreed to a two-year work programme “aimed at developing guidance for operationalising the Belém adaptation indicators”.

The set included five indicators on assessing progress towards climate-resilient and sustainable food systems.

4. The indicators for assessing progress under target 9(b), attaining climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply and distribution of food, as well as increasing sustainable and regenerative production and equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all, are as follows: (a) Proportion of area under management for food and agricultural production utilizing practices and technologies relevant to climate change adaptation; (b) Extent of implementation of institutional frameworks for knowledge transfer, research and development, and extension services supporting climate change adaptation in the areas of food and agriculture relative to needs; (c) Level of degraded areas that are under management for food and agricultural production, including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable; (d) Level of food and agricultural yield in areas that are under management for food and agricultural production, including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable; (e) Proportion of the population with equitable access to adequate food and nutrition, including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable.
Indicators assessing food systems and agriculture within the final GGA text. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

The indicators on ecosystems and biodiversity included measuring the proportion of ecosystems “providing services to populations that depend on them”, the level of adaptive capacity due to the implementation of nature-based solutions and the levels of threat status of ecosystems and species.

However, observers noted that the indicators were heavily caveated, with the introductory text of the agreement “emphasis[ing]” their voluntary nature.

7. Emphasizes that the Belem Adaptation Indicators are voluntary, non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative, global in nature, respectful of national sovereignty and national circumstances and country-driven, and that the indicators should not create additional reporting burdens, particularly for developing country Parties, are not intended to serve as a basis for comparison among Parties, shall not become a barrier and shall not be used under any circumstances as a condition for developing country Parties to access funding under the Convention and the Paris Agreement;
Introductory text from the GGA text agreed at COP30, emphasising the voluntary and non-binding nature of the indicators. Source: UNFCCC (2025).

(For more on adaptation and the GGA, see Carbon Brief’s explainer of COP30’s key outcomes.)

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Tropical Forest Forever Facility and other forest pledges

At the COP30 leaders’ summit, Brazil officially launched the Tropical Forest Forever Fund to “reward” countries that conserve their tropical forests.

During the negotiations, the facility raised $6.6bn and had the support of 53 countries, including countries with tropical forests and those that will act as investors.

This instrument is intended to be a financial vehicle to raise $125bn from countries, philanthropy and private investors, which will then be invested in the global bond market. It is intended to be able to support up to 74 countries that have tropical forests across many regions, such as the Amazon and the Congo Basin.

The TFFF has been described as “the largest forest-finance mechanism ever created” and praised by Brazil’s finance minister, Fernando Haddad, as “innovative” for combining public and private financing.

However, it has also received criticism.

As Carbon Brief has previously reported, experts have concerns around fragmenting existing climate finance and inadequate accountability. Other criticisms have focused on worries that the fund could benefit investors over forest countries and that 20% of the funds being directed to Indigenous peoples is insufficient.

For Sandra Guzmán, founder and general director of the Climate Finance Group for Latin America and the Caribbean (GFLAC), the Brazilian government focused on moving forward with the TFFF and neglected other aspects of financing, such as the Baku to Belém roadmap to mobilise $1.3tn per year in climate finance by 2035. She told Carbon Brief:

“The TFFF is not a mechanism that has been agreed upon multilaterally. [If the fund fails in its mission], it would only confirm that Brazil could have [capitalised] on other funds that are within the [UN climate] convention and do have a future.”

After the launch of the TFFF, it was rejected by 150 civil society groups and Indigenous peoples’ organisations, who said the fund “does not seek to address the true structural causes of forest destruction” and “does not prioritise Indigenous peoples and local communities”.

The COP30 presidency stated that, in the second week of negotiations, governments, multilateral funds and Indigenous leaders met to discuss how an Indigenous governance model – known as Dedicated Grant Mechanism (DGM) – can “inform and strengthen the emerging generation of climate finance facilities”.

Analysis by the civil society organisation Leave it in the Ground (LINGO), presented at COP30, suggested that not extracting fossil fuels beneath forests eligible for the TFFF would prevent 4.6tn tonnes of CO2 from being released. 

These emissions would be saved if countries “were to adopt a pledge of no fossil-fuel extraction in its forests”, the report said. 

Kjell Kǘhne, director of LINGO, said in a press conference attended by Carbon Brief that while restrictions on fossil fuels are not part of the scope of the discussions of the TFFF, this would make it “even stronger”.

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Other forest funds

Elsewhere at COP30, countries renewed their COP26 commitment to help protect rainforests in the Congo Basin, which contains the world’s second-largest area of tropical forest.
A Belém “call to action” pledged to raise more than $2.5bn for the cause over the next five years. This was put forward by Gabon and France and signed by Germany, Belgium, Norway and the UK, alongside development banks and other groups.

Forest & Climate Leaders' Partnership post on LinkedIn: "

A new pledge of $1.8bn was put forward from more than 35 governments and philanthropic organisations to help secure land rights across forests and other ecosystems for Indigenous peoples, local communities and Afro-descendent communities, according to the Forest & Climate Leaders’ Partnership. (See: Indigenous representation.)

The UK also announced almost £17m in funding for the Accelerating Innovative Monitoring for Forests (AIM4Forests) programme, a cooperation between the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UK that supports countries in monitoring and reporting on forests.

Meanwhile, Brazilian development bank BNDES approved R$250m (£35m) for ecological restoration and tree-management projects in parts of the Amazon and Atlantic forests, Brazilian outlet InfoMoney reported, adding that the funding will help to recover up to 19,000 hectares of forest land.

On 17 November, when forests featured as one of the COP30 themes of the day, more than 70 civil-society groups called on governments to set up forest “fossil-free zones” – areas where oil, coal and gas are not extracted – to protect forests and the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities.

Earlier that week, Colombia said it was the first Amazonian nation to keep its entire Amazon forest area “free from oil and mining activities”, InfoAmazonia reported.

Countries that hold the Amazon rainforest, including Brazil, Peru and Colombia, also launched an initiative, called Amazonia Forever, to gather more than $1bn to invest in Amazonian infrastructure and cities.

Brazil’s planning and budget minister, Simone Tebet, said this programme for cities and resilient infrastructure would “enable us to take action not only on forest and water resources, but also on urban challenges”.

