The Greenland ice sheet melt season 2023 is now over and it completes a 27th year in a row in which Greenland has lost ice.
The 2022-23 year saw both very high melt, particularly in July, but also higher than usual rain and snowfall in the late spring and early summer.
The increase in both melt and snowfall are exactly what scientists expect in a warming climate, and although they have tended to balance each other to some extent, Greenland has still ended up losing more ice than it gained.
As in previous years, while very high temperatures hit North America and Europe this summer, Greenland in between was comparably cool and wet. However, this was not enough to stop Greenland losing ice.
Extended snowfalls from October to December 2022 and the late onset of the melt season contributed to a relatively large accumulation of mass on Greenland’s surface. Nonetheless, this could not outweigh the losses by surface melting and breaking off of icebergs.
Overall, Greenland’s ice sheet lost 196 billion tonnes (Gt) of ice over the 12 months from September 2022 to August 2023.
This means that the last year to see a net gain of ice is still 1996.
In this annual guest post, we discuss the processes of ice sheet melt, glacier “calving” and the weather and climate that explain these losses.
(See our previous annual analysis for 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016 and 2015.)
Surface melt
Greenland’s annual cycle covers the 12 months up until the end of August.
The pattern sees the ice sheet largely gain snow from September, accumulating ice through autumn, winter and into spring. Then, as the year warms up into late spring, the ice sheet begins to lose more ice through surface melt than it gains from fresh snowfall, generally from the end of June. This melt season usually continues until the middle or end of August.
The snow gains and ice losses at the ice sheet’s surface over these 12 months are the “surface mass balance” (SMB) of the ice sheet. The SMB consists of gains through snowfall and losses through runoff and evaporation. Therefore, snowfall is the only way for the ice sheet to gain mass.
The data suggest that the Greenland ice sheet ended the year 2022-23 with a total SMB of about 398Gt. This is the 15th highest SMB in a dataset that goes back 43 years and is quite close to the 1981-2010 average.
The past year’s SMB is illustrated in the maps and charts below, based on data from the Polar Portal. The blue line in the upper chart shows the day-to-day SMB. Large snowfall events become visible as “spikes”. The blue line in the lower chart depicts the accumulated SMB, counted from the beginning of the “mass balance year” on 1 September 2022. In grey, the long-term average and its variability are shown. The red line shows the record low year of 2011-12 for comparison.
The map shows the geographic spread of SMB gains (blue) and losses (red) for 2022-23, compared to the long-term average.
Heat over North America and Europe, cool over Greenland
A closer look at the weather and ice sheet changes through the past 12 months reveals some interesting developments.
Early winter began with above-average snowfall on several occasions in September, October, November and December. In late winter, a rather dry period followed, so that the accumulated SMB was close to – and then slightly below – average as melting began.
The most remarkable feature in the evolution of the SMB in 2023 was the extended period of growth in June. At the end of that month, the accumulated SMB was almost 150Gt above average.
The effect of this extra snow meant that the onset of the melt – or “ablation” season was on 29 June – 16 days later than the 1981-2022 median. The ablation season is defined as the first day of three days in a row with an SMB below -1Gt.
As in previous summer seasons, the reason for the comparatively wet and cool spells over the Greenland ice sheet can be found quite far away from Greenland in “blocking” weather patterns.
These high-pressure weather systems have a huge impact on weather extremes. Strong persistent blocks over North America and Europe were present in the end of May and the first decade of June and at the end of August. The last of these caused catastrophic rainfall in Greece and Libya.
In such a blocked flow, the jet stream is shaped like the Greek capital letter Omega (Ω). Research suggests that such patterns in recent years have been stronger and more persistent. With the jet stream bulging up to the north over Canada and northern Europe, troughs of low pressure are found at each “foot” of the omega – including over Greenland.
The map below shows an example of the recurring circulation patterns, bringing cool weather over Greenland (blue shading) along with high temperatures over Canada and Europe (red shading).
The melt season that followed was stronger than average – even comparable with the record years of 2012 and 2019 – with melting over more than 50% of the ice sheet for 29 days in a row, from 27 June to 25 July.
And while the world was rightly focused on other extreme weather events this summer, the Greenland summer also saw its own record-breaking conditions.
The station at the summit of Greenland – about 3,000 metres above sea level – recorded a new average temperature record of -7.3C, almost 2C warmer than the previous record of -9.2C set in 2012 and 4C warmer than the long-term average at summit station.
