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Last year was the hottest the Earth has experienced since the start of global temperature records in the mid-1800s – and likely for many thousands of years before.

The year 2024 was the first in which average global temperatures at the surface of the planet exceeded 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in the majority of leading datasets.

While reaching 1.5C in an individual year is not equivalent to a breach of the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit – which refers to long-term warming – it nevertheless indicates that the world is quickly approaching this internationally agreed threshold.

Here, Carbon Brief examines the latest data across the Earth’s oceans, atmosphere, cryosphere and surface temperature. (Use the links below to navigate between sections.)

Noteworthy findings from this 2024 review include…

  • Global surface temperatures: It was the warmest year on record by a large margin – at between 1.46C and 1.62C above pre-industrial levels across different temperature datasets and 1.55C in the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) synthesis.
  • Exceptional monthly temperatures: Global temperatures set a new record each month between January and June, extending a 15-month record-setting stretch which began in 2023.
  • Warmest over land: Global temperatures over the world’s land regions – where humans live and primarily experience climate impacts – were a record 2.3C above pre-industrial levels.
  • Warmest over oceans: Global sea surface temperatures set a new record at 1.1C above pre-industrial levels.
  • Ocean heat content: It was the warmest year on record for ocean heat content. In 2024, the oceans added 25 times more heat than all annual human energy use.
  • Regional warming: It was the warmest year on record in more than 100 countries – including China, Canada, Mexico, Germany, Brazil, Greece, Malaysia and South Korea – and in areas where a total of 3.3 billion people live.
  • Unusual warmth: The specific causes behind the exceptionally warm, record-setting temperatures in both 2023 and 2024 remain an open scientific question, with human-caused greenhouse gases, variability in El Niño and changes in the reflectivity of clouds all playing a role.
  • Comparison with climate models: Observations for 2024 are above the central estimate of climate model projections in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sixth assessment report, but well within the model range.
  • Heating of the atmosphere: It was the warmest year in the lower troposphere – the lowest part of the atmosphere – by a large margin.
  • Sea level rise: Sea levels reached new record highs, with notable acceleration over the past three decades.
  • Shrinking glaciers and ice sheets: Cumulative ice loss from the world’s glaciers and from the Greenland ice sheet reached a new record high in 2024, contributing to sea level rise.
  • Greenhouse gases: Concentrations reached record levels for carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and nitrous oxide.
  • Sea ice extent: Arctic sea ice saw its seventh-lowest minimum extent on record, while Antarctic sea ice was at the second-lowest level on record for much of the year.
  • Looking ahead to 2025: Carbon Brief predicts that global average surface temperatures in 2025 are likely to be the third warmest on record after 2024 and 2023, at around 1.4C above pre-industrial levels. However, large uncertainties remain given how exceptionally and unexpectedly warm the past two years have been.

Record warm surface temperatures

Global surface temperatures set a new record in 2024, surpassing the record set in 2023 by around 0.11C. It was unambiguously the warmest year since records began in the mid-1800s. 2024 was far warmer than any year prior to 2023, exceeding the previous record (set in 2016) by a massive 0.26C.

The figure below shows global surface temperature records from five different datasets: NASA, NOAA, the Met Office Hadley Centre/University of East Anglia’s (UEA) HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth and Copernicus ERA5.

Other surface temperature datasets not shown – including JRA-3Q, the AIRS satellite data and the Japanese Meteorological Agency – also show 2024 as the warmest year on record.

Annual global average surface temperatures over 1850-2024. Data from NASA GISTEMP, NOAA GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth and Copernicus ERA5. Temperature records are aligned over the 1981-2010 period and use the WMO approach to calculate warming relative to the pre-industrial (1850-1900) baseline. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Global surface temperature records can be calculated back to 1850, though some groups such as NASA GISTEMP choose to start their records in 1880 when more data was available.

Prior to 1850, records exist for some specific regions, but are not sufficiently widespread to calculate global temperatures with high accuracy (though work is ongoing to identify and digitise additional records to extend these further back in time).

These longer surface temperature records are created by combining ship- and buoy-based measurements of ocean sea surface temperatures with temperature readings of the surface air temperature from weather stations on land. (Copernicus ERA5 and JRA-3Q are an exception, as they use weather model-based reanalysis to combine lots of different data sources over time.)

