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Canada’s Steel and Aluminum Industries Demand Tariffs to Block Chinese Dumping

Canada’s steel and aluminum industries are sounding the alarm over what they describe as an “existential threat” while urging the federal government to align with the United States and Mexico in imposing tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum to prevent market dumping. This plea comes amid growing concerns that Canada could become a conduit for Chinese products circumventing American and Mexican tariffs.

Why Canada’s Steel and Aluminum Industries Raise The Alarm

Canada currently produces primary aluminum—rather than recycled aluminum—at eight smelters located in Quebec and one in Kitimat, British Columbia. These facilities are owned by three major companies: Alcoa, Aluminerie Alouette, and Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto also operates an alumina refinery in Vaudreuil, Quebec. 

The Canadian aluminum industry produces a wide range of products, including doors, windows, house siding, beverage cans, foil products, cooking utensils, and electrical wiring.

As of 2022, Canada ranked as the world’s 4th-largest producer of primary aluminum, following China, India, and Russia. The North American country produced about 3.0 million tonnes of primary aluminum in 2022, which accounts for about 4.4 percent of global production. In contrast, China alone produces more than half of the world’s aluminum. 

A notable advantage of Canada’s aluminum industry is its lower carbon footprint compared to other major producers, thanks to its reliance on renewable energy sources, particularly hydroelectric power.

In 2023, Canada’s smelter production of aluminum was estimated at around 3 million metric tons as seen below. Throughout the observed period, Canada’s aluminum production volume remained relatively stable. The country’s peak production occurred in both 2016 and 2017, when it reached 3.2 million metric tons. 

Canada aluminum smelter production 2023

How Significant Is Canada’s Aluminum Production and Export Market?

Canada is the world’s second-largest exporter of aluminum, with aluminum product exports totaling $18.2 billion in 2022. The United States is the primary market for these Canadian exports, making it a crucial partner in the aluminum trade. This close trade relationship underscores the importance of maintaining strong economic ties and competitive advantages in the aluminum industry.

However, the recent actions of the U.S. government of imposing tariffs on China imports spurred the industry’s interest to do the same. 

Catherine Cobden, President and CEO of the Canadian Steel Producers Association (CSPA), emphasized the urgency of the issue during a press conference in Ottawa. She stressed the need for Canada to act in concert with its North American trade partners under the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).

“We can’t be the only CUSMA country that is not taking this serious action,” Cobden stated, highlighting the critical nature of the moment for Canada’s steel industry.

  • The CSPA represents 13 steel companies, including major players like Stelco, Algoma Steel Inc., and Rio Tinto.

In late July, Aluminum Alloy Ingot prices dropped across key regions. In the U.S., higher inventories and weaker demand in automotive and construction sectors led to a decline. Germany saw similar drops due to reduced manufacturing activity. In China, prices fell due to increased domestic production and slower demand, with domestic brands outperforming foreign competitors in the automotive industry.

The Canadian industry leaders’ call to action follows the U.S. government’s May announcement of a 25% tariff increase on Chinese steel and aluminum. Additionally, the U.S. has imposed higher tariffs on other Chinese products, including electric vehicles (EVs), semiconductors, critical minerals, and batteries. 

In response, Mexico, in July, introduced a 10% tariff on aluminum and a 25% tariff on steel not produced within Mexico, in collaboration with the U.S. These measures aim to prevent Chinese producers from bypassing tariffs through Mexican trade routes.

The Implications of Urging Tariffs on Chinese Imports

The CSPA and the Aluminium Association of Canada are advocating for a 25% tariff on all Chinese steel products and most aluminum products entering Canada. This would mirror the recent U.S. decision to impose tariffs on 289 different Chinese steel and aluminum imports. Cobden stressed the urgency of the situation, warning that failure to act could result in job losses and hinder economic growth and investment in Canada’s steel and aluminum industries.

The concern now is that Canada could become a “back door” for Chinese steel and aluminum entering North America, undermining the protective measures taken by the U.S. and Mexico. This potential loophole has prompted Canadian industry leaders to push for similar tariffs to safeguard domestic jobs and industries.

What more Jean Simard, President and CEO of the Aluminium Association of Canada noted that:

”China’s metal is seven times more carbon-intensive than Canada’s.”

Thus, Simard said that allowing Chinese steel and aluminum into Canada would increase the country’s carbon footprint and undermine efforts to promote sustainable industrial practices. He called on the government to act swiftly to protect Canadian jobs, technology investments, and the environment.

What Are The Consequences of No Action?

The potential consequences of failing to impose tariffs are stark. Over 760,000 tonnes of Chinese steel entered the American market in 2023, with similar amounts the previous year. These volumes are 20% higher than the current amount of Chinese steel entering Canada annually. Industry leaders fear that any Chinese steel diverted from the U.S. market due to tariffs could flood the Canadian market, further eroding the domestic steel and aluminum industries.

The CSPA and Aluminium Association of Canada are urging the federal government to act quickly and decisively. They warn that any delay could lead to a further decline in the Canadian steel and aluminum industries, with long-term consequences for employment, economic growth, and Canada’s position in the global market.

As the government considers its next steps, industry leaders are making it clear that urgent action is needed to protect Canada’s steel and aluminum sectors from the growing threat of Chinese overcapacity.

The post Canada’s Steel and Aluminum Industries Demand Tariffs to Block Chinese Dumping appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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