Carbon credits are vital in the global fight against climate change. They let governments, businesses, and people offset their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by supporting projects that remove or reduce carbon from the air. Of the various carbon removal strategies, biochar is a promising solution. It sequesters carbon for decades or centuries while offering agricultural and environmental co-benefits.
Biochar is a carbon-rich material produced by heating organic biomass—such as crop residues, forestry waste, or other plant matter—under low-oxygen conditions. When applied to soil, biochar locks carbon in a stable form, helping to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO₂) levels. This stability, combined with its positive impact on soil fertility and water retention, makes biochar an attractive option for carbon credit programs.
This article offers a complete guide to biochar carbon credits. It explores the science of biochar, the production technologies, and its benefits for the environment and agriculture. It also explains how biochar qualifies for carbon credit certification and discusses the market dynamics that create investment opportunities.
Understanding biochar and its role in carbon markets helps everyone—farmers and corporations alike. This knowledge allows stakeholders to make smart choices for climate action and sustainable growth.
Key facts to note:
- Biochar can store carbon for hundreds or even thousands of years. This depends on how it’s made and used.
- Studies estimate that using biochar could remove up to 1.8 gigatons of CO₂ every year. This is possible if it is scaled globally in a sustainable way.
- Biochar projects can now earn carbon credits. They qualify under standards like Verra’s VCS and the Gold Standard. This means they can make money from carbon removal.
What is Biochar?
Biochar is a carbon-rich material produced through the thermal decomposition of organic biomass under low-oxygen conditions, a process known as pyrolysis. Pyrolysis is different from regular burning. It stops carbon in biomass from turning into CO₂. Instead, it keeps carbon in a stable form that can stay in soils for hundreds of years and makes biochar a highly effective tool for long-term carbon sequestration.
Types of Biomass Used
The raw material, or feedstock, used to make biochar greatly affects its properties, stability, and ability to store carbon. Common biomass sources include:
- Agricultural residues: rice husks, corn stalks, wheat straw, sugarcane bagasse.
- Forestry residues: sawdust, wood chips, tree trimmings.
- Organic waste streams: green waste, food waste, manure.
- Specialty feedstocks: invasive plant species or certain algae.
The choice of feedstock affects carbon content, nutrient makeup, pH, and soil benefits. Wood-based biochar has high carbon stability. Manure-based biochar, on the other hand, is rich in nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus. This makes it great for improving soil fertility.

Properties of Biochar
Biochar’s effectiveness depends on several key properties:
- Carbon Content: Typically between 50–90%, with higher carbon content contributing to greater sequestration potential.
- Stability: Resistant to decomposition, with some biochars remaining stable in soil for hundreds to thousands of years.
- Porosity and Surface Area: A highly porous structure enhances water retention, nutrient storage, and microbial habitat in soil.
- pH and Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC): Can improve soil fertility by retaining nutrients and moderating soil acidity.
Environmental and Agricultural Implications
By incorporating biochar into soils, multiple benefits occur simultaneously:
- Carbon Sequestration: Each ton of biochar applied can lock ~1–3 tons of CO₂-equivalent, depending on feedstock and process efficiency.
- Soil Improvement: Enhances water retention, nutrient availability, and microbial activity.
- Waste Management: Turns organic waste into a useful product. This prevents it from decomposing and releasing methane, which is a strong greenhouse gas.
Global Potential
The IPCC report states that using biochar on a large scale with sustainable feedstocks could reduce emissions by up to 1.8 GtCO₂ each year. This would cover a large part of global emissions.
Moreover, biochar is versatile. It works well in both tropical and temperate farming, making it useful around the world.
From Biomass to Black Carbon: How It’s Made
Biochar comes from heating biomass in low or no oxygen, also called pyrolysis. Many production technologies have been created over the years. They differ in efficiency, carbon yield, energy co-products, and their fit for carbon credit projects. Knowing these technologies is key to evaluating biochar quality and its ability to store carbon.
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Slow Pyrolysis
Slow pyrolysis is the most common method for biochar production. Biomass is heated slowly at moderate temperatures (400–600°C) over several hours. This method produces a high yield of biochar with stable carbon content, making it ideal for carbon sequestration and soil improvement. The slow process also generates some syngas and bio-oil, which can be captured and used for energy.
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Fast Pyrolysis
Fast pyrolysis rapidly heats biomass to similar temperatures, but over seconds to minutes. This approach prioritizes the production of bio-oil, with biochar as a secondary output. Biochar yields are lower than those from slow pyrolysis.
However, this process also produces liquid fuels, which can boost overall economic viability. The carbon stability of fast pyrolysis biochar is usually lower. This can affect its use for carbon credit verification.

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Gasification
Gasification partially oxidizes biomass at high temperatures (700–1,000°C) to produce syngas, with biochar as a co-product. The biochar yield is lower compared with pyrolysis, but it is often rich in fixed carbon and can be applied to soil or further processed.
Gasification is particularly suitable for integrated energy-biochar projects, combining carbon removal with renewable energy generation.
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Hydrothermal Carbonization (HTC)
HTC uses wet biomass, such as agricultural residues or manure, converting it under moderate heat and high pressure into hydrochar, a type of biochar. This method avoids the energy-intensive drying step required in conventional pyrolysis. Hydrochar has moderate carbon stability and can be used in soils or as a feedstock for further carbonization.
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Plasma Arc Carbonization
Plasma arc carbonization uses electric plasma to heat biomass to high temperatures. This process creates biochar that is very pure and stable. The carbon content is great for long-term sequestration. However, the process uses a lot of energy that can impact overall lifecycle emissions and project costs.
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Torrefaction
Torrefaction is a mild form of pyrolysis carried out at lower temperatures (200–300°C). It partially carbonizes biomass, making it easier to grind and transport, while also improving its energy density. Torrefied biomass isn’t as stable as fully pyrolyzed biochar. However, it can be used as a precursor for more carbonization. It also works well as a soil amendment, with some potential for carbon storage.
Comparing Technologies
Each production technology has trade-offs in carbon yield, stability, energy co-products, and operational complexity:
- Carbon stability: Slow pyrolysis and plasma arc produce the most stable biochar.
- Biochar yield: Slow pyrolysis generally yields the highest quantity of biochar.
- Energy co-products: Fast pyrolysis and gasification produce useful bio-oil or syngas.
- Suitability for carbon credits: Methods yielding stable, long-lasting carbon are preferred for verified carbon removal projects.
Choosing the right technology depends on several factors: project goals, feedstock availability, energy needs, and how you plan to use biochar. This could be for soil improvement, energy production, or generating carbon credits. As biochar projects grow, the choice of technology will directly affect environmental impact and financial success.
How Biochar Captures Carbon: The Science of Permanence
Biochar’s primary climate benefit comes from its ability to sequester carbon in a stable form. It is different from many organic materials. While those materials break down and release CO₂ into the air, biochar traps carbon in a stable form. This structure can stay in the soil for decades or even centuries.
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Carbon Sequestration Mechanism
During pyrolysis or other carbonization processes, biomass is heated in low-oxygen conditions. This transforms volatile compounds into gases or liquids, while the remaining solid material—biochar—contains a high proportion of fixed carbon. Once in the soil, this carbon resists microbial breakdown. This helps remove CO₂ from the air and stores it for a long time.
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Longevity in Soil
The stability of biochar is one of its most important attributes for climate mitigation. Depending on feedstock, production method, and soil conditions, biochar can persist for hundreds to thousands of years. This long-term stability makes it a more reliable carbon storage option than other organic materials. Compost and crop residues decompose much faster.
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Co-Benefits Enhancing Carbon Retention
Beyond direct sequestration, biochar improves soil structure, water retention, and nutrient availability. These benefits promote healthier plant growth, which in turn absorbs more CO₂ from the atmosphere. Biochar also cuts nitrous oxide and methane emissions from soils. This boosts its overall effect on reducing greenhouse gases.
