China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions were unchanged from a year earlier in the third quarter of 2025, extending a flat or falling trend that started in March 2024.
The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) saw CO2 emissions from transport fuel drop by 5% year-on-year, while there were also declines from cement and steel production.
The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that while emissions from the power sector were flat year-on-year, a big rise in the chemical industry’s CO2 output offset reductions elsewhere.
Other key findings include:
- Power-sector CO2 emissions were flat in the third quarter, even as electricity demand growth accelerated to 6.1%, from 3.7% in the first half of the year.
- This was achieved thanks to electricity generation from solar growing by 46% and wind by 11% year-on-year in the third quarter of 2025.
- In the first nine months of the year, China completed 240 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 61GW of wind capacity, putting it on track for a new renewable record in 2025.
- Oil demand and emissions in the transport sector fell by 5% in the third quarter, but grew elsewhere by 10%, as the production of plastics and other chemicals surged.
After the first three quarters of the year, China’s CO2 emissions in 2025 are now finely balanced between a small fall or rise, depending on what happens in the last quarter.
A drop in the full-year total became much more likely after September, which recorded an approximately 3% drop in emissions year-on-year.
Electricity demand – and associated emissions – have tended to grow fastest during the summer months, due to rapidly rising demand for air conditioning amid hotter summers.
If this pattern repeats, then China’s CO2 emissions will record a fall for the full year of 2025.
While an emission increase or decrease of 1% or less might not make a huge difference in an objective sense, it has heightened symbolic meaning, as China’s policymakers have left room for emissions to increase for several more years, leaving the timing of the peak open.
Either way, China is set to miss its target to cut carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – from 2020 to 2025, meaning steeper reductions are needed to hit the county’s 2030 goal.
Finely balanced emissions
China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 18 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the third quarter of 2025, when emissions were unchanged year-on-year.
This picture is finely balanced, however, with contrasting trends in different sectors of the economy underlying the ongoing plateau in CO2 emissions, shown in the figure below.
Emissions from the production of cement and other building materials fell by 7% in the third quarter of 2025, while emissions from the metals industry fell 1%. This is due to the ongoing real-estate contraction, as the construction sector uses most of the country’s steel and cement output.
Emission reductions from steel production continued to lag the reductions in output, which fell 3%. This is because the fall in demand was absorbed by the lower-carbon electric-arc steelmakers, whereas carbon-intensive coal-based steel production was less affected.
China has struggled to increase the share of electric-arc steelmaking despite targets, due to the large capacity base and entrenched position of coal-based steelmaking crowding out the lower-emission producers.
Power-sector emissions were unchanged year-on-year in the third quarter, as strong growth from solar and wind generation, along with small increases from nuclear and hydro, nearly matched a rapid rise in demand.
Emissions from transport fell by 5% over the period, but oil consumption in other sectors grew by 10%, driven by chemical industry expansion. This resulted in a 2% rise in oil consumption overall.
Gas demand and emissions grew by 3% overall in the three-month period, with consumption in the power sector up by 9% and by 2% in other sectors.
The figure below shows how emissions in each of these sectors has changed in the first nine months of 2025, for example, power-sector CO2 output is down 2% in the year so far.
The rapid recent growth of CO2 emissions in the chemical industry is a continuation of recent trends and, as such, the sector’s coal and oil use have both surged in 2025 to date.
The outlook for emissions in the final quarter of 2025 – and the year as a whole – depends on whether further declines in cement, transport and power are enough to offset increases elsewhere.
Solar and wind growth keep power sector emissions flat
In the power sector, China’s dominant source of CO2, emissions remained flat in the third quarter even as electricity demand grew strongly.
Electricity generation from solar and wind grew by 30%, with solar up 46% and wind power generation increasing 11%. With small increases from nuclear and hydropower, non-fossil power sources covered almost 90% of the increase in demand, even as demand growth accelerated to 6.1% in the third quarter, up from 3.7% in the first half of the year.
This is illustrated in the figure below, where the columns show the change in generation by each source of non-fossil power every quarter and the line shows the increase in electricity demand.
Despite a small increase in electricity generation from fossil fuels to cover the remaining 10% of demand growth, power sector emissions stayed unchanged in the third quarter of 2025.
This is because the average thermal efficiency of coal power – the amount of fuel per unit of output – improved slightly, while the share of gas-fired generation increased at the expense of coal.
The figure above shows that the growth in clean-power sources has been covering all or nearly all of the rise in electricity demand in recent quarters, but once again there is a fine balance.