Some differences between temperature records are apparent early in the record, particularly prior to 1900 when observations are more sparse and results are more sensitive to how different groups fill in the gaps between observations. However, there is strong agreement between the different temperature records for the period since 1970, as shown in the figure below.

Global surface temperature records, 1970-2024

Annual global average surface temperatures as in the prior chart, but showing the period from 1970-2024. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Global temperatures in 2024 clearly stand out as much warmer than anything that has come before, above even the exceptionally warm temperatures of 2023. This can be seen in the figure below from Berkeley Earth. Each shaded curve represents the annual average temperature for that year. The further that curve is to the right, the warmer it was.

The width of each year’s curve reflects the uncertainty in the annual temperature values, which is caused by factors such as changes in measurement techniques and the fact that some parts of the world have fewer measurement locations than others.

Global mean temperature anomaly and uncertainty in degrees C.
Global average surface temperatures for each year, relative to 1850-1900, with their respective uncertainties (width of the curves) from the Berkeley Earth surface temperature record. Figure from Berkeley Earth.

The year 2024 was the warmest on record for both the world’s land and ocean regions. Global average land temperatures were around 2.3C above pre-industrial levels in the Berkeley Earth dataset, while global ocean temperatures exceeded 1.1C.

The figure below shows land (red) and ocean (blue) temperatures along with their respective confidence intervals, relative to pre-industrial levels, in the Berkeley Earth surface temperature record.

Land and ocean temperatures 1850-2024
Land and ocean temperature rise since the pre-industrial 1850-1900 period. Figure from Berkeley Earth.

Global land regions – where the global human population lives – has been warming around 70% faster than the oceans – and 40% faster than the global average in the years since 1970.

2024 started off quite hot, boosted by an El Niño event that peaked at the start of the year. The first six months of the year set new all-time monthly records, extending a run of 15 record-setting months that started in July 2023. The latter part of the year remained warm, and was only slightly exceeded by the exceptionally hot temperatures experienced in the second half of 2023.

The figure below shows each month of 2024 in black, compared to all prior years since 1940. Each year is coloured based on the decade in which it occurred, with the clear warming over time visible, as well as the margin by which both 2023 and 2024 exceeded past years.

Monthly global temperature anomalies

Monthly global surface temperatures for each year since 1940, with anomalies shown relative to the pre-industrial 1850-1900 period using data from Copernicus/ECMWF ERA5. Chart by Carbon Brief.

First year above 1.5C in most records

In the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries agreed to work to limit global temperatures to “well below 2C” and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels”.

While the agreement did not specifically define how to measure the breach of these climate targets, the goals have been widely interpreted (including by the IPCC) to refer to temperature averages over 20 years.

In other words, the limits refer to long-term warming, rather than an individual year that includes the short-term influence of natural fluctuations in the climate, such as El Niño.

However, a single year exceeding 1.5C still represents a grim milestone and a sign that the world is quickly approaching the target. And, in the majority of datasets in 2024, global surface temperatures exceeded 1.5C for the first time. (In the Berkeley Earth dataset, 2023 was actually the first year above 1.5C.)

Temperature record 2024 temperatures relative to preindustrial
NASA GISTEMP 1.47C
Hadley/UAE HadCRUT5 1.53C
NOAA GlobalTemp 1.46C
Berkeley Earth 1.62C
Copernicus/ECMWF 1.60C
JRA-3Q 1.59C
Japanese Meteorological Agency 1.52C

Global temperature anomalies for 2024 relative to pre-industrial temperatures (1850-1900).

NOAA and NASA were the only organisations to report global temperatures below 1.5C – and by just a few hundredths of a degree. Berkeley Earth, Copernicus and JRA-3Q all estimated that temperatures were around 1.6C.

This year, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) provided a synthesis of the different global surface temperature records – incorporating NASA, Hadley, NOAA, Berkeley, Copernicus and JRA-3Q data – which is a useful tool to provide a best-estimate across the different groups. It finds that 2024 was the first year above 1.5C, coming in at 1.55C compared to 1.45C in 2023.

The figure below shows various temperature records along with their published uncertainty range (where available), alongside the WMO synthesis estimate.

How warm was 2024? Global average temperatures in 2024 relative to the 1850-1900 average
Global surface temperatures in 2024 from each group and the WMO synthesis, with anomalies shown relative to the pre-industrial 1850-1900 period and uncertainties plotted when available. Figure from Berkeley Earth.