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Agriculture and food security

With agribusiness giant Brazil hosting this year’s summit, many expected COP30 to have a stronger focus on agriculture and food than previous years.

Formal negotiations for agriculture and food systems under the UN climate convention fall under the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on the implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security (SJWA). COP30 ended without a substantive outcome for the SJWA.

The current four-year mandate of SJWA – which runs workshops, is developing an online portal and prepares an annual synthesis report of agriculture-relevant work undertaken by UN climate convention bodies – began in 2022 and runs out at COP31 next year.

At COP30, the main points of discussion for countries were a consideration of the outcomes of a workshop on “systemic and holistic approaches” to implementing climate action on food and agriculture, as well as countries weighing in on a special forum of the standing committee on finance (SCF) on financing for sustainable food systems and agriculture.

As the summit got underway in Belém, several parties began pushing the idea of capturing key messages from the workshop and forum into a formal SJWA decision.

Observers told Carbon Brief that Argentina, the African group and the least-developed countries (LDCs) wanted “means of implementation” – shorthand for finance – added to the text, while the EU opposed references to “Article 9.1” in the agriculture workstream. (See: Climate finance in Carbon Brief’s main COP30 outcomes piece.)

(c) Further recognized the urgent need to foster adaptation and resilience-building in agricultural systems and that solutions must be context-specific and take into account national and local circumstances; (d) Recognized that the extent to which developing country Parties are able to embed relevant measures in their adaptation strategies relating to agriculture and implement them effectively depends on the provision of adequate, predictable and accessible means of implementation, including finance, technology development and transfer, and capacitybuilding support from developed country Parties; (e) Acknowledged that only a small portion of climate finance is directed to agriculture and food systems; (f) Invited developed country Parties to significantly scale up the provision of new, additional, predictable and grant-based finance for actions related to adaptation in agriculture and improvement of food security and to ensure that such finance is accessible, country-driven and aligned with the national priorities and plans of developing country Parties;
Draft text on agriculture negotiations published on 13 November, with references to means of implementation. Credit: UNFCCC (2025)

The next day, various blocs circulated text proposals on recognising the workshop outcome. These texts, seen by Carbon Brief, included proposals from the EU and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) on food systems “which span the entire value chain”, links to biodiversity, “precision agriculture” and market-based rewards for farmers.

G77 and China, meanwhile, flagged 13 points for inclusion in the draft text, including recognising the “fundamental priority of ending hunger” and a call for developed countries to “significantly scale up…grant-based finance for adaptation actions in agriculture”.

Language from all of these proposals was incorporated into a draft text released on the first Thursday of COP30.

This draft – with 23 square brackets, indicating text not yet agreed – included many references, ranging from agroecology to AI-farming and using “high-integrity carbon-market approaches under Article 6” to reward farmers.

It also recognised that the World Trade Organization (WTO) “can be useful in ensuring a stable, predictable global agricultural trade underpinned by rules” that support climate action.

(i) Noted that an approach to building sustainable food systems that encompasses all components of the value chain – from food production, storage and processing to food packaging, distribution and consumption, as well as disposal of waste – is essential to ensuring food security and can contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions; (j) Acknowledged that, for systemic and holistic approaches to implementation of climate action on agriculture, food systems and food security to be successful, they must consider the central role of farmers in and take into account the national and local circumstances and specificities of agricultural production systems; (k) Highlighted the potential of agroecology in ensuring the sustainability of agriculture and food systems;
Sections from a 13 November draft text incorporating blocs’ divergent views on “holistic approaches” to climate action in agriculture. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

Five hours later, this was replaced by a brief draft, which postponed further discussions until June next year, taking into account the earlier text.

Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security Version 13/11/2025 21:30 Draft conclusions proposed by the co-facilitators 1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation continued consideration of the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security.1 2. They agreed to continue consideration of this matter at their sixty-fourth sessions (June 2026) taking into account the draft text “Version 13/11/2025 16:00” prepared for these agenda items at these sessions. 2
The draft text published on the evening of 13 November, with countries agreeing to conclude agricultural negotiations under SJWA at COP30. Source: UNFCCC (2025).

Many observers expressed their dismay at negotiations finishing so abruptly, before the end of week one and without a substantive outcome.

Teresa Anderson, global climate justice lead at Action Aid International, told Carbon Brief that negotiations “took a turn for the worse” after Australia and the EIG “pushed for dodgy language” on what could be considered “systemic” and “holistic”. Anderson said:

“In June, many countries talked about agroecology. And yet here in the COP, Australia and others just submitted language on precision agriculture, on AI and just basically a lot of corporate greenwash…Countries weren’t able to agree on [this] because there was just too much new nonsense in there.”

The final draft conclusions “recognised that progress was made at these sessions” and “noted that more time is needed to conclude the discussions thereon”.

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Article 6

Carbon markets – particularly relating to forests – were expected to be a key priority for the Brazilian presidency at COP30.

On 7 November, the Brazilian presidency launched a global coalition on “compliance carbon markets”, endorsed by 18 countries.

The voluntary initiative said it is designed to allow members to “share experiences and learn from each other”. It also said the coalition will “explore options to promote interoperability of compliance carbon markets in the long term”.

Finally, it mentioned information exchange on the “potential use of high-integrity offsets”, referencing a sector that has faced intense scrutiny in recent years.  

The same day, Honduras and Suriname announced a deal to issue “high-integrity rainforest carbon credits” in partnership with Deutsche Bank, German agrochemical giant Bayer and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN).

An action outside the COP30 venue on 11 November, resisting what activists called a “carbon casino” at the climate talks. Credit: Bianka Csenki, Artivist Network (2025).
An action outside the COP30 venue on 11 November, resisting what activists called a “carbon casino” at the climate talks. Credit: Bianka Csenki, Artivist Network (2025).

Formal negotiations on carbon trading under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were expected to be somewhat muted, but ended up being rather complicated.

In Baku last year, countries had finally agreed on the rules for country-to-country carbon trading under Article 6.2 and for a new international Paris Agreement carbon market under Article 6.4, bringing a decade of negotiations to a close. Countries also agreed to undertake a review of these rules in 2028.