As such, the outlook for the final quarter of 2025 and for power-sector emissions over the years ahead depends on the relative strength of rising demand and clean-power output.
From 2021 to 2025, there has been a marked seasonal pattern in electricity demand growth, with more rapid rises in the summer peak “cooling season”, from June to August.
In these months, residential electricity consumption grew by a striking 13% per year, compared with just 6% during other parts of the year. Industry and service-sector consumption also grew faster in the summer months.
As a result, growth in total power demand has been significantly faster, at 6.8% during the summer months, compared with 4.6% in the rest of the year.
This is due to both increased prevalence of air conditioning and to hotter summers, with the average number of “cooling-degree days” increasing by one third from 2015–16 to 2024–25, as shown in the figure below.
This seasonal pattern implies that electricity consumption might ease off in the final quarter of 2025, which would set a lower bar for clean-power growth to meet or exceed rising demand.
On the generation side, the first nine months of 2025 has seen China adding 240GW of solar and 61GW of wind power capacity. While the rate of new installations has slowed down sharply since May, China is still on track for a new record for the whole year as developers rush to complete projects included in the 14th five-year plan, which finishes at the end of 2025.
China had 181GW of wind and 234GW of utility-scale solar under construction in early 2025, according to the Global Energy Monitor. After the capacity additions in the first nine months of 2025, this leaves 120GW of wind and 123GW of utility-scale solar under construction, much of which is likely to be commissioned this year.
The rate of new wind and solar additions in 2025 to date is shown in the figure below, alongside comparable figures for each year since 2020.
The slowdown in installations in recent months is due to a new pricing system that requires developers of new solar and wind-power plants to secure contracts directly with buyers, instead of being guaranteed the benchmark price for coal power, which was the case until May.
The change in pricing led to a major rush to complete projects faster than originally scheduled, seen in the May 2025 bump in the figure above.
This left few projects to complete in the third quarter, meaning that the current slow pace in installations does not yet reflect the capacity growth that can be expected under the new system.
China’s power-sector emissions have been falling slowly since early 2024, due to the rapid growth of solar and wind power generation. The unprecedentedly large capacity additions have enabled non-fossil power generation to cover electricity demand growth, but only barely.
Any sustained slowdown in solar and wind deployment would mean that power-sector emissions would begin to creep up again, unless electricity demand slows sharply. This is not expected – the State Grid has forecast 5.6% annual demand growth until 2030, compared with 6.1% from 2019 to 2025.
One indicator pointing towards robust ongoing solar capacity growth is that the production of solar cells has continued at or above 2024 levels – even after the slowdown in installations in recent months – growing 8% year-on-year in the third quarter.
The amount of new solar-cell capacity produced in Chinese factories each month, minus exports, has tended to predict new domestic solar installations, with a lag.
However, the outlook for wind and solar growth in China is clouded by a large gap between industry and government expectations for the sector.
The China Wind Energy Association is targeting at least 120GW of wind-power capacity added per year in the next five years, while the China Photovoltaic Industry Association projects 235-270GW of solar added in 2026, rising to 280-340GW in 2030.
In contrast, president Xi Jinping recently announced that China would “strive to” bring the county’s installed solar and wind capacity to 3,600GW by 2035. This implies just 200GW of capacity added per year over the next decade, extending a target set earlier for 2025-27.
The pace of solar and wind deployment under the new pricing system depends heavily on the implementation of the national-level rules at the provincial level, particularly the choice of minimum pricing. Most provinces are yet to finalise their rules and only six provinces have published results from auctions for “contracts for difference” – the key policy instrument under the new rules – so far, with nine more auctions underway.
Meanwhile, the additions of new coal and gas-fired power capacity have accelerated, as the projects started after the government loosened permitting and started to promote coal-fired power projects in 2020 are starting to complete.
The result has been that the utilisation of coal-fired power capacity – the share of hours during which each unit is in operation – has begun to fall significantly, as power generation from coal has declined since April 2024. Utilisation peaked at 54% in the 12 months to February 2024 and fell to 51% in the 12 months to September 2025.
Another 230GW of coal-fired power capacity is under construction. If power generation from coal continues to stay stagnant and if all of this new capacity is added to the system, then utilisation would fall to 43%. This could prompt a rethink of the government’s promotion of coal-fired power projects.
Chemical industry’s runaway growth pushes up oil demand
In the oil sector, there are once again competing factors at work. China’s transport oil consumption has been falling since April 2024, driven in large part by the rapid adoption of EVs.
However, total oil consumption still increased 2% in the year to September, as a 4% fall in transport fuel use was more than offset by an 8% rise elsewhere, dominated by industrial demand.