As noted earlier, these datasets are nearly identical over the past 50 years. Differences in warming relative to pre-industrial levels emerge earlier in the record, particularly prior to 1900 when observations are more sparse and the choice of how to fill in the gaps between observations has a large impact on the resulting temperature estimate.

The figure below shows how different temperature records look if each is calculated relative to its own pre-industrial baseline, rather than using an average pre-industrial baseline as shown in the prior section. Focusing on warming since pre-industrial levels – rather than more recent warming – magnifies differences between groups, with the variation in warming across groups largely due to the most uncertain early part of the record.

Global warming 1850 to 2024 (95% confidence interval shown for Berkeley Earth temperature anomalies relative to 1850-1900 average)
Annual global surface temperatures since 1850, with anomalies shown relative to the pre-industrial 1850-1900 period for each dataset. Figure from Berkeley Earth.

Ocean heat content sets another record

Last year was the warmest on record for the heat content of the world’s oceans. Ocean heat content (OHC) has increased by around 484 zettajoules – a billion trillion joules – since the 1940s. The heat increase in 2024 alone compared to 2023 – about 16 zettajoules – is around 25 times as much as the total energy produced by all human activities on Earth in 2023 (the latest year in which global primary energy statistics are available).

Human-emitted greenhouse gases trap extra heat in the atmosphere. While some of this warms the Earth’s surface, the vast majority – around of 93% – goes into the oceans. About two-thirds of this accumulates in the top 700 metres, but some also ends up in the deep oceans.

The figure below shows annual OHC estimates between 1950 and present for the upper 700 metres (light blue shading) and 700-2,000 metres (dark blue) of the ocean.

Global ocean heat content, 1950-2024

Annual global ocean heat content (in zettajoules – billion trillion joules, or 10^21 joules) for the 0-700 metre and 700-2,000 metre layers. Data from Cheng et al. (2024). Chart by Carbon Brief.

In many ways, OHC represents a much better measure of climate change than global average surface temperatures, because it is where most of the extra heat ends up and is much less variable on a year-to-year basis than surface temperatures.

The graph above shows a distinct acceleration in OHC after 1991, matching the increased rate of greenhouse gas emissions and other radiative forcing elements over the past few decades.

A year of climate extremes

While media coverage of 2024 temperatures has largely focused on the global average, many different regions of the planet experienced climate extremes.
The figure below shows global temperature anomalies in 2024 across the world, with the red areas warmer than the baseline period (1951-80) used by Berkeley Earth and the (few) blue areas experiencing cooler temperatures.

2024 global heat map, relative to 1951-1980 averages
Surface temperature anomalies for 2024 from Berkeley Earth. Note that Berkeley uses a 1951-80 baseline here to show anomalies.

Approximately 3.3 billion people – 40% of Earth’s population – live in places that experienced their warmest year on record in 2024. This was concentrated in Asia, South and Central America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. It also includes two-thirds of the population of China, as well as most of the population of Brazil, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico and one-third of the population of the US.

The figure below highlights regions of the planet that experienced their top-five warmest (red shading) or coldest (blue) temperatures on record in 2024. Overall, around 24% of the planet set a new record, including 32% of the land and 21% of the ocean. No location on the planet experienced record cold temperatures (or even top-five record cold temperatures) for the year as a whole.

Annual average temperature rankings in 2024
Regions of the world among the five warmest (reds) of five coolest (blues) on record for average annual temperatures in 2024. Figure from Berkeley Earth.

In 2024, more than 100 countries saw their warmest year on record, as listed in the table below.

Africa Asia Europe North America Oceania South America
Algeria
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Liberia
Libya
Malawi
Mozambique
Republic of the Congo
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Sudan
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Brunei
Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Mongolia
North Korea
Oman
Palau
Philippines
Singapore
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Yemen
Albania
Austria
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Kosovo
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Malta
Moldova
Montenegro
Netherlands
Poland
San Marino
Republic of Serbia
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine
Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Belize
Canada
Dominica
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Trinidad and Tobago
Federated States of Micronesia
Fiji
Kiribati
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Brazil
Colombia
Guyana
Paraguay
Suriname
Venezuela

While the contiguous US saw record warmth, 2024 was the country’s second-warmest year on record once Alaska and Hawaii temperatures are included.

Furthermore, the continents of North America, South America, Asia, Africa and Europe each set new annual average records in 2024.

