Governments are still at loggerheads over the timeline for publishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) next three-part report, after countries doubled down on existing positions at a meeting in Bangkok.
Last week, around 330 delegates from more than 100 countries met in Thailand for the 64th session (IPCC-64) of the UN’s climate science body.
The meeting, set against the backdrop of a global energy shock triggered by war in the Middle East, comes more than two-and-a-half years into the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7).
There was disagreement on a range of issues, including the workplan for the cycle’s “working group” reports.
For five consecutive meetings, countries have failed to agree on whether the reports should be completed before, or after, the second “global stocktake” process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), due to culminate in 2028.
IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea tells Carbon Brief the “frustrating and disappointing” meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”.
“We made some formal decisions by consensus, but I would say they were more to postpone the decision making than they were to take decisions,” he says.
AR7 report timeline
As is typical for an IPCC assessment report cycle, AR7 will include three “working group” reports – on the physical science of climate change, impacts and adaptation, and mitigation. These will be summarised in a synthesis report.
Work is already underway on the three headline reports, as well as a special report on cities and climate change and methodology reports on carbon dioxide removal technologies and inventories for short-lived climate forcers.
However, countries are yet to reach an agreement as to when the three headline reports will be published, after deadlocked negotiations at meetings at Lima, Hangzhou, Sofia and Istanbul.
A coalition of developing and developed countries have backed a plan – proposed by the IPCC’s co-chairs – that would see the three reports published in 2028. This would enable their findings to feed into the second global stocktake, due to conclude that year at the COP33 conference.
The global stocktake is a five-yearly appraisal of global progress on tackling climate change that is designed to inform the national climate goals countries must submit to the UN under the Paris Agreement.
A separate group of countries, including China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have argued for a longer timeline on the grounds that developing nations need more time to review and approve the reports, according to reports from inside the meeting. This would mean some of the working group reports would be published after the second global stocktake is completed.
Dr Bill Hare, CEO and senior scientist at Climate Analytics, tells Carbon Brief that “the majority of countries, across geographies and levels of development, including least developed countries and small island developing states” support a timeline where the AR7 reports align with the stocktake.
Speaking during the opening session of IPCC-64, UNFCCC executive secretary Simon Steill said that 194 nations who attended COP30 in Belem last year had “emphasised the critical importance of the IPCC’s work in ensuring that the best available science feeds into the global stocktake”.
The timeline of the AR7 reports was not on a provisional agenda released ahead of the meeting.
However, the contentious issue was belatedly added to the agenda on the meeting’s first day, according to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB) reporting from inside the meeting.
This came after objections about the omission from a raft of countries, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Kenya, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Venezuela.
According to the ENB, Saudi Arabia “insisted” the issue be included on the agenda and warned that deferring it to the next meeting “risked a scenario in which the budget would not be approved and further work would be delayed”.
In response to calls for clarification on why there was no formal agenda item on report timelines, IPCC AR7 chair Prof Jim Skea said the secretariat had “not detected the flexibility” among governments that could lead to its resolution, according to the ENB.
Skea thus proposed that “informal consultations” would be held in order to “identify the basis for any flexibility”. He also suggested the subject be discussed in a session earmarked for “any other business”.
This proposal was rejected by some delegations, who argued the issue required more formal treatment and said informal consultations might not be inclusive, the ENB says.
In the end, the IPCC agreed to add the item to the agenda and establish a contact group, co-chaired by Brazil and Canada, tasked with advising the IPCC on how to make progress.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Skea explains that the secretariat did not put the issue on the agenda because it had “very low expectations about the success of such a discussion” and felt that more preparation was needed “to build the foundations for a decision” at a future meeting.
The last-minute addition of AR7 timelines to the agenda prompted some delegations to question the inclusivity of discussions. They noted that some countries had come without permission from their governments to discuss the issue, the ENB reports, whereas others with “limited resources” had decided to skip the meeting altogether.
This position was articulated at different stages of negotiations by Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands and Singapore in interventions supported by Canada, China, Cuba, Mexico, South Korea and Tanzania.
Climate Analytics’ Hare explains:
“The agenda item ‘progress with the timeline of AR7’ was added at the last minute upon pressure by countries including India and Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to introduce their own timelines into the process, which would push both WG2 and WG3 to 2029.