Consumption fell by 4-5% across each of the three main transport fuels: diesel, used in trucks and other heavy vehicles; petrol, mainly used in cars; and jet fuel.
The reduction in petrol consumption accelerated in October, falling 8% year-on-year, erasing the usual spike seen at this time of year related to the week-long national holiday.
Within industry, the production of primary plastics grew 12% year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2025, while the production of chemical fibres grew by 11% and the production of ethylene by 7%. The increase in the output of these products accounts for the entire increase in oil use outside the transportation sector.
These sharp increases in chemical production are shown in the figure below.
One clear driver of the growth in plastics production is import substitution – replacing equivalent products imported from overseas – as well as growing exports.
China is still a net importer of primary plastics by value in 2025 so far, but only just. The value of imports fell by 8% while the value of exports increased by 8% in the first nine months of the year.
The five-year plan for 2021-25 targeted an increase in chemicals production to reduce the imports of key raw materials to less than 40% of demand, with projects launched to meet this target coming online this year.
More recently, the government has encouraged oil refineries to shift from the production of transport fuels to chemicals, in order to adapt to falling demand for oil in transportation. It set a target for the petrochemical and chemical sector’s economic output to grow by more than 5% per year in 2025-26.
The US-China tariff tit-for-tat has added further momentum to import substitution. The US has been China’s largest source of imports of polyethylene – the most widely used plastic in the world – since 2023, but China has expanded its domestic production in response to the trade spat.
Still, the change in China’s net exports of plastics cannot account for more than a fraction of the increase in output volume, however, as estimated based on reported polymer prices. This indicates that growing domestic demand is a major driver of the rapid growth in plastics production.
Packaging is the largest use of plastics in China, with the booming online retail and food delivery industry driving rapid growth.
Express parcel volumes grew 21% in 2024 and 17% through September 2025. The value of the single-use plastic tableware market averaged 21% annual growth from 2017 to 2022 and the revenue of the online food delivery industry is projected to grow 11% in 2025.
The government is taking measures to curb single-use plastics, but these would need to be intensified to fully counteract the growth rates seen in food deliveries and other drivers. The demand for high-performance materials in new manufacturing industries is also a significant driver.
Will China’s emissions peak early or rebound?
After the third quarter of 2025, it is clear that the plateau or slow decline of China’s CO2 emissions that started in early 2024 continues.
Whether emissions increased or decreased marginally in the first three quarters of the year is too close to call, given the uncertainties involved, but a drop in full-year emissions became much more likely after September, which recorded an approximately 3% drop in emissions year-on-year.
Still, either a small increase or decrease in the calendar year of 2025 remains possible and will be ultimately be decided by developments in the fourth quarter.
China’s emissions from fossil-fuel use are highly likely to increase this year, with the increase of coal and oil use in the chemical industry outweighing the reductions in emissions from the power, metals, building materials and transportation sectors. This will be balanced out by a fall in cement process emissions.
What is already clear is that the 2025 carbon-intensity target will be missed, as it would have required absolute emission reductions of 4% or more this year, after slow progress during the earlier years of the five-year period.
This also means that the carbon-intensity target in the next 15th five-year plan for 2026-2030 would need to be more ambitious than the one that China missed during the current period, to close the shortfall to the country’s 2030 intensity target.
China targeted an 18% reduction in 2021-25, but will only have achieved around 12% by the end of this year. It would then need a reduction of around 22-24% in the next five years to achieve its headline climate commitment for 2030, a 65% carbon-intensity reduction on 2005 levels.
Whether emissions fall this year – or not – has high symbolic significance. Having committed to peaking emissions “before 2030”, China’s policymakers have left their specific peaking year open.
China’s new greenhouse gas emission target for 2035, announced by Xi in September, was set as a reduction of 7-10% below an undefined “peak level”, making it clear that policymakers are still planning for – or at least leaving the door open to – a late peak, only just before 2030.
Setting this target from “peak levels” means that the timing and level of China’s emissions peak affects not only the path of its CO2 output in the next few years, but also the size of cuts needed to meet the 2035 goal – and presumably also subsequent targets thereafter.
The target of reducing emissions from “peak levels” could also create an incentive for provinces to increase emissions before the expected peak year, known as “storming the peak” in Chinese.
This incentive could be curbed by the creation of the “dual control” system for carbon intensity and total carbon emissions. The Central Committee of the Communist Party recently reiterated that this should happen during the next five-year period, but the specific timeline is an open question.
If the system is not operational from 2026, with annual carbon intensity and possibly absolute carbon emission targets allocated to provinces, then that could further allow for and incentivise emissions increases in the short term.
