Last week, hundreds of scientists, policymakers and journalists flocked to the University of Exeter to attend an international conference on “tipping points”.
Attendees also explored “positive tipping points” – large-scale, self-propelling social changes that would reduce the impact of humans on the climate.
(For more on the key talking points, new research and ideas that emerged from the four-day event, see Carbon Brief’s full write-up of the event.)
On the sidelines of the conference, Carbon Brief asked a wide range of delegates which tipping point concerns them the most.
These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:
Prof Gabi Hegerl: “I am particularly worried about tipping points that involve the biosphere and humans due to breaching thresholds for heat or drought that then ripple into food availability, livelihood and ecosystems.”
Prof Carlos Nobre: “The Amazon is a very serious tipping point, because [dieback] could release around 250bn tonnes of CO2 by 2100 – which will make it impossible to [limit global warming] at 1.5C.”
Gaia Vince: “I would say that we have already passed the tipping point for coral reef ecosystems…As a scuba diver, I find it a tragedy because I love coral reef ecosystems, but it’s also a tragedy for human systems.”
Dr Andrew Hartley: “The tipping point I’m most concerned about is Amazon forest dieback…because of the significance of the carbon cycle and the feedback to the global climate. Also [due to] the effects that Amazon tipping has on food security, both locally and globally.”
Prof Tim Lenton: “The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, or AMOC, for sure. The consequences of crashing that would be devastating globally – and also for where I live in the UK.”
Prof Peter Cox: “The one that I’ve worked on most and worries me most at the moment is Amazon dieback. And that’s because we’ve got two things, two stressors, going on at once that push it in the wrong direction. Climate change is one, deforestation is another.”
Prof Johan Rockström: “The tipping element that worries me most is coral reef systems, for the simple reason that the scientific uncertainty range is very limited.”
Dr Patricia Pinho: “For me, it is the Amazon…I think it’s going to be a really profound, irreversible change that will affect the global population in the most dramatic way.”
Prof Ricarda Winkelmann: “I’m mostly concerned about the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets. This is because we know that, even at lower warming levels, they are already at risk of transgressing tipping points in certain regions.”
Dr Nico Wunderling: “The tipping element that worries me most is the Amazon rainforest. This is because the Amazon rainforest is not only threatened by climate change, but also by deforestation at the same time.”
Dr Rebecca Shaw: “The coral reef tipping point…It signals the end of the most colourful and biodiverse ecosystem which supports the nutrition and livelihoods of over one billion people.”
Dr David Obura: “The ice [tipping elements] – because they are the first ones to go that have cascading impacts on other tipping elements.”
Dr David Armstrong McKay: “The Amazon is actually probably closer to a deforestation-induced tipping point than to a climate change-induced tipping point. So, I actually think that could be potentially in the offing sooner than we would like.”
Kate Raworth: “The tipping point that I fear we will fail to cross is [the social tipping point] around transforming our mindsets.”
Chair in climate system science in the school of geosciences at the University of Edinburgh
I am worried about all of them, but for the immediate future, I am particularly worried about tipping points that involve the biosphere and humans due to breaching thresholds for heat or drought that then ripple into food availability, livelihood and ecosystems. The Earth system tipping points will do that too, but maybe a little bit later. Examples [of this] are the coral diebacks triggered by marine heatwaves, forest change and fires, and droughts threatening livelihoods and putting people on the move.
I did a research project on the US Dust Bowl and the trigger [for that event] was drought causing vegetation and crop dieback, [which led to] extreme heat and dust storms in response – and migration, as memorialised in [the 1939 John Steinbeck novel] The Grapes of Wrath. And, now with warming, all droughts get supercharged.
Prof Carlos Nobre Scientist and meteorologist who spearheaded the multi-disciplinary, multinational large-scale biosphere-atmosphere experiment in Amazonia
The Amazon is a very serious tipping point, because [dieback] could release around 250bn tonnes of CO2 by 2100 – which will make it impossible to [limit global warming] at 1.5C. We could also lose the largest [host to] biodiversity on the planet, which would induce a tremendous, large number of epidemics and several pandemics. Also, of course, the Amazon forest controls aspects of the global climate. In South America, the climate is entirely controlled by the Amazon forest.
