Canada’s steel and aluminum industries are sounding the alarm over what they describe as an “existential threat” while urging the federal government to align with the United States and Mexico in imposing tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum to prevent market dumping. This plea comes amid growing concerns that Canada could become a conduit for Chinese products circumventing American and Mexican tariffs.
Why Canada’s Steel and Aluminum Industries Raise The Alarm
Canada currently produces primary aluminum—rather than recycled aluminum—at eight smelters located in Quebec and one in Kitimat, British Columbia. These facilities are owned by three major companies: Alcoa, Aluminerie Alouette, and Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto also operates an alumina refinery in Vaudreuil, Quebec.
The Canadian aluminum industry produces a wide range of products, including doors, windows, house siding, beverage cans, foil products, cooking utensils, and electrical wiring.
As of 2022, Canada ranked as the world’s 4th-largest producer of primary aluminum, following China, India, and Russia. The North American country produced about 3.0 million tonnes of primary aluminum in 2022, which accounts for about 4.4 percent of global production. In contrast, China alone produces more than half of the world’s aluminum.
A notable advantage of Canada’s aluminum industry is its lower carbon footprint compared to other major producers, thanks to its reliance on renewable energy sources, particularly hydroelectric power.
In 2023, Canada’s smelter production of aluminum was estimated at around 3 million metric tons as seen below. Throughout the observed period, Canada’s aluminum production volume remained relatively stable. The country’s peak production occurred in both 2016 and 2017, when it reached 3.2 million metric tons.

How Significant Is Canada’s Aluminum Production and Export Market?
Canada is the world’s second-largest exporter of aluminum, with aluminum product exports totaling $18.2 billion in 2022. The United States is the primary market for these Canadian exports, making it a crucial partner in the aluminum trade. This close trade relationship underscores the importance of maintaining strong economic ties and competitive advantages in the aluminum industry.
However, the recent actions of the U.S. government of imposing tariffs on China imports spurred the industry’s interest to do the same.
Catherine Cobden, President and CEO of the Canadian Steel Producers Association (CSPA), emphasized the urgency of the issue during a press conference in Ottawa. She stressed the need for Canada to act in concert with its North American trade partners under the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).
“We can’t be the only CUSMA country that is not taking this serious action,” Cobden stated, highlighting the critical nature of the moment for Canada’s steel industry.
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The CSPA represents 13 steel companies, including major players like Stelco, Algoma Steel Inc., and Rio Tinto.
The Canadian industry leaders’ call to action follows the U.S. government’s May announcement of a 25% tariff increase on Chinese steel and aluminum. Additionally, the U.S. has imposed higher tariffs on other Chinese products, including electric vehicles (EVs), semiconductors, critical minerals, and batteries.
In response, Mexico, in July, introduced a 10% tariff on aluminum and a 25% tariff on steel not produced within Mexico, in collaboration with the U.S. These measures aim to prevent Chinese producers from bypassing tariffs through Mexican trade routes.
The Implications of Urging Tariffs on Chinese Imports
The CSPA and the Aluminium Association of Canada are advocating for a 25% tariff on all Chinese steel products and most aluminum products entering Canada. This would mirror the recent U.S. decision to impose tariffs on 289 different Chinese steel and aluminum imports. Cobden stressed the urgency of the situation, warning that failure to act could result in job losses and hinder economic growth and investment in Canada’s steel and aluminum industries.
The concern now is that Canada could become a “back door” for Chinese steel and aluminum entering North America, undermining the protective measures taken by the U.S. and Mexico. This potential loophole has prompted Canadian industry leaders to push for similar tariffs to safeguard domestic jobs and industries.
What more Jean Simard, President and CEO of the Aluminium Association of Canada noted that:
”China’s metal is seven times more carbon-intensive than Canada’s.”
Thus, Simard said that allowing Chinese steel and aluminum into Canada would increase the country’s carbon footprint and undermine efforts to promote sustainable industrial practices. He called on the government to act swiftly to protect Canadian jobs, technology investments, and the environment.
What Are The Consequences of No Action?
The potential consequences of failing to impose tariffs are stark. Over 760,000 tonnes of Chinese steel entered the American market in 2023, with similar amounts the previous year. These volumes are 20% higher than the current amount of Chinese steel entering Canada annually. Industry leaders fear that any Chinese steel diverted from the U.S. market due to tariffs could flood the Canadian market, further eroding the domestic steel and aluminum industries.