At the same time, China has made commitments to peak emissions before 2030, reduce coal consumption gradually during the 2026-30 period and to reduce carbon emissions per unit of GDP by more than 65% by 2030, from 2005 levels.
Meeting the last target – which China has made internationally as part of its 2030 Paris pledge – would require, in practice, that emissions in 2030 are limited at or below their 2024 level, given progress to date and expected GDP growth rates.
Realising these targets, in turn, would require clean-energy growth rates well above the minimum of 200GW of new wind and solar capacity per year, set by China’s 2035 pledge – unless the rate of energy-demand growth sees a sharp and unexpected slowdown.
Beating these minimum clean-energy growth rates would also be necessary if policymakers want to maintain the tailwind that these sectors have provided to China’s economy in recent years.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, from WIND Information, an industry data provider, and Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.
Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil consumption, apparent consumption of transport fuels (diesel, petrol and jet fuel) is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.
Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.
The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 18 months appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 18 months
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Scientists have long known that fires release substantial amounts of greenhouse gases and pollutants into the atmosphere.
However, estimating the total climate impact of fires is challenging.
Now, new satellite data has shed fresh light on the complex interplay between the climate and fires in different landscapes around the world.
It suggests that global emissions from fires are much higher than previously assumed.
In this article, we unpack the latest update to the Global Fire Emissions Database (GFED) – a resource that combines satellite information on fire activity and vegetation to estimate how fires impact the land and atmosphere.
The latest update to the database – explored in new research published in journal Scientific Data – includes data up to and including the year 2024.
It reveals that, once the data from smaller fires is included, fire emissions sit at roughly 3.4bn tonnes of carbon (GtC) annually – significantly higher than previous estimates.
It also shows that carbon emissions from fires have remained stable over the past two to three decades, as rising emissions from forest fires have been offset by a decline in grassland fire emissions.
The database update also illustrates how the amount of area burned around the world each year is falling as expanding agriculture has created a fragmented landscape and new restrictions on crop residue burning have come into force.
Landscape fires
Fire events vary widely in cause, size and intensity. They take place across the globe in many types of landscapes – deserts and ice sheets are the only biomes that are immune to fire.
When vegetation burns, it releases greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming. It also releases pollutants that cause local air pollution and, on a global scale, have a cooling effect on the climate.
Forest fires often generate considerable media attention, especially when they threaten places where people live.
However, the forest fires that make the news represent just a small fraction of all fires globally.
More than 95% of the world’s burned area occurs in landscapes with few trees, such as savannahs and grasslands.
Fires have helped maintain tropical savannah ecosystems for millions of years. Savannahs have the perfect conditions for fire: a wet season which allows grasses and other “fuels” to grow, followed by an extended dry season where these fuels become flammable.
Historically, these fires were ignited by lightning. Today, they are mostly caused – intentionally or accidentally – by humans.
And yet, despite their prevalence, these fires receive relatively little media attention. This is not surprising, as they have been part of the landscape for so long and rarely threaten humans, except for their impact on air quality.
Fires also occur in croplands. For example, farmers may use fire to clear agricultural residues after harvest, or during deforestation to clear land for cultivation.
The term “landscape fires” is increasingly used to describe all fires that burn on land – both planned and unplanned.
(The term “wildfire”, on the other hand, covers a subset of landscape fires which are unplanned and typically burn in underdeveloped and underinhabited land.)
Calculating the carbon emissions of landscape fires is important to better understand their impact on local air quality and the global climate.
New data
In principle, calculating carbon emissions from fires is straightforward. The amount of vegetation consumed by fire – or “fuel consumption” – in one representative “unit” of burned area has to be multiplied by the total area burned.
Fuel consumption can be determined through field measurements and satellite analysis.
For example, the burned area of a relatively small fire can be measured by walking around the perimeter with a GPS device. Fuel consumption, meanwhile, can be derived by measuring the difference in amount of vegetation before and after a fire, something that is usually only feasible with planned fires.
In practice, however, fires are unpredictable and highly variable, making accurate measurement difficult.
To track where and when fires occur, researchers rely on satellite observations.
For two decades, NASA’s MODIS satellite sensors have provided a continuous, global record of fire activity. To avoid too many false alarms, the algorithms these satellites use are built in a way so fires are flagged only when they burn an entire 500-metre grid cell.
However, this approach misses many smaller fires – resulting in conservative estimates of total burned area.
The latest update to the GFED includes, for the first time, finer-resolution satellite data, including from the European Space Agency’s “sentinel missions”.