Comparison with Other Carbon Removal Methods
Biochar is unique among carbon removal methods. It stores carbon permanently and also boosts soil productivity. It stands out because it removes carbon and helps agriculture.
Biochar also needs less land than afforestation or direct air capture. Its lower risk of reversal makes it more appealing for verified carbon credit projects. This is better than forests or soil carbon projects, which can be impacted by wildfires or changes in land use.
Implications for Carbon Credits
The permanence and verifiability of carbon storage in biochar make it highly suitable for carbon credit programs. Accurate measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of biochar carbon content are essential to ensure credits represent real climate benefits. As standards change, biochar’s stable carbon profile makes it a strong choice in voluntary and compliance carbon markets.
Benefits of Biochar: Soil, Water, and Waste Wins
Biochar offers a range of environmental, agricultural, and climate benefits, making it a versatile tool for sustainability and carbon mitigation efforts. Its ability to store carbon permanently is complemented by positive impacts on soil health and ecosystem services.
Environmental Benefits:
- Carbon Sequestration: Biochar locks carbon in a stable form, helping reduce atmospheric CO₂ levels.
- Reduced Emissions: By improving soil properties, biochar can lower nitrous oxide and methane emissions from agricultural soils.
- Waste Valorization: It converts biomass waste into a useful product, reducing open burning or decomposition that would otherwise release greenhouse gases.
Agricultural Benefits:
- Improved Soil Fertility: Biochar enhances nutrient retention in soils, reducing the need for synthetic fertilizers.
- Water Retention: Its porous structure increases soil moisture-holding capacity, helping crops withstand drought conditions.
- Crop Yield Enhancement: Healthier soils and better nutrient availability can lead to higher and more stable agricultural yields.
Climate Mitigation Impact:
- Long-Term Carbon Storage: Biochar carbon remains stable in soils for decades to centuries, providing a reliable carbon removal solution.
- Synergy with Other Practices: When combined with regenerative agriculture or sustainable forestry, biochar amplifies carbon capture and environmental benefits.
- Support for Carbon Markets: High-stability biochar can generate verified carbon credits, creating financial incentives for adoption.
Co-Benefits for Communities and Ecosystems:
- Biochar production can create new job opportunities in rural areas.
- It supports circular economy principles by converting agricultural and forestry residues into a high-value soil amendment.
- The improved soil and ecosystem health contribute to biodiversity and resilience against climate impacts.
Waste to Asset: Ending Residue Burning
Biochar has a big but often-ignored benefit. It can turn farm waste into a useful carbon product that lasts a long time. Agriculture around the world creates over 5 billion tons of crop residues each year. A lot of this waste is burned or left to rot. This process releases significant amounts of CO₂, methane, and nitrous oxide.
In many areas, especially in Asia and Latin America, open-field burning of waste is a big cause of rural air pollution and seasonal haze.
Biochar production offers a controlled and beneficial alternative, as the company in the video shows. Pyrolysis changes residues like rice husks, corn stover, coconut shells, sugarcane bagasse, and forestry by-products into stable carbon.
The process prevents greenhouse gases from escaping and keeps carbon locked away for hundreds to thousands of years. This intervention cuts air pollution, lowers greenhouse gas emissions, and builds a carbon sink.
The importance of this waste-to-value pathway is twofold:
- It provides farmers with a practical method for managing biomass without incurring disposal costs, and
- It transforms a climate liability into a climate asset.
In this way, biochar acts as both a soil amendment and a key strategy to tackle agricultural waste and its environmental effects.
Biochar’s multifaceted benefits make it a compelling solution for farmers, investors, and policymakers alike. Its role goes beyond capturing carbon: it combines climate action with real benefits for farming and environmental management.
Biochar Carbon Credits: How Biochar Becomes a Tradable Removal Credit
A carbon credit represents a verified, quantifiable reduction or removal of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions — typically 1 ton CO₂-equivalent (CO₂e) per credit. For biochar projects, carbon credits come from measuring the carbon stored in stable biochar. This carbon isn’t released and is verified under accepted protocols.
Biochar turns “biogenic” biomass like agricultural waste and wood chips into a stable, carbon-rich solid. This process counts as carbon removal, not just avoidance, if the feedstocks, production, and storage follow set standards.
Credibility Matters: Certification Standards & Methodologies
To ensure credits represent real, permanent removals, biochar projects must follow recognized methodologies and go through a monitoring, reporting, and verification process. As of 2025:
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The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) has officially approved three biochar methodologies under its Core Carbon Principles (CCP). These include Isometric Biochar Production and Storage and Verra’s VM0044 (Biochar Use in Soil & Non‑Soil Applications).
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Under Isometric’s registry, over 30 projects are set to issue about 500,000 credits starting in 2026. In contrast, fewer than 10 projects are registered under Verra VM0044 by the end of 2025, with an expected output of around 249,000 credits each year.
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More approved methods boost the credibility of biochar as a trustworthy carbon removal option.
MRV (Monitoring, Reporting, Verification): What Gets Measured
For biochar carbon credits to be valid, MRV processes typically include:
- Documenting feedstock type (must be biogenic biomass) and origin — to verify the carbon source is renewable/biogenic.
- Recording details of the conversion process (e.g., pyrolysis yield, reactor efficiency) and final biochar mass produced.
- Tracking the fate of biochar — e.g., soil application, embedding in materials, or other stable storage — to ensure the carbon remains sequestered instead of being oxidized or burned.
- Independent audits for certification registries to verify data before credits are issued.
Only after successful MRV can a carbon credit (1 tCO₂e removed) be issued, listed, traded, or retired.
Economics: Production Cost and Carbon Removal Potential
Peer‑reviewed research offers some concrete figures for biochar economics and sequestration potential:
- One study estimated the production cost of biochar at about US$232.87 per ton of biochar.
That same study estimated that 1 ton of biochar production mitigates about 6.22 tons of CO₂ (i.e., CO₂e removed), implying a high leverage ratio of carbon removal vs material produced.
In their crop-production experiments, the authors found that applying biochar at 8 tons/hectare yielded the most favorable economic returns. At that rate, the benefit–cost ratio (BCR) was ~1.476, net present value (NPV) was positive, and internal rate of return (IRR) reached ~85.7%.
They also observed that at higher application rates (24–28 t/ha), returns became negative. This finding suggests optimal biochar application rates are key for both agronomic benefit and economic viability.
These data suggest that, under the right conditions (efficient production, proper application, stable feedstock), biochar projects can be both climate‑effective and economically competitive, especially if carbon credits are priced favorably.
The Biochar Carbon Credit Market Landscape
The market for biochar carbon removal credits (often called Biochar Carbon Removal or BCR credits) has grown rapidly in recent years. According to a 2025 market snapshot by CDR.fyi, over 3 million tCO₂e of biochar credits are contracted by mid-2025.

In just the first half of 2025 alone, 1.6 million tonnes were sold — more than half of the total contracted volume to date.
Deliveries and retirements have also accelerated: by mid‑2025, about 683,000 tonnes had been delivered and 330,000 tonnes retired.
This surge demonstrates strong growth momentum. According to a report cited by a market intelligence platform, the overall market value (i.e., the dollar value of transactions) for biochar credits rose dramatically, reflecting both volume growth and rising per‑credit prices.
According to a market‑outlook report, about 80% of global biochar credit volume is listed on a major biochar marketplace. This indicates concentration and market data transparency.
For 2024–2025, around 41% of carbon credits purchased by corporates came from “high‑quality” vetted biochar projects. This is in comparison with only 13% from lower-quality ones, showing increasing demand for certified, high‑integrity biochar credits.
Moreover, according to a 2023 industry report, the broader biochar industry (not only credits but all biochar-related production and activities) already had annual revenues exceeding US$ 600 million, with projections to nearly US$ 3.3 billion by 2025.
These figures illustrate that biochar is shifting from niche or experimental to a more mature, scaled market, at least in terms of demand and production capacity.
Price Trends, Credit Value & How Biochar Compares
- As of 2025, the average price for biochar carbon removal credits is about US$ 177 per tonne CO₂e, per Sylvera data.