“As the AR7 timeline was not on the provisional agenda, many developing countries with resource and capacity constraints across the continent did not attend the session.”
One observer to the talks tells Carbon Brief that logistical issues prompted by the war in Iran had contributed to some countries’ decision not to attend.
‘Heated and polarised’
Discussions about the AR7 report timeline were focused on how to reach agreement by the IPCC’s next session.
A number of solutions were proposed, including for the IPCC secretariat to hold “informal conversations” between sessions to the creation of an “options paper” based on country submissions that would be presented at IPCC-65. Ultimately, all options ultimately failed to get the consensus required to be officially ratified by the IPCC.
On Thursday, the co-chairs of a contact group tasked with advising on how to progress with the timeline issue reported that “no consensus had been reached” and said there was a need for a “further exchange of views”, according to ENB.
Singapore subsequently suggested a plan for countries to formally submit views on the topic to the IPCC secretariat, which would then summarise submissions and present an “options report” for discussion at IPCC-65, says ENB. This would allow countries that were not prepared or not present at IPCC-64 to contribute, the country delegation said.
On the other hand, the Cook Islands said that “time is of the essence and further submissions from members should not be invited”, reports ENB. The country delegation also said the report timeline presented by co-chairs in Lima provided “sufficient time” for report reviews. This intervention was supported by Australia, Belize, Chile, Dominican Republic, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Samoa and Vanuatu.
Saudi Arabia repeated objections raised at previous meetings and said there was a need to address issues relating to overlaps in report scheduling, back-to-back reviews, inclusivity and capacity, as well as how the IPCC aligns with the UNFCCC processes, reports the ENB.
Instead, Saudi Arabia suggested that a later publication of working group reports in 2028 and 2029 would “provide sufficient intervals between IPCC sessions, time for developing countries to undertake their reviews and inclusive engagement”. This intervention was backed by Bahrain, Belarus, Kenya, Russia and Yemen, according to ENB.
As in previous IPCC sessions, there were diverging opinions around whether the IPCC needed to align report production with the global stocktake.
Some countries – including Bangladesh, Panama and South Korea, emphasised the need for the reports to align with the UNFCCC process.
The Netherlands, backing the plan for countries to submit their views ahead of IPCC-65, said delivery of AR7 reports after the global stocktake would “significantly lower” their policy relevance. The delegation noted that “never before” had the timeline given rise to such “heated and polarised debate”, according to the ENB.
Others – including Saudi Arabia, China and Russia – minimised the role of IPCC reports as an input into the stocktake, reports ENB.
A selection of interventions by country delegations at the IPCC’s Bangkok meeting, as reported in the ENB’s meeting summary. ENB (2026).
A number of countries, including France, Haiti and Panama, stressed that the absence of several delegations from the Bangkok meeting, including many small-island states, made the discussions about the timeline less inclusive, according to ENB.
Skea tells Carbon Brief that none of the talking points raised by countries around AR7 reports were new:
“I didn’t hear any new arguments offered at this meeting.”
No decision
By close of play on Thursday, Skea presented a draft decision text which proposed that governments entrust the IPCC secretariat to develop an “options paper” that would be circulated ahead of IPCC-65, with a view to making a decision at the meeting.
India, Russia and Saudi Arabia said that they would prefer the creation of a “task group” that would produce a “compilation of views and proposals” on options for the timeline, according to the ENB. This would provide the “basis for further discussion” at IPCC-65.
Skea subsequently advised IPCC vice-chair Ladislaus Chang’a to form a huddle to find a middle ground between these two approaches.
On Friday, Chang’a presented a compromise solution where the IPCC chair and secretariat would “facilitate an exchange on the timeline with a view to reaching a decision at IPCC-65”, according to ENB. This would include overseeing a “task group” that would work between now and the next session.
This “draft decision” was backed by Brazil, China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
However, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, the Cook Islands, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Sweden and Switzerland said they could not support it, ENB says.
Antigua and Barbuda, the Cook Islands and a coalition of European nations instead suggested the chair hold “informal conversations” with governments over the coming months, with a view to coming to a timeline agreement at IPCC-65, says the ENB.
Skea subsequently proposed eliminating the reference to the task group in the decision text and to postpone all further deliberations on the timeline to IPCC-65.
This proposal faced opposition from a swathe of developing and emerging-economy countries, including Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Cuba, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Libya, Russia, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.
