- Formal negotiations
- Finance
- Global review
- Global report
- Digital sequence information
- Harmful subsidies
- Marine biodiversity
- Planning, monitoring, reporting and review
- Article 8(j) implementation
- Biodiversity and climate change
- Links with other bodies
- Around the COP
- Armenian presidency
- Protests
- Lobbying and influence
- Carbon and biodiversity markets
Brice Böhmer is climate and environment lead at Transparency International.
As the dust settles after COP29, a feeling of despondency and betrayal has set in. But amid the inevitable post-mortem, the international climate community must ask itself: are we really that surprised?
This is the third year running that a repressive petrostate has hosted COP, and the second where the summit – intended to help reduce global emissions – has instead been used as a deal-brokering conference for some of the world’s biggest polluters.
The murky world of climate diplomacy
The fingerprints of the fossil fuel industry were all over Baku, chiefly those of the host country itself. An undercover Global Witness investigation caught the Azerbaijani COP29 chief executive using his role to discuss fossil fuel “investment opportunities” in the run-up to the conference. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s president opened the event by hailing oil and gas as a “gift from god”. His government then went on to sign new gas deals with Bulgaria and Slovakia while, elsewhere, developing nations were frantically scrambling for vital climate financing.
Overall, at least 1,773 fossil fuel lobbyists were granted access to COP29 according to Kick Big Polluters Out. In reality, however, it’s not possible to determine the true scale of the industry’s involvement. Our own analysis found that half of the registered participants (26,104) either chose not to disclose their relationship with their nominator, or hid behind unhelpfully vague categories such as ‘guest’ and ‘other’.
While it’s true that a fraught geopolitical landscape and the re-election of Donald Trump as US president meant negotiators in Baku were always facing an uphill battle, the vulnerabilities of climate diplomacy to climate corruption can no longer be ignored.
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In fact, the upsurge of climate denialism and dwindling faith in multilateralism makes rooting out undue fossil fuel influence and other conflicts of interest more important than ever.
The threat of climate corruption is an issue for at least two significant reasons. Most obviously, it undermines the integrity of the process when those who stand to gain little from a green transition – and everything to gain from the continued extraction of fossil fuels – are granted privileged access.
There is also the issue of trust. How can nations fully trust the negotiating process when it is so clearly infiltrated by private interests? Attendees need reassurances that their commitment will lead to meaningful progress, not exploited as diplomatic cover for behind-closed-doors manoeuvres and fossil fuel deal-making.
Strengthening climate multilateralism
As ever when it comes to questions of corruption, sunlight is the best disinfectant. To preserve the integrity of COP specifically – and multilateral climate action in general – we should be asking ourselves: which countries are being permitted to host COP? What suitability tests have they undergone? Who are they granting privileged access to?
Relatedly, Brazil’s President Lula recently announced that, in preparation for COP30, he is working towards a “global ethical assessment” bringing together different sectors of civil society to reflect on climate action “from the perspective of justice, equity, and solidarity”. His government has also joined forces with the UN to address disinformation campaigns that derail climate action.
Our recent report with the Anti-Corruption Data Collective, an organisation that aims to expose the threats to democracy, economic justice and the environment posed by financial secrecy and transnational corruption, offers recommendations to sustain this momentum and channel it into COP reform ahead of next year’s UN climate summit in Belém.
Big emitters accused of hiding behind climate treaties in international hearing
These include strengthening the selection process for host nations. Currently, these are chosen on a rotating basis between the five UN regional groupings. Regional group members consult with each other and make an offer to the UN climate secretariat (UNFCCC), which then adopts a decision before going on a fact-finding mission to determine that all “logistical, technical and financial elements for hosting the sessions are available” and reports back to the COP Bureau. This committee – which is elected from representatives of countries nominated by each of the UN regional groups and small island developing states – advises the COP president, acts as a focal point between governments and leads on issues of process management.
Our report proposes stricter criteria, by allowing only countries that have been vetted by the COP Bureau and whose proposal demonstrates commitment to the goals of the UN climate convention and the Paris Agreement, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law and managing potential conflicts of interest to be appointed hosts. The influential Club of Rome recently called for similar measures.
With Turkey, a country judged to have “critically insufficient” climate targets, and Australia, the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas in 2021, currently competing for the COP31 presidency, host selection reform cannot come soon enough.
Full disclosure
Publishing the participant list, meanwhile, has proved an effective way of boosting public scrutiny at COP. The UNFCCC should build on this by mandating that delegates fully disclose their nominator-affiliation to allow for even more transparency. Host deals involving corporations and organisations granted partner status for the ‘Green Zone’ (where civil society gathers outside the government-led negotiations) should also be made publicly accessible.
In addition, the COP Bureau should review the Code of Ethics for Elected and Appointed Officers to ensure that hosts disclose any relationships, financial or otherwise, that could compromise the objectivity and impartiality of the presidency. Had such measures been in place pre-Baku, they would surely have helped limit the extent to which the summit appears to have been used to promote businesses connected to Azerbaijan’s first family; not least the $5.2 million government contract awarded, without any competitive tender process, to Aliyev’s son-in-law for summit accommodation, as reported by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.
The entrance to the COP29 summit venue in Baku, Azerbaijan, November 2024 (Photo: Climate Home News/Megan Rowling)
To deter such cronyism, the Code of Ethics should include the powers to replace the COP President and other host-nation officials if they violate their duties of fairness, transparency and accountability.
To reinforce this approach, host country agreements should make the UNFCCC secretariat’s approval of partners compulsory. They should also follow the UNFCCC processes for due diligence and prevent sponsorship by entities “whose products, services or operations may negatively affect the objectives, activities or reputation of the secretariat, including but not limited to entities whose core products or core related services include fossil fuels”.
Multilateral climate diplomacy is far from perfect, but it remains our best hope of achieving meaningful climate action. The UNFCCC, with the co-operation of countries in the COP Bureau, must lead by example through major structural changes to the organisation and execution of COPs, extinguishing the threat of corruption and ensuring climate summits are preserved for those who want to fight climate change – not those profiting from it.
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Here’s how we take back control of COP from the world’s biggest polluters
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Climate Change
COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan
Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.
The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.
It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.
Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.
Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.
This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.
It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.
The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.
During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.
Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later.
Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.
Formal negotiations
Finance
Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.
At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.
The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.
As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.
The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.
Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.
Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya.
Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.
Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.
However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.
Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.
The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.

Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature.

The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.
The list was last amended in 2006.
(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)
Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.
The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.
By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.
Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.
By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.
At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:
“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”
The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.
Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:
“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”
On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.
Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.
While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.
At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.

At the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance.
China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”
While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries.
The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent.
Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter.
At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.
A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary:
“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”
The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries.
However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18.
Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.
The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.
“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever COP-commissioned report on debt and biodiversity.
Global review
In Yerevan, countries agreed on the first stocktake of progress towards the 2030 nature targets – known as the “global review”.
The review was one of the keenly anticipated outcomes from COP17 and was seen as less controversial than some of the other major negotiation strands.
It was swiftly signed off by countries at the start of the final COP17 plenary, with just one last-minute addition.
The concept of carrying out a global review on “collective progress” was set out in the GBF and its underlying documents.
The details of how this review would be carried out were supposed to be agreed at COP16, but it was not discussed before the plenary in Cali was suspended for loss of “quorum”. It was instead adopted at the
