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China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the final quarter of 2025, likely securing a decline of 0.3% for the full year as a whole.

This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.

Other key findings include:

  • CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).
  • The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.
  • Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.
  • Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.
  • This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.

The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.

This is well short of the 18% target set for that period by the 14th five-year plan.

Moreover, China would now need to cut its carbon intensity by around 23% over the next five years in order to meet one of its key climate commitments under the Paris Agreement.

Whether Chinese policymakers remain committed to this target is a key open question ahead of the publication of the 15th five-year plan in March.

This will help determine if China’s emissions have already passed their peak, or if they will rise once again and only peak much closer to the officially targeted date of “before 2030”.

‘Flat or falling’

The latest analysis shows China’s CO2 emissions have now been flat or falling for 21 months, starting in March 2024. This trend continued in the final quarter of 2025, when emissions fell by 1% year-on-year.

The picture continues to be finely balanced, with emissions falling in all major sectors – including transport, power, cement and metals – but rising in the chemicals industry.

This combination of factors means that emissions continue to plateau at levels slightly below the peak reached in early 2024, as shown in the figure below.

China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals until September 2025. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.

Power sector emissions fell by 1.5% year-on-year in 2025, with coal use falling 1.7% and gas use increasing 6%. Emissions from transportation fell 3% and from the production of cement and other building materials by 7%, while emissions from the metal industry fell 3%.

These declines are shown in the figure below. They were partially offset by rising coal and oil use in the chemical industry, up 15% and 10% respectively, which pushed up the sector’s CO2 emissions by 12% overall.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2.
Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-September 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration. The consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel is adjusted to match quarterly totals estimated by Sinopec.

In other sectors – largely other industrial areas and building heat – gas use increased by 2%, more than offsetting the reduction in emissions from a 3% drop in their coal consumption.

Clean power covers electricity demand growth

In the power sector, which is China’s largest emitter by far, electricity demand grew by 520 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2025.

At the same time, power generation from solar increased by 43% and wind power generation by 14%, delivering 360TWh and 130TWh of additional clean electricity. Nuclear power generation grew 8%, supplying another 40TWh. The increased generation from these three sources – some 530TWh – therefore met all of the growth in demand.

Hydropower generation also increased by 3% and bioenergy by 3%, helping push power generation from fossil fuels down by 1%. Gas-fired power generation increased by 6% and, as a result, power generation from coal fell by 1.9%.

Furthermore, the surge in additions of new wind and solar capacity at the end of 2025 will only show up as increased clean-power generation in 2026.

On the other hand, the growth in solar and wind power generation has fallen short of the growth in capacity, implying a fall in capacity utilisation – a measure of actual output relative to the maximum possible. This is highly likely due to increased, unreported curtailment, where wind and solar sites are switched off because the electricity grid is congested.

If these grid issues are resolved over the next few years, then generation from existing wind and solar capacity will increase over time.

Developments in 2025 extended the trend of clean-power generation growing faster than power demand overall, as shown in the top figure below. This trend started in 2023 and is the key reason why China’s emissions have been stable or falling since early 2024.

In addition, 2025 saw another potential inflection point, shown in the bottom figure below. It was the first year ever that energy storage capacity – mainly batteries – grew faster than peak electricity demand in 2025 and faster than the average growth in the past decade.

Top columns: Year-on-year change in annual electricity generation from clean energy excluding hydro, terawatt hours. Left solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in total electricity generation, TWh. Bottom columns: Year-on-year change in energy storage capacity, gigawatts. Right solid and dashed line: Annual and average change in peak electricity demand. Sources: Power generation and demand from Ember; peak loads from China Electric Power News since 2020; peak loads until 2019 and pumped hydro capacity from Wind Financial Terminal; battery storage capacity from China Energy Storage Alliance; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.

China’s energy storage capacity increased by 75GW year-on-year in 2025, while peak demand only increased by 55GW. The rise in storage capacity in 2025 is also larger than the three-year average increase in peak loads, some 72GW per year.

Peak demand growth matters, because power systems have to be designed to reliably provide enough electricity supply at the moment of highest demand.

Moreover, the increase in peak loads is a key driver of continued additions of coal and gas-fired power plants, which reached the highest level in a decade in 2025.

The growth in energy storage could provide China with an alternative way to meet peak loads without relying on increased fossil fuel-based capacity.

The growth in storage capacity is set to continue after a new policy issued by China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in January.