Within the Article 6.4 market, key tools for “nature-based” removals and rights safeguards were still being developed after COP29 by the “supervisory body” in charge of standards.

At COP30, negotiations focused on the annual report of this body, which had been given autonomy to set these standards at COP29.

The supervisory body had recently adopted a standard on non-permanence on 10 October, which had been the subject of heated debate in the sector.

The standard describes how to handle the risk of someone selling carbon credits for a project that removes CO2 from the atmosphere, only for this stored carbon to be released back into the atmosphere. This is a phenomenon known as “reversal” and is particularly pertinent for tree-planting projects, which may be at risk from wildfires and drought.

In a joint letter published on 12 November, a group of NGOs and carbon-trading advocates said this and other standards “could exclude all land-based activities”, such as forests, from the Article 6.4 market.

They called for new guidance to be given to the supervisory body to prevent this from happening. Their recommendations on amending the rules around reversal risk to give more scope to include nature-based projects – which were opposed by some scientists and other NGOs – were picked up and reflected in an early draft text at COP30.

This text, published on 14 November, asked the market’s supervisory body to “consider carbon market forecasts” and revise its standards so as not to “discourage the development” of nature-based solutions.

Aruna Chandrasekhar on BlueSky: "Also: why should a UN watchdog body have to consider whether its standards will affect carbon market forecasts and “discourage the development” of nature-based credits?"

At the same time, text options “urging” the body to make its decisions more transparent and “minimise time in closed-door sessions” were heavily bracketed.

24. Encourages the Supervisory Body to monitor the application of the “Standard: Addressing non-permanence and reversals in mechanism methodologies” to mechanism methodologies developed for Article 6.4 activities involving nature-based solutions and revise the methodologies as appropriate to facilitate the development of such types of Article 6.4 activities without compromising the environmental integrity; 25. Requests the Supervisory Body to prioritize the work on the development of largescale crediting programs and jurisdictional approaches drawing lessons from the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, including exploring the requirements needed for jurisdictional approaches to nature-based solutions to ensure environmental integrity; 26. Also requests the Supervisory Body to provide a clear science-based procedure for assessing international leakage in the adopted “Standard: Addressing leakage in mechanism methodologies”, emphasizing the need for flexibility in methodological development given the lack of established global leakage accounting for nature-based approaches;
The first draft text on Article 6.4 carbon markets had several references to nature-based solutions and approaches, calling for flexibility from the supervisory body in applying its standards to them. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

In response to this draft text, Isa Mulder of Carbon Market Watch told Carbon Brief:

“All of the pro-market flexibility in there [would] completely undermin[e] the Paris Agreement.”

On 15 November, Climate Action Network awarded Indonesia its “Fossil of the Day” for repeating “lobbyists’ talking points” surrounding weaker rules on the permanence of nature-based credits – “sometimes verbatim” – in its intervention in Article 6.4 negotiations.

While explicit references to nature and nature-based carbon crediting projects were removed in a second draft issued late on 15 November, the text still asked the body to apply a “tailored approach” and weigh the “economic feasibility” of its standards.

In the end, references to these two terms were also dropped. Many countries saw the effort to give detailed guidance to the supervisory body as an attempt to “micro-manage” its work, creating uncertainty for market actors.

The final decision on Article 6.4 gave carbon-credit projects registered under the “clean development mechanism” (CDM) a six-month deadline extension, until June 2026, to “transition” into the Paris Agreement’s new carbon market.

In theory, this could allow up to another 760m tonnes of CO2-equivalent of credits to enter the Paris Agreement regime.

The final Article 6.4 decision “averted disaster” and could potentially make the UN-backed carbon market “marginally” more inclusive, according to Carbon Market Watch, which added that these improvements “do little to change the rather worrying course that Article 6 seems to be on”.

The decision “reiterates” that supervisory body members should not have “any financial or other interests” that could affect – or be seen to affect – their impartiality.

It also “requests” that the body strengthen its consultation processes by informing, reaching out to and including Indigenous peoples, local communities and others who “cannot easily participate” in the complex mechanism.

"18. Requests the Supervisory Body to enhance the transparency of its decision-making and that of the Methodological Expert Panel while safeguarding the productivity of their work; 19. Also requests the secretariat to raise awareness of the multiple opportunities for stakeholder engagement in the mechanism to ensure that stakeholders are informed and able to participate in stakeholder consultation processes effectively; 20. Further requests the Supervisory Body to strengthen its stakeholder consultation processes while also ensuring the expeditious operationalization of the mechanism; 21. Requests the Supervisory Body to facilitate the engagement of a broad range of stakeholders, including designated national authorities, relevant experts and those that cannot easily participate in the mechanism, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and also requests the Supervisory Body to report on its outreach measures taken to ensure broad participation in public consultations across different groups of stakeholders in its next annual report;"
The final COP30 decision on Article 6.4 calls for the UN-backed carbon market’s autonomous body to include Indigenous peoples in its consultations. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

While there are fewer rules that govern country-to-country carbon trading under Article 6.2, countries were supposed to submit “initial reports” of these bilateral carbon-trading deals for review by technical experts ahead of COP30.

The first six reviews – including a Swiss-supported project to promote “climate-smart” rice cultivation in Ghana and sustainable forest management in Guyana and Suriname – were completed ahead of the summit.

A particular issue being considered at COP30 was the fact that, to date, “all trades” under Article 6.2 so far have been flagged with “inconsistencies” during expert review.

The COP30 Article 6.2 decision simply “notes” these inconsistencies and “urges” countries to sort them out, while adding that the reporting and review process is still “in the early stages”. It also asks reviewers to “clearly explain” any issues they find and how to resolve them.

"10. Also notes the inconsistencies with the requirements in the guidance on cooperative approaches identified in the first round of Article 6 technical expert reviews, while noting that the Article 6, paragraph 2, reporting and review processes are still in the early stages of implementation and urges Parties to address the inconsistencies identified in accordance with decision 4/CMA.6, paragraphs 39–44; 11. Requests Article 6 technical expert review teams to clearly explain their findings on any inconsistencies and any recommendations on how to resolve them;"
Conclusions on how to deal with “inconsistencies” found during reviews of country reports under Article 6.2. Source: UNFCCC (2025).

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Deforestation roadmap

During the Belém talks, momentum began to build around agreeing a roadmap to end deforestation, although it was largely overshadowed by the push for a similar fossil-fuel phase-out plan.

At COP26, more than 130 countries had signed on to a non-binding pledge to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030. This pledge was formally recognised in the global stocktake agreed at COP28. Although the rate of deforestation is decreasing, countries are off track to meet this goal.

A roadmap aimed to help achieve this deforestation target did not appear in the final mutirão decision agreed at COP30. However, in the closing plenary of the summit, Corrêa do Lago said the Brazilian presidency would work to create deforestation and fossil-fuel roadmaps outside the COP negotiation process.

In a speech at the opening of the leaders’ summit before COP30 began, Lula had called for roadmaps to “reverse deforestation, overcome dependence on fossil fuels and mobilise the resources required to achieve these goals in a fair and planned manner”.

By the second week of negotiations, around 45 countries backed a deforestation roadmap, including Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, the EU and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to a Carbon Brief tracker. This increased to at least 92 countries by Friday 21 November, after a large group of more than 50 rainforest nations got behind the proposal.

WWF and Greenpeace had urged countries to adopt the deforestation roadmap “as a formal outcome at COP30”, while Colombia’s environment minister, Irene Vélez-Torres, wrote in Backchannel, a climate commentary platform:

“We need to see the global north come behind a roadmap – and quickly.”

However, the final text signed off on 22 November did not include mentions of either roadmap. (See: ‘Global mutirão’.)

Although more than 90 countries backed the deforestation roadmap, “wider political will to secure this in Belém was lacking”, WWF said in a statement.

Carolina Pasquali, executive director of Greenpeace Brazil, said that Lula’s government had “set the bar high” in calling for deforestation and fossil-fuel roadmaps, but the “divided multilateral landscape was unable to hurdle it”.

After the talks ended, Prof Nathalie Seddon, the director of the nature-based solutions initiative at the University of Oxford, said in a statement:

“Until we have coupled roadmaps for ending deforestation and phasing out fossil fuels, grounded in rights and direct finance for those who safeguard ecosystems, we will remain off track for a safe and just future.”

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‘Unilateral trade measures’

After several failed attempts to bring climate-related “unilateral trade measures”, such as the EU’s deforestation regulation, onto the agenda at previous COPs, the issue was taken up in Belém as part of presidency-led discussions and reflected in the key outcome of the summit, the “global mutirão”.

This decision creates three annual “dialogues” on trade, to be held at the Bonn intersessional meetings in 2026, 2027 and 2028. It also “reaffirms” that climate measures, “including unilateral ones, should not constitute” trade restrictions that are “arbitrary” or “discriminat[ory]”.

This is the first-ever mention of trade measures in a COP cover decision.

While the issue of trade has received a significant level of attention at recent summits, it is not a new one for the UN climate regime. The text agreed in Belém, below, precisely repeats the language in article 3.5 of the 1992 UN climate convention.

56. Reaffirmsthat Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade; 57. Requests the subsidiary bodies to hold a dialogue at their sixty-fourth, sixty-sixth (June 2027) and sixty-eighth sessions (June 2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, including the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking into account paragraph 56 above, decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028 and requests the subsidiary bodies to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event;
The final COP30 mutirão decision referring to unilateral trade measures, a COP first. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

In Belém, the issue of such measures had once again been raised by Bolivia on behalf of the like-minded developing countries (LMDCs, a group that includes China, India and others).

Within the presidency-led consultations, the LMDCs called for a recurring agenda item on trade, Tuvalu supported a dialogue and the African group proposed a system for countries to report new trade measures to the UN climate convention, according to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin.

On Sunday in the middle of COP, the presidency published a summary of its consultations, containing five options for a decision on trade measures, including dialogues, roundtables or the creation of a platform.

"Options (mutually supportive or alternatives, as Parties see fit) 1. Implement and operationalize Article 3.5 of the Convention, including through an annual dialogue on climate change-related trade restrictive unilateral trade measures 2. Discussions related to cross-border impacts of climate policies to continue being addressed under response measures forum and its KCI with a focus in the near term on international cooperation and green/low carbon standards 3. Hold round tables on the nexus between trade and climate change in 2026 and 2027, with outputs serving as inputs to GST2 4. Parties introducing a climate-related trade measure (e.g., green standards) for consultations under the UNFCCC (potential role WTO, UNCTAD, etc) 5. Create a platform on climate-related trade measures for understanding the cross-border impacts on developing countries"
Options presented in the presidency’s summary note on unilateral trade measures on 16 November, after conducting consultations with parties. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

David Waskow, director of the international climate initiative at the World Resources Institute thinktank, told a media briefing that trade is a “real issue” for some countries and not just a “bargaining tactic or some sort of chit that’s being put on the table”.

He added that the EU “feels strongly” about the ways trade measures support climate action, but developing countries have “real concerns” about how those measures play out.

Avantika Goswami, climate-policy lead at Delhi-based thinktank the the Centre for Science and Environment, told Carbon Brief that, while it is “not ideal to not have a formal agenda item” on unilateral trade measures, the reference to the UN climate convention in the text “is welcomed”, as well as the dialogues that will take place over the next three years. Goswami added:

“At the very least, this will elevate the issue of unilateral trade measures to be more high-profile within the COP space and will provide a forum for countries to discuss their concerns and challenges, as well as possible solutions for the way forward.”

Alongside the discussions under the presidency, these measures continued to crop up within different negotiation streams, including on just transition, “response measures” and technology.

The final decision on the just transition work programme removed all references to trade, although it recognised the role of smallholder farmers and food production.

(f) The multisectoral and multidimensional nature of just transitions and the resultant need for whole-of-economy approaches to just transitions that engage the private sector, including micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, and rural economy actors, especially smallholder farmers, and that contribute to the creation of decent work and quality jobs and food production;
The final decision on the just transition work programme refers to the role of smallholder farmers and food production. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

Anderson, from ActionAid, told Carbon Brief that civil society had “fought hard” to make sure food and farmers were included in the just transition discussion. She told Carbon Brief:

“We’ve been calling for a just transition in agriculture because agriculture is the [second biggest] polluter after fossil fuels, and the [biggest] employer in the world.