I’m most worried about Amazon [dieback] because I have worked on it for 40 years. But the other tipping points deeply concern me. The melting of the permafrost will release more than 200bn tonnes [of greenhouse gases], mostly methane. Ice sheet melt in Greenland is a very serious tipping point because it could raise sea level rise by three metres in 200 years. The melting of Greenland has already started. Species extinction is also very serious.
One thing that was not much talked about [at this conference] is that when the ocean heats up, particularly the Arctic Ocean, then a tremendous amount of methane is released. And if that happens – if the Arctic Ocean warms up by 3-4C – the amount of methane that would be released could see [air] temperatures reach 8-10C [above pre-industrial levels]. At 8-10C, the only inhabitable places for us humans will be the top of the Alps, the Andes and the north and south poles. The rest of the planet would be uninhabitable.
I would say that we have already passed the tipping point for coral reef ecosystems, for example. That really is a tragedy. As a scuba diver, I find it a tragedy because I love coral reef ecosystems, but it’s also a tragedy for human systems. They are the nursery for our fisheries. And, of course, they’re not just fisheries – they are a valid ecosystem and a biodiversity hotspot. This will have untold consequences and cascading impacts for other parts of the ecosystem, for example, the cycling of nutrients and coral reefs are really important to stop coastal erosion. And they actually provide sand, the lovely white sand that people go on holiday for Bucha.
Climate impacts scientist at the Met Office Hadley Centre
The tipping point I’m most concerned about is Amazon forest dieback and reduction in the function of the Amazon forest, because of the significance of the carbon cycle and the feedback to the global climate. Also [due to] the effects that Amazon tipping has on food security, both locally and globally, because of [the Amazon’s] contribution to major commodity markets, such as soybean and maize.
This might interact with climate change in the future to lead to more severe events, particularly in populated areas of Brazil. If an Amazon tipping point were to occur, it might lead to more severe events on the coast of Brazil which would affect a much larger population. There are negative impacts across the forest from the drying of the forest, for example for the Indigenous communities, but also globally.
Founding director of the Global Systems Institute and chair in climate change and Earth system science at the University of Exeter
The Atlantic Meridional Overtoning Circulation, or AMOC, for sure. The consequences of crashing that would be devastating globally – and also for where I live in the UK. By our own calculation, we could have less than half the viable area for growing a couple of major staple crops, wheat and maize worldwide. We would have a widespread water crisis. We could have collapses of the monsoons in West Africa and India that would displace hundreds of millions of people. It is hard to see that as anything other than a catastrophe.
Professor of climate system dynamics in mathematics and director of the Global Systems Institute at the University of Exeter
The one that I have worked on most and worries me most at the moment is Amazon dieback. And that’s because we’ve got two things, two stressors going on at once that push it in the wrong direction. Climate change is one, deforestation is another. You can imagine crossing the boundary in various ways – but, if you push diagonally, you get there quicker.
If I had spoken to you 25 years ago, I would have said I’m really worried about [Amazon dieback]. Then I went through a phase of thinking that the models have overdone it. And now I’m thinking the models that don’t include land-use change are underdoing it. So, I’m more concerned about that one.
There are others as well, but that is the one that is also quite fast. The other [tipping points] we worry about, we’re worried about a long-term commitment. It takes a while for the AMOC to shut down, it really does. It takes a while for the Greenland ice sheet to melt. We’ve done work that suggests you can overshoot even a little bit for these slow systems. The Amazon forest is a decadal dieback, especially if it is fire driven.
Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and professor in Earth system science at the University of Potsdam
There is not a simple answer to this – there is a two-part answer.
The tipping element that worries me most is coral reef systems, for the simple reason that the scientific uncertainty range is very limited. We have, unfortunately, ample evidence that at 1.5C we’re very likely to knock over, potentially, the entire tropical coral reef system on Earth. [This threatens] the livelihoods of 400 million people and a fundamental nursing ground for the whole ocean food web. So that is one deep concern. It is the canary in the coal mine – the first kid on the block to fall over. We’re so close.
The second one is AMOC – the whole overturning of heat in the Atlantic, which connects the entire ocean system. Not only is the latest science showing that we are going from low likelihood to uncomfortably high likelihood, but we also know – with very little uncertainty – that this would cause a catastrophic impact across the entire world, and it would go fast. So the AMOC, I would argue, is today the most important scientific message to the world. If you want a really hard-hitting reason to act at a level of planetary emergency, it is the AMOC. That is the second one.
From a planetary boundary perspective, it is important to recognise that – on climate science grounds – the Amazon basin is not at risk of tipping until 3-5C of warming. But as soon as you factor in loss of biodiversity, deforestation and changes in hydrology – then the temperature risk goes down to between 1.5-2C. So suddenly – when taking a more integrated [assessment] approach – the conclusion is that it is also very close to a tipping point.
Deputy science director at the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM)
For me, it is the Amazon. When we think of the planetary crisis, we think about the Amazon and all the regulating climate services it provides. This is not only regionally, but we know it’s a global “climate good”, if you will. But it is highly sensitive to land-use change and increasing temperature. So, if we transition to a point of no return – Amazon dieback – and transforming or transitioning to another ecosystem, the function of the forest will not be doing what it has been doing for the past millennium and so on. And then we cannot revert this loss. I think it is going to be a really profound, irreversible change that will affect the global population in the most dramatic way.
Of course, we have the people on the front line that I’m working with – Indigenous people, traditional population – that are safeguarding this resource, but they are also at the front line of climate risks and the impacts that we already observe. If we miss this opportunity of really reverting from increasing greenhouse emissions and increasing temperature, we’re going to miss the window of opportunity to really protect the region, protect the ecosystem and the forest for the global society.
Founding director of the Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology and professor of climate system analysis at PIK and the University of Potsdam
So I am thinking about this from a risk perspective – so both the likelihood as well as the impacts – and I think the answer depends on that. Because when it comes to the likelihood and the particular threshold – and we know about those – I’m mostly concerned about the Greenland and the West Antarctic ice sheets. This is because we know that, even at lower warming levels, they’re already at risk of transgressing tipping points in certain regions.
But when it comes to the impacts and also the timescales over which those play out, there are other tipping elements that worry me most. In particular, regional tipping elements. So if we think of the mountain glaciers, for instance, these impacts are already experienced right now and several mountain glaciers are undergoing these accelerated changes. And so thinking about the timescales when it comes to the impacts is also incredibly important.
Junior professor at the Center for Critical Computational Studies at Goethe University Frankfurt and researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.
The tipping element that worries me most is the Amazon rainforest. This is because the Amazon rainforest is not only threatened by climate change, but also by deforestation at the same time. So that means that the critical threshold from climate change alone, at around 3-4C of global warming, can come down to 1.5-2C. Climate change and deforestation basically go hand-in-hand to lower the [Amazon’s tipping] threshold because of this double threat.
The coral reef tipping point – it comes first because of warming surface waters, and then the outcome is sealed by ocean acidification. It signals the end of the most colourful and biodiverse ecosystem which supports the nutrition and livelihoods of over one billion people and has captured the imagination of more people than any other through the characters like Nemo the clownfish, SpongeBob SquarePants, and, of course, Frank the coral [a character from an educational YouTube video].
If humanity is not motivated to act in the face of the loss of coral reefs, is there hope that we will act in time to prevent the Amazon and glacier tipping points?
Chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services and founding director of CORDIO East Africa
The ice [tipping elements] – because they are the first ones to go that have cascading impacts on other tipping elements. When [ice masses] reduce, we lose their albedo, waters heat up more [and] the AMOC can collapse. That has the biggest impact across the planetary system, including the Amazon.