This policy means energy storage sites will be supported by so-called “capacity payments”, which to date have only been available to coal- and gas-fired power plants and pumped hydro storage.

Concerns about having sufficient “firm” power capacity in the grid – that which can be turned on at will – led the government to promote new coal and gas-fired power projects in recent years, leading to the largest fossil-fuel based capacity additions in a decade in 2025, with another 290GW of coal-fired capacity still under construction.

Reforming the power system and increasing storage capacity would enable the grid to accommodate much higher shares of solar and wind, while reducing the need for new coal or gas capacity to meet rising peaks in demand.

This would both unlock more clean-power generation from existing capacity and improve the economics and risk profiles of new projects, stimulating more growth in capacity.

Peaking power CO2 requires more clean-energy growth

China’s key climate commitments for the next five-year period until 2030 are to peak CO2 emissions and to reduce carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels. The latter target requires limiting CO2 emissions at or below their 2025 level in 2030.

The record clean-energy additions in 2023-25 have barely sufficed to stabilise power-sector emissions, showing that if rapid growth in power demand continues, meeting the 2030 targets requires keeping clean-energy additions close to 2025 levels over the next five years.

China’s central government continues to telegraph a much lower level of ambition, with the NDRC setting a target of “around” 30% of power generation in 2030 coming from solar and wind, up from around 22% in 2025.

If electricity demand grows in line with the State Grid forecast of 5.6% per year, then limiting the share of wind and solar to 30% would leave space for fossil-fuel generation to grow at 3% per year from 2025 to 2030, even after increases from nuclear and hydropower.

Such an increase would mean missing China’s Paris commitments for 2030.

Alternatively, in order to meet the forecast increase in electricity demand without increasing generation from fossil fuels would require wind and solar’s share to reach 37% in 2030.

Similarly, China’s target of a non-fossil energy share of 25% in 2030 will not be sufficient to meet its carbon-intensity reduction commitment for 2030, unless energy demand growth slows down sharply.

This target is unlikely to be upgraded, since it is already enshrined in China’s Paris Agreement pledge, so in practice the target would need to be substantially overachieved if the country is to meet its other commitments.

If energy demand growth continues at the 2025 rate and the share of non-fossil energy only rises from 22% in 2025 to 25% in 2030, then the consumption of fossil fuels would increase by 3% per year, with a similar rise in CO2 emissions.

Still, another recent sign that clean-energy growth could keep exceeding government targets came in early February when the China Electricity Council projected solar and wind capacity additions of more than 300GW in 2026 – well beyond the government goal of “over 200GW”.

Chemical industry

The only significant source of growth in CO2 emissions in 2025 was the chemical industry, with sharp increases in the consumption of both coal and oil.

This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates how CO2 emissions appear to have peaked from cement production, transport, the power sector and others, whereas the chemicals industry is posting strong increases.

Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals.
Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Even though chemical-industry emissions are small relative to other sectors – at roughly 13% of China’s total – the pace of expansion is creating an outsize impact.

Without the increase from the chemicals sector, China’s total CO2 emissions would have fallen by an estimated 2%, instead of the 0.3% reported here.

Without changes to policy, emission growth is set to continue, as the coal-to-chemicals industry is planning major increases in capacity.

Whether these expansion plans receive backing in the upcoming five-year plan for 2026-30 will have a major impact on China’s emission trends.

Another key factor is the development of oil and gas prices. Production in the coal-based chemical industry is only profitable when coal is significantly cheaper than crude oil.

The current coal-to-chemicals capacity in China is dominated by plants producing higher-value – and therefore less price-sensitive – chemicals such as olefins and aromatics, as feedstocks for the production of plastics.

In contrast, the planned expansion of the sector is expected to be largely driven by plants producing oil products and synthetic gas to be used for energy. For these products, electrification and clean-electricity generation provide a direct alternative, meaning they are even more sensitive to low oil and gas prices than chemicals production.

Outlook for China’s emissions

This is the latest analysis for Carbon Brief to show that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for seven quarters or 21 months, marking the first such streak on record that has not been associated with a slowdown in energy demand growth.

Notably, while emissions have stabilised or begun a slow decline, there has not yet been a substantial reduction from the level reached in early 2024. This means that a small jump in emissions could see them exceed the previous peak level.

China’s official plans only call for peaking emissions shortly before 2030, which would allow for a rebound from the current plateau before the ultimate emissions peak.