“We know we need to transition in agriculture, but it has to be fair to protect jobs, livelihoods, families, communities and global food security. That is really, really important, because we know there’s a lot to learn from many years of climate action that hasn’t always put rural communities, who are often marginalised, first in the conversation.”

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Biofuels

A sign for Embrapa – Brazil’s state-owned firm that is a key player in biofuels research – at the entrance of the COP30 AgriZone. Credit: Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo
A sign for Embrapa – Brazil’s state-owned firm that is a key player in biofuels research – at the entrance of the COP30 AgriZone. Credit: Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo

On 14 October, at the pre-COP in Brasilia, the Brazilian presidency launched the Belém 4x pledge, which aimed to gather high-level support to quadruple the production and use of “sustainable fuels” – such as hydrogen and biofuels – by 2035, as compared to 2024 levels.

An excerpt of the Belém 4x pledge calling for a quadrupling of “sustainable fuels use” globally, while referring to the increased uptake of biofuels. Source: Government of Brazil (2025)
An excerpt of the Belém 4x pledge calling for a quadrupling of “sustainable fuels use” globally, while referring to the increased uptake of biofuels. Source: Government of Brazil (2025)

The pledge was co-sponsored by Italy and Japan, supported by India and has been backed by 23 countries so far, including Canada and the Netherlands. On 14 November, Brazil announced a partnership with the Clean Energy Ministerial to “advance Belem 4x”.

However, the pledge was “rejected” by some NGOs, including Climate Action Network and Greenpeace, who criticised the environmental, social and food security impacts of biofuels.

Hikmat Soeriatanuwijay at Oil Change International said in a statement:

“The Belém 4x pledge uses the language of sustainability to justify continued fossil-fuel use. The [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] states that forest protection will have the highest mitigation value; however, exploitation of natural forests and cropland for bioenergy undermines this priority.”

The 4x pledge was based on the International Energy Agency’s report on “delivering” sustainable fuels, which included “woody biomass” being converted into biofuels. 

However, the IEA report also warned that, for fuels to be considered sustainable, they “need to comply” with other criteria, “such as preservation of biodiversity, sustainable water management and compliance with social safeguards”. 

In a statement from the Climate Land Ambition and Rights Alliance (CLARA), former Tasmanian Greens leader Peg Putt from the Biomass Action Network called the pledge’s promotion of liquid and gaseous fuels derived from wood a “dangerous distraction”. Putt said:

“The combustion of wood for bioenergy releases massive amounts of stored greenhouse gases immediately and the myth of its carbon neutrality is based on flawed accounting that ignores the decades forests need to regrow, if they ever do. The true carbon cost rarely appears on any national balance sheet.”

Many observers feared that biofuels would be included in the negotiations or in COP30’s cover decision.

As of an 18 November informal note, elements for a decision on the just transition work programme still referred to the role of “transitional fuels”.

That term has no officially agreed definition, although many states believe that it covers bioenergy and biofuels.

"Option 1: The role of transitional fuels in achieving just transitions that align with different national priorities and circumstances; Option 2: no text"
Several iterations of the just transition text included an option with a reference to “transitional fuels”, which didn’t make it to the final text. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

This option was deleted from draft text published on 21 November, and is not reflected in the final just transition work programme decision. 

The final global mutirão decision also had no explicit mention of biofuels, transitional fuels or sustainable fuels.

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Food systems and water

Transforming food systems and agriculture was one of the six “pillars” on the COP30 “action agenda”, but many observers were disappointed with the outcomes on food in Belém.

Food solutions were “on display” at COP30 – in the form of local dishes served to delegates and new pledges announced – but “none of this made it into the negotiating rooms or the final agreement”, said Dr Elisabette Recine, a member of the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food). She added in a statement:

“Despite all the talk, negotiators failed to act, and the lived realities of those most affected by hunger, poverty and climate shocks went unheard.”

Outside the formal negotiations, a number of new pledges were announced, including the Belém declaration on hunger, poverty and human-centered climate action, which aims to address the “unequal distribution of climate impacts”.

This was adopted by 43 countries and the EU and focused on a number of actions, including supporting climate adaptation for small farmers and expanding social-protection systems, such as government unemployment and illness pay. The German cooperation and development minister described it as a “pioneering step in linking climate action, social protection and food security”.

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) launched a food waste initiative to help halve food waste by 2030 and also target a reduction in methane emissions of up to 7%, as food waste is a source of the potent greenhouse gas. (See: Methane.)

The food waste pledge was backed by Brazil, Japan and the UK, alongside several cities and private companies, and included goals for governments to integrate food waste into climate and biodiversity plans.

Delegates inside the COP30 conference venue in Belém, Brazil on 14 November. Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis
Delegates inside the COP30 conference venue in Belém, Brazil on 14 November. Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis

The thematic days for food and agriculture on 19 and 20 November saw a raft of other new announcements, including Brazil launching the resilient agriculture investment for net-zero land degradation (RAIZ).

This initiative is aimed at bringing together governments and investors to restore degraded farmland. It was backed by 10 countries, including the UK, Australia and Saudi Arabia.

An FAO press release said RAIZ will help governments to attract more funding and allocate investment towards restoring agricultural land. No specific financial goal was mentioned, but Bruno Brasil from Brazil’s ministry of agriculture said in a statement that it could “unlock billions globally to restore degraded farmland, protect biodiversity and ensure food security”.

Brazil and the UK also put forward a declaration to spur action around reducing the environmental impact of fertilisers. This expressed “intent” to prioritise sustainable production of fertilisers and improved nutrient management, alongside recognising that improper use of fertilisers “threaten[s] our ecosystems and food systems”.

Additionally, some initiatives launched at previous COPs were updated in Belém. Colombia, Italy and Vietnam joined the Alliance of Champions for Food Systems Transformation – a coalition of countries pledging to take strong action on transforming food systems that was first launched at COP28.

