The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is meeting in Paris this week for its annual forum. On the negotiating table is a once-in-a-decade opportunity to end the flow of public money into fossil fuels, but you’d be forgiven for not knowing about it.
The OECD is made up of a group of primarily wealthy countries, who collectively set their own standards around big global issues like tax, trade and the environment.
Despite being one of the world’s most influential trade bodies, decisions at the OECD often happen behind closed doors.
Members say that this allows them to get on with “building better policies for better lives” without distraction.
The problem is that channelling billions of dollars of public money into fossil fuels each year doesn’t square with that aim.
The OECD regulates its members’ “export credit agencies”. These are government-owned institutions that provide loans, guarantees, credit and other forms of financial services – often at subsidised rates – to large infrastructure projects around the world.
Between 2018 and 2020, OECD export credit agencies (ECAs) also provided more international public finance for fossil fuels ($41 billion) than any other type of public finance institution, including multilateral development banks like the World Bank. They spent five times more on fossil fuels than renewable energy projects every year.
Too much LNG
Without ECA support, many new oil and gas projects would not go ahead. Over the last decade, these institutions have pumped over $80 billion into liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects, which receive the overwhelming majority of ECA support.
Projects include the Vaca Muerta gas pipeline in Argentina, a carbon bomb that threatens to release 50 billion tons of carbon dioxide over its lifetime; and $14 billion in loans and guarantees to a controversial LNG project in Mozambique. LNG is often cited as a bridge fuel in the clean energy transition, but the reality is the opposite. We already have more LNG infrastructure than we can use to stay within safe climate limits.
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Every dollar spent on new fossil fuels puts the brakes on our clean energy transition. To keep global temperature rise to within 1.5C – as per the Paris Agreement goal – the International Energy Agency is clear there is “no need“ for investment in new supplies of coal, oil and gas.
Under the Paris Agreement, all countries promised to “make financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development“, but the opaque governance structure of the OECD provides a loophole for oil and gas finance to keep flowing, via ECAs.
Public money
This isn’t a good way to spend public money. With peak demand for fossil fuels now expected as soon as 2030, any investment in new fossil fuel projects risks failing to deliver a return. Economists have estimated that around $1.4 trillion in oil and gas assets are at risk of becoming stranded.
Far from delivering energy security, public investment in fossil fuels exposes us to huge economic risks, whereas channeling this money into clean energy could open up new economic opportunities. Every dollar of investment in renewables creates three times more jobs than investment in fossil fuels.
Poll after poll shows that voters in OECD countries don’t want their money going into fossil fuels either. Almost two thirds of British and Canadian voters want their governments to stop subsidising fossil fuels.
In the United States there’s majority bipartisan support for ending fossil fuel subsidies.
Using public money to prop up a twilight industry isn’t in the public interest – it makes us all worse off.
At the Glasgow climate conference, Cop26, a majority of OECD member countries committed to ending public fossil finance for the unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, including by driving multilateral negotiations through the OECD.
Backtracking
Despite this, some OECD countries have backtracked on their commitment. Research from Oil Change International shows that since 2021, the United States, Germany, Italy and Japan have approved at least $5.2 billion in new public finance for international fossil fuel projects.
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This year alone, the US, via its ECA, the United States Export-Import Bank (EXIM), provided $740 million to oil and gas projects around the world. If President Joe Biden is to become the climate leader he wants to be, there is clearly much more to do.
OECD members already signalled the beginning of the end for public fossil fuel finance, by ending ECA support to coal-fired power in 2021.
The UK, EU and Canada proposals on the table represent a rare moment of leadership that must help set the stage for forging agreement on a global phase-out of fossil fuels at the upcoming climate conference in the United Arab Emirates.
They must not be shut down and strung out by OECD members still clutching onto fossil fuels such as Japan, South Korea and the United States.
Countries should use this week’s meeting to reform export credit agencies for good, so they catalyse the clean energy transition and preserve our planet, rather than destabilise it.
Sandrine Dixson-Declève is the co-president of The Club of Rome and co-lead of the Earth4All initiative
The post The OECD must take its chance to stop funding oil and gas appeared first on Climate Home News.
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/11/06/the-oecd-must-take-its-chance-to-stop-funding-fossil-fuels/
For the first time, new-energy vehicles (NEVs) made up 67% of new car sales in China in September, according to the latest data from the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA).
The figures show that NEVs, which include battery electric cars and plug-in hybrids, captured a record share of sales, even though fewer were sold than last year.
This is because sales of combustion-engine cars are falling steeply, a trend that the CPCA has attributed to rising petrol prices following the start of the Hormuz crisis.
Indeed, sales of fuel-only cars were down 31% year-on-year in the first nine months of 2026, with plug-in hybrid sales down 26% – whereas battery EV sales were only down 4%.
One analyst tells Carbon Brief that China’s rapidly growing EV fleet has offset demand for 143m barrels of oil since the start of the Hormuz crisis.