If China is to meet its 2030 carbon intensity commitment – a 65% reduction on 2005 levels – then emissions would have to fall from the peak back to current levels by 2030.

Whether China’s policymakers are still committed to meeting this carbon intensity pledge, after the setbacks during the previous five-year period, is a key open question. The 2030 energy targets set to date have fallen short of what would be required.

The most important signal will be whether the top-level five-year plan for 2026-30, due in March, sets a carbon intensity target aligned with the 2030 Paris commitment.

Officially, China is sticking to the timeline of peaking CO2 emissions “before 2030”, which was announced by president Xi Jinping in 2020.

According to an authoritative explainer on the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the upcoming five-year plan, published by state-backed news agency Xinhua, coal consumption should “reach its peak and enter a plateau” from 2027.

It says that continued increases in demand for coal from electricity generators and the chemicals industry would be offset by reductions elsewhere. This is despite the fact that China’s coal consumption overall has already been falling for close to two years.

The reference to a “plateau” in coal consumption indicates that in official plans, meaningful absolute reductions in emissions would have to wait until after 2030. Any increase in coal consumption from 2025 to 2027, before the targeted plateau, would need to be offset by reductions in oil consumption, to meet the carbon intensity target.

Moreover, allowing coal consumption in the power sector to grow beyond the peak of overall coal use and emissions implies slowing down China’s clean-energy boom. So far, the boom has continued to exceed official targets by a wide margin.

In addition, the explainer’s expectation of further growth in coal use by the chemicals industry indicates a green light for at least a part of its sizable expansion plans.

The Xinhua article recognises that oil product consumption has already peaked, but says that oil use in the chemicals industry has kept growing. It adds that overall oil consumption should peak in 2026.

Elsewhere, the article speaks of “vigorously” developing non-fossil energy and “actively” developing “distributed” solar, which has slowed down due to recent pricing policies.

Yet it also calls for “high-quality development” of fossil fuels and increased efforts in domestic oil and gas production, suggesting that China continues to take an “all of the above” approach to energy policy.

The outcome of all this depends on how things turn out in reality. The past few years show it is possible that clean energy will continue to overperform its targets, preventing growth in energy consumption from fossil fuels despite this policy support.

The key role of the clean-energy boom in driving GDP growth and investments is one key motivator for policymakers to keep the boom going, even when central targets would allow for a slowdown. It is also possible that the five-year plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises could play a key role in raising ambition, as they did in 2022.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.

Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil, apparent consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is taken from Sinopec quarterly results, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use.

Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated from refinery throughput, with the production of the transport fuels and the net exports of other oil products subtracted. Fossil-fuel consumption includes non-energy use such as plastics, as most products are short-lived and incineration is the dominant disposal method.

The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions have now been ‘flat or falling’ for 21 months

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Cropped 25 March 2026: Seabed mining talks stall | ‘Blueprint’ for land use | India feels Iran war impacts

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We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Seabed mining talks stall

UNFINISHED BUSINESS: The International Seabed Authority (ISA) ended a two-week meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, without agreement on the “long-delayed” code for deep-sea mining, which “remains both unfinished and deeply contested”, said Oceanographic. Several countries raised “fundamental scientific, environmental and governance gaps” in the draft regulations, it added. CBC News reported that although the ISA’s executive secretary, Leticia Carvalho, had previously said she “hoped a mining code could be finalised this year”, she “did not provide a new timeline” following the most recent talks.

DOUBLE TROUBLE: Meanwhile, federal regulators in the US have announced that they have identified nearly 70m acres (283,000 square kilometres) of seabed off the Northern Mariana Islands “that could be open to mineral leasing”, reported E&E News. The outlet noted that this recommendation was nearly double the government’s initial area under consideration, announced last autumn.

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PROCESS PROBLEMS: The CBC News article noted that 40 member countries now support a moratorium on deep-sea mining, but the ISA has “faced mounting pressure in recent months after the US…moved to begin approving mining outside the ISA process”. In the Conversation, an international-law expert from Duke University wrote: “The Trump administration’s attempt to unilaterally exploit the seabed resources of the global commons will severely undermine part of the rules-based international order that the US built and of which it has been the main beneficiary.”