This data shows that fires too small to be picked up by a satellite with a 500-metre spatial resolution are extremely common. So common, in fact, that they nearly double previous estimates of global burned area.
The data shows that, on average, 800 hectares of land – an area roughly the size of Australia – has burned annually over the past two decades.
The map below shows the frequency of fires around the world. Regions shaded in dark red burn, on average, 50-100% each year. In other words, fires occur annually or biannually. Regions in dark blue, on the other hand, are those where fires occur, but are very infrequent. Most regions fall in between these extremes.
The map shows that the areas most prone to fire are largely found in the world’s savannah and agricultural regions.
Falling burned area
Over recent decades, the total burned area globally each year has been declining.
This is largely due to land-use change in regions which used to have frequent fires.
For example, savannah is being converted to croplands in Africa. This transforms a frequently burning land-use type to one that does not burn – and creates a more fragmented landscape with new firebreaks which limit the spread of fire.
The decline in burned area is also due to the introduction of more stringent air quality regulations limiting crop residue burning in much of the world, including the European Union.
The amount of “fuel” – or biomass – in a unit area of land varies greatly. Arid grasslands are biomass-poor and, therefore, produce less carbon emissions when burned, whereas fuel consumption in tropical forests with peat soils is extremely high.
Maps of carbon emissions from fires closely resemble maps of burned area. However, they typically highlight biomass-rich areas, such as dense forests.
This is illustrated in the map below, which shows how fires in regions coloured dark red on the map produce, on average, 1,000-5,000 grams of carbon per square metre. In these places, much more carbon is lost during fires than gained through photosynthesis.
Meanwhile, much of the world’s savannah regions are coloured in yellow and orange on the map, indicating that fires here produce between 100-500 grams of carbon per square metre.
Rising forest fire carbon emissions
The boost in fire emissions captured by the latest version of the GFED is most pronounced in open landscapes, including savannahs, grasslands and shrublands.
Forest fire emissions, on the other hand, have barely changed in the updated version of the database. This is because most forest fires are relatively large and were already well captured by the coarse resolution satellite data used previously.
However, the trend in forest fire emissions is sloping upwards over the study period.
Overall, current estimates – which take into account the new data from smaller fires – suggest that, over 2002-22, global fire emissions averaged 3.4GtC per year.
This is roughly 65% higher than estimates set out in the previous update to the GFED, which was published in 2017.
For comparison, today’s fossil fuel emissions are around 10GtC per year.
Comparisons between fire and fossil fuel carbon emissions are somewhat flawed, as much of the carbon released by fires is eventually reabsorbed when vegetation regrows.
However, this is not the case for fires linked to deforestation or the burning of tropical peatlands, where regrowth is either much slower – or non-existent, if forests are converted to agriculture. These fires account for roughly 0.4GtC each year – just less than 12% of total fire emissions – and contribute directly to the long-term rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2).
The traditional view of forest fires as “carbon-neutral” is increasingly uncertain as the climate changes due to human activity. Longer fire seasons, drier vegetation and more lightning-induced ignitions are increasing fire frequency in many forested regions.
This is most apparent in the rapidly-warming boreal forests of the far-northern latitudes. The year 2023 saw the highest emissions ever recorded by satellites in boreal forests, breaking a record set just two years before.
Moreover, the fires in boreal forests are becoming more intense – meaning they burn hotter and consume a larger fraction of vegetation. This, in turn, jeopardises the recovery of forests.
In cold areas, fires also cause permafrost to break down faster. This happens because fires remove an organic soil layer that has an insulating effect which prevents permafrost thaw.
The map below shows the dominant fire type in different regions of the world, including boreal forest fires (dark green), cropland fires (red), open savannah (darker yellow) and woody savannah (brown).
Changing ‘pyrogeography’
Thanks to more precise satellite data we now know that fire emissions are higher than we thought previously, with the new version of GFED having 65% higher overall fire emissions than its predecessor.
However, all evidence suggests that emissions from fires have been stable over the past two to three decades. This is because an increase in forest fire emissions is being offset by a decline in grassland fire emissions.
The world’s changing “pyrogeography” is illustrated in the bar chart below, which breaks down annual fire emissions across different types of biome.
It shows how low-intensity grassland fires with modest fuel consumption – represented in yellow and brown – have declined over time, while high-intensity forest fires – illustrated in green colours – are becoming more prominent, albeit with substantial variability in emissions year-on-year.
The post Guest post: Why carbon emissions from fires are significantly higher than thought appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: Why carbon emissions from fires are significantly higher than thought
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