The CSPA and Aluminium Association of Canada are urging the federal government to act quickly and decisively. They warn that any delay could lead to a further decline in the Canadian steel and aluminum industries, with long-term consequences for employment, economic growth, and Canada’s position in the global market.
As the government considers its next steps, industry leaders are making it clear that urgent action is needed to protect Canada’s steel and aluminum sectors from the growing threat of Chinese overcapacity.
The post Canada’s Steel and Aluminum Industries Demand Tariffs to Block Chinese Dumping appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Carbon credit providers vs marketplaces: who does what
Carbon credit providers vs marketplaces is the first comparison many buyers try to make. In this comparison, a carbon credit provider is the project developer: the company that originates credits from its own projects and sells them directly. A carbon credit marketplace is a platform that lists credits from many projects at published prices.
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Carbon Footprint
Democrats who call climate change an emergency should not defend a permitting system too slow to build the clean energy that would address it.”
Democrats, Take The Deal. New York Times editorial, Nov. 12.
Carbon Footprint
Designing an Insetting Program: A Step-by-Step Playbook for Procurement
Insetting program design starts with your supplier map. The carbon claim comes much later.
Consider a coffee procurement team that funds a farm intervention before checking its sourcing data. The supplier aggregates coffee lots from several regions. The buyer lacks farm-level traceability. Another purchaser expects to report the same outcome. A more attractive project brochure solves none of these problems.
If the distinction between a value-chain intervention and a purchased credit is still open, read CCC’s Insetting vs Offsetting guide before you set the brief.
Insetting program design begins with the purchasing relationship and works outward. You need to decide 1) where an intervention belongs, 2) what business problem it addresses, 3) who pays for it, 4) how results will be measured, and 5) what the evidence will let you say about them. This five-step playbook turns that sequence into a procurement plan.
Step 1: Insetting program design starts with supplier mapping
Start with the commodities that matter most to your Scope 3 inventory and sourcing continuity. Ask finance for spend by supplier, sustainability for the emissions baseline, and category managers for origin and volume records. Then identify which suppliers can trace material to a jurisdiction, sourcing region, producer group, or individual land-management unit.
The level of traceability affects what you can account for. Under the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, the spatial boundary for purchased land-based products depends on the traceability associated with each volume. Farm-specific factors or removals require physical traceability through an acceptable chain-of-custody model. A contract with a tier-one trader, by itself, does not establish a link to the farms behind its deliveries.[1]
Build a first-pass table with five columns: commodity and annual volume; supplier and origin; current traceability level; land-use and production risks; and the business owner who can change the purchasing terms. Mark missing data plainly. A blank cell is cheaper to fix before a program starts than after a claim is drafted.
If your company sets an SBTi Forest, Land and Agriculture target (FLAG), keep its land-related target boundary separate from energy and industry emissions. The current FLAG guidance also requires relevant companies to assess primary deforestation-linked commodities in their value chains.[2]
Step 2: Choose a commodity and jurisdiction for a pilot
Select one supply corridor where the sourcing connection can be established and procurement has a reason to stay. A useful pilot has repeat purchases, suppliers willing to share records, an intervention matched to a diagnosed problem, and a defined plan to measure the result. Carbon potential alone is a poor selection rule if the supplier cannot deliver the crop your business needs.
Compare candidate regions on land-use risk, supplier concentration, local rights and tenure, the availability of baseline data, and exposure to drought, erosion, or forest conversion. Check the relevant legal requirements separately. A nature project does not satisfy a due-diligence obligation merely because it has a carbon method attached.
Consider a coffee buyer sourcing from two districts. In the first, producer-group records identify the farms, while recent dry seasons have increased rejected green coffee lots. In the second, deliveries pass through several intermediaries and farm origins are unknown. Pilot shade management in the first district, with local agronomic advice and quality checks built into the plan. The buyer can trace purchases there and test the intervention against a defined sourcing problem.
Use a short decision memo to record why the selected corridor beats the alternatives, what remains uncertain, and what would stop the pilot. That memo is the first control against a project drifting toward whatever happens to photograph well.
Step 3: Design the supplier engagement and commercial model
The intervention needs an owner on each side of the contract. Decide who supplies planting material or training, who maintains the practice, who bears the cost if a harvest disappoints, and how long the buyer expects to purchase from participating suppliers. Where smallholders participate, budget cash flow and technical support for practices that offer a later return.