Henry Musa Kpaka on X/Twitter: "Sierra Leone welcomes Italy to the Alliance of Champions for Food Systems Transformation (ACF)! Delighted to see Italy join our growing coalition of countries committed to transforming food systems for people, nature, and the climate. As members of the ACF, we share a collective vision to make food systems more sustainable, inclusive, and resilient through political leadership, collaboration, and action. Italy strengthens our shared voice and global impact as we advance this agenda together. #FeedSalone #ACF #COP30 #FoodSystemsTransformation #SierraLeone"

A number of reports released during the talks looked at how food systems were included in countries’ climate plans, called “nationally determined contributions”, or NDCs. A report from WWF and Climate Focus found that 93% of new NDCs included at least one measure around agriculture or food systems, an increase from 86% of previous pledges.

Another NGO assessment of how food systems were incorporated into 10 NDCs found that pledges from Somalia and Switzerland were “very strong” in this regard and included actions from across the entire food system. Climate pledges from Brazil and New Zealand, on the other hand, were ranked as “weak”, the report said.

Sebastian Osborn from Mercy for Animals, one of the organisations involved in the assessment, told a press conference:

“Overall, countries are not fully embracing the potential benefits of incorporating food systems into their climate policies.”

Elsewhere, the Gates Foundation put forward $1.4bn for smallerholder farmer climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia. The Rockefeller Foundation announced more than $5.4m to “strengthen the resilience” of food systems and provide children’s school meals.

In terms of water and ocean outcomes, six more countries joined the “blue NDC challenge”, an initiative launched by Brazil and France earlier this year that encourages nations to integrate ocean measures into their climate pledges.

Finally, analysis from the World Resources Institute, Ocean & Climate Platform and Ocean Conservancy found that more than 90% of new NDCs submitted by coastal and island countries included ocean-based climate actions, an increase from 73% in 2022.

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Climate and nature ‘synergies’

Some hoped that a first-of-its-kind outcome on jointly addressing climate change, biodiversity loss and land degradation could emerge from COP30.

However, in the end, pushback from some nations scuppered plans for a new “synergies” agreement.

At the Rio Earth summit in 1992, the world decided to address Earth’s most pressing environmental problems under three separate conventions: one on climate change, one on biodiversity and the final one on land desertification.

But, for the past few years, a growing number of scientists, politicians and diplomats have questioned whether tackling these issues separately is the right approach.

And, at the most recent biodiversity and land desertification COPs, countries agreed to new texts calling for closer cooperation between the three Rio conventions.

Speaking at a side event on nature at COP30, Juan Carlos Monterrey, Panama’s hat-sporting special climate envoy, said that countries committed a “big sin” when they decided to “decided to split the environment into three different structures”.

(Panama has plans to be the first country to publish one document that will function as both its climate plan – known as a “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) – and its nature plan – known as a “national biodiversity strategy and action plan” (NBSAP).)

After pledging to make COP30 a “nature COP”, the presidency held consultations on an agenda item called “cooperation with other international organisations”, with the hopes of producing the first substantive outcome on addressing climate change, biodiversity loss and land degradation together.

A draft “areas of interest” text linked to the issue spoke of “creat[ing] a space for continuous discussions to enhance cooperation among the Rio conventions” and the “establishment of a process to come up with a set of recommendations on how to enhance cooperation and policy coherence”.

However, several nations, including Saudi Arabia, vocally opposed the progression of a substantive outcome – and the final version of the “synergies” text is just five paragraphs long, containing little that is new.

Observers pointed out to Carbon Brief that Saudi Arabia’s opposition was particularly puzzling, given it currently holds the presidency for the desertification COP.

In an interview with Carbon Brief, Dr Osama Faqeeha, deputy environment minister for Saudi Arabia and chief adviser to the COP16 desertification presidency, said that the nation did not support any action that might lead to “dissolving the conventions”.

When pressed on whether, as the COP16 desertification presidency, it should be prioritising more “synergistic” work between the three Rio conventions, Faqeeha added:

“We have to realise the convention is about land. Preventing land degradation and combating drought. These are the two major challenges.”

Bethan Laughlin, a senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London, said the final synergies text “fell short of the high ambition championed by many countries and civil society”, but does offer some hope for future collaboration. She told Carbon Brief:

“This agenda item may not have had a substantive outcome in the text, but it also did not fail. Countries have committed to continued dialogue and collaboration, moving [the agenda item] beyond its previous relegation as a brief annual intersessional discussion – towards meaningful political engagement.”

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Indigenous representation

COP30 achieved several milestones for Indigenous peoples, including securing recognition of their land rights in the mutirão decision and agreeing on a just transition mechanism that ensures that Indigenous peoples rights are included.

Belém’s climate summit was attended by more than 3,000 representatives of Indigenous peoples, making it the largest participation of Indigenous peoples in the history of COPs.

However, Cultural Survival – a not-for-profit organisation that supports Indigenous rights worldwide – said in a statement that this COP was “one of the most frustrating and disappointing” for Indigenous peoples. It noted that only 14% of 2,500 Indigenous representatives from Brazil received accreditation to access the official negotiations area.

Fany Kuiru, general coordinator of the Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), told Carbon Brief that some Indigenous representatives felt discontent due to a lack of “full and effective” participation.

On the second day of COP30, dozens of Indigenous protesters clashed with security guards in order to enter the negotiations and demand climate action and forest protection.

Emil Gualinga, a member of the Kichwa Peoples of Sarayaku, in Ecuador, said in a press release that Indigenous peoples continue to be excluded from negotiation rooms and most of their proposals were not incorporated into final decisions.

In Belém, Brazil’s minister of Indigenous peoples, Sonia Guajajara called for the mutirão text to integrate the demarcation of Indigenous lands as a climate policy.

Indigenous peoples viewed this statement as “quite positive”, Toya Manchineri, general coordinator of the Coordination of Indigenous Organisations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB), said at a press conference attended by Carbon Brief.

Currently, few countries’ climate plans recognise the territorial rights of Indigenous peoples as climate instruments, according to a recent report that analysed the NDCs of 15 countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

One of the major outcomes of COP30 for Indigenous peoples was the commitment to allocate $1.8bn to support Indigenous peoples and Afrodescendants’ tenure rights from 2026 to 2030 as part of the Forest and Land Tenure Pledge. Another finance-related outcome was the establishment of the Tropical Forest Forever Facility, which guarantees that 20% of its funds will go to Indigenous groups. (See: Tropical Forest Forever Facility and other forest pledges.)