My own [research], of course, is coral reefs. So, in a way, the coral reef tipping point does concern me the most. [But] it doesn’t have cascading impacts on other tipping elements. It does on people, in socioeconomic terms – but not on other system elements. So, in a sense, it is the least worrying one.
Lecturer in geography, climate change and society in the school of global studies at the University of Sussex and lead author on an influential tipping points assessment, published in Science in 2022
One of the tipping systems that concerns me the most is Amazon rainforest dieback. Because even though we assessed it a few years ago as having a warming threshold that’s a bit higher than what we might be seeing – we’ve thought it is maybe at a best estimate of 3.5C – there’s also deforestation as well. The Amazon is actually probably closer to a deforestation-induced tipping point than to a climate change-induced tipping point. So I actually think that could be potentially in the offing sooner than we would like. That would have huge impacts for biodiversity, for South America as a whole, by shifting rainfall patterns, which would really affect a lot of people for agriculture or ecosystems. Also, the Amazon as an ecosystem is so incredibly biodiverse and amazing in itself, it would be a tragedy to lose it.
Senior visiting research associate and lecturer at the University of Oxford’s Environmental Change Institute and co-founder and conceptual lead of Doughnut Economics Action Lab
The tipping point that I fear we will fail to cross is [the social tipping point] around transforming our mindsets. We need to move from the extractive, degenerative economy towards a regenerative one. This all starts within our head and it underlies everything.
[A failure to do this] is what is driving us towards all these [Earth system tipping points].
China has released its “15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy”, outlining key targets and policies for the sector in 2026-2030.
A key focus of the plan is boosting renewable generation and consumption as a share of China’s overall energy mix.
It calls for continued capacity additions of wind and solar – albeit at lower levels than previous years – as well as hydropower, biomass and other clean-energy sources.
Specifically, China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, 2,800GW will be wind and solar.
The country had previously pledged to install 1,200GW of wind and solar by 2030, a goal that China met six years early.
Another major theme is the provision of wind and solar supply that is “dependable” and “grid-friendly”.
Setting a target for “dependable output” from wind and solar could help to entrench their role as a provider of “energy security”, according to analysts.
The government also aims to boost renewables consumption by developing non-power uses of renewable energy, in sectors such as steel and chemicals.
Below, Carbon Brief examines the key targets and policies outlined in the five-year plan and what they mean for China’s energy transition.
Five-year plans are key to China’s political system. An overarching plan, covering all socioeconomic issues of importance to policy leaders, is published at the beginning of each five-year cycle.
The plan for the 15th five-year period (2026-2030) was published in March 2026.
It includes what the government considers to be the most important targets and policy signals for climate and energy. For example, binding targets for carbon intensity, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption and total energy production capacity.
Following this overarching document, five-year plans focused on specific sectors or themes are then published over the course of the five-year plan period.
This year, the government has already published several five-year plans related to energy and climate change. One covers the development of the “new-type” energy sector more broadly. Another wraps climate goals together with other environmental targets under the “Beautiful China” programme.
By contrast, the renewables five-year plan focuses specifically on the development of hydropower, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and wave energy.
It covers topics including capacity and generation targets, as well as efforts to increase integration and reliability of wind and solar. It also has policies to encourage “non-power use” of renewable energy and ways to strengthen innovation of clean-energy technologies.
What overarching renewables targets are in the plan?
China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, according to the five-year plan.
Of this, 2,800GW will be wind and solar – a pledge reiterated from China’s action plan for peaking carbon emissions, which was released earlier this month.
The goal more than doubles a previous 2030 target for wind and solar to reach 1,200GW, which China met six years early.
As of June 2026, the country has installed just under 2,000GW of wind and solar capacity, as well as 454GW of hydropower. Biomass, geothermal and wave energy hold very small shares of the overall energy mix.
As such, China would need to build 160GW of wind and solar each year – and just under 220GW of renewable capacity in total – to meet the targets.
The country installed 277GW of new solar alone in 2024 – and 315GW in 2025.