England’s new ‘blueprint’ for land use

‘BLUEPRINT’: The UK government released its “long-awaited and much-delayed” land-use framework, detailing how England can optimise its land for food, housing, climate and nature, reported Carbon Brief. The “blueprint” found that “England has enough land to meet all of its objectives, if land is used efficiently”, the outlet added. The Guardian said that “farmers and campaigners broadly welcomed the framework”, with the president of the National Farmers’ Union saying that implementation “will require clear guidance, the right policy framework and incentives to avoid unintended outcomes”.

PRACTICAL MATTERS: Alongside the framework, the Environment, food and rural affairs committee of the UK parliament “launched a major inquiry into how England’s land is used”, reported FarmingUK. The inquiry will focus on how the land-use framework “works in practice”, it added. The outlet said: “Looking ahead, the committee will scrutinise how government policy [on land use] is coordinated across departments.”

SLOW PROGRESS: Meanwhile, the National Audit Office found that nature-restoration progress across England has “slowed due to ‘recent funding uncertainty’”, reported Agriland. The office examined the Nature for Climate Fund, a programme under the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, which was established in 2020 and “led to a substantial increase in tree-planting and peatland restoration”, the outlet said. However, the report also found that “targets in England will continue to be missed” without substantial changes, said the Forestry Journal.

News and views

  • PROTECTED WATERS: On 10 March, outgoing Chilean president Gabriel Boric signed a decree to expand and “fully protect” two marine protected areas that “harbour the highest concentration of marine species found nowhere else on Earth”, Island Conservation reported. The new administration told the Guardian that its “intention is not to eliminate protections” and, barring legal and technical issues, it will allow the areas “to go forward as planned”.
  • BUSINESS CLASH: Following “clashes” with the agribusiness sector, Brazil launched its new climate plan, which calls for a 49-58% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 2022 levels by 2035, reported Folha de Sao Paolo. Meanwhile, Climate Home News wrote that the “Tropical Forest Forever Facility” – which Brazil championed – is “unlikely to make payments to rainforest countries until at least 2028”.
  • SAVE THE FISHES: A new UN report identified 325 freshwater fish species “requiring coordinated international conservation action” to address declining populations due to overexploitation, habitat degradation and other compounding pressures, said Down to Earth. The report was launched at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, which began on Monday in Campo Grande, Brazil.
  • FACE PALM: A Climate Home News and SVT investigation found that Neste – the world’s largest producer of sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) – was sourcing “key ingredients from an opaque supply chain” that allowed “fresh palm oil to be passed off as waste”. Neste said it would look into the outlets’ findings, adding that it was “currently not aware of any verified cases of fraud” in its raw-materials sourcing.
  • CRITICAL HABITAT: The US government plans to approve the country’s first critical-minerals mine in Patagonia, Arizona, even as locals warn of potential water and biodiversity impacts, Inside Climate News reported. The project site – which holds “one of the largest undeveloped zinc resources in the world” – borders “one of the most important biodiversity hotspots in North America”, which is home to 12 endangered species, including jaguars and Mexican spotted owls, the outlet added.
  • RE-PEAT OFFENDERS: More than 370,000 tonnes of peat were exported from Ireland in 2025, with revenues totalling around €40m – “despite there being no known legal commercial peat extraction operation in the country”, said the Irish Times. This represents a higher volume than was exported in 2023 or 2024, but a decrease from the nearly one million tonnes exported in 2020, it added.
  • ‘FIELDS OF IRON’: Rural voters in Denmark have begun to “sour” on solar power, with one populist leader in 2024 saying “no to fields of iron!”, said the Guardian. Danish PM Mette Frederiksen “failed to secure a majority” in the country’s general election on Tuesday, where the climate footprint of agriculture has been a concern for voters, reported BBC News.

Spotlight

Plate half full

This week, Carbon Brief looks at the impact of the US-Israel-Iran war on India’s kitchens, restaurants, workers and farmers – and what it means for the climate.

On 23 March, two Indian-flagged tankers made their way through the mine-laden Strait of Hormuz, hugging Iran’s coastline.

The ships are carrying more than 90,000 tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), equivalent to roughly one day of the country’s cooking gas consumption.

In India – the world’s second-largest LPG importer – gas is intrinsically tied to food security.

With 60% of these imports sourced from Gulf countries, the war’s immediate impacts have been acutely visible in India’s kitchens and restaurants.

Lunch on the move

Since 10 March, many Indian cities and towns have seen snaking queues and skirmishes breaking out as India’s poor rushed to refill gas cylinders in the heat of an early summer.