Put these terms in a supplier agreement or pilot addendum. It should cover eligible farms and volumes, consent to data collection, access for monitoring, any land or carbon rights that matter, benefit sharing, and what happens if the purchasing relationship ends. Ask local counsel and producer representatives to review the arrangement. The Accountability Framework is a useful reference for supply-chain work involving forests, ecosystems, and human rights.[3]
Avoid assigning an automatic carbon benefit to the buyer. The contract should say which party has the right to report each outcome, how overlapping claims will be checked, and how any issued credits will be handled. A reduction reported in a buyer’s inventory cannot simply be sold for someone else’s offset claim without an accounting review. SBTi FLAG guidance excludes purchased credits used as offsets from near-term FLAG target achievement.[2]
Set commercial measures beside environmental ones: delivered volume, rejection rate, supplier retention, and procurement cost. They tell you whether the program works as a supply-chain investment, even if carbon accounting takes longer to resolve.
Step 4: Build monitoring, reporting, and verification before rollout
Agree on the baseline and data flow before paying for a full rollout. Identify the land units or sourcing regions in scope, the practices that change, the records suppliers already keep, and the additional measurements the program requires. Decide which data can come from field visits, transaction records, or remote sensing, and who checks each source.
For carbon, separate three questions. Did the practice happen? Did emissions or removals change under an applicable method? Can the buyer attribute a defensible share to its purchased goods without double counting? The GHG Protocol’s 2026 guidance includes dedicated chapters on spatial boundaries, data and methods, evaluating actions, credited outcomes, and assurance.[1] These are distinct jobs. A photograph of a planted tree answers only part of the first.
CCC’s MRV and Additionality article explains the separate evidence questions a project reviewer will ask.
Create an evidence file for every reporting period: dated supplier and farm records, purchase volumes, methods and emission factors, uncertainty, quality checks, and changes from the baseline. Specify who can challenge the data and how corrections are recorded. If a project also seeks credit certification, keep project accounting and corporate inventory accounting separate. The GHG Protocol says its land standard focuses on entity-level inventories and does not set the rules for credit certification.[4]
Start with the minimum viable measurement design that can survive review. Add complexity when the pilot tells you which data actually changes a decision.
Step 5: Decide what can be reported and claimed
Insetting program design needs reporting rules before the marketing copy. Procurement, sustainability, finance, and legal should agree on four distinct outputs: operational performance; observed land or nature outcomes; inventory effects, if the accounting criteria are met; and any separately issued credits. One dashboard can display them, but they should not share a single unqualified headline.
SBTi FLAG guidance allows certain land-based removals within a company’s operations or supply chain to contribute to FLAG pathways, subject to criteria including permanence, traceability, data quality, and allocation. It does not allow purchased offsets to meet near-term FLAG targets.[2] Eligibility therefore depends on evidence and the applicable target rules, not on calling an activity “insetting.”
Draft a claims register. For each proposed sentence, record the period, boundary, data owner, calculation method, reviewer, and whether the result is measured, estimated, or still a goal. If the evidence supports only “we funded a pilot with 200 farms,” say that. Do not turn a funding fact into a verified emissions reduction.
What good looks like by year three
Treat year three as a review point, not a promised payback date. A mature pilot should have mapped participating supply volumes, a stable supplier agreement, a repeatable data collection process, and a comparison of commercial and environmental results against the baseline. It should also have a documented answer for outcomes that cannot be included in the buyer’s inventory.
Scale only where the pilot improves a sourcing decision and the evidence can follow the product. If neither condition holds, redesign the intervention or change the corridor. A disciplined program can conclude that a site is unsuitable. That is useful procurement intelligence.
Discuss your insetting program with CCC
Carbon Credit Capital designs nature-based supply chain investments around sourcing needs and measurable sustainability outcomes. Schedule a consultation with our carbon and sustainability experts to map your tier-one supplier network, FLAG exposure, and first pilot decision.
Sources
[1] GHG Protocol, Land Sector and Removals Standard, version 1.1, and companion Guidance, June 2026: https://ghgprotocol.org/land-sector-and-removals-standard ; https://ghgprotocol.org/land-sector-and-removals-guidance
[2] Science Based Targets initiative, Forest, Land and Agriculture Science-Based Target-Setting Guidance, version 1.2, March 2026, especially pp. 16–17, 37, and 41: https://sciencebasedtargets.org/resources/files/SBTiFLAGGuidance.pdf
[3] Accountability Framework initiative, Accountability Framework and guidance for companies: https://accountability-framework.org/
[4] GHG Protocol, Frequently Asked Questions: Land Sector and Removals Standard, questions 10 and 18: https://ghgprotocol.org/blog/frequently-asked-questions-land-sector-and-removals-lsr-standard
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