For “high‑quality” vetted biochar credits (i.e., credits from projects that pass stricter quality/integrity screening), the average price appears to be higher, around US$ 200 per tonne CO₂e, compared to ~US$ 153/t for credits that did not meet the highest vetting standards.

A recent market assessment in late 2025 indicates that, despite some slowdown in retirements (i.e., credits being permanently “used up”), prices have remained resilient. For example, U.S. biochar credits were assessed at roughly US$150/tCO₂e for 2025 delivery.
Biochar has typical “sequestration factors,” which show how much CO₂ is removed per tonne produced. This means the value of each tonne of biochar can be quite high. For example, one tonne of biochar can remove about 2.5 to 3.3 tonnes of CO₂. This depends on the feedstock and production method.
At current market prices, this could mean around US$450-700 in carbon credits. The exact value varies based on the price per tonne of CO₂e and the quality premium.
Biochar credits are priced between intermediate and premium levels for carbon removal. They cost more than many nature-based credits, like afforestation or land-use credits. However, they are cheaper than high-end options, such as some direct air capture (DAC) or bioenergy-with-carbon-capture and storage (BECCS) credits.
This “sweet spot” offers high permanence at a more moderate cost. It explains why demand grows, mainly among corporate buyers who seek credible long-term carbon removals.

Price: How Biochar Credits Compare to Other CDR Methods
Why biochar often commands a premium vs most nature-based credits?
- Durability/permanence: Biochar converts biomass carbon into a stable form that resists decomposition for decades to centuries when applied to soil. Buyers value this durability relative to many nature-based credits, which face reversal risks (fires, land-use change). Supercritical notes demand for “durable, credible supply” is outpacing supply.
- Measurability & additionality: Biochar MRV is becoming more robust and tech-enabled (geotagging, machine data), raising buyer confidence and willingness to pay a premium for verified removals.
- Co-benefits: Soil health, nutrient retention, and waste valorization deliver tangible non-carbon benefits that some buyers value (and sometimes pay more for).
Why is biochar generally cheaper than many tech-based durable CDR pathways?
- Lower capital intensity/near-term deployability: Pyrolysis and biochar production are proven today and can be deployed at smaller scales than capital-intensive DAC plants or BECCS facilities, lowering per-tonne price ceilings for many projects. Supercritical emphasizes biochar “works today” and has already delivered substantial tonnes.
- Easily scalable: Biochar production can be scaled more easily than many tech-based carbon removal methods. It uses common biomass residues like crop stalks or forestry waste. Small farms can start projects that grow regionally or industrially. Modular systems and multiple feedstocks make scaling flexible, while co-products like bio-oil add value. This makes biochar a practical, low-energy carbon removal option for both farmers and businesses.
- Co-product revenue: Biochar projects can stack revenue streams (physical biochar sales, heat/electricity), which can lower net credit cost per tCO₂e relative to DAC, which has fewer co-revenue streams.
At-a-glance, here is a comparison table showing global average price ranges for biochar and other CDR methods:
Biochar is often called a “hybrid” carbon removal solution because it blends nature-based and technological approaches. On one hand, it uses natural biomass—crop residues, forestry waste, or other organic materials—to store carbon in soil for decades or centuries.
On the other hand, its production involves controlled technological processes, like pyrolysis or gasification, which optimize carbon stability and can generate energy or bio-products as co-benefits.
This combination allows biochar to deliver reliable carbon sequestration while integrating with modern innovations, making it both a practical and versatile tool for climate mitigation.
Hemp Biochar and Its Market Potential
Hemp biochar is gaining attention because hemp grows quickly and produces a large amount of biomass. This makes it a good feedstock for biochar.
The global industrial hemp market was valued at about US$11-12 billion in 2025. It continues to grow as more companies use hemp for textiles, building materials, food products, and other sustainable goods.

A recent market study shows that the hemp biochar segment is worth about US$210 million in 2025. It is expected to reach around US$475 million by 2032, growing at a rate of about 12% per year. This growth is supported by rising demand for natural soil enhancers, carbon removal solutions, and low-carbon materials.
Hemp biochar also helps cut waste because it uses leftover stalks and other plant parts. This lowers disposal costs for farmers while creating a useful product for soil health and long-term carbon storage.
Key Players, Procurement Patterns, and Market Dynamics
Corporate buyers are among the biggest demand drivers. According to a recent market data summary, a relatively small number of large purchasers account for a significant share of total biochar credit purchases, led by Microsoft and Google. This concentration of demand (and often long‑term offtake agreements) has helped stabilize pricing and accelerate project financing.

On the supply side, despite the volume of credits contracted and sold, some market observers note that a large portion of biochar producers still do not participate in voluntary carbon markets. They instead choose to sell biochar for soil, agriculture, energy, or other uses rather than pursue credit generation.
Moreover, liquidity in the biochar credit market seems relatively high. One report estimates that a majority of issued credits undergo primary transfer (i.e, sale or trade) quickly, with average transfer times now on the order of weeks rather than months.
However, this growth has also sparked increasing scrutiny of quality. According to analysis from 2024–2025, a non-trivial share of biochar credits comes from projects that failed vetting for high-quality standards. These credits sell for significantly lower prices at ~ US$153/tCO₂e vs ~ US$220 for quality‑vetted.
Returns vs. Risks: What Buyers Must Underwrite
Given the trend in price stability, rising demand, and growing corporate interest in durable carbon removal technologies, biochar-based credits present a compelling investment opportunity:
- for project developers (those producing biochar),
- for investors or funds backing biochar plants or operations, and
- for corporate buyers aiming to secure a long‑term carbon removal supply.
The fact that biochar credits sit between low-cost nature‑based offsets and high-cost engineered technologies on the cost/permanence spectrum gives them a competitive advantage, especially as standards tighten and demand for high-integrity credits grows.
Key Risks and Challenges:
- Supply bottlenecks: while demand surges, not all biochar producers are participating in credit markets. This limits the pool of available credits for high-integrity, verifiable carbon removal.
- Credit quality variation: as shown by the price differences between “high‑quality” vs “lower‑vetting” credits, buyers and investors must carefully assess project standards, feedstock, production method, and verification rigor.
- Market volatility and demand concentration: heavy reliance on a few large buyers could create market instability if corporate demand shifts or regulatory incentives change.
- Non‑market pressures: environmental or supply‑chain constraints (e.g., sustainable biomass sourcing, land‑use competition, feedstock availability), which may limit scaling or raise costs.

The Friction Points: Feedstock, MRV, and Scale
While biochar offers significant environmental and economic benefits, the adoption of biochar for carbon removal and carbon credits faces technical, market, and environmental challenges. Understanding these limitations is essential for project developers, investors, and policymakers.
Technical Challenges
- Feedstock Availability and Quality: Sustainable and consistent biomass supply is crucial. Competing demands for agricultural residues or forestry waste can limit availability, affecting scalability and project economics.
- Production Technology Constraints: Different pyrolysis or carbonization methods yield varying amounts of biochar and carbon stability. Ensuring high-quality, verifiable biochar requires careful technology selection and process optimization.
- Carbon Quantification: Accurately measuring the carbon content and permanence of biochar is complex. Soil conditions, environmental factors, and application methods can influence carbon retention, making monitoring and verification more challenging.
Market Challenges
- Standardization and Certification Costs: The market still faces variability in methodologies, verification protocols, and registry standards. Certification and MRV costs can be a barrier, particularly for small-scale producers.
- Credit Quality Variation: Not all biochar carbon credits are created equal. Buyers must navigate differences in permanence, verification rigor, and project transparency, which can affect market confidence and pricing.
- Liquidity and Market Access: Although volumes are growing, access to buyers, marketplaces, and financing remains limited in some regions, slowing market participation.
Environmental Considerations
- Sustainable Sourcing: Overharvesting biomass can lead to land degradation, deforestation, or competition with food production. Projects must ensure feedstock sustainability.