At this juncture, a growing number of countries supported pressing ahead without a decision text, citing lack of consensus as the meeting clock was running down, notes ENB.
Among these countries was Canada. Its delegation noted there was little time left in the session – and that countries had heard “basically nothing” about the scientific work of the IPCC at the meeting, reports ENB.
Despite some last-hour calls from India and South Africa for previous proposals to be revisited, no agreement was reached and no decision issued.
Review of IPCC principles and procedures
Another issue discussed in Bangkok was a review of the IPCC’s principles and procedures, which inform how the panel goes about putting together its reports.
The principles and procedures came into force in 1998 and are meant to be reviewed every five years. However, the last review was delayed due to the Covid pandemic.
Opening the agenda item on the IPCC’s principles and procedures towards the beginning of the talks on Tuesday, IPCC officials laid out 12 topics that the IPCC bureau had prioritised for review, according to the ENB. These included:
- Author selection criteria
- Responsibility for author selection
- Chapter scientists
- Scope of literature/Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge. (See Carbon Brief’s recent report on considering Indigenous knowledge within the IPCC.)
- Selection criteria and responsibilities for review editors
- Terms of reference for the chair, vice chairs and working group co-chairs
- Terms of reference for technical support units
- Developing country engagement and broader finance concerns
- Carbon footprint and inclusivity
- Artificial intelligence
- Copyright
- Timing and guidance on conflict of interest
Skea told countries that, while the bureau’s input was meant to inform discussions, it was for them to decide if a review of the principles and procedures was needed and what topics should be covered.
In discussions that followed, some countries called for the review to focus on the inclusivity of global south countries, while others said the review should be “targeted”, “focused” and “completed within a set time frame” to allow the IPCC to make swift progress.
Noting countries’ differing views, Skea proposed a huddle to discuss whether a task force on the review should be created.
On Wednesday, countries once again set out their priorities for the review.
According to the ENB, many countries “prioritised copyright, conflict of interest procedures, AI, and ensuring inclusivity by supporting the participation of developing and least developed countries and incorporating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge”.
Many also said the “principles and procedures are working well and supported a limited review that could be completed by IPCC-65, ahead of the report approval sessions starting in 2027”, the ENB says.
A small number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, India and Russia, called for the procedures to dictate that the timing of IPCC reports should be unaffected by “external factors”.
This could be interpreted as a reference to the push for the next IPCC assessment report to coincide with the next global stocktake – something that Saudi Arabia, India and Russia oppose.
Skea proposed the establishment of a contact group to try to take discussions forward, appointing Egypt and Ireland as co-chairs.
On Friday, the contact group co-chairs told the talks that they had found no agreement on whether to complete a review of the principles and procedures at these talks or at a future session.
Skea then presented a draft decision produced by the contact group co-chairs, which stated that the “IPCC’s principles and procedures are robust and have worked well” and expressed thanks to the bureau “for their work in preparing for a review of the principles and procedures”.
In response, Saudi Arabia said the draft “lacked a clear process and could be misleading”, with India adding that the “group had not reached agreement”, according to the ENB.
Colombia suggested “specifying that the review of principles and procedures had ended and would be considered again in 2031”, it continues.
This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia, who said the “review has just begun”.
India, Kenya and Saudi Arabia also opposed language indicating the principles and procedures “have worked well and are robust”.
Norway “observed that lack of consensus could be interpreted to mean that no amendments of the principles and procedures were appropriate and the panel could consider the review complete”, according to the ENB.
Skea presented a slightly revised text for adoption, which was adopted without further discussion.
The text notes the “diversity of views expressed at the session” and “decides to consider the review of the IPCC principles and procedures at future sessions, as appropriate”.
The ENB notes that this outcome left countries confused, saying:
“Some countries saw lack of consensus as an indication that discussions on the issue are now complete, while others believe the review process has just begun.”
Approval of meeting summaries
In what could be viewed as a signifier of the high levels of disagreement between countries, the talks failed to approve the meeting reports from its past three sessions in Peru, China and Bulgaria.
(The approval of the reports from China and Bulgaria had already been shifted to this meeting after countries failed to agree to them at previous sessions.)
During discussions on Wednesday, many European countries, along with Panama, complained about a “lack of transparency” in the reports, according to the ENB.