Melt season
There were two main melting periods of the ablation season. Despite the cool start, as the melt season got underway there was a period of very high temperatures at the end of July. This brought intense melt all around the ice sheet that led to very large ice losses over a few days.
The map on the left side shows the area of ice melt on 10 July when the maximum melt extent (67%) of this summer (shaded in red) was reached. The centre map shows the second melt maximum (50%), which peaked on 23 August, and finally the map on the right depicts the situation at the end of the season on 31 August. Melting was above average from 21 June through to – and beyond – the end of the season.
Components of the mass balance
The SMB is just one component of the “total” mass mass balance (TMB) of the Greenland ice sheet:
TMB = SMB + MMB + BMB
Here, MMB is the “marine” mass balance, consisting of the breaking off – or “calving” – of icebergs and the melting of the front of glaciers where they meet the warm sea water. BMB is the “basal” mass balance, which refers to ice losses from the base of the ice sheet. This makes a small, but non-zero, contribution to the TMB and mainly consists of frictional effects and the ground heat flux.
The figure below shows the components of the TMB (red) going back to 1987, which includes the SMB (blue), MMB (green) and BMB (orange). These estimates are based on the modelling approach set out in Mankoff et al in 2021.
For the past year, the TMB clocked in at a loss of 196Gt of ice. This means that 2022-23 was the 27th year in a row where the Greenland ice sheet has lost mass overall. As the chart shows, Greenland last saw an annual net gain of ice in 1996.
The only way for the ice sheet to gain ice is via the SMB – that is, through snowfall. The other components, MMB and BMB, are always negative, so the surplus of snowfall over runoff and the two other components needs to be large enough to compensate.
Using data from the GRACE satellites, we can estimate the TMB independently. The distance of these twin satellites changes slightly due to tiny gravity differences caused by mass changes. Expressing these distance differences as mass changes is not straightforward, however, which is the reason why GRACE data are only made available a few months later.
Furthermore, using satellites, we can measure the speed at which ice flows through control points on the ice sheet where we know the thickness and shape of the ice. Thus, we can estimate MMB, the amount of ice being lost by the process of calving and submarine melting. This data is openly available, allowing us to monitor the whole ice sheet budget.
The map and graph below show the gain (blue) and loss (red) in the mass of ice. The difference in these mass changes over a glaciological year (September-August) is the TMB of the ice sheet for that particular year.
The map shows that most of the loss of ice occurs along the edge of the ice sheet, where independent observations also indicate that the ice is thinning. High up in central Greenland, there is a small increase in the mass of the ice – most likely due to a small increase in snowfall, as we would also expect in a warming climate.
The graph illustrates the month-by-month development in changes of mass measured in gigatonnes, relative to April 2002. The left axis on the graph shows how this ice mass loss translates into a sea level rise contribution, where 100Gt corresponds to 0.28mm of global sea level rise.
The two approaches to calculating TMB have a common period of 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2023. These estimates suggest that the Greenland ice sheet lost around 4,578Gt (Mankoff et al.) to 4,745Gt (GRACE) of ice over this time. Note that the two methods are completely independent.
The result from both datasets is equivalent to around 13mm of global average sea level rise. Recent research suggests that the imbalance of the Greenland ice sheet caused by climate change means it is committed to contributing at least 274mm to global sea levels in future, regardless of 21st-century climate pathways.
The post Guest post: How the Greenland ice sheet fared in 2023 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Özgür Özel is the leader of Turkey’s main opposition “New Party” and a member of parliament from Manisa.
The world is running out of time to deliver on the Paris Agreement. The UN Environment Programme’s latest Emissions Gap Report concludes that the chance of keeping warming below 1.5C without overshooting it is gone. Even if every country delivers its current national pledges, the planet is heading for about 2.6C of warming this century.
This is the backdrop as governments and their leaders gather in Antalya for COP31, ten years after the Paris Agreement took effect. Turkey lies in the Mediterranean, one of the regions most exposed to climate change, and hosting the summit is a real opportunity.
It is also a responsibility, and that responsibility begins at home. The world does not lack targets. What it has lacked – almost everywhere – is delivery. If Antalya is remembered for anything, it should be for shifting the focus from what countries promise to what they actually do.
For many people in Turkey, the climate crisis is already part of daily life. In 2021, forests in Manavgat, a district of Antalya, burned for more than a week. Last year, wildfires forced more than 50,000 people from their homes around the western coast city of Izmir. This October, Istanbul had its heaviest rainfall in more than 80 years, with the floods killing at least eight people.
COP31 Briefing: What to expect from the Antalya climate summit?