Another says that the crisis is “reinforcing China’s electrification of road transport”.
Meanwhile, amid slowing domestic sales, Chinese carmakers’ exports of NEVs more than doubled [in 2026 to date / in September] from a year earlier.
NEV record
A record two out of every three cars sold in September in China were NEVs, according to CPCA data, as shown in the figure below.
(NEVs predominantly include battery electric vehicles – BEVs – and plug-in hybrids – PHEVs. BEVs only run on electricity, whereas PHEVs also have a combustion engine.)
This marks a rapid rise for NEVs from just 6% of new car sales in 2020 up to 58% in 2026 to date – and a record 67% in the month of September.
This year, NEVs’ share of sales has also bounced back from a low of 39% in January, after the full purchase tax exemption that had been in place for more than a decade came to an end in December 2025.
The gain in NEV share in 2026 has come amid a slowdown across the wider domestic passenger-car market, which has hit sales of combustion-engine vehicles particularly hard.
This September, passenger-car retail sales across all categories declined, with overall sales volumes falling 28% year-on-year.
The contraction was led by combustion-engine vehicles, which saw sales fall 43% year-on-year in September and 31% in 2026 to date.
However, sales of PHEVs also fell by 36% year-on-year in September and by 26% in 2026 to date. By comparison, BEVs performed better, although sales still declined 8.5% from a year earlier in September and 4% in 2026 to date.
As a result, NEV sales overall fell by 17% in September and 13% in 2026 to date.
While the market changes in 2026 to date were particularly dramatic, they reflect a broad continuation of trends seen over the past decade.
Indeed, sales of combustion-engine cars in China peaked in 2017 and they have been declining ever since, shown in the figure below.
Impact of Hormuz
Part of the reason for the advance of NEVs in 2026, said Chinese technology news outlet OFweek, was petrol cars “giving up market share” as they were outperformed by electric alternatives.
Cui Dongshu, secretary-general of the CPCA, cited higher petrol prices as an explanation for September’s weak combustion-car sales, in comments to financial news outlet National Business Daily.
Imports of oil into China in January-September have fallen 15% compared to 2025, equivalent to 470m barrels, as ongoing conflict tightened supply and drove up prices.
China’s passenger-car NEV fleet has displaced 143m barrels of oil so far during the strait of Hormuz crisis, Euan Graham, senior energy analyst at thinktank Ember, tells Carbon Brief.
EVs “accounted for 12% of the decrease in China’s oil use post-Hormuz”, according to an estimate provided to thinktank the Brookings Institute by an unnamed analyst.
Erica Downs, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, tells Carbon Brief that the strait of Hormuz crisis and higher oil prices are “reinforcing China’s electrification of road transport”.
She says the “world’s largest oil supply disruption” vindicates China’s early bet on EVs, which was partly driven by concerns about oil-supply security.
NEV demand down
Nevertheless, NEV sales have fallen year-on-year, albeit at a slower rate than overall car sales. The growth in NEV market share has also been decelerating.
Zhang Yichao, a partner at consulting firm AlixPartners, tells Carbon Brief that NEVs benefit from government trade-in policies and a “strong pipeline” of new models, particularly those involving innovation.
He says these factors help explain why NEVs sales have fallen at a slower rate to their combustion-car counterparts.
Cui told the state-run China National Radio that the fall for NEVs and for cars overall in September 2026, is also due to a high baseline of sales from the same month in 2025, as well as changes to trade-in policies and disruptions from the holiday period.
Other factors, says consulting firm Wood Mackenzie, are the weakened demand due to “demand pull-forward” in 2025 caused by the end of subsidies, as well as “tighter financing conditions”.
Zhang tells Carbon Brief he does not “see much more room ahead” for further growth in NEVs’ market share.
He adds that, in his view, their share in China is unlikely to exceed 80%, as some premium-market segments and specific use cases will continue to require combustion-engine vehicles.
Exports surge
Meanwhile, while domestic NEV retail sales fell 17% in September 2026, exports more than doubled, increasing 164% year-on-year, according to the CPCA.
This extends the decline in domestic sales and very strong growth in exports seen across 2026 to date, as shown in the figure below.
In September, 1,084,000 NEVs were sold domestically in China, while 558,000 NEVs were exported.
Exports are becoming increasingly important to Chinese carmakers, in the face of weaker domestic demand and cut-throat industrial competition.
The CPCA says exports have become “a core priority” for some carmakers.
However, the surge in exports from China has created concern in the EU, which has placed tariffs on imports of EVs from China and recently agreed plans to cut imports of hybrids.
Countries including Mexico and Turkey have also placed tariffs on Chinese EV imports.
At the same time, the Chinese government is putting policies in place that might be expected to disincentivise exports, such as cutting VAT export rebates.
Analysts differ on what impact this policy shift will have, with some saying it will be limited, while others believe it could cause the price of exported cars to rise.
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