China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.

The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.

This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.

Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.

However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.

It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.

But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.

Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.

Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.

Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.

What does the plan say about peaking coal?

Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.

The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.

Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.

The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:

“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”

However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.

The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.

Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.

Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.

But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.

The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.

In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.

It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.

The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.

The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.

The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:

• Peaking coal consumption;
• “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
• Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
• Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
• “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
• Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
• Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
• Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.

The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.

“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.

A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.

This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”

However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.

State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.

“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.

While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.

Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.

“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.

What does the plan say about China’s coal production?

The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.

The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.

The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.

Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.

Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.

“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.

Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.

It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.

This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.

New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.

This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.

The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.

Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.

What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?

The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.

The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.

Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.

In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.

It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.

This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.

Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.

Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.

China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.

Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.

It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]

The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.

At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.

In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.

Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.

In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.

However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.

She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.

How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?

Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.

As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.

Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.

A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.

But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.

China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.

The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”

The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.

Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.

As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.

Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:

“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”

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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?

The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.

A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.

The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.

In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.

This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.

This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future

Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.

Openings down, pipeline up

But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.

“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.

The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.

Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.

Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.

Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.

The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.

New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus

An unprecedented territory grab for extraction

Deep sea mining is a speculative industry. Everywhere it has tried to launch, it has failed. From Norway to New Zealand, efforts to exploit the seabed have crashed into a wall of opposition: legal challenges, parliamentary blocks, and fierce resistance from local communities, scientists, the fishing industry, and environmental groups. The world is not waiting for deep sea mining; it is actively mobilising against it.

As scientists increasingly warn of potentially irreversible ecological destruction to the planet’s last pristine wilderness, independent financial audits have exposed the industry’s underlying economic model as it underestimates its own financial and legal risks. A powerful coalition of over 43 governments, Indigenous activists, hundreds of scientists, and corporate giants, from the fishing industry to major automakers, has formed a global line of defence to keep the deep ocean off-limits to mining.

Major global banks such as BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank and the Asian Development Bank have refused to finance these projects. Faced with international deadlock and financial stress, key players in an increasingly desperate industry have abandoned multilateral diplomacy. Instead, they have pivoted to a dangerous geopolitical gamble: teaming up with the Trump administration to unilaterally claim the global commons in blatant defiance of international law.

A unilateral power grab

Deep sea mining isn’t just an environmental disaster, it is a unilateral power grab disguised as a resource war, and a modern iteration of colonial history in the Pacific. For centuries, Western empires exploited Pacific nations; today, Global North corporations are attempting a new wave of “blue colonisation.” By treating the Pacific Ocean as an empty warehouse of commodities, tech ventures are undermining the sovereign rights, cultural heritage, and birthright guardianship of Indigenous Pacific peoples who have protected and been sustained by these waters for generations.

But the rush by global superpowers and corporations to seize deep sea minerals has become a critical catalyst for unity across the Pacific. While a few states (such as Nauru, Cook Islands, and Tonga) sponsor exploration contracts, a powerful regional front is forming to resist what local leaders and Indigenous advocates describe as a new wave of resource exploitation.

Key Priorities for the July 2026 ISA Session

The July International Seabed Authority (ISA) Council session represented a critical crossroads for the protection of our global commons. This gathering offered a pivotal opportunity for responsible governments to wrestle control of the timeline away from commercial actors, reject corporate bullying, and prioritise precaution for the common good. Fast- tracking the Mining Code is not a neutral administrative step; it is a monumental, irreversible trigger that opens the floodgates to commercial exploitation. The only way to finalise these regulations this year would be for governments to abandon their legal obligations to protect the marine environment and deny safeguarding global equity. Rushing this process would permanently erode multilateral norms and inadvertently validate lax, unilateral mining pathways.

Governments have the opportunity and tools to diffuse this threat and demonstrate global cooperation for the common good at the International Seabed Authority.

• Governments have the tools to create major barriers to unlawful mining efforts and defend this global commons. The legal obligations of 170+ governments to constrain any companies or nationals from participating in unlawful deep sea mining are clear. This provides the opportunity to shut off access to personnel, offshore engineering, ports, financing, processing, refining, and markets for unlawful mining. A recent legal opinion concludes that Allseas’ May 2026 contract to operate deep sea mining machinery for The Metals Company under unilateral U.S. authorisation triggered the obligation under international and Dutch law for the Dutch government to intervene against this corporate violation.123 Failing to do so would constitute a breach of its binding obligations under UNCLOS.
• Unless the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber decides to order a suspension of the ISA’s inquiry into any contractors involved in unilateral mining, the ISA’s advisory commission and governments should conclude the ISA inquiry into whether any contractors are supporting unilateral efforts, and support punitive consequences for any companies breaching their obligations. It would be untenable for contractors to retain internationally legitimate rights to exploration while simultaneously participating in a violation of international law.
• This common ground across delegations is that the international community does not want mining to start right now, and is not ready to adopt a Mining Code that would open the gates to exploitation applications. Governments can join the 43-strong coalition calling for a moratorium, and show their support for the centrality of science-based decision-making at the Assembly by supporting a resolution tabled by Vanuatu.
• The ISA Council is due to establish a roadmap for the next phase of its work. Progressive governments must stand united to ensure this decision formalises strong pre-conditions before any mining can begin – including having enough scientific knowledge to make informed decisions. Adopting flawed, premature regulations will not stop unilateralism; it will only legitimise bad faith action. Rushing to adopt weak regulations means falling into a trap set by corporate actors who are trying to make a mockery of international law. Whereas agreeing a clear set of conditions for international approval of mining would help the ISA to shield itself from receiving commercial mining applications submitted under false expectations of the Mining Code being ready for adoption.

A line in the sand

As geopolitical tensions rise and the erosion of international norms by a few rogue actors breeds global instability, it is vital that governments act decisively to safeguard the collective interest. There is no better place to demonstrate the power of international cooperation than over the high seas, the waters that connect all continents. This collective strength is already proven, buoyed by the historic success story of the Global Ocean Treaty dedicated to protection, which triumphantly entered into force in January 2026.

The biggest threat to our oceans is not industrial fisheries or deep sea mining machines. It is the infection of doom and gloom that fools us into thinking we are powerless to stop things from getting worse.

But people power and international cooperation are showing their resilience. Despite intense corporate headwinds, the Global Ocean Treaty is now law, and deep sea mining has been successfully held back from the Arctic to the Pacific. We can win big together—even in the toughest of times.

As Greenpeace, we know we can win historic victories for the oceans. People before us in our movement had a harder time and they fought – and won. Putting Antarctica off-limits to mining and drilling during the Cold War.

Stopping deep sea mining through international agreement can signal a shift. It builds on the growing momentum that when Indigenous peoples are included and involved in decision-making, nature and the life-support system it provides for us all win. It’s a site battle where we can agree to limit private greed for the common good.

Governments who believe in the importance of international cooperation, the rule of law and science need to stand up and make progress where they can.

The threat of deep sea mining represents a new potential source of conflict over minerals, environmental degradation, and unilateral efforts to seize resources and territories in breach of international law. This is the last thing the world needs right now.

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Published by Greenpeace International, July 2026

The Stakes for the ISA and Deep Sea Mining for 2026 and Beyond