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The COP30 presidency’s voluntary timetable asks countries to plan first, then build up clean energy – only turning to oil and gas supplies from 2031
Measurable outcomes
Two weeks of climate negotiations cannot deliver everything that is needed to resolve the crisis, but COP31 can push for a few things that can be measured. The first is a voluntary fossil-fuel transition roadmap, with national milestones for 2030 and 2035 reported in the same format every year.
The second is a stronger commitment to protecting forests, with progress tracked over time. The third is yearly reporting on progress towards the agreed $1.3 trillion a year in climate finance by 2035, backed by a financial roadmap.
On adaptation, the indicators agreed in Belém should become funded national plans. By COP32, we should be able to see how many countries have an adaptation plan and the financial commitment behind each one.
Regional resilience partnership
The summit also has an unusual shape. Turkey hosts, Australia leads the negotiations, and the Pacific island nations play a central role. Climate diplomacy now sits at the centre of energy security, trade and development, and Turkey, which bridges developed and developing economies, is well placed to help build consensus between them. The lasting value of its presidency will depend on the practical partnerships it leaves behind.
One such partnership could connect two very different regions. On a map, the Mediterranean and the Pacific seem to have little in common, but their problems look similar: eroding coastlines, salt creeping into aquifers, failing harvests, fishing towns with fewer fish.
Turkey and Australia could launch a Mediterranean–Pacific Climate Resilience Partnership, linking coastal cities, scientists, institutions including development banks and island governments. It does not need a new bureaucracy. It can start with a few projects: shared satellite data and early-warning systems, better coastal flood defences, and trials of water-saving farming in the communities most at risk. What matters is visible results on the ground, not a ceremony.
Turkey’s track record
Turkey does have progress to point to. It has committed to net zero by 2053, and its solar and wind capacity has grown fast. The sunshine, the wind and the industrial base are all there. But the long-term direction of the energy mix is still unclear.
Turkey also signed the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forests and Land Use at COP26, pledging to halt and reverse forest loss by 2030. With four years left, COP31 is a chance to show how that promise will be kept.
COP30 roadmap says faster use of existing tools can halt forest loss by 2030
And while the summit celebrates zero waste, Turkey took in more than half a million tons of European plastic waste last year, much of it bound for Mersin and Adana. On November 21, the day after COP31 closes, an EU ban on plastic-waste exports to non-OECD countries takes effect. Turkey, as an OECD member, is exempt. That should worry us more than it seems to.
None of this will carry much weight unless Turkey’s own record holds up. A leadership at odds with its own environment and its own citizens will struggle to inspire global confidence in its commitment to protecting the planet.
Threat to local climate action
Cities are where adaptation happens. Water, flood protection, waste and urban planning fall largely to municipalities. That is why the imprisonment and removal of more than 50 elected opposition mayors, including the mayor of Istanbul, matter for environment and climate policy, as well as for democracy.
When local leadership is disrupted, investment plans stall and work on flood defences and water supplies loses continuity. As a result, local governments are left paralysed.
Comment: From Australia to Chile, our cities are driving a green investment boom
Inconsistent policymaking when it comes to the environment and climate deepens the problem in Turkey as it does in other countries. A few practical steps would make a real difference.
Set out a gradual, well-planned energy transition. Stop new construction in streambeds and drinking-water basins and put zoning maps online. Inspect every imported plastic shipment and cap total imports. Hold public hearings on environmental impact assessments before permits are issued, not after. And publish an independently audited climate scorecard each year covering emissions, renewables capacity, forest loss and adaptation spending.
This could set an example beyond Turkey. Many emerging economies are trying to cut emissions while protecting jobs and keeping industry competitive. Digital tools and artificial intelligence are already available to help forecast wildfire risk, reduce grid losses and track water use.
With the 1.5C limit now set to be breached, Antalya’s success will be measured by the greenhouse gases avoided, the investments delivered and the forests still standing in the years that follow. It is our responsibility to watch closely and see whether those commitments are delivered, transparently and in line with international standards.
The post Turkey must make COP31 a turning point for global climate action appeared first on Climate Home News.
Turkey must make COP31 a turning point for global climate action
As oil companies pull out of Argentina’s oil heartland in the Patagonian province of Chubut, workers and communities are struggling to secure their future, with little say in the decisions being made about it.
“The impacted are fragmented, the exploiters organised,” said José Glinski, a member of parliament from the province.
In Comodoro Rivadavia, where Argentina’s oil industry began in 1907, those words carry particular weight. For nearly 120 years, oil has shaped the city’s economy and that of Chubut province, which helped power Argentina for decades. Now the companies that built their fortunes there are shifting their investments elsewhere, threatening an economy that has depended on oil for generations.