China’s total installed capacity of renewable energy from 2016-2025, and its target for 2030. Source: National Energy Administration, Carbon Brief.
A key part of meeting the targets will be the development of large-scale clean-energy bases in China’s northern regions. These will generate power to be exported elsewhere via ultra-high voltage lines. The plan also encourages greater “local consumption” and installations of distributed energy (see below).
The plan says that further research will be directed at increasing the renewable share of electricity generated by these large-scale energy bases to 100%.
A recent report by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that output from these bases “continues to be paired with coal-fired generation in the name of balancing and system flexibility”. It says that currently, coal generates 42% of the power transmitted to the rest of the country from these bases.
China will also add more hydropower, says the plan, with capacity rising from 448GW in 2025 to 570GW in 2030. Some 160GW of this will be pumped-storage hydropower.
Meanwhile, the plan sets a target for renewable power generation to reach 6,000 terawatt-hours (TWh), 4,000TWh of which would come from wind and solar.
This would be a 50% increase in five years as renewables generated just under 4,000TWh of electricity in 2025, according to the National Energy Administration.
By 2030, the plan says that total consumption of renewable energy will stand at 1.8bn tonnes of coal equivalent (Gtce).
This would be up from 1.2Gtce in 2025, which represented about one-fifth of China’s total energy consumption of 6.2Gtce that year.
The renewable targets in the plan are lower than those suggested in a recent study by high-profile Chinese scholars.
The study, from the department of energy and power engineering and the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University in Beijing, assessed the “likelihood of China attaining its carbon peak” under different pathways.
It found that, in order to meet its climate commitments, China would need to either install more than 4,000GW of “non-fossil energy capacity” before 2030, or to “maintain a total energy consumption” below 6.5Gtce.
The table below outlines some of the key renewables targets for 2030, as specified in the plan.
Key targets for 2030, adapted from 15th five-year plan for renewable energy
Type
2025
2030
Percentage change
Renewable energy use
1.2Gtce
1.8Gtce
53%
Total renewables capacity
2,340GW
3,500GW
50%
Wind and solar capacity
1,840GW
More than 2,800GW
52%
Of which: Solar thermal
1.8GW
15GW
733%
Hydro capacity
450GW
570GW
27%
Of which: Pumped storage hydropower
66GW
160GW
142%
Wave energy
–
0.4GW
–
Renewable generation
4,000TWh
6,000TWh
50%
Of which: Wind and solar
2,300TWh
4,000TWh
74%
Non-electricity use
60Mtce
150Mtce
150%
Renewable hydrogen
0.25Mt
2Mt
700%
Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?
As well as increasing the overall size of China’s renewable power supply, the country must also maintain an “uninterrupted and reliable power supply”, officials from the NDRC and NEA told state news agency Xinhua in coverage of the new plan.
To support this goal, the plan says that the development of renewables will “enter a new stage”. This will mean that “improving quality and serving as a reliable alternative” to fossil fuels will be as important as “expanding scale”.
The plan, therefore, proposes targets for the “firm capacity” from wind and solar (置信出力). This is the amount plants or grids can be relied on to produce during critical supply periods, in conjunction with on-site storage.
The target for wind is a firm capacity of at least 11% of total installed capacity by 2030, while the equivalent goal for solar is 6%.
Wind and solar will also be expected to supply more than 20% of total demand in peak periods during the summer and winter evenings, says the plan. It expects “reliable peak-shaving capacity from renewable sources” to reach more than 300GW.
The new targets are a “positive move”, says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, as it “only applies during peak load and critical supply periods, when coal power is typically used to stabilise the power supply”.
She adds that this could, theoretically, “prevent the construction of new coal-fired power projects that are proposed and approved for the reason of meeting peak demand”.
The new metrics mark a change in focus, says Lyu Wenbin, director general of the Energy Research Institute – a state thinktank under the NDRC – in an “explanatory reading” posted on BJX News. He says it “marks a shift in renewable energy development from the mere pursuit of installed capacity to…also taking into account system support capabilities”.