They suggested that countries making interventions should be named in the reports and that the number of speakers showing their support or opposition to an issue should be included.
This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia.
In response, Skea called for a huddle to convene to discuss the matter further.
On Friday, Skea noted that some countries had suggested that the “quality” of the report from the most recent meeting in Peru was higher than those from China and Bulgaria and suggested that countries adopt it.
Germany opposed this, expressing “openness” to further revisions of the report, in light of “diverging views” and a “lack of consensus in the room”, according to the ENB.
France requested that “past and future reports include everything that has been said by all delegates”, a view that was described as “unacceptable” by Saudi Arabia.
Skea said the lack of consensus from countries meant the issue would be deferred to the next IPCC meeting. This was reflected in a text adopted at the meeting.
Funding crunch
The IPCC receives funding from its parent organisations, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP), in addition to voluntary contributions from its member governments and the UNFCCC. This money is held in a “trust fund”.
According to the IPCC, the trust fund “supports IPCC activities, in particular the participation of developing country experts in the IPCC, the organisation of meetings as well as publication and translation of IPCC reports”.
However, in her opening remarks at last week’s meeting, UNEP executive director Inger Andersen warned that “expenditures from the IPCC trust fund have exceeded contributions over the last few years”, according to the ENB. She added:
“If this continues, the trust fund’s cash balance will be depleted before the end of the seventh cycle, impacting both this cycle and the transition to the next.”
The IPCC secretariat presented nine different IPCC funding scenarios for 2026-29 to the delegates. These scenarios include three different future expenditure levels, ranging from a “business as usual” scenario to a “severe spending cuts” scenario, which would see “fully virtual operations with suspension of multiple activities”.
They combine these expenditure scenarios with three different contribution scenarios, including a scenario in which annual contributions match annual expenditure and another that is equivalent to 2025 expenditure.
These scenarios highlighted that the IPCC trust fund is “likely to be depleted soon without new and larger financial contributions, expenditure cuts, or both,, the ENB says. It continues:
“The message was clear: if contributions do not increase, significant cuts in operations and more efficient meeting formats will need to be implemented. Possible ways forward include reduced activities and the greater use of virtual meetings, which run counter to the needs voiced by many countries for inclusivity, equity and capacity.”
The ENB adds that “the timing of this situation is particularly difficult”, because the IPCC is moving into its “busiest and most difficult part” of the assessment cycle, when the initial draft of reports are being written and reviewed.
According to the ENB, “the pattern of contentious meetings may also increase costs, especially if the panel requires late night sessions or extended days to conclude its work”.
Skea tells Carbon Brief that he is “more confident” about the budget than the “mood music that came out of some of the reporting”. He notes:
“It is really only in the worst-case scenarios where you combine low levels of contributions with high levels of spend that you run into real difficulties during the [AR7] cycle.
“During the first Trump administration, other countries stepped in [with funds] and we are now seeing these signs as well.”
The ENB reports that “Sweden has committed to increasing its contribution by 150% and encouraged all countries to contribute financially or host plenary sessions”.
The IPCC did not publish an updated budget in the documents for the IPCC-64 meeting.
Working group updates
The co-chairs of the three AR7 working group reports (WG1, WG2 and WG3) also presented updates on progress.
All three working group reports highlight the first joint lead author meeting, which was held in Paris in December. The meeting brought together lead authors from all three working groups and saw a total of 650 attendees.
All working groups have also submitted “zero order drafts” – an initial draft text – of their reports to their respective technical support units.
Meanwhile, the World Climate Research Programme and IPCC co-sponsored a workshop on high-impact events and Earth system tipping points in Paris in November 2025.
Separately, the IPCC undertook an expert review of the first order draft of the “special report on climate change and cities” between October and December 2025.
The agenda for the Bangkok meeting also included a range of other items.
IPCC legal officer Jennifer Lew Schneider reported that there are currently 263 organisations with “observer status” to the IPCC, alongside 20 new applications.
IPCC vice-chair Diana Ürge-Vorsatz presented a progress report on an expert meeting on “gender, diversity, equity and Inclusivity”, which was held in September 2025.
The UNFCCC’s Annett Möhner presented a review of collaborations between the IPCC and UNFCCC. In its summary of the meeting, the ENB says:
“She described activities and outcomes from UNFCCC COP30 including decisions on the global mutirão, procedural and logistical elements of the global stocktake process, and the Belém gender action plan, as well as conclusions on research and systematic observation.”