As the government prioritised the 340m households that use LPG over commercial establishments, restaurants have faced “catastrophic closures”.

Ashok Vada Pav – birthplace of Mumbai’s vada pav, or potato burger, which has been described as the “soul of the [city’s] working class” – has shut its doors. Ramashraya – serving south Indian breakfasts since 1939 – had to turn away customers who have been coming there for decades.

However, hot lunches – cooked at home or purchased from the city’s many canteens – continue to travel the length of Mumbai in tiered steel tiffins carried by the iconic dabbawallahs.

A dabbawallah balances hot tiffins to take to office workers in the south of Mumbai. Credit: Alamy Stock Photo
A dabbawallah balances hot tiffins to take to office workers in the south of Mumbai. Credit: frederic REGLAIN / Alamy Stock Photo.

Ramdas Karwande, president of the Mumbai Tiffin Box Suppliers Association, told Carbon Brief that, of the 80,000 lunches that dabbawallahs carry across the city each day, 40% are typically from caterers. That number has halved in the past weeks, he said.

Karwande explained:

“People who come to this city from places far away have no choice but to eat canteen food. But home food is still on the move, because everyone needs to eat somehow.”

Fuel to firewood

In an address to parliament on Monday, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi likened the fallout of the war to that of the Covid-19 pandemic – a comparison that has drawn criticism.

The cooking gas shortages have prompted an exodus of migrant workers leaving cities for their home states, where biomass cooking remains accessible.

Cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai, have put a pause on emissions curbs for dirtier fuels since 14 March, as poorer families facing soaring black-market gas prices turn to wood, kerosene and coal.

While government gas and biogas schemes have led to a decrease in firewood usage in many states over many years, analysts have said the current crisis “offers a critical moment to rethink India’s cooking energy mix”.

In Mumbai’s wealthy suburb of Khar, induction stoves have been “flying off shelves”, Jaffair Sheikh, who sells appliances at an upmarket electronic retail store, told Carbon Brief. He added:

“We’re selling 20 units a day, when we used to sell almost zero before this war.”

However, only 5% of India’s households have access to electric cooking devices and the country’s grid is still largely powered by coal.

Away from the cities, there is a looming fear of the war’s impact on agriculture, given India’s dependence on the Gulf for fertiliser imports.

Siraj Hussain, India’s former agriculture secretary, told Carbon Brief:

“Gas is the main raw material for urea – and urea stocks are grossly insufficient to meet even kharif season (May to July) demand. But if the government can reduce supply to states where excessive fertiliser is used and increase supply to states where consumption is low, to some extent, this deficit will not be as harmful as it would be otherwise.”

Crop stock and biofuel fears

Punjab’s farmers, meanwhile, were already worried about the impact of an early summer on wheat production.

However, Hussain told Carbon Brief that India’s food security in terms of wheat and rice “will not be affected too much” because the country is “sitting on” excessive stocks. He added that he hopes the war will “persuade the government” to reduce its use of rice for ethanol production.

Still, food inflation is already being felt across the country. Karwande added:

“Everyone is tense. The monthly payments we get are going down and running a house is now difficult: the same problems we had during lockdown are back. Oil, sugar, everything has become expensive. This is not just our problem; this is everybody’s problem. The government has to do something.”

Watch, read, listen

FARMERS’ FUTURES: High Country News explored how farmers in the Colorado River basin are dealing with water shortages “amid deep political divisions about the river’s future”.

FOOD SHOCK: Experts on Al Jazeera’s Counting the Cost podcast looked at whether the US-Israel war on Iran could “​​trigger the next global food shock”.

LYNX IN BIO: BBC News featured the winning images from the Wildlife Photographer of the Year People’s Choice Award. The photos will be on display at London’s Natural History Museum until 12 July.

ECO BREAKDOWN: Mongabay detailed the causes of the “mental health crisis” impacting conservationists, including biodiversity decline, climate change, low wages and burnout.