- Lifecycle Emissions: Energy-intensive production methods or transportation can offset some carbon removal benefits if not carefully managed.
- Application Risks: Incorrect application rates or practices can reduce soil benefits and carbon retention, diminishing environmental impact.
Balancing Potential and Risk
Despite these challenges, ongoing technological improvements, evolving standards, and growing corporate demand are helping to mitigate risks. Stakeholders are increasingly focused on combining high-integrity verification, sustainable feedstock management, and optimized production methods to unlock the full climate potential of biochar.
Proof It Works: Real Projects Moving Real Tonnes
Several biochar projects around the world demonstrate both environmental impact and carbon credit generation.
- Cool Planet (USA):
Cool Planet produces biochar from agricultural residues and applies it to crop fields. Their projects have sequestered thousands of tons of CO₂ annually while improving soil fertility. Verified carbon credits from these operations are listed on voluntary markets, attracting corporate buyers seeking high-quality removals. - Carbon Gold (UK):
Carbon Gold combines biochar production with horticultural and agricultural applications. Their biochar has improved soil structure and water retention, while the associated carbon credits have been independently verified under the Verra standard. - Terra Preta (Australia):
In Australia, Terra Preta projects convert unloved biomass waste, such as orchard prunings and agricultural residues, into biochar. Beyond storing carbon, these projects enhance soil productivity and reduce fertilizer use, providing dual benefits for farmers and the climate.
Impact summary: Across these examples, biochar projects:
- Remove CO₂ permanently from the atmosphere.
- Improve soil health and crop yields.
- Generate verifiable carbon credits for voluntary and corporate markets.
These success stories highlight the feasibility of biochar as a scalable carbon removal solution that delivers measurable environmental and economic benefits.
How to Participate in Biochar Carbon Credits: Launch, Verify, Sell
Participating in biochar carbon credits can be approached by different stakeholders — farmers, project developers, investors, businesses — depending on resources, goals, and local context. Here is a general roadmap based on established methodologies and current market practices:
Key Preconditions and Initial Steps
Before entering the carbon credit pathway with biochar, a project must meet certain basic conditions:
- Use eligible biomass feedstock: The raw material must be “biogenic” — e.g., agricultural residues, wood chips, forestry, or crop waste. Non‑eligible materials (e.g, plastics, tires, municipal solid waste) are generally excluded.
- Adopt an approved methodology/standard: For biochar carbon credits, one widely accepted standard is Verra’s methodology VM0044 Biochar Utilization in Soil and Non‑Soil Applications (as of version 1.2, active since June 27, 2025).
- Demonstrate additionality and project soundness: Under VM0044 v1.2, an investment analysis is required to show that the project wouldn’t have happened under a “business-as-usual” baseline.
- Create a project plan including monitoring and application strategy: The project must plan not just for producing biochar, but for where and how biochar will be applied (e.g., soil, non-soil) — because carbon sequestration depends on stable storage.
Project Registration, Monitoring, Reporting & Verification (MRV)
Once prerequisites are met, the participation process moves through these stages:
- Project registration — submit project details (feedstock, production method, biochar application, baseline scenario) to the registry (e.g., Verra).
- Validation / independent audit — a third‑party verifier (VVB) assesses compliance with methodology requirements (e.g., feedstock eligibility, carbon yield calculations, additionality, environmental safeguards).
- Implementation → Biochar production & application — produce biochar via pyrolysis or another approved method, apply it to soil or approved non‑soil uses (as described in project plan).
- Monitoring & Reporting — systematically document biomass inputs, biochar yield, biochar application location and amount, soil or land use data, and other required metrics.
- Verification — the verifier reviews the monitoring report and issues a verification report; once approved, credits (e.g., Verified Carbon Units, VCUs) are issued.
- Credit issuance and sale/trade/retirement — once issued, credits can be sold through voluntary carbon marketplaces or private agreements. Buyer entities (companies, investors) purchase these credits to offset emissions or hold as long-term assets.
For Farmers and Small‑scale Producers
If you are a farmer or smallholder, take note of these:
- Aggregation may be an option: under approved biochar credit classes, small producers can aggregate biomass feedstock and biochar output under a single project developer, helping overcome high transaction/verification costs that otherwise deter small-scale efforts.
- Combining biochar application with soil fertility benefits makes the approach more attractive — beyond just carbon credits, improved yields and soil health may help justify the investment in biochar production and verification.
- Participation may require upfront investments (kiln/pyrolysis equipment, documentation, possible external verifiers) — so it’s important to assess economic feasibility before committing.
For Investors, Project Developers, and Businesses
Organizations or investors seeking to develop biochar carbon removal projects should:
- Ensure clear feedstock sourcing strategies, ideally using agricultural or forestry residues that would otherwise decompose or be burned — avoiding unsustainable biomass harvesting.
- Use an approved methodology (e.g., VM0044) and design projects with robust MRV, permanence, and documentation — important especially now that the credit standards are under stricter scrutiny.
- Factor in verification and transaction costs: third‑party audits can cost thousands of USD per cycle; small volumes may not justify these costs.
- Consider blending revenue streams: biochar can yield soil‑improvement benefits or biochar sales for agriculture/industry — diversifying income beyond carbon credits.
Challenges to Watch Out For
Even with proper setup, as a market participant, you should be aware of:
- The need for long‑term commitment and record‑keeping: carbon credits generally reflect long‑term carbon storage, requiring adherence over years.
- Costs vs scale tradeoff: small-scale efforts may struggle to cover verification costs; aggregation or partnerships may be necessary.
- Feedstock sustainability: using biomass that competes with food production, leads to deforestation, or causes land‑use conflicts, undermines the environmental integrity of the project.
- Market uncertainty: credit prices and demand fluctuate; demand depends on corporate commitments to climate goals and regulatory developments.
Next Decade: From Niche to Gigaton?
The outlook for biochar is positive. It works as both a soil improver and a carbon removal solution. Growing interest from governments, companies, and investors suggests biochar will play a bigger role in climate action over the next decade.
The global biochar market is expected to grow fast. Recent estimates suggest it could reach US$1.5–2.5 billion by 2030, with strong annual growth. Other forecasts show continued expansion through the 2030s, driven by demand in agriculture, waste management, and carbon removal.

Farmers use biochar to improve soil health and crop yields. At the same time, companies are buying biochar carbon credits because they offer durable carbon removal. This is pushing biochar from a niche product into a more mainstream climate solution.
Some studies suggest biochar could remove large amounts of CO₂ by 2040, if production and supply chains scale. Growth is strongest in North America and the Asia–Pacific, where biomass is abundant.
Still, success depends on sustainable feedstocks, consistent quality, and strong verification systems.
In sum: the next 5–15 years may see biochar evolve from a niche soil amendment to a globally relevant carbon‑removal solution. This is particularly true if demand for durable, verifiable carbon credits continues to grow and supply-side constraints are addressed.
The Bottom Line: Durable Carbon With Co-Benefits
Biochar is a powerful solution that combines climate mitigation, sustainable agriculture, and waste management. It sequesters carbon permanently while improving soil health and crop yields. With global market growth and rising interest from farmers, businesses, and investors, biochar carbon credits offer a scalable, verifiable path for carbon removal.
Realizing its full potential requires sustainable feedstock, reliable production, and strong verification. Biochar not only removes carbon but also supports agricultural sustainability, rural livelihoods, and circular-economy principles.
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Carbon Footprint
Why I’m Pro-Nuke Now: Beginning
I composed this essay over much of 2026, as I was writing Beyond Vogtle — my detailed study (co-authored with James Boucher) of U.S. nuclear costs from the 1980s post-Three Mile Island reactors to the Vogtle 3 and 4 units completed earlier in this decade. It traces my journey from nuclear power doubter to proponent.
My story is both general and personal: what was changing in the wide world of nuclear power, energy policy and climate; and how I viewed those changes. I hope this mode of story-telling resonates with a wide audience and also provide a backdrop to “Beyond Vogtle.”