Similarly, Simone Schiele – programme officer at the IPBES secretariat – noted outcomes of the IPBES-12 meeting held in February 2026, as well as ongoing IPBES work.
‘Frustrating and disappointing’
IPCC chair Skea tells Carbon Brief that, overall, the meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”. He says:
“It was a frustrating and disappointing meeting. It was only a business meeting – there was no science involved in it. The lack of progress was a frustration to me, sitting there, chairing it.”
The next meeting – IPCC-65 – will take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during the second week of October 2026.
During this session, delegates hope to finalise the timeline for the AR7 reports and approve the draft reports of the IPCC’s 61st, 62nd and 63rd sessions.
As such, the ENB notes that “intersessional work” will play an important role in preparing panel members for meetings at IPCC-65. This, it says, includes the “submission of proposals on the AR7 timeline and informal consultations with the chair to identify points of convergence and possible flexibility”.
Skea says the secretariat will be working between sessions “to figure out the process that will move [things] in the right direction”. He continues:
“One of the issues that we have to consider is that there has been, in my view, quite a loss of trust between different groups of countries. We do need to address the trust issue, as well as the technicalities of how the timeline is constructed.”
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IPCC: ‘Frustrating and disappointing’ meeting leaves AR7 timeline in deadlock
Global fossil-fuel emissions are set to fall by around 0.5% in 2026 amid the fallout from the Hormuz crisis, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
The US-Iran war has severely disrupted trade through the strait of Hormuz, causing a spike in oil and gas prices that continues to ripple around the global economy.
Each month of disruption – and each new flashpoint, such as in Yemen – is increasing the incentive to switch to alternatives.
Those alternatives include coal, with the latest forecasts pointing to a 1.2% rise in coal demand this year – apparently supporting media claims of a “return to coal” in the wake of the crisis.
Yet Carbon Brief’s analysis shows the rise in emissions associated with this increased coal use, much of which is unrelated to Hormuz, is set to be more than offset by declines for oil and gas.
The estimated overall impact on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels in 2026 is shown in the figure below and amounts to a reduction of around 0.5% from 2025 levels.
(Fossil fuels account for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions.)
The emissions estimates for each fossil fuel are based on the latest forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for coal, oil and gas, in light of the ongoing global energy crisis.
For example, the agency initially estimated that global coal demand would decline this year. In its 2025 coal report, published in mid-December, it said that declining coal demand in China would outweigh the impact of pro-coal policies under US president Donald Trump.
In contrast, the latest update, published in September 2026, said that global coal demand would rise by 1.2% in 2026, instead of the small decline that had been expected.
The report highlighted the boost to coal demand from higher gas prices in the wake of Hormuz. However, there are limits to this, because few countries can switch from gas to coal at large scale.
The IEA’s latest report also noted the role of a strong El Niño, which is pushing up the need for cooling and depressing hydropower output in key markets. Other short-term factors are also affecting coal demand this year, including a rising amount of “wasted” wind and solar in China.
For gas, the IEA did not initially update its previous forecast that global gas demand would rise by 2.0% in 2026, which had been published in January of this year.
Its most recent forecast – published in July – already pointed to a 0.6% drop in demand in 2026. Since then, pressure on gas demand from high prices has only grown stronger.
For oil, there has been an even more dramatic shift in forecasts since the start of the year.
In its January 2026 oil market report, the IEA forecast a rise in demand in 2026 of 930,000 barrels per day (bpd). As shown in the figure below, this has been steadily revised downwards over the course of the year, as the Hormuz crisis was first ignited – and then extended.
By September, the IEA was forecasting a 2,500,000bpd drop in oil demand in 2026, equivalent to a reduction of 2.4% from 2025 levels.
(A 15 September research note from Morgan Stanley, not available online, found a “consensus” forecast of a 2,415,000bpd drop in demand in 2026.)
While there are many short-term factors at play in the shifting forecasts for 2026, it is clear that the latest energy crisis will also affect fossil-fuel demand in the next year and beyond.
For example, whereas the IEA initially forecast that oil demand would rebound in 2027 to well above 2025 levels, it is now expecting use of the fuel to be effectively flat for two years.