The plan pledges to “accelerate the construction of grid-friendly wind and solar power stations”. It says this will enhance “reliable peak-load generation” and strengthen renewables’ ability to ensure “safe and stable operation” of the grid.
It says this will particularly be a focus in the energy-hungry east, central and south areas of China.
It sets out a slightly different focus for areas that already have a high share of renewables in their power mix, such as north-west China. Here, the aim will be to develop wind and solar parks that are “capable of providing voltage, frequency and inertia support”.
“This is a real challenge”, says James Norman, research analyst at GEM. He says these challenges are particularly acute in some circumstances:
“[For example], when the share of wind and solar is very high, relatively few synchronous generators (like coal) are online or large volumes of electricity are being transferred through high voltage DC lines.”
The plan mentions many technological solutions to address the problem, he tells Carbon Brief. However, he adds, there are no quantitative details for the issue. For example, he notes there is no target for “how many gigawatts of wind and solar must gain grid-forming capability”. This is in contrast to the goals for overall renewables capacity or generation.
Norman was a co-author on the recent GEM report, which identified further barriers to renewable uptake. It said these include transmission bottlenecks, alongside systemic features such as dispatching and power-contract mechanisms.
As a result, said the report, renewable power – especially solar – is increasingly being “curtailed”, particularly in north-western and northern provinces.
Yao also notes that the plan does not “spell out specific measures to address systemic constraints” around the electricity grid and the role of coal in the power sector.
“I interpret this as evidence that the vested interests are still strong in the policy debate,” she adds.
What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?
Alongside gigawatt-scale clean-energy megabases, China also aims to expand construction of “distributed” energy. This means smaller-scale installations, such as rooftop solar.
More than 300GW of “distributed new energy” is to be added over 2026-30, some 60GW per year.
The plan aims for distributed new energy to be adopted in sectors such as industry, transport, buildings and agriculture.
Applications include the use of distributed solar and wind in industrial parks, coal mines and oilfields, as well as encouraging residents to install solar panels on buildings and developing rural clean-energy grids.
In some regions, distributed solar and wind is “likely to meet a large proportion of local demand”, says Prof Pan Jiahua at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He tells Carbon Brief that micro- and mini-grids using such resources will be particularly important in central and coastal China.
The 60GW annual target for new distributed energy is not “overly ambitious”, says Isadora Wang, head of China at the thinktank Transition Asia. She tells Carbon Brief that distributed solar additions, alone, exceeded 100GW in both 2024 and 2025.
Cosimo Ries, analyst at the consultancy Trivium China, agrees that the target is reachable. The biggest question mark, he tells Carbon Brief, is whether it will continue to make sense for industry and utilities to build distributed power at the volumes seen during the 14th five-year plan period.
He adds that market conditions for distributed solar have deteriorated sharply over the past two years. He says a range of factors have hit investor confidence:
“[Distributed solar faces] growing exposure to market trading, worsening returns in spot markets, growing risks of curtailment and new policies limiting or forbidding the selling of power back to the grid.”
What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?
The plan also sets goals for renewable energy’s role in “non-electricity use”.
This means using renewable energy for purposes other than generating electricity, through converting it to other forms, such as heat or mechanical energy.
The government is aiming for non-power use to nearly triple from 60m tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2025 to 150Mtce in 2030.
Ries tells Carbon Brief that he thinks this target is “one of the main highlights” of the plan. However, he notes that limited available data means it is hard to assess the level of its ambition. He adds that, given the relative conservatism of China’s other recent clean-energy targets, this one may also be met relatively easily.
Key applications for non-power use of renewables include “green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol”, says the plan. It also points to using wind and solar for heat, as well as to biomass and geothermal for heating and cooling.
Green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol are the “centrepiece” of the non-power push, according to state-owned newspaper Economic Information Daily.
For hydrogen alone, China plans to scale up renewable hydrogen production to 2m tonnes in 2030, up from 250,000 tonnes in 2025.
Today, non-power use of renewables accounts for only around 1% of China’s total energy consumption, NEA and NDRC officials said in a Q&A. They added that there is “considerable room for growth” in sectors such as industry, transport and buildings.
Potential new applications include the use of wind and solar for heat. This could see the use of centralised wind and solar heating stations in the chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, papermaking and food sectors.
New projects in the steel and cement sectors should use locally-generated wind and solar to power electric-arc furnaces and kilns, adds the plan.
Wang tells Carbon Brief that she believes the naming of individual sectors is a “clear indication” that they will be included in China’s renewable consumption quotas. These already cover aluminium and other heavy industry sectors.
She adds that power and heat demand from the named sectors may help absorb distributed renewable energy. It will also serve as a testing ground for matching demand with supply through increased grid flexibility and power price reforms.
To Ries, the growing focus on non-power use signals that China’s decarbonisation efforts are “now entering deeper waters”. That means regulators are turning from easier-to-abate sectors, such as aluminium, to more challenging industries, such as steel.
The plan could create a “second growth curve” for the new-energy industry, says He Zhao, in a commentary for China Power News Net. He, the vice-president of the China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI). says this might begin with non-power use, before shifting to fuel, feedstock and heat substitution.
What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance?
The next five years is a prime opportunity for China to “consolidate our leading position across the entire industrial chain” for clean-energy technologies, says the plan.
It adds that the government will “strengthen technological innovation” and accelerate the roll-out of new applications of artificial intelligence in China’s renewable-energy system.
A particular focus for new R&D will be “cutting-edge, original and disruptive technologies”. It also points to technologies that “enhance the reliability of renewable energy” as a substitute for fossil fuels.
The plan names technologies for further development. For wind power, these include “reliable and low-cost” blades, ultra-tall towers and new types of floating platforms. It also mentions the development of “high-altitude wind power”. For solar, it points to the development of perovskite and other “high efficiency” solar cells, as well as space-solar technologies.
The plan also pledges to develop a power market that supports the “full entry” of renewable-energy companies. It underscores that companies should plan for an increasingly market-based and competitive environment.
Meanwhile, the government will also deepen cooperation with other countries on clean energy and “advance” global climate cooperation, it says.
A priority will be “strengthening” international coordination on investment and development in “green energy projects”. Another is “actively promoting the free circulation of China’s high-quality green technologies and products in global markets”.
Chinese exports of clean-energy technologies have been surging, especially since the closure of the strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, Chinese investment in clean-energy projects in Belt and Road Initiative member states totalled $20bn in the first half of 2026. This is also driven by the crisis.
The US, EU and others have launched tariffs and pricing mechanisms to curb imports of Chinese cleantech. This has contributed to pushback from China, against what it and others refer to as “unilateral trade measures”.
China is transitioning from a “major energy nation” (能源大国) to an “energy powerhouse” (能源强国), writes the Energy Research Institute’s Lyu in his explanatory reading. He says this will enable China to increasingly shift to building “systemic” advantages in developing clean-energy technologies.
He continues that, from 2026-2030, China will “move to the very forefront of the global stage” on clean energy, “venturing into uncharted territory”. This will create both “major new challenges and significant opportunities” for the country, he adds.
Interview: Dr Sun Yixian on his new database tracking Chinese climate ‘leadership’
SYDNEY/KINGSTON, Wednesday 29 July — The future of deep sea mining will be a focus for world leaders this week as the International Seabed Authority (ISA) Assembly takes place in Kingston, Jamaica.
Country delegates and members from Pacific Civil Society have come together to discuss a deep sea mining code, while the call for a moratorium grows. It follows the ISA’s contentious decision last week to extend The Metals Company subsidiary Nauru Ocean Resources Inc’s (NORI) exploration contract, despite its support for the pursuit of unlawful deep sea mining via US unilateralism.
The Assembly’s agenda was agreed to yesterday, with a science item put forward by Vanuatu to be heard on Thursday local time. Overnight, Mozambique and Mauritius joined the call for a global moratorium.