It’s in three parts.
Detail from 1979 rally poster. Full poster appears below.
The first installment begins at the big Washington rally called to mark the Three Mile Island reactor accident, and covers the recession of nuclear dread, the advent of virtually always-on reactor operation, and nuclear’s status as the least carbon-emitting energy supply technology.
Installment #2 begins with the failure (to date) of carbon tax advocacy — “A Climate Cure No One Wanted” — and continues with the closure of Indian Point and the concurrent slow dissolve of my dream that renewable energy could do it all.
The third and final installment begins with a slight detour in which I contrast the appalling human damage from automobility with nuclear power’s increasingly remote dangers, and then return to energy policy with a fresh way to regard nuclear power’s potential contribution to decarbonizing U.S. grids.
Thank for reading. Enjoy. And be sure to look at Beyond Vogtle: What History Tells Us About the Cost of New Nuclear (yes, that’s the full title).
— C.K.
* * * * * * * * *
I’m pro-nuclear power. Big time.
I don’t just want the U.S. to keep running its 95 extant reactors. I want us to build more. Lots more. Hundreds.
I’m not alone. Public opinion is shifting toward nuclear power. But I came to that conclusion after spending years arguing the other side. From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, I published a raft of critical analyses that got a good deal of public attention ― and even some traction within the nuclear industry itself. My core argument was that the cost of building nuclear plants was rising much faster than the costs of competing sources of energy. The main driver, I said, was a cascade of safety-requirement changes triggered by widespread fears of reactor accidents.
Here’s the full poster.
That work earned me a speaking spot at the massive May 6, 1979 rally in Washington demanding a halt to reactor construction in the wake of the March 28 meltdown at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. In the weeks before the rally, my research was cited in hundreds of news stories. At the Capitol, I stood alongside consumer advocate Ralph Nader, the leading figure in the U.S. antinuke movement; actress Jane Fonda, whose new film, “The China Syndrome,” had eerily foretold the Three Mile Island meltdown; and folk-rock icon Jackson Browne. I told the cheering throng that nuclear power was finished.
Cost overruns and canceled reactor projects were putting billions of dollars on the line, and I spent much of the next decade in courtrooms all over the country, explaining patiently to utility regulators why investors, not customers, should bear those losses. I eventually moved on to other public policy work, sparking big-city bicycling and helping bring congestion pricing to New York. But I kept watching nuclear power and the broader energy landscape. Over time, what I saw led me to turn from skeptic to supporter. Here’s why, in eight parts.
1. Fear and Dread Recede
Ask 100 random people today what “TMI” means, and at least 90 will say “Too Much Information.” Maybe one will mention the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island.
That’s a real shift.
The 1970s were commercial nuclear power’s first decade, and the Three Mile Island accident brought it to a terrifying close. Sixty hours into the slow-unfolding crisis, as fears grew that a “hydrogen bubble” in the reactor might explode and rupture the containment dome, CBS Evening News anchor Walter Cronkite captured the nation’s dread: “The world has never known a day quite like today. It faced the considerable uncertainties and dangers of the worst nuclear power plant accident of the atomic age. And the horror tonight is that it could get much worse.”[1]
The stricken reactor was eventually stabilized. But a combination of soaring costs and public apprehension brought an end to nuclear power’s rapid expansion in the United States.
Cronkite’s warning was about Three Mile Island itself, but it seemed to foreshadow more disasters to come. Yet since 1979, the U.S. nuclear industry has accumulated nearly 20 times as much reactor operating experience as it had built up in its entire history before the meltdown, without a sequel.[2] Like the dog that didn’t bark, this quiet fadeout of reactor calamities is an overlooked shift ― and it is prompting a rethink of long-held certitudes about nuclear power.
With each passing year there are fewer people who grew up with dread from Cold War-era A-bomb drills and weapons test fallout that got bundled into nuclear power. There are more young people like Zeke, a Brooklyn high-schooler who in 2019 went to Battery Park City to greet climate activist Greta Thunberg after her sail-powered trans-Atlantic voyage, but who this past May called fears about nuclear power “over-exaggerated.”[3] (Thunberg herself has said that Germany made a mistake by phasing out its nuclear plants, since it led to a sharp rise in coal-fired electricity.)
I’ve heard the same sentiment in hundreds of casual conversations over the past decade ― at climate rallies and on Trader Joe’s checkout lines, in California and in New York. These conversations suggest that the oppositional currents that once compelled federal nuclear regulators to keep piling on costly new safety requirements are losing force.
2. Permanent Peak Performance
Even before construction costs began to soar in the 1970s, nuclear power had another Achilles heel: spotty operating performance.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. nuclear power sector struggled to maintain even a 60 percent “capacity factor” ― a measure of how much of a plant’s potential output it generates. That’s a dismal rate for equipment that’s expensive to build. I know this because I researched and wrote the first full-length study of shortfalls in U.S. nuclear plant performance, in 1976.[4]
That started to change in the mid-1980s. Plants finished safety upgrades required after Three Mile Island. The industry began sharing best practices ― and mistakes to avoid. Economic incentives helped too, as utility earnings became tied to how often plants actually ran.
A remarkable turnaround, though seldom credited in climate and nuclear discourse.
The turnaround has been dramatic. Since 2000, U.S. nuclear plants have averaged 90 percent capacity factor ― a huge leap from the earlier 60 percent. In effect, downtime has dropped four-fold, from 40 percent of the time to just 10 percent. Repair jobs and retrofits that used to drag on are now precision-scheduled like the train heist in “Breaking Bad.”
The higher reliability brings a huge symbolic benefit. In the 1970s, U.S. reactors seemed to stumble from one fiasco to the next. In Alabama, a technician using a lit candle to locate an air leak started a fire that burned through a thousand cables and knocked two brand-new reactors offline for 19 months. At some ocean-cooled plants, saltwater corroded delicate heat-transfer tubes, forcing protracted repairs. Profits and industry morale took a beating, and nuclear power became a punchline on “The Simpsons.”
Those days are long past. Nuclear power, uniquely, has blossomed into both grid bulwark and climate hero. Thanks to those higher ― much higher! ― capacity factors, each nuclear plant now displaces 50 percent more carbon-emitting power generation than it used to.[5] In fact, at a 90 percent capacity factor, a kilowatt of nuclear power delivers double or triple the climate benefit of a kilowatt of wind power (which averages 30 to 40 percent capacity factor) and roughly five times that of solar (15 to 20 percent) ― a crucial distinction that’s often missing from gushing coverage of renewable energy.
3. Climate to the Fore
Nuclear power’s newfound operational mastery would matter much less but for the urgency of the climate crisis and the persistence of U.S. and global carbon emissions. Like wind and solar, nuclear power generates electricity without burning carbon.
Squint to see that nuclear lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions range from 5.1 to 6.4 (in g CO2 equivalent per kWh); analogous range for solar-PV is 7.4 – 83.0; wind, 7.8 – 23.0. Source, Dinon et al., in report linked in this section’s second paragraph.
It is true that fossil fuels are implicated in nuclear power’s supply chain. Uranium mining uses petroleum, and enriching nuclear fuel requires electricity. But even counting upstream carbon, nuclear power’s climate footprint is smaller than that of wind, solar or hydropower, according to an authoritative 2022 analysis by a multinational team for the UN Economic Commission for Europe. (Their finding matched that of the similarly comprehensive 2018 report by the UN-chartered Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.[6])
That’s another big change. In nuclear power’s early years, uranium fuel enrichment was so energy-intensive that the three U.S. “gaseous diffusion” plants were said to consume 10 percent of all electricity used by American factories. But diffusion enrichment has given way to gas centrifuges and, more recently, laser isotopic separation ― methods that use 20 times less energy to isolate fissile U-235 from U-238.
The bottom line: kilowatt-hour for kilowatt-hour, nuclear-generated electricity is at least as effective as solar and wind at cutting climate pollution. Meanwhile, Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, “heat domes” and wildfires, and, in August, the first Himalayan glacial collapse, have made once-hypothetical climate death and disruption a daily reality. More than rising electricity demand from A.I., it’s the climate crisis that’s driving renewed interest in nuclear power.
Click here for the second installment, Why I’m Pro-Nuke Now: Beginning.
[1] Quoted passage is from a local (PA) news site, though the an archived Channel 2 broadcast it cited is no longer on line.
[2] The sole “near-miss,” and a major one, was the 2002 discovery by operators at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant near Toledo, OH of extensive corrosion of the reactor vessel head — a vital barrier against loss of coolant and release of radiation. The U.S. General Accounting Office sternly rebuked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for failing to identify and prevent the corrosion. See GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC Needs to More Aggressively and Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant’s Shutdown, GAO-04-415, May 2004.
[3] In-person conversation at People’s Policy Conference at the New School for Social Research in New York, May 2, 2026.
[4] C. Komanoff, Power Plant Performance: Nuclear and Coal Capacity Factors and Economics (15 MB pdf), Council on Economic Priorities, 1976.
[5] Dividing today’s 90% uptime by the former 60% yields 1.50, indicating 50 percent more kilowatt-hours per kW.
[6] IPCC Annex III report, Technology-Specific Cost and Performance Parameters, 2018. See table on p. 1333.
Carbon Footprint
Why I’m Pro-Nuke Now: Centerpiece
This is the second part of a three-part post. It begins with the failure of carbon tax advocacy and continues with the closure of Indian Point and the concurrent dissolution of my dream that renewable energy could do it all. Part I, “Beginning,” started with the Three Mile Island accident and covered the decline of nuclear dread, the advent of splendidly reliable reactor operation, and nuclear’s climate-hero status. It’s available here. — C.K.
4. A Climate Cure No One Wanted
Nuclear fission, wind turbines, solar panels. Each is a kind of miracle, creating electricity from sunlight, air currents, or the splitting of atoms rather than by setting things on fire. But to economists focused on decarbonization, a greater miracle would have been the widespread adoption of carbon taxes, or, as some prefer to call it, a “price on carbon” — a fee added to fossil fuels’ market price based on their carbon content. Such a tax would shift incentives across the economy away from using fossil fuels, cutting production of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide.
Economists trace the carbon tax idea to the early 20th century British economist Alfred Pigou and his conception of “externalities” ― social costs, like pollution, that aren’t reflected in market prices, and are dumped on communities “external to the process.” My interest dates to the early 1970s, when I was a fledgling environmental analyst in New York City government. I had a front-row seat as an ingenious “sulfur surcharge” eliminated the price advantage of dirty, high-sulfur fuel oil, foiling an eleventh-hour attempt by the oil industry to undercut a groundbreaking clean-air regulation.
Much later, in 2007, I co-founded the Carbon Tax Center, an organization built around the idea of taxing fossil fuels by their carbon content. We proposed a national carbon tax starting at $15 per ton of CO2 and rising in annual steps to $100 within a decade. Our modeling suggested that by then, the myriad changes driven by the financial rewards for burning less carbon would be cutting U.S. emissions by nearly a third ― far more than conventional energy-efficiency standards or clean-energy subsidies.
To be clear, this wasn’t an either-or choice. A carbon tax was unusual in that it reinforced nearly every other decarbonization measure rather than competing with it. But what really set carbon pricing apart was its reach. Carbon taxes would reward every action that reduced fuel use ― not just buying more fuel-efficient cars, but driving less overall; not just laws mandating energy-efficient buildings, but reforming zoning to let new homes be built in town instead of spreading into sprawl; and, in the power sector, switching from higher-carbon coal to lower-carbon gas and from gas to virtually zero-carbon solar, wind, and nuclear power.
A carbon tax would have worked something like New York’s congestion pricing program, which last year began charging drivers $9 a day to enter Manhattan south of 60th Street. Congestion pricing hits gridlock with a one-two punch. The first punch is the price itself: faced with the toll, enough car owners find driving no longer worth it, that traffic actually drops. The second punch is the steady stream of subway improvements funded from the toll revenue — station elevators, real-time train signals, new lines — which pull still more commuters out of cars. Just so, the “stick” of a price and the “carrot” of better alternatives reinforce each other.
I took part in the 20-year campaign that pushed congestion pricing across the finish line. Its advent — and survival — in Trump’s second term is heartening. But it also highlights, by contrast, how little headway has been made toward a U.S. carbon price.
That failure constitutes a tragically missed opportunity for nuclear power, given how much a $100-per-ton carbon price could strengthen its economics. Compared with burning natural gas, the dominant source of U.S. electricity today, a $100/ton CO2 price would give nuclear roughly the same competitive edge as shaving 40 percent off the cost to build new reactors. Or, put another way, that carbon price would be like doubling or tripling what gas-fired power plants pay for pipeline fuel — pushing prices back to pre-fracking scarcity levels.[7])
5. Losing Indian Point
In the spring of 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic raging, my wife and I fled the city for our cabin in the Adirondacks. One morning I was outside the general store, loading groceries onto my bicycle, when my phone started buzzing. It was Dietmar Detering, someone I knew slightly as leader of the advocacy group Nuclear NY, calling from Queens. I picked up and said hello.
“You call yourself a climate activist,” Dietmar began, his voice sputtering with anger. “Indian Point is being taken apart, and you haven’t said a word to stop it. How dare you?”
I vaguely knew that a 2017 deal ― pushed by the self-proclaimed environmental group Riverkeeper and brokered by then-Gov. Andrew Cuomo ― was about to shut down the Indian Point nuclear plant, located on the Hudson River 35 miles north of midtown Manhattan. The older of its two reactors unit would (literally) get the chop within a week; its twin would follow in a year. Both reactor vessels would be cut to pieces and their radioactive components chemically dissolved. Once that process began, there’d be no turning back.
I stood there holding my phone, stunned. A near-stranger was berating me! I would have hung up, but there was something raw in his voice that I couldn’t ignore. I don’t remember exactly what I said ― probably some version of “don’t blame me.” After all, the carbon tax I’d spent years advocating would have made Indian Point too valuable to shut down. Then I offered what I thought was my strongest point: soon enough, Indian Point’s carbon-free electricity would be replaced by zero-carbon wind and solar anyway, so little harm would be done.
Then Dietmar lowered the boom.
“You don’t get it, do you?,” he said, his voice now cold. “Even if all those new solar panels and wind turbines get built, they won’t displace fossil fuels. They’ll just be replacing carbon-free nuclear electricity that was already protecting the climate. They can’t do both.”
“Wait. What? Say that again.”
“Think of it this way,” Dietmar said. “When new renewables have to replace an existing power source that was already displacing fossil fuels, like Indian Point, their net climate benefit is zero. The renewables you’ve been counting on to push out fossil fuels can’t do that job as long as they’re having to take the place of nuclear plants that were already doing the decarbonizing.”
Full disclosure: those aren’t Dietmar’s exact words. They’re actually mine, drawn from articles I later wrote for Gotham Gazette and The Nation, and from a letter I co-wrote with futurist Stewart Brand, yes, the “Whole Earth Catalog” guy, urging California Gov. Gavin Newsom to halt the planned closure of the Diablo Canyon reactors along his state’s coast. But they capture Dietmar’s central point: shutting down a working nuclear power plant ― or any large source of carbon-free electricity ― nullifies the climate benefit that new replacement wind and solar projects are supposed to provide.
Six years later, Indian Point’s closure still haunts me. Why didn’t I speak up? It’s how I imagine I’d feel if a climbing partner had died because of some mistake I made. In New York, where I live, I measure every increment of renewable energy against the carbon benefit we threw away when Indian Point was shut down and dismantled.
