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During his three-year tenure as Japan’s prime minister, Fumio Kishida’s created the Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) to, in his words, “help Asia decarbonise together”.
But a year and a half after AZEC was formally launched, a new report by the international research organization Zero Carbon Analytics shows that one-third of agreements between Japan and AZEC member countries promote or prolong fossil fuels.
Of the 158 projects financed by Japan under this initiative, 56 include fossil fuel technologies such as natural gas, co-firing ammonia with fossil fuel in power plants, hydrogen produced with fossil fuels, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and e-fuels.
A report by Zero Carbon Analytics shows the projects signed under the AZEC initiative leave renewable energy on the sidelines and favour technologies that promote or prolong fossil fuels. (Photo: Zero Carbon Analytics)
The alleged climate benefits of these technologies are hotly disputed. While some studies have claimed gas is a less polluting fossil fuel than the coal used for electricity in much of Southeast Asia, a study published last week suggested that it can actually be more polluting, especially when it is imported across the sea in a liquid form called LNG.
Ammonia co-firing involves burning ammonia alongside coal in coal-fired power plants. While this reduces the amount of coal burned, critics note that the plants still burn mostly coal and that the co-firing can encourage governments to allow the coal-fired power plant to keep operating longer. Similarly, carbon capture and storage technology captures just some of a power plant’s emissions and can encourage the authorities to keep the plant open longer.
Ammonia, hydrogen and e-fuels are all fuels which can be made in more polluting ways using fossil fuels or cleaner ways with renewable electricity.
Louisiana communities are suffering from Japan-funded LNG exports
AZEC was launched in 2023 to advance climate cooperation in Asia, with Japan playing a central role. Kishida likened it to an Asian version of the European Coal and Steel Community – a predecessor to the European Union. Members include most countries in Southeast Asia and Australia.
But Japan’s fossil fuel investments – particularly gas projects – through AZEC are inconsistent with its pledge to stop overseas financing for unabated fossil fuels, experts told Climate Home News.
At their 2022 meeting in Berlin, G7 leaders all agreed to “end new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, except in limited circumstances clearly defined by each country that are consistent with a 1.5 °C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement”.
Report author Amy Kong said: “Relying on these technologies is a slower and more expensive path to decarbonisation for the region, and risks derailing national power sector emissions targets set out in the International Energy Agency’s 2050 net zero scenario.”
Shigeru Ishiba, Japan’s recently appointed prime minister, has suggested the country will prioritise regional cooperation and has argued in favour of renewable energy. However, there is still little information on the future of AZEC under his new government.
Zero emissions community
Japan’s goal with the AZEC initiative was to invest public funds from its climate transition bonds to “create a huge new decarbonisation market in Asia”, former PM Kishida said during the community’s launch.
Through AZEC, member countries could apply for Japanese funding for energy projects. More than 150 projects have been approved between the Japanese government or government-backed institutions and their AZEC counterparts, the Zero Carbon Analytics report shows.
Initial investments were administered via a host of Japan’s government-backed institutions, including the environment and the trade ministries. Many of Japan’s private-sector firms have also partnered with these public entities.
But according to Zero Carbon Analytics’ analysis, over one-third of those MOUs will promote fossil fuels or technologies that will prolong the use of fossil fuels. This threatens to lock-in coal and gas investments that may be difficult to reverse, the report says.
On the other hand, 54 MOUs signed under AZEC include renewables and electrification technologies, about a third of the total. These include solar PV power, wind, hydroelectric, geothermal, battery storage, electric vehicles, green hydrogen and ammonia, and waste management. But of these 54 agreements, only 11 include wind and solar.
UAE’s ALTÉRRA invests in fund backing fossil gas despite “climate solutions” pledge
‘False solutions’
Non-governmental organizations across Asia have raised concerns that AZEC primarily promotes fossil-based technologies.
Ayumi Fukakusa, deputy executive director of Friends of the Earth Japan, told Climate Home that technologies like CCS, ammonia and biomass co-firing and LNG “only delay climate actions and prolong the life of fossil fuel infrastructure”. She added that “AZEC will further lock-in Asian partners in massive emissions and doesn’t support real decarbonization”.
Hanna Hakko, Japan-based senior associate of the E3G think tank argued that Japan’s AZEC initiative would “serve the region far better by enabling the growth of renewable energy”, which would make the country more energy independent and contribute to long-term emissions reductions.
Wicaksono Gitawan is an Energy Transition Associate and Project Manager at Indonesian nonprofit CERAH. He called AZEC a form of “green colonialism.”
Japan’s push for ammonia co-firing has also been criticized by other governments, most prominently by Canadian, UK, and German ministers during the 2023 G7 meeting.
‘Green colonialism’
Japan signed by far the most deals with the region’s most populous nation Indonesia, followed by Thailand and Malaysia. Historically, Japan has been the top source of infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia and spearheaded the creation of an Asian LNG market in the 1960s.
Japan’s government-backed financial institutions, such as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, invested $93 billion in overseas oil and gas projects between 2013 and 2023. About $42 billion of that was in fossil fuels projects in Asiawhile just $9 billion was spent on clean energy over the same period.
Campaigners say the long-term financial benefits of AZEC are questionable. Fukakusa from Friends of Earth Japan said “most of the support made by the Japanese government in the past, especially for energy projects, are through loans,” which risk adding pressure on already debt-burdened economies in Southeast Asia.
According to a Wood Mackenzie analysis, the cost of electricity from utility-scale solar PV in Asia declined significantly over the last few years, while the costs of coal and gas generation increased. In 2023, renewables were 13% cheaper than conventional coal in Asia and are expected to be 32% cheaper by 2030.
(Reporting by Walter James, editing by Sebastian Rodriguez and Joe Lo)
The post Japan backs fossil fuels in Southeast Asian “zero emission” initiative appeared first on Climate Home News.
Japan backs fossil fuels in Southeast Asian “zero emission” initiative
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Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.
The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.
It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.
Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.
Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.
This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.
It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.
The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.
During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.
Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later.
Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.
Formal negotiations
Finance
Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.
At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.
The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.
As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.
The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.
Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.
Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya.
Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.
Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.
However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.
Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.
The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.
Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature.
The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.
The list was last amended in 2006.
(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)
Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.
The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.
By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.
Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.
By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.
At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:
“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”
The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.
Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:
“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”
On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.
Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.
While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.
At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.
At the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance.
China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”
While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries.
The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent.
Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter.
At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.
A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary:
“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”
The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries.
However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18.
Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.
The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.
“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever