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Despite progress since the Paris Agreement, a peak in greenhouse gas emissions is only just within sight – and time is fast running out to stay below 1.5C of human-caused global warming since the preindustrial era.

As a result, almost all pathways that keep 1.5C within reach now involve a temporary “overshoot”. 

This term refers to a period where the best estimate of warming exceeds 1.5C, until temperatures are brought back below the limit by removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.

While this idea is growing in prominence, there have only been limited efforts to understand what it would mean to breach the 1.5C limit, even if this is only during a temporary period of overshoot.

In a new Nature paper, we present the findings of a three-year Horizon Europe-funded project, looking at what overshoot means for emissions, temperatures, climate impacts and adaptation.

Our results show that overshooting 1.5C comes with significant uncertainty in terms of warming outcomes, climate impacts and associated risks. For example, climate uncertainty means that what is referred to as a 1.5C “pathway” carries a notable risk of much greater levels of warming.

In order to hedge against the risk of higher-than-expected warming, the world would need to develop substantial capacity for “net-negative” CO2 emissions. This could be used to reverse a temporary overshoot and reduce long-term risks, if warming is no more extreme than expected.

Even so, overshoot would come with irreversible consequences for humans and ecosystems, our research finds, such as rising sea levels and ecosystem loss.

Overshoot overconfidence

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been key to shaping our understanding of overshoot scenarios. In its latest sixth assessment report (AR6), the IPCC considered a range of pathways that limit median warming in 2100 to below 1.5C.

The report categorised the pathways according to their probability of breaching 1.5C, but also offered information on the amount of any expected overshoot.

Specifically, the C1 “no or limited overshoot” pathways allow an overshoot of “up to about 0.1C”. The C2 pathways return warming to 1.5C “after a high overshoot” of between “0.1C-0.3C”.

These categorisations give the impression that overshoot can be neatly and confidently constrained – to within a few tenths of a degree – and that in choosing a particular pathway, the countries of the world would have full control over the planetary thermostat.

Crucially, however, the numbers refer only to  median warming outcomes. Considering the uncertainties in Earth system feedbacks, it is not possible to rule out much higher peak warming. For example, this could be up to 2.5C under C2 scenarios (at the 95th percentile of all model runs).

If the increase in temperatures is indeed much higher than expected under median warming, or if warming continues even when CO2 emissions reach net-zero, then returning to below 1.5C after an overshoot would require much more CO2 removal than thought.

Even with stringent emissions reductions, we therefore cannot rule out the possibility that reversing a 1.5C overshoot would require the removal of hundreds of billions of tonnes CO2 by 2100.

Indeed, based on the simple climate model FaIR, our findings show that 400GtCO2 of additional removals could be needed to return temperatures to 1.5C by 2100, if warming reaches the 75th percentile of expected levels rather than the median (about 1.7C instead of 1.5C, an outcome with a likelihood of one-in-four).

(This is based on generating more than 2,000 physically plausible climate outcomes for an emission pathway that limits median warming to around 1.5C and achieves net-zero CO2 by around mid-century, without the need for net-negative emissions thereafter.)

To reach 400GtCO2 of removals by 2100 would mean taking nearly 10GtCO2 out of the atmosphere every year after global CO2 emissions reach net-zero. For comparison, current removals amount to around 2GtCO2 per year, from all sources.

The 400GtCO2 of removals that could be needed to deal with higher-than-expected warming is similar to the amount of removals that is typically being relied on in 1.5C pathways, assuming median levels of warming in response to a given level of emissions.

This is shown in the figure below, where the first row illustrates the range of cumulative CO2 removal needed to return temperatures to below 1.5C by 2100, depending on how sensitive the climate is to a given level of emissions. The bottom two rows show removals in C1 “no or limited overshoot” and C2 “high overshoot” 1.5C pathways, assuming a median warming response.

Cumulative net-negative CO2 emissions by 2100 under a range of pathways. The coloured bars show the 25th to 75th percentile range, while the whiskers indicate the 5th to 95th percentile range. Credit: Schleussner, C. et al. (2024).
Cumulative net-negative CO2 emissions by 2100 under a range of pathways. The coloured bars show the 25th to 75th percentile range, while the whiskers indicate the 5th to 95th percentile range. Credit: Schleussner, C. et al. (2024).

Our findings imply the world may therefore need a “preventive” capacity to remove hundreds of billions of tonnes of CO2 by 2100, to hedge against the risk of higher-than-expected warming.

Moreover, given the political, economic, sustainability and other constraints on the speed and scale at which CO2 removal can be scaled up, it therefore may not be possible to rely on removals to compensate for a failure to reduce emissions in other parts of the economy.

Irreversible impacts

If warming is no more severe than expected under median outcomes, then preventive CO2 removal capacity could be used to steadily reduce temperatures after overshoot.

This could be an important way to minimise long-term climate risks following overshoot.

For example, for every 100 years of overshoot above 1.5C, our findings show that there would be an additional 40cm of sea-level rise by 2300. There would be similarly irreversible consequences for the world’s frozen ecosystems, such as permafrost and peatlands.

In addition, overshoot increases the risk of crossing irreversible climate “tipping points”.

These findings show that even if a global temperature overshoot is reversed, the temporary breach of the 1.5C limit would still come with some irreversible consequences.

Peak and decline

Our study offers a framework for minimising the risks associated with higher-than-expected warming and potentially irreversible climate impacts after temperature overshoot.

Instead of the current categories of mitigation pathway, which focus on peak warming and end-of-century temperatures – apparently with a high level of precision – our paper suggests “peak and decline” (PD) scenarios that allow us to consider a wide range of plausible climate outcomes.

These scenarios aim to achieve a peak in warming, followed by sustained temperature reductions during a period of at least several decades. Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would need to decline towards net-zero CO2 to achieve temperature peaking, followed by net-negative CO2 emissions to enter a long-term decline.

The “peak” is determined by how fast emissions are reduced in the near term, towards reaching net-zero CO2 emissions. This determines the maximum cumulative CO2 emissions of a pathway and therefore the level and timing of peak warming. Importantly, the stringency of non-CO2 GHG emission reductions will also strongly affect peak warming.

The pace of global temperature “decline” after the peak – and therefore the ability to reverse a temporary exceedance of a target limit – depends on the level of net-negative CO2 emissions that can be achieved.

In PD “overshoot” pathways (PD-OS), warming exceeds 1.5C before returning to that level and staying there into the future. These are similar to PD pathways, but the carbon budget, timing of net-zero CO2 and amount of CO2 removal depends on the length, level and timing of overshoot.

In PD “enhanced protection” pathways (PD-EP), warming is kept as low as possible and gradually reversed over time, to minimise climate risks. They entail stringent, rapid cuts in GHG emissions, achieving net-zero CO2 as soon as possible and using sustainable levels of CO2 removal to reduce warming over time, potentially reaching net-zero or even net-negative GHGs.

These pathways are illustrated in the figure below, where the 1.5C limit is shown as a horizontal dotted line, and the different peak and decline pathways are contrasted with a scenario in which temperatures continue to increase, despite reaching net-zero CO2.

Illustrative climate outcomes under different conceptual peak and decline pathways. Credit: Schleussner, C. et al. (2024).
Illustrative climate outcomes under different conceptual peak and decline pathways. Credit: Schleussner, C. et al. (2024).

Our findings suggest that a peak and decline “enhanced protection” pathway would offer the best way to hedge against the uncertainties and minimise the risks around overshoot and the response of the climate system. This would entail two actions from countries worldwide.

First, it would mean reducing emissions as fast as possible to slow down temperature increase, reduce peak warming, and reduce the dependency of needing large amounts of CO2 removals to even achieve net-zero CO2 emissions.

Second, it would mean rapidly scaling up global capacity for CO2 removal to hedge against high-risk outcomes from stronger than expected climate feedback.

The scale of preventive removal capacity that we estimate could be needed, is only just achievable within sustainable limits. If some removal capacity is used to compensate for a failure to rapidly reduce emissions, then it would not be available to manage higher-than-expected warming.

Overall, our paper reinforces the idea that earlier emissions reductions are the best way to minimise far-reaching climate risks in the 21st century and beyond.

The post Guest post: How to minimise the risks from overshooting the 1.5C limit appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Guest post: How to minimise the risks from overshooting the 1.5C limit

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Climate Change

COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan

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Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.

The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.

It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.

Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.

Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.

This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.

It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.

The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.

During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.

Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later. 

Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.

Formal negotiations

Finance

Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.

At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.

The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.

As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.

The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.

Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.

Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya. 

Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.

Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.

However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.

Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.

The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.

BlueSky post by Aruna Chandrasekhar (@arunacsekhar.bsky.social): "COP17 was supposed to be a nature finance stocktake, ramping contributions to "at least $30bn/yr" and sketching the bones of post-2030 nature funding. "Broadening the contributor base" was an outlier, appearing exactly once in the COP16 decision. Now it's the headliner."

Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature. 

The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. The text says: "The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions and which costs are agreed between a developing country Party and the institutional structure referred to in Article 21, in accordance with policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility criteria and an indicative list of incremental costs established by the Conference of the Parties. Other Parties, including countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, may voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. For the purpose of this Article, the Conference of the Parties, shall at its first meeting establish a list of developed country Parties and other Parties which voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. The Conference of the Parties shall periodically review and if necessary amend the list. Contributions from other countries and sources on a voluntary basis would also be encouraged. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy, predictability and timely flow of funds and the importance of burden-sharing among the contributing Parties included in the list."
The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. Source: UN CBD

The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.

The list was last amended in 2006.

(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)

Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.

The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.

By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.

Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.

By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.

At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:

“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”

The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.

Lim Li Ch