New science

  • Less than half of the Amazon rainforest that was affected by the 2023-24 drought is “expected to recover to pre-drought conditions” within seven years | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
  • Beavers can turn the ecosystems surrounding streams into “persistent” sinks of carbon that can sequester an order of magnitude more than non-beaver-modified ecosystems can store | Communications Earth & Environment
  • Climate change-induced heat could result in half a trillion hours of lost productivity by 2055 in a low-emissions scenario, disproportionately impacting low-income countries and agricultural workers | GeoHealth

In the diary

  • 23 March-2 April: Third meeting of the preparatory commission for the High Seas Treaty, New York
  • 24-27 March: 64th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Bangkok
  • 26-29 March: 14th ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization, Yaoundé, Cameroon

Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyer and Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org

The post Cropped 25 March 2026: Seabed mining talks stall | ‘Blueprint’ for land use | India feels Iran war impacts appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Cropped 25 March 2026: Seabed mining talks stall | ‘Blueprint’ for land use | India feels Iran war impacts

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Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister

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The global energy shock triggered by the Iran war could give countries the chance to build a “new geopolitical balance” by forging a coalition committed to phasing out fossil fuels, Colombian Environment Minister Irene Vélez Torres said.

Delegates from about 45 nations are set to meet next month in Colombia’s Caribbean city of Santa Marta for the first conference on the transition away from fossil fuels, after a drive by 80 countries at COP30 failed to deliver a roadmap to phase out planet-heating coal, oil and gas.

Vélez Torres told an online press briefing her “maximum aspiration” for the summit was to “incline geopolitics towards a coalition of countries willing to eliminate fossil fuels” that can start taking action without having to negotiate agreements by consensus at UN talks.

“Ever since COP30 there has been growing momentum. The current crisis only gives us more relevance. We have a possibility to materialise a new geopolitical balance,” she said.

She added “it’s not the moment” to formalise this coalition or give it a name, but said that “as conversations move forward, and we can meet at a second conference to consolidate shared visions, something more formal can be created”.

    The conflict in the Middle East has disrupted about a fifth of the world’s gas passing through the Strait of Hormuz, particularly heading towards Asia. This has led to growing calls for investment in renewables as a way to strengthen energy security and economic stability, as oil and gas prices skyrocket.

    COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago, Brazil’s top climate diplomat, told the online briefing that building a parallel process on phasing out fossil fuels outside the UN climate regime – which requires slow negotiations with oil and gas producers to reach consensus – can be “extremely useful”.

    COP30 new roadmap proposal

    After governments failed to kickstart the creation of a roadmap away from fossil fuels at COP30, Corrêa do Lago proposed to draft a voluntary proposal instead, which he said would be launched towards the second half of the year.

    He added that, because it is not a formal document under the UN process, the voluntary roadmap was not meant to be adopted by countries at COP31 later this year, but to contribute to continued debate.

    “The more that we create a document that incorporates the positions, figures and concerns of various countries, the more influence it will have on debates at the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement,” he said.

    UN head calls for platform for “honest dialogue” on fossil fuel transition

    Countries have been asked to submit inputs to the Brazil-led roadmap. Meanwhile, the Australian COP31 “president of negotiations” Chris Bowen has vowed to continue debates on the fossil fuel transition, while Turkish COP president Murat Kurum rejected it as a major focus and said he will “safeguard the development priorities of the countries”.

    Vélez Torres added that both the Santa Marta conference and Brazil’s roadmap were “deeply complementary”, with the summit focusing more on channelling technical support, finance and “creating an honest space where we can put all the cards on the table”.

    Carlos Nobre, a veteran Brazilian climate scientist, said the push for a transition away from fossil fuels was “essential”, and added that countries must focus on accelerating a “super-rapid” energy transition at COP31 to prevent global temperatures from crossing dangerous climate tipping points such as melting permafrost or the collapse of the Amazon rainforest.

    Colombia and Brazil head to polls

    While both Colombia and Brazil have led the push for a global phase-out of fossil fuels, the two South American countries are heading to the polls later this year. Both countries face anti-climate movements promising to change course if elected.

    Vélez Torres warned of “great political risks of a relapse”, referring to a potential new government reversing the current government’s halt on all new coal, oil and gas exploration. Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella has proposed to resume production, particularly venturing into shale gas fracking.

    “However, we think we are building a bloc that is bigger than a country. The sense of continuity and sense of progress that we are giving to this discussion, I think are going to be difficult to relapse,” she said.

    Corrêa do Lago said “this year we have to show the world what alternatives are viable”.

    “We have to work together and not let that those who are betting on a general disaster divide those who are searching for solutions,” he added.

    The post Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister appeared first on Climate Home News.

    Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister

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    Can new CEO steer Global Center on Adaptation back on course?

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    The new head of the Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) faces a formidable task: raise urgent funding to get the organisation back on track following damaging revelations about its former management, just as tight budgets prompt many donors to rethink their climate spending.