Rae Bainteiti, Pacific Political Coordinator at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said from the ISA in Kingston:
“As we move into the General Assembly this week, the fundamental issue remains that there is not enough science to guarantee the safety and protection of the ocean in a world where deep sea mining is allowed. As trustees of the ocean, the common heritage of humankind, our Pacific governments must stand firm against corporate interests that are pushing to move ahead with deep-sea mining outside the ISA framework. If deep sea mining goes ahead, Pacific communities will suffer the economic, cultural and social consequences. We continue to call on all States to support a moratorium as the principled and responsible pathway to protect the ocean.”
Currently, 45 countries, including seven Pacific nations, support a moratorium or precautionary pause on deep sea mining. Last week, Australia’s Labor National Conference committed to supporting a moratorium, but the government has yet to make an official comment.
More of Germany’s electricity came from wind and solar power than fossil fuels for the first time ever in 2025.
Together, wind and solar power generated 225 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity – accounting for 44% of the total in 2025 – with just 217TWh (43%) coming from fossil fuels.
Solar and onshore wind have grown rapidly under Germany’s “Energiewende” strategy over the past two decades, as the nation transitions away from both coal and nuclear power.
Renewables have recently faced mounting opposition from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the current coalition government has been trying to develop new gas-power plants.
Nevertheless, Carbon Brief analysis of Energy Institute data – shown in the chart below – illustrates how wind and solar have continued growing, emerging as the nation’s largest power source.
The success of renewables in Germany mirrors the EU as a whole, which also saw wind and solar overtake fossil-fuel power generation in 2025 for the first time.
“Other renewables” includes hydropower, bioenergy, geothermal and other renewable sources not otherwise stated. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy, 2026.
Germany has various targets in place that require a rapid expansion of wind and solar power, including cutting economy-wide emissions to net-zero by 2045.
The nation is also aiming to increase renewables’ share of electricity consumption to 80% by 2030 to achieve a “largely climate neutral” power system by 2035. It aims to decarbonise its electricity entirely once coal power has been phased out, which has a deadline of “no later than” 2038.
(The renewables targets also include electricity generated from hydropower and bioenergy. The latter produces a relatively large share of Germany’s power – roughly a tenth in 2025.)
Germany has to rely on renewables more than neighbours, such as France and the UK, to achieve its climate goals. This is due to its phaseout of nuclear power, which is a key part of the “Energiewende” strategy.
Nuclear power has long faced widespread public opposition in Germany. This year, the centre-right chancellor Friedrich Merz described the nuclear phaseout as a “strategic mistake”, but the government has ruled out a return to conventional nuclear power.
The country has an official coal phaseout date of 2038, but experts say the country is on track to eliminate coal from its power supply years earlier. This is despite some pressure to temporarily slow the transition away from coal during the recent energy crisis.
(Very few outside the AfD are calling to scrap the coal phaseout altogether, but the government will publish a review of the timelines in August.)
While coal generation has fallen quickly, even as nuclear was being phased out, some argue that coal could have been cut more quickly if nuclear had remained.
Gas-power expansion has also been framed by the government in recent years as an essential component of Germany’s transition away from coal and nuclear power, to support a renewables-heavy grid.
The current government under Merz has tried to boost gas and recently adopted a law to provide state support for new gas-fired power plants. The plan is for these plants to be converted to run on “green hydrogen” by 2045, in order to meet the climate-neutrality goal.
Germany aims to install 115 gigawatts (GW) of onshore wind by 2030 and approved a record 20.8GW of new capacity in 2025.
Meanwhile, solar generation has reached unprecedented levels during the hot summer of 2026.
However, the government’s planned grid reforms have been criticised by the renewables industry for risking slowing down the energy transition. Under the proposals, renewables developers would only be granted automatic grid connections in areas with limited grid capacity if they waive compensation for future curtailed generation.
Interview: COP31 president says electrification is ‘surest way to protect citizens’