Additionally, 15 countries committed to a collective target to recognise and secure land tenure of 160m hectares by 2030 for Indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities. Brazil announced the demarcation of 10 new Indigenous territories and acknowledged that 59m hectares must be secured over the next five years.

The preamble of the mutirão decision also recognised Indigenous rights, including their land rights and traditional knowledge.

"Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as their land rights and traditional knowledge, and of local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,"
The mutirão decision sets out that climate action taken by countries should “respect, promote and consider” the rights of Indigenous peoples, including their land rights and traditional knowledge. Source: UNFCCC (2025)

Gualinga, the Ecuadorean Indigenous leader, said in a press release that this recognition was an “important step forward and it gives us tools to continue advocating for our rights in future decisions”.

However, he noted that Indigenous groups had proposed more robust language in the mutirão text, such as including their full and effective participation in the development and implementation of NDCs, as well as direct access to financing.

Indigenous peoples also demanded that the climate finance received by countries must include their traditional knowledge and “explicit guarantees” of principles such as free, prior and informed consent, legal security of land, Indigenous land tenure and complaint mechanisms, Kuiru told Carbon Brief.

She added that Indigenous communities have their own mechanisms for managing funds and that “have already demonstrated to be efficient”, which is why they advocate for direct funding to Indigenous peoples.

Indigenous peoples around the world have struggled to receive such funding directly. Only 0.7% of climate finance provided to developing countries mentions the word “Indigenous”, a new study by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) found.

The mutirão decision ultimately did not include direct access to climate finance for Indigenous peoples.

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Methane

Methane – the potent greenhouse gas that is the second-biggest contributor to global warming, after CO2 – featured in several COP30 pledges and announcements, but overall did not make major waves in Belém.

A UNEP report released during the summit looked at countries’ progress towards meeting the voluntary global pledge to reduce methane emissions by 30% by 2030, which has been backed by almost 160 countries since its launch at COP26.

The report found that while progress has been made on the extent of the increase in methane, emissions are still rising each year. Based on current government pledges, methane emissions will reduce by 8% by 2030, but they could reduce by 32% with more ambition and “full implementation of existing technically feasible reductions”, the report found.

Martin Krause, the director of the climate-change division at UNEP, said at the report’s launch that drastically cutting methane is “like pulling the climate emergency brake”, saying countries should “pull that brake hard and fast”.

Caitlin Smith at the Changing Markets Foundation campaign group said in a statement that to make progress on cutting methane, governments must “ramp up action on agriculture – the biggest source of methane, yet a blind spot for most rich countries”.

Inger Andersen on BlueSky: "Reducing methane emissions is one of the most immediate and effective steps to slow the climate crisis. The latest Global Methane Status Report, launched today at #COP30 by @unep.org @ccacoalition.bsky.social , shows progress, but more is needed to deliver global goals."

Research from thinktank Planet Tracker – released just before COP30 – found that 52 of the world’s largest meat, dairy and rice companies emit a combined 22m tonnes of methane every year.

The report also found that only seven of these 52 companies directly report the distribution and scale of their methane emissions and just one – Danone – has a specific methane-reduction target.

Also during the talks, the Changing Markets Foundation launched an interactive tool tracking agricultural methane emissions from companies and countries around the world.

Meanwhile, Farmers Weekly reported that the UK government “quietly shelved” plans to announce a national pledge to cut livestock methane emissions by 30% by 2030.

The UK, Brazil and China hosted a methane summit on the weekend before talks officially began. During this event, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition launched an “action accelerator” to help governments in developing countries cut emissions from super pollutants, including methane.

Brazil, Cambodia, Nigeria and four other countries have been initially chosen for this initiative and will receive a combined $25m to “advance their efforts in this area. The plan aims to work with up to 30 countries by 2030 and gather around $150m in funds. Additionally, 11 countries signed a statement committing to “drastically reducing” fossil methane emissions.

Mia Amor Mottley on X/Twitter (@miaamormottley): "At the Belém Climate Summit, in the lead up to @cop30nobrasil , I chose to speak on one critical issue: Methane. Methane is 80 times more destructive than Carbon Dioxide. If we act now, we can pull the emergency brake on global warming and buy the world time to transition. #COP30"

Other measures were announced in Belém, including a joint strategy to boost methane reductions across the agriculture, energy and waste sectors in developing countries, launched by the Global Methane Hub and the Global Green Growth Institute.

This initiative will focus on Mexico, Nigeria and Senegal, a statement said.

On 19 November, a scheme to boost efforts to cut methane and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture was launched. The farmers’ initiative for resilient and sustainable transformations (FIRST) aims to help countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia share “practical, low-cost solutions that cut emissions, strengthen food security and improve resilience”, a statement from the Climate and Clean Air Coalition said.

Some funding was also put forward for tackling methane, with businessman Mike Bloomberg announcing $100m in investment towards methane-cutting efforts, such as satellite monitoring of leaks of the gas.

Bloomberg told a press briefing attended by Carbon Brief that methane is an “extremely important part of the climate puzzle”.

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Agricultural greenwashing

Brazil is a major producer of soya beans, beef, rice, biofuels and many other agricultural products. As a result, observers and media outlets were keenly watching out for any instances of agribusiness-related greenwashing or lobbying at COP30.

Before the negotiations began, DeSmog published a list of eight “big ag greenwashing terms” to watch out for in Belém. These included phrases such as regenerative agriculture, as well as arguments around fossil fuels and ways of measuring methane emissions.

The outlet published a number of other articles during the talks, reporting (alongside the Guardian) that more than 300 agricultural lobbyists attended COP30, mapping out the food and farming companies and trade groups at COP30 and detailing the social media influencers “enlisted” by agribusiness companies ahead of the talks.

“Sustainable” claims around biofuels also came under scrutiny in Belém. DeSmog identified nearly 60 events on the benefits of biofuels at COP30, led by both industry groups and related companies.

These included a “high-level event on the critical role of biofuels” and a “sustainable biofuels” section in the summit’s action agenda.

Unearthed reported that a COP30 sustainable agriculture pavilion, located around 2km outside the official “blue zone” where negotiations took place, was “sponsored by agribiz interests linked to deforestation and anti-conservation lobbying”.