By that gauge, wind and solar look mediocre. Take those 42-inch square “balcony solar” arrays that Germans are buying like hotcakes ― they’re a neat idea, but it would take 50 million of them to match the carbon reduction Indian Point provided, as I wrote here in June. Or consider a rooftop solar setup for the City Island boathouse where my ecologically minded physicist pal stows his sailboat ― fine on its own, but matching Indian Point’s climate value would require solarizing 600,000 similar buildings across the state.[8]
Underneath these daunting numbers is Dietmar’s deeper point: all of this new renewable capacity should have been added on top of Indian Point, not built to replace it.
6. Renewables in a Dimmer Light
Solar and wind power were guiding passions of my adult life. From the 1970s onward, I savored every news story about the latest gains in solar efficiencies and blade lengths. Wind turbines especially stirred me, with their kinetic kinship to bicycles and futuristic look.
Befitting my mathematical bent, I would calculate how much fossil fuel each new wind farm would keep in the ground. For Cape Wind, intended as the first U.S. offshore wind farm, near Cape Cod, I consulted a digest of ballpark dimensions to illustrate how much coal the project would displace each year: enough to cover the entire playing field at Boston’s Fenway Park — foul territory included — in a pile three times the height of the park’s famed “Green Monster” outfield wall.[9]
While I was playing with those numbers, a Stanford mechanical engineering professor named Mark Z. Jacobson was launching a stream of papers spelling out just how many wind turbines and solar panels ― on land, at sea, on rooftops, on farmland or rangeland ― would be required to satisfy the energy needs of different states and countries.
A table in Jacobson’s paper for New York helpfully broke down how much energy had to come from each source. Offshore wind was his largest category, charged with supplying 40 percent of New York State’s energy year-round. The number of turbines: 12,700.
That figure should have given me pause. Filling that quota meant building a hundred Cape Wind projects in the waters off Long Island, even as well-heeled locals including Riverkeeper figurehead Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (yes, that Kennedy) and Walter Cronkite (yes, that Cronkite) were NIMBYing the actual Cape Wind project to death. Ditto, wind projects proposed for the next county over from our cabin in the Adirondacks.
None of those projects were ever built — not just because of local opposition, but also because of a lack of full-throated support from environmentalists who should have championed them for their climate value. Especially in liberal Northeastern states, it seemed impossible to build anything that asked property owners to tolerate construction disruption or changed views, decarbonization be damned.
You might expect the outlook for Jacobson’s all-renewables vision for New York to be improving. Wind turbines are now so prodigious that he can propose 8,000 15-gigawatt turbines instead of 12,700 5-gigawatt ones.[10] And solar power has captured the public’s imagination in a way wind power has not — it’s no accident that climate activist (and Jacobson acolyte) Bill McKibben titled his 2025 call-to-action book, “Here Comes The Sun.”
Nevertheless, the carbon-free electricity lost when Indian Point closed has gone almost entirely unreplaced. Nearly nine-tenths of the power it generated is being made up by burning natural gas — not due to corporate chicanery but because no other source has stepped up. (See chart below.)
And dreams of an all-renewables grid still have to contend with an intrinsic fault ― one even more disabling than the NIMBY opposition sparked by the projects’ thirst for land. That weakness is intermittency: the fact that wind and solar output varies not just day to day, but moment to moment, at the mercy of the weather.
Jacobson has doggedly calculated how many megawatt-hours of wind and solar would be needed to match New York’s ― and other states’ ― total annual energy use. But neither his nor anyone else’s atmospheric models are detailed enough, meteorologically, to verify that a 100% wind-water-solar grid could keep the power on continuously ― hour by hour, year in and year out. Building in extra capacity doesn’t solve this problem. Compensating for weather’s unpredictability by deliberately oversupplying wind and solar, or backing them up with batteries, may look good on paper. But either approach would be punishingly expensive and probably insufficient as well, without ample supplies of reliable, dispatchable power such as nuclear. If there’s no wind, having twice as many turbines won’t help.[11]
In New York, the political fallout from losing Indian Point’s copious ’round-the-clock carbon-free electricity is landing on Cuomo’s successor. With the plant’s closure having pushed New York’s carbon-reduction targets out of reach, Gov. Kathy Hochul this year bowed to reality and froze a 2019 law tying New York’s climate and energy future to renewables. Forces ranging from standard-issue Democrats to grassroots greens are pillorying Hochul as a sellout to Big Oil, though her proposal to add five large reactors across the state — she dubs it her Nuclear Reliability Backbone — is almost certainly a more assured path to decarbonization than the fashionable all-renewables approach.
Click here for the final installment, Why I’m Pro-Nuke Now: Conclusion.
[7] The two representations in the text of carbon pricing’s boost to new reactors’ economics are derived and sourced in my Sept. 2026 paper with James Boucher, Beyond Vogtle: What History Tells Us About the Cost of New Nuclear.
[8] Comparisons in this paragraph employ: 2,028 MW capacity and 90% capacity factor for Indian Point; 220 W capacity and 15% CF for balcony solar. 17 kW capacity and 20% CF for boathouse solar. 10 MW and 40% CF for each wind turbine.
[9] Cape Wind assumptions: 130 3.6-GW turbines and 40% capacity factor yield 1,641 GWh/year. Coal assumptions: 9,800 Btu/kWh, 11,500 Btu/lb of coal, 1.32 coal specific gravity, 62.4 lb of water per cubic foot. Calculations yield 132-foot-high coal pile covering Fenway Park’s 128,000 sq ft surface (est’d from http://www.baseball-statistics.com/Ballparks/Bos/index.htm). That is 3-4x Green Monster height of 37 feet, 2 inches, per Wikipedia.
[10] While Jacobson’s new offshore wind configuration would outproduce its predecessor by nearly two to one, he has also upped his forecast for total required energy, leaving constant offshore wind’s share 40 percent share.
[11] To take a recent example: at the onset of a late June – early July 2026 heat wave, New York State’s wind farms collectively were producing less than one percent of their rated 3,000-megawatt capacity. See my “Beyond Vogtle” report (FN 46) referenced in Footnote 7.
Carbon Footprint
Why I’m Pro-Nuke Now: Conclusion
This concludes my three-part post. Part I, “Beginning,” began with the Three Mile Island accident and covered the decline of nuclear dread, the advent of fabulously reliable reactor operation, and nuclear power’s climate-hero status; it’s available here. Part II, “Centerpiece,” covered the failure of carbon tax advocacy, the closure of Indian Point, and the dissolution of my dream that renewable energy could do it all; it’s available here. This part takes antinuclear activism to task for turning a blind eye to the far more lethal harms from unrestrained automobility, and then turns to the need to redefine “least-cost” decision rules guiding electricity investment. — C.K.
7. A More-Brutal Bête Noire
On a different, but as I’ll show, related topic: I had known for some time that deaths from being struck by a motorist were shockingly common in the U.S., with 300 a year in New York City alone. I had made that fact a central element in defending bicycling against the moral panic over ― of all things ― New York’s industrious bicycle couriers during the pre-digital 1980s. And as a bicycle commuter I had long jousted with drivers. But the death of oncologist Dr. Jie Zhang in 1994 forced me to consider driver-caused traffic violence as an assault on both public health and the moral order.
The horrific death in 1994 of physician and expectant mother Jie Zhang called into question antinuclear dogma that prioritized hypothetical reactor accidents over lethal dangers like unrestrained automobility.
A speeding driver hit and killed Dr. Jie outside Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center on Manhattan’s East Side. She was nine months pregnant. As she lay dying, her colleagues at the hospital delivered her son, who survived. The newspaper ran a photo of the newborn in his father’s arms. My wife and our week-old son were safe at home. My good fortune was hard to bear.
What were the hazards of nuclear power, next to those of motorized traffic? There was and is no agreed-upon damage ratio between the two technologies. But in my eyes, the anti-nukers’ derogatory depictions of U.S. nuclear regulators seemed better suited to officials in charge of “auto safety.” In 2009, for example, after a spate of deaths in SUV rollovers, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration required that roofs on new vehicles be able to support three times their already swollen weight. That rule led to wider windshield-obstructing structural posts , badly expanding SUV drivers’ blind spots. The result, according to a recent New York Times report, was a tidal wave of crashes that killed hundreds of pedestrians and cyclists and injured thousands more.