This puts a question mark over its previous expectation – published in October last year – that global oil demand would not peak until as late as 2030.
“For every month the conflict lasts, the probability of permanent [oil] demand destruction increases,” wrote Sverre Alvik, vice president at consultancy DNV in a late August analysis.
As fuel prices have surged, electric vehicles (EVs) have captured record shares of major car markets, from Australia and China through to Europe, Indonesia and Thailand.
In July, EV sales nearly doubled year-on-year in “new markets”, noted Alvik, pointing to countries outside China, Europe and North America.
The IEA says the 2027 outlooks for coal and gas are interdependent, with coal demand potentially increasing again if gas prices remain elevated – or dropping back if gas prices ease.
At the same time, governments in countries that had planned to rely on imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been signalling shifts towards favouring domestic clean energy instead – or continuing to use coal for longer.
The current crisis, therefore, has the potential to not only lower fossil-fuel use and emissions in the short term, but also on a more lasting basis.
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The post Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis
Aviation is on track to be responsible for 80% of the UK’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 2050, according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).
Emissions from flying have more than doubled since 1990 – driven by rising passenger numbers – even as the climate impact of every other sector in the UK economy has fallen.
The UK does not have “credible” policies in place to reverse this trend of rising emissions, says the CCC in new advice to the government on future aviation policy.
The government has signalled its support for expanding Heathrow, the nation’s largest airport, while relying on “techno-fixes” such as “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs) to cut emissions.
Yet, even without Heathrow expansion, the CCC says aviation emissions are on track to be higher in 2050 than they are today – reaching 38m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2).
As the chart below shows, this would account for most of the remaining CO2 from the UK economy, all of which would need to be removed from the atmosphere in order to meet the legal target of net-zero emissions.
Expanding Heathrow would add another 2.4MtCO2 in 2050, amounting to around 5% of all the UK’s emissions. (This would increase to 4.5MtCO2 when expansion is complete in 2054.)
With a final decision on Heathrow expansion expected by 2029, the government asked the CCC for its advice on whether the plan is compatible with the UK’s climate targets.
The CCC has concluded that the UK simply lacks sufficient policies to reduce aviation emissions and “expanding Heathrow would compound the problem”. In a press briefing, CCC chair Nigel Topping told journalists:
“The UK does not currently have a credible plan to reduce [aviation emissions] in line with net-zero, so that creates a serious challenge for meeting our climate commitments.”
The “jet-zero strategy”, launched by the previous Conservative government in 2022, set out plans to cut aviation emissions. However, the Labour government has since accepted that the strategy’s expectations for SAFs, electric planes and fuel-efficiency improvements were unrealistic.
The CCC says a “credible and robust net-zero policy framework for aviation” should be set out in a revised strategy, which is planned for 2027. Only then could Heathrow expansion be aligned with the net-zero goal, adds the committee.
As part of this new strategy, the CCC says the “aviation sector needs to take responsibility for its emissions”. It says policies should be designed based on the “polluter pays” principle, requiring the aviation industry to fund its own SAFs and CO2 removal.
Specifically, the committee says funding will be needed for “engineered removal” technologies, such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS).
These technologies are currently “not yet available at the scale required”, but are vital for the kind of permanent CO2 removal needed to mop up aviation emissions, says the CCC.
(“Natural solutions” such as tree planting are the other main way CO2 is expected to be removed from the atmosphere. However, the CCC envisages these removals offsetting the remaining methane emissions from livestock agriculture in the UK, whereas it says “engineered removals” would be required to remove and store CO2 from flights.)
The CCC acknowledges that placing decarbonisation costs on airlines would likely lead to higher ticket prices. It estimates that this could mean an increase, in 2024 prices, of around £150 for a return trip to Alicante, Spain, and £400 for a return trip to New York by 2050.
However, it says this is preferable to a public spending approach, which would result in the roughly 50% of the population who do not fly paying for flight-related CO2 removals.
In addition, the committee notes that higher costs would help to manage demand for flights, which would otherwise be expected to increase considerably over the coming decades.
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The post CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’
A fifth of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions are linked to international trade in goods and services, a new tracker shows, spotlighting a little-studied issue that researchers say should be tackled by the UN climate process.