Campaigners protested against “big agriculture lobbyists” outside this “AgriZone” pavilion during the negotiations, the Grocer said.

The Associated Press said the pavilion sought to “spread a message of lower-carbon agriculture possibilities”, but added that “industrial agriculture retains a big influence at the climate talks”.

Civil society and farmers’ groups protest at the industry-sponsored “AgriZone” on the first day of COP30. Credit: Jason Valenzuela, Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (2025)
Civil society and farmers’ groups protest at the industry-sponsored “AgriZone” on the first day of COP30. Credit: Jason Valenzuela, Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (2025)

Brazilian outlet Agência Pública, meanwhile, reported that Brazil placed the “billionaire brothers” who own JBS, the world’s largest beef producer, on a “VIP list” at COP30.

The Changing Markets Foundation also published a report looking at COP30 events led by the agriculture industry and assessing Brazil’s “agricultural methane blind spot”.

Teresa Anderson, global climate justice lead at Action Aid, told Carbon Brief that agribusiness was the “elephant in the room” at COP30. She added:

“We’ve had this COP set in the Amazon, with the Brazilian presidency, talking a big game on forests, but absolute crickets when it comes to naming the biggest threat to forests, which is big industrial agriculture.”

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COP30: Key outcomes for food, forests, land and nature at the UN climate talks in Belém

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Greenhouse Gases

Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes

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Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows. 

Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.

The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.

The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.

The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.

Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.

One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.

Compound events

CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.

These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.

Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:

“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”

CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.

The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.

For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.

Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.

The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.

In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.

In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.

Saint Basil's Cathedral, on Red Square, in Moscow, was affected by smog during the fires in Russia in the summer of 2010.
Saint Basil’s Cathedral, on Red Square, in Moscow, was affected by smog during the fires in Russia in the summer of 2010. Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo

The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.

Increasing events

To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.

The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.

The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.

Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.

The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).

The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.

Charts showing spatial and temporal occurrences over study period
Spatial and temporal occurrence of compound drought and heatwave events over the study period from 1980 to 2023. The map (top) shows CDHEs around the world, with darker colours indicating higher frequency of occurrence. The chart in the bottom left shows how much land surface was affected by a compound event in a given year, where red accounts for heatwave-led events, and yellow, drought-led events. The chart in the bottom right shows the relative increase of each CDHE type in 2002-23 compared with 1980-2001. Source: Kim et al. (2026)

Threshold passed

The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.

In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.

The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.

This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.

Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.

In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.

Daily data

The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.

He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.

Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.

Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:

“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”

However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.

Compound impacts

The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.

These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.

Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.

The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.

Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:

“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”

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Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes

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DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Energy crisis

ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.

‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.

‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.

China’s climate plan

PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal ​in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.

ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”. 

Around the world

  • EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
  • RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
  • FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
  • NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.

98

The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.


Latest climate research

  • Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
  • Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
  • Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025

UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.

Spotlight

Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine

Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.

The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.

Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.

The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.

‘Sustainable income’

On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.

In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.

Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”

With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.

Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.

Ambition Lawrence Weston’s Mark Pepper and the wind turbine.
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s Mark Pepper and the wind turbine. Artwork: Josh Gabbatiss

‘Climate by stealth’

Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.

The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.

Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:

“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”

This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.

Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:

“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”

From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:

“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”

Watch, read, listen

OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.

MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.

TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine

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Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?

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China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.

The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.

The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.

The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.

The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.

However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.

This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.

Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.

Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.

What is China’s 15th five-year plan?

Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.

Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.

These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.

The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.

Category Indicator Indicator in 2025 Target by 2030 Cumulative target over 2026-2030 Characteristic
Economic development Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) 5 Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. Anticipatory
‘Green and low-carbon Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) 17.7 17 Binding
Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) 21.7 25 Binding
Security guarantee Comprehensive energy production
capacity (100m tonnes of
standard coal equivalent)
51.3 58 Binding

Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.

Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.

The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.

The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).

It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)

The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.

The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.

Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.

There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.

Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.

The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.

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What does the plan say about China’s climate action?

Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.

It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.

The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.

Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.

11th five-year plan (2006-2010) 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) 15th five-year plan (2026-2030)
Chapter title Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China
Sections Developing a circular economy Actively respond to global climate change Accelerate the development of functional zones Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking
Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems Strengthen resource conservation and management Promote economical and intensive resource use Continue to improve environmental quality Continuously improving environmental quality
Strengthening environmental protection Vigorously develop the circular economy Step up comprehensive environmental governance Accelerate the green transformation of the development model Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems
Enhancing resource management Strengthen environmental protection efforts Intensify ecological conservation and restoration Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles
Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources Promoting ecological conservation and restoration Respond to global climate change
Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security
Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries

Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.

The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.

Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.

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What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?

In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.

This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.

Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.

However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.

Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.

This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.

At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.

However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.

Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.

Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.

(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)

For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.

However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.

The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.

China reports meeting its latest carbon-intensity target after a change in methodology.
Dashed lines: China’s carbon-intensity targets during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plan periods. Bars: China’s achieved carbon-intensity reductions according to either the old methodology (dark blue) and the new one (light blue). The achieved reductions during the 12th and 13th five-year plans are from contemporaneous government statistics and may be revised in future. The reduction figures for the 14th five-year plan period are sourced from government statistics for the new methodology and analysis by CREA under the old methodology. Sources: Five-year plans and Carbon Brief.

The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.

It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.

To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.

As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.

Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.

This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:

“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”

Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.

He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.

Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.

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Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?

“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.

The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.

In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.

The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.

Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.

He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.

The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.

Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.

While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.

She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.

China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.

The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.

It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.

As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.

State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission ​lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.

Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.

The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.

Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.
Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.
Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.

The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.

It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.

Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.

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What does the plan signal about coal?

The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.

Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.

He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.

Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.

The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.

Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.

The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.

Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.

However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.

There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.

Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.

Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.

The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.

However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.

Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.

“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:

“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”

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How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?

Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.

Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.

“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.

Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.

The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.

China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:

“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”

Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.

At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.

This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:

“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”

The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.

This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:

“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”

The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.

China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:

“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”

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What else does the plan cover?

The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.

China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.

China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.

An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.

The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.

Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.

Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.

China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.

This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.

Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.

It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.

It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.

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Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?

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