    Rindra Rabarinirinarison, who served as Madagascar’s economy and finance minister from 2021-2025, said the change of leadership at the Rotterdam-based GCA was “an opportunity to reset things”, pledging to repair the centre’s reputation after its founding CEO left under a cloud.

    “I plan to strengthen partnerships and rebuild this trust. Why? Because people only give you money if they trust you – and they only trust you if they know you well,” she told Climate Home News in her first interview since taking over at the GCA’s floating office in the Netherlands this month.

    During her first weeks in the job, she plans “to meet with all our partners to correct the communication challenges that have emerged” – a reference to the revelations about the centre’s workplace culture that emerged in a series of investigative articles published by Dutch broadcaster NOS last year.

      When the GCA was launched to considerable fanfare in 2018, climate adaptation was largely neglected by politicians, development banks and investors, who were more focused on efforts to cut planet-heating emissions than on helping people cope with their effects. The GCA’s plan, together with the high-powered Global Commission on Adaptation which it co-hosted, was to correct that imbalance.

      Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who served as founding chair of the GCA and is now its emeritus chair, said back then that the commission, of which he was a member, would “play a vital role in elevating the political importance of adaptation, and also in making the case that greater resilience is achievable”.

      Today, most experts agree that adaptation – and the increasingly urgent need to invest in it – have won far more prominence on the international agenda, even if dollars have yet to flow on the scale required.

      Richard Klein, director of science and innovation at the GCA between September 2018 and December 2019, said the centre had helped propel that progress, alongside other organisations like the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

      But Klein, now an independent adaptation expert, told Climate Home News the GCA had squandered the opportunity to generate innovative research and had become “a mid-sized consultancy … that lives way beyond its means”.

      “High-pressure” environment

      The reporting by NOS portrayed a toxic workplace culture in which staff were expected to put furthering the high-profile advocacy of the GCA’s dynamic ex-boss Patrick Verkooijen ahead of their research to help vulnerable communities adapt to worsening extreme weather and rising seas.

      Verkooijen recently stepped down from the GCA after two four-year terms during which he was appointed as chancellor of the University of Nairobi, where the centre planned to set up a dual headquarters.

      Asked about the criticism of his leadership, Verkooijen said the GCA had been created as a startup organisation at a time when there was “a very great sense of urgency that adaptation needed to be scaled up – all leading to a huge amount of pressure for delivery”.

      “I believe managers and staff did their best, though certainly not every system was perfect – there could be tense and high-pressure moments,” he told Climate Home News in emailed responses.

      Conversations with ex-GCA employees, as well as an unpublished editorial authored by several former staffers and shared with Climate Home News, supported the NOS reports about an atmosphere of conflict in which operations were focused on advancing Verkooijen’s efforts to promote adaptation and the centre’s work to leaders, especially in Africa.

      “It was painful, how, in the end, just everything was about visibility around him,” Klein said.

      Verkooijen said that while he would not discount employees’ personal experiences, the GCA had not received official complaints about its leadership and “did not recognise the environment as it was characterised in media”. The GCA has invested in building up staff systems and safeguards, especially in the last three years, he added.

      “Significant” downsizing underway

      Rabarinirinarison takes over as the organisation faces tough decisions about its size and capacity going forward. It is being forced to downsize from 60-plus employees because of financial uncertainty following an end to funding from the British government and a question-mark over whether other countries – including the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway – will renew their support.

      Other key funders, including France and the Gates Foundation, have agreed to provide continued backing, the GCA said. It denied a report by NOS that it is facing imminent bankruptcy, which Climate Home News understands was based on a confidential internal document outlining a range of scenarios in line with different funding outcomes.

      Rabarinirinarison said she could not comment on potential layoffs, which are being discussed as part of a “significant resizing to adjust the head count with the contracted resources available to us”.

      But she conceded that the centre’s current financial situation is “very serious right now”. Funding from the Dutch government – which was instrumental in setting up the GCA – is due to run out in May, and earlier efforts to win a new commitment must now be revived after a minority centrist government took office in February. Prime Minister Rob Jetten is a former climate minister and supports the clean energy transition.

      “We are hopeful the new government’s approaches to our work will be favourable – and this is the advantages to have a new management, new face, new hope and new explanations,” said Rabarinirinarison, adding that the Netherlands will be her first port of call, followed by other key partners that have backed the GCA up to now.