Currently, as part of the Paris Agreement, every country is responsible for counting and reducing the planet-heating emissions that are produced within its territory. Manufacturing countries, for example, may have high emissions even if what they make is exported for consumption elsewhere.
But new analysis from the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and climate consultancy Matière, based on the tracker’s data, shows that some countries have a high footprint of “imported emissions” from goods and services they ship in. These emissions are often ignored in the places where the products are consumed because they are not formally counted under greenhouse gas inventories.
In the European Union, for example, while domestic emissions have declined since 2015, imported emissions have remained unchanged, the analysis shows. In some countries, like Austria or Sweden, they are as high as the country’s entire annual carbon footprint.
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Former EU lead climate negotiator Jacob Werksman said that under the Paris Agreement, these traded emissions are accounted for in the countries where they are originally produced, but importing countries can also take responsibility for their consumption.
“It starts with a wide recognition by many jurisdictions around the world that we need to know the carbon content of these products, and we then need to agree what is a fair, effective, transparent and relatively easy-to-implement way of measuring that carbon in traded products,” he told a launch event for the trade emissions tracker, which contains data for different countries, sectors and gases.
Trade and its role in addressing climate change has become a higher priority at UN climate talks after a push led by emerging economies including China, India and South Africa led to the first trade and climate change dialogue held this year at the mid-year session in Bonn.
At the upcoming COP31 UN summit in Antalya, some voluntary initiatives like the Brazil-led Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade are expected to continue, but the issue does not feature in Türkiye’s Action Agenda of climate initiatives and formal negotiations are not scheduled on the topic.
China: the world’s top emissions exporter
As a manufacturing powerhouse, China ranks first in the new tracker as the world’s top-emitting country, but the data shows that a large chunk of the country’s carbon emissions – an amount larger than Brazil’s entire annual carbon footprint – are linked to products that are exported and consumed abroad.
Russia, Brazil, the US and the EU rank as the top destinations for Chinese trade-related emissions, which are mostly linked to components for power generation, basic metals like copper and lead, and non-metallic minerals like graphite and phosphorus.
Yet China is also the world’s top emissions importer, related mostly to agricultural products, fossil fuels and minerals brought from the US, the EU, Japan and India, among others. The US ranks second by a close margin, with both countries importing about 1.6 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent.
China’s industrial engine starts to break its fossil fuel habit
Richard Baron, ECF’s industrial policy and trade director, said Chinese clean energy products are key for reducing emissions around the world, adding that Europe is “not able to do without those technologies” for its energy transition.
“China has an emissions trading system that counts CO2 differently there. But if China and the EU were to agree on some kind of translation mechanism to say ‘this is how we measure it’, and companies can understand the protocol to navigate both markets, that would set the tone for a lot of other conversations,” he said at the platform’s launch event last week.
The analysis suggests that if the EU and China aligned their climate requirements for products, the resulting standards could influence trade flows representing about 7% of global emissions.
Baron said there’s “a plethora” of multilateral spaces to hold these discussions, including the climate and trade dialogue at the UN climate talks or the Climate Club at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which seeks to cut industrial emissions.
Trade breaks into agenda of UN climate talks – but will it have teeth?
Controversial trade measures
Instruments like the Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – a recent piece of legislation that penalises emissions-heavy imported products – are one tool that could be used to address trade-related emissions, said Antoine Oger, executive director at the Institute for European Environmental Policy.
He said a significant portion of imported emissions in Europe are already covered by CBAM, as it includes sectors like cement, iron and steel, fertilisers and aluminium. This then allows the EU “to engage in constructive dialogue with our trade partners”, he added.
But across diplomatic summits, including at UN climate talks, emerging economies have pushed back heavily against the CBAM and other trade measures. The most recent BRICS declaration adopted on Saturday by 11 such countries – including China, India and Russia – condemns “protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives”.
The declaration calls for the “elimination of such unlawful measures”, which they argue have “far-reaching negative implications for the human rights, including the rights to development, health and food security” of vulnerable communities.
“The question of responsibility is a political question,” Oger said. “These emissions exist – they are emitted somewhere to make a product that will be consumed elsewhere. So you can debate responsibility but the idea is for the two parts to recognise there’s a problem.”
The aim, he added “is not to point fingers, but to accept this is a reality of our emissions profiles and ask what we can do about it”.
The post International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored appeared first on Climate Home News.
International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored
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