As a young attorney in the 1960s, Ralph Nader rocketed to fame by documenting how regulatory capture made cars excessively dangerous. His subsequent pivot to opposing nuclear power initially made sense but, over time, inadvertently left American pedestrians, cyclists, and occupants of smaller vehicles vulnerable not just to “vehicle bloat” but driver distractions and the “windshield perspective” of police, prosecutors and juries.
All the while, anti-nuclear activists keep pounding their drum, willfully ignoring U.S. reactors’ splendid post-seventies safety record (see Sections 1 & 2). With few domestic miscues to flog, they leaned instead into the faraway disasters at Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011). Those disasters were real enough, but they differed from the U.S. situation not just in location but also in root cause. Soviet and Japanese officials had downplayed reactor risks, while the U.S. nuclear enterprise had built a culture dedicated to containing them.
Even reactor radioactivity, like reactor accidents, is becoming another non-barking dog. We are half-a-century into the age of large-scale deployment of nuclear power, and not a single large-scale study has emerged that credibly pins increased morbidity and/or mortality on nuclear power plant operation. Moreover, the old Rubik’s Cube problem of nuclear waste disposal is yielding to engineered solutions. The hangup was never technical. It was political.
8. By All Means, Decarbonize
For half-a-century, nuclear power and renewable energy have circled each other like wary prizefighters.
The two weren’t simply antithetical, they were incompatible — logistically as well as culturally. One couldn’t be for both; you had to pick a side. That was the gospel of physicist Amory Lovins, whose revolutionary 1976 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken,” upended energy policy debates and galvanized the antinuclear power movement.[12]
In Lovins’ influential framing, nukes epitomized “hard” energy — lumbering and brittle. Renewables — wind and solar — were “soft” — home-grown and “right-sized.” (This was before the relentless push for engineering efficiencies turned wind turbines into colossi and blanketed entire fields with solar panels.)
Fifty years on, the climate crisis has entered the ring and demanded that the rivals partner up. The choice now is carbon-burning vs. carbon-free. Further, the perilous timeline of the crisis has toppled another dictum, also traceable to Lovins: that the transition from fossil fuels must proceed under a “least-cost-first” hierarchy that turns to costlier energy sources only after first exhausting all of the less-expensive ones.
Once, that logic was persuasive. In a leisurely, decades-long transition, why not have the lowest-cost energy lead the way? Wherever a home solar array or a Great Plains wind farm could turn a profit, the thousand busy ants of capitalism could be trusted to deploy them. The climate-warping curve would bend, steadily, painlessly, bringing a more flexible and benign energy system into the bargain.
That was the idea. The reality is falling far short, as revealed by the stubborn persistence of U.S. carbon emissions.[13] The manifold causes have been touched on here; they include everything from traditional NIMBYism to viral versions built on conspiracy-mongering, along with supersized pickups, “sport utes” and the absence of robust carbon emissions pricing. The shale revolution and two Trump presidencies did their part as well, keeping fossil fuels cheap (until No. 47 made war on Iran), which added to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere and America’s stock of carbon-consuming cities and towns, farms and roadways.
In World Cup parlance, we’ve entered stoppage time. A new rule applies: nuclear power ― or any other fossil-fuel antidote ― need not pencil out as cheaper than solar or wind to merit a part in decarbonizing U.S. grids. Instead, we should pursue any energy source or energy-saving measure that displaces fossil fuel use at lesser cost than the harm caused by burning those fuels in the first place.
Feb. 11, 1985 cover.
Think of it like the hikers’ joke about the bear: I don’t need to outrun the bear, I just need to outrun you. In the same way, new nuclear plants don’t need to be cheaper per kilowatt-hour than solar or wind. Their electricity just needs to cost less than the added climate damage that would result from burning the fossil fuels that would otherwise fill the gap. And on that test, new nuclear power plants appear likely to succeed.
Let’s break that down.
What will new U.S. reactors cost to build?
This year I applied my statistical skills and power plant knowledge to the 49 most recently built U.S. reactors. Forty-seven of them limped to completion in the dozen years following Three Mile Island. At the time, their swollen costs so ravaged U.S. electric utilities that Forbes magazine termed the U.S. nuclear power program “the largest managerial disaster in business history.”
Nevertheless, my analysis of that cost data points to a path forward. I found that even if future reactor costs track past costs, a program that builds two or more reactors at each site and uses standardized designs will allow new plants to be built for an average cost of $8,200 per kilowatt of capacity, in 2025 dollars. At that price, building and running new reactors is almost certainly a lower-cost proposition than facing the ecological and human damage from burning equivalent fossil fuels.[14]
If anything, my figure is on the pessimistic side, since it bakes in the kind of shifting regulatory requirements that drove up costs so much in the post-TMI period. Even so, it comes to just half of what it cost to build the final two reactors — Georgia Power new Vogtle 3 and 4 units ― a project that nuclear power critics dredge up at every opportunity as proof that any new U.S. nuclear plant is doomed to be uneconomical.
An alternative visualization of this chart appears as Fig. 9 in “Beyond Vogtle.”
Just as important, the odds of future extreme overruns appear low. Using a probabilistic model, I found that the likelihood that a new twin-unit plant, built to a standardized design, will end up costing as much as Vogtle is slim ― the same odds, around 1.7%, as correctly calling six coin flips in a row.[15]
Will the long time to build new reactors undo their climate benefit?
Past nuclear plants seemed to take forever to finish. The 47 reactors whose costs I analyzed averaged nearly 12 years from initiation to completion ― a 50 percent worsening from their 1970s counterparts. Much of that added time traces back to Three Mile Island, which triggered design changes, equipment upgrades, and staffing shifts across the entire U.S. nuclear sector, each adding delays. Slowing demand for power also led some utilities to stretch out construction schedules on their own.
To nuclear power’s critics, these setbacks come with the territory. But reactors aren’t the only major infrastructure projects facing long timelines. Delays in building wind farms, transmission lines, and other accoutrements of renewable energy have prompted plenty of national hand-wringing too. Even balcony solar ― the latest face of decarbonization ― will need time to scale up. Electrical codes and fire regulations must be rewritten, and then the real challenge begins: installing roughly 25 million of these devices (at 220W each) to match the climate benefit of a single 1,000-megawatt reactor.
There’s also a déjà vu tinge to the complaint that nuclear power is too slow to help with the climate crisis. That argument easily predates Vogtle 3 and 4 ― the massive Georgia project that tested residents’ patience and wallets, but is now helping decarbonize Atlanta and hundreds of other cities. The goal isn’t to repeat Vogtle’s egregiously high cost, which doesn’t yet clear the bar set by the social cost of carbon. It’s to treat the climate fight as an ongoing effort to reduce harm by whatever effective means are available.
Balcony solar and giant nukes aren’t rivals ― they’re partners. Building Vogtle didn’t stop Georgians from putting solar panels on their roofs in 2015, and if balcony solar really is the money-saving no-brainer its supporters claim, there’s no reason it shouldn’t help rate-burdened Georgia families in 2027, too. “All hands on deck” is a cliché, but it fits here. The world has no time to wait ― it needs to decarbonize by every means available. Including nuclear power.
[12] Lovins’ Foreign Affairs article is available here. I recounted its momentous impact on energy policy and public discourse for The Electricity Journal in 10 Blows That Stopped Nuclear Power (Jan/Feb 1991).
[13] U.S. CO2 emissions circa averaged only 1 to 2 percent annual reductions over the period 2010-2025, a rate many times slower than needed to meaningfully address the climate crisis.
[14] See Komanoff & Boucher, “Beyond Vogtle,” op. cit., pp. 41-44.
[15] The chance of correctly calling six coin-tosses in a row is one-half raised to the sixth power, which is 1 in 64, or 1.56%, which more or less matches the 1.7% chance that a new nuclear plant will cost as much as or more than Vogtle 3 and 4. See Komanoff & Boucher, op. cit., Fig. 9.
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