      She is also planning to seek potential new sources of funding in the Middle East and Asia, where the GCA has offices in Bangladesh and China.

      The centre’s work so far has been heavily focused on supporting large adaptation projects carried out by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank across Africa, to which it has provided consulting services and technical advice.

      Flagship Africa investment programme

      The GCA threw its weight behind the Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program (AAAP), which launched its second phase last September at the Africa Climate Summit in Ethiopia and the United Nations General Assembly.

      The AAAP investment initiative for climate adaptation on the continent began in 2021 and was implemented through a partnership involving the African Union Commission, the AfDB and the GCA.

      According to the GCA’s website, its first phase embedded “climate adaptation solutions” into more than $20 billion of development investments across some 40 African nations.

      Global South’s climate adaptation bill to top $300 billion a year by 2035: UN

      An article by NOS, published last October, accused the centre of misleading donors by overstating its role in the AAAP and other projects, saying documentation examined by NOS did not back up the extent of GCA’s claimed contributions to the work.

      The GCA, for its part, put out a statement rejecting the NOS findings, which it said “provide an inaccurate representation of the Center’s work and achievements, as well as our relationships with partners”.

      A GCA spokesperson told Climate Home News that, after sharing information with NOS and requesting corrections from the outlet which were not made, it recently filed a complaint about the coverage with the Dutch ombudsman.

      In emailed comments, Verkooijen defended the achievements of the centre under his stewardship, saying it had made a “substantial contribution” to developing knowledge including through its co-management of the Global Commission on Adaptation and its “State and Trends on Adaptation series” of reports. He said that, at the advocacy level, GCA had made “clear-cut contributions to elevating the level of political priority for adaptation” and had participated in embedding climate considerations into around 100 large development projects delivered by international financial institutions.

      In most cases, he wrote, “these projects … would not have factored in climate risks and adaptation without the GCA’s contribution – or not to the same degree”.

      Pitching adaptation as a “driver for growth”

      In the future, Rabarinirinarison thinks the GCA can continue to act as a “solutions broker” on adaptation, while facilitating access to international climate finance for Global South governments and communities which have limited capacity to develop bankable adaptation projects and navigate complex processes.

      The GCA can use its expertise to help countries understand the significant risks of failing to protect their economies from extreme weather and serve as a strong proponent of adaptation as a “driver for growth”, she said.

      The centre still has “room to grow”, she added, by delivering more “technical expertise reports” and “technical advocacy”, ensuring that adaptation is “effectively included in large-scale financial institutional lending” and bridging the gap between discussions and implementation at scale.

      Climate adaptation can’t be just for the rich, COP30 president says

      Some in the sector question the need for a Global North-based organisation to be doing such work for the benefit of Global South countries, despite its shift to African leadership. The GCA board also has a new chair, with Mauritius President Ameenah Gurib-Fakim this month taking over the role from Senegal’s former leader, Macky Sall, who is bidding to become the next UN chief.

      Finding a USP in a maturing sector

      Sander Chan, who was a senior researcher at the GCA from 2020 to 2022, criticised the organisation for focusing too heavily on building the business case for adaptation, mobilising money and seeking private-sector involvement, while doing too little to include or strengthen the perspectives and voices of local and Indigenous communities.

      The centre has, however, developed a training and advocacy network for some 35,000 youth supporters of adaptation across the Global South, as well as hosting an online platform for locally led adaptation intended to showcase and connect community groups and practitioners.

      Klein and Chan, now an associate professor at Radboud University in the Netherlands, also questioned the value added by the centre beyond its awareness-raising and brokering roles, which they argue are now less important and can be fulfilled by other better-established institutions.

      Klein said it will be tough for the GCA’s new leadership to develop a unique selling point unless it goes beyond its current activities, given that more organisations today are offering similar services and looking for a larger share of the pie.

      “I think it’s more than just a matter of rebuilding trust in how [the centre] used to operate,” he said. “It’s also: is there still a need for what they’re doing?”

      Rabarinirinarison’s strategy, if the GCA can procure funding to get itself back on course, is to expand its work and knowledge base to pitch adaptation as key to economic growth and “selling this product as our main asset”.

      “I do believe that GCA is able to perform essential services, and its partners are able to notice its value and continue to support us if we communicate well,” she said.

      The post Can new CEO steer Global Center on Adaptation back on course? appeared first on Climate Home News.

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