Argentina’s national oil company, YPF, whose roots lie in Comodoro Rivadavia, is selling off its mature oilfields in the region to concentrate investment in the shale oil and gas reserves of Vaca Muerta, further north. According to Glinski, around 10,000 direct jobs have gone in Chubut, and unemployment has climbed from 2% to 10% in a single year.
“And this while all remaining companies have kept extremely high levels of profit,” he said.
COP31 Briefing: What to expect from the Antalya climate summit?
Glinski blames government policy as much as the companies. “Companies are choosing to leave and the government lets them do so, while weakening tax and environmental regulations, leaving the city without the necessary income to organise the transition.”
Nobody has yet worked out who will clean up the old fields and more than 6,000 wells, look after the workers who remain, or pay for whatever comes next.
Comodoro Rivadavia is not alone. From Mejillones and Tocopilla in Chile to La Guajira in Colombia and Appalachia in the United States, from Scotland to Mpumalanga in South Africa and East Kalimantan in Indonesia, places built around fossil fuels for generations face some version of the same problem. As investment moves elsewhere, plans to protect workers, support communities and repair damaged land often lag far behind, if they exist at all.
Building an economy beyond fossil fuels
In Comodoro, as locals call the city, the community has not been passively waiting for oil to run out.
“We have looked into multiple alternatives for the territory, including building on geothermal capacity, an agricultural programme that could reinforce food security and focus on cultures that are not too water dependent, and exploring also aquaculture built on local species,” explained Ruben Zárate, who heads Comodoro Conocimiento, a public agency created by the municipality to develop economic opportunities. “The only alternative is economic diversification.”
But having ideas is one thing. Finding the money and securing the political support to put them into practice is another. In many countries, decisions that shape a region’s economy are made in the capital or in company boardrooms, and local authorities have little say, and few resources, when a major employer pulls out.
Glinski points to deals struck at the national level that leave communities without a meaningful say in decisions affecting their future.
“Some of the barriers relate to the absence of regulation of private actors which have negotiated conditions at the national level that prevent provinces or territories from capturing benefits that could be useful to fund the transition,” he said. “Comodoro had no voice in these deals.”
One example is Argentina’s Large Investment Incentive Regime, known as RIGI, which offers substantial tax benefits and regulatory guarantees to major investors. Argentina’s Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN) has warned that this regime could also give large projects preferential access to water and energy at the expense of local communities and businesses, making it harder for regions to diversify their economies.
At root, it’s a question of power: who controls the money and the decisions, and whether the people who kept these industries running for generations have any control over what comes next.
“Comodoro, like most territories that developed around fossil fuels, is heavily dependent. Everyone knew the oil business would end, but none planned for it,” said Antonella Risso, a climate expert and community member. “Comodoro deserves a bright future. Its people have the capacity to chart a future for its next hundred years – a real Just Transition”.
What COP31 could do
Last year in Belém, governments agreed to develop a Just Transition Mechanism. At COP31 in Antalya they will negotiate how it should work, and civil society is pushing for a strong Belém-Antalya Mechanism (BAM) that can help channel resources for action on the ground.
Camila Mercure, a climate policy officer with FARN and a coordinator of CAN’s Just Transition working group, said, “For a city like Comodoro Rivadavia, the BAM could mean support to develop diversification plans, assess viable alternatives, and access public, grant-based finance to put them into practice.”
“Workers and communities must have a meaningful role in shaping these plans, building on local knowledge and priorities. The aim should be to create decent livelihoods beyond fossil fuels and avoid alternatives that reproduce the same economic dependence, inequalities and environmental harm,” she said.
Why COP31 needs to start talking about just transition finance
The BAM could also put regions in touch with each other. Officials in Patagonia, northern Chile, Mpumalanga or East Kalimantan are wrestling with many of the same questions, and sharing what has worked would spare them from starting from scratch.
Then there are the companies. Fossil fuel producers should not be able to walk away from their workers, their environmental obligations and the towns that depended on them. The BAM could help regions share experiences and develop ways to hold companies accountable, ensuring they plan ahead and pay their fair share of the transition costs.
In Comodoro Rivadavia, the transition has already begun, without the community’s consent and with little support. COP31 is a chance to help places like it plan ahead, before the last company leaves rather than after.
The post When the oil companies leave, who pays? appeared first on Climate Home News.
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2026/11/05/when-the-oil-companies-leave-who-pays/