Untangling the drivers of spiking global temperatures

Global temperatures spiked in both 2023 and 2024 in a manner that scientists had not anticipated. Projections of 2023 temperatures were far below what actually occurred, and even 2024 projections ended up being on the lower end, despite incorporating 2023’s extremes.

The figure below shows estimates by four different groups that provided temperature predictions for the year prior to any data being collected – the UK Met Office, NASA’s Dr Gavin Schmidt, Berkeley Earth and Carbon Brief’s own estimate.

Comparing different 2024 temperature projections

Temperature predictions for 2024 from the UK Met Office, NASA’s Dr Gavin Schmidt, Berkeley Earth, and Carbon Brief relative to pre-industrial (1850-1900) temperatures and compared to the historical average of six different datasets produced by the WMO. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Unusually high global temperatures in 2023 and 2024 have sparked a slew of new studies by scientists attempting to explain the excessive heat. A range of possible causes has been proposed, including:

  • The possibility that El Niño behaved unusually as it followed a rare extended triple-dip La Niña event. A 2024 paper found that when El Niño followed an extended La Niña in climate model simulations, it produced a temperature spike commensurate to what was observed in 2023-24 around 10% of the time.
  • A decline in emissions of sulphur dioxide, reducing atmospheric aerosol concentrations and “unmasking” additional warming from past human greenhouse gas emissions. Multiple different papers have looked at the effects of a 2020 low-sulphur marine shipping fuel regulation, and ongoing research is looking at the effects of a sharp drop in sulphur emissions in China.
  • An unusual 2022 eruption of the Hunga-Tonga Hunga Ha’apai volcano that put around 150m tonnes of water vapour into the stratosphere, as well as some sulphur dioxide. Papers have been mixed on whether the water vapour warming or the sulphur dioxide cooling would be larger.
  • Other factors include an uptick in the 11-year solar cycle, and unusually low Saharan dust concentrations in early summer 2023.

One notable paper, published in the journal Science in early December 2024, found a substantial decline in reflective low-cloud cover in the northern mid-latitudes and tropics. They noted that this has the effect of increasing the amount of solar radiation that reaches the Earth’s surface and is re-radiated as heat.

The finding by itself does not reveal what caused a decline in cloud reflectivity, and the authors note that it could be a combination of natural variability, declining atmospheric aerosol concentrations associated with falling sulfur emissions, or – more worryingly – a sign of a strong positive cloud feedback associated with warming.

The figure below, created by Dr Robert Rohde at Berkeley Earth, synthesises the main drivers of temperature change over the past decade. It includes estimates of the warming contribution from human greenhouse gas emissions, El Niño and La Niña, changes in the solar cycle, the Hunga-Tonga eruption, and the 2020 low-sulphur marine fuel regulations. For the latter two elements, it includes a range of six published estimates of the eruption and five published estimates of the low sulphur fuel rules.

Factors affecting global temperature – last 10 years
Illustration of contributing factors driving global surface temperatures over the past decade. Each line for the Hunga Tonga eruption and marine fuel pollution reduction reflects a different published estimate. Figure from Berkeley Earth.

Over the longer-term, human emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases alongside planet-cooling aerosols are the main driver of global temperatures. Global temperatures have risen by more than 1.3C since pre-industrial times as a result of human activity.

However, on top of long-term warming, global temperatures vary year-to-year by up to 0.2C.

These variations are primarily driven by El Niño and La Niña events that redistribute heat between the atmosphere and oceans. However, other factors such as volcanic eruptions, the 11-year solar cycle and changes in short-lived climate forcers can influence year-to-year temperature changes.

The figure below shows the El Niño (red shading) and La Niña (blue) conditions over the past 40 years (collectively referred to as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, or “ENSO”). While not unprecedented, the extended La Niña conditions since the latter half of 2020 have extended for an unusually long period of time.

Historical Nino 3.4 sea surface temperature anomaly
Niño 3.4 sea surface temperature anomalies relative to the ocean average, for 1982-2024. Deviations below 0.5C and above 0.5C are generally used to determine La Niña and El Niño conditions, respectively. Figure from International Research Institute (IRI) at Columbia University.

Carbon Brief has used this historical relationship between ENSO conditions and temperature to effectively remove the effects of El Niño and La Niña events from global temperatures, as shown in the figure below.

This analysis indicates that El Niño boosted global temperatures in 2024 by around 0.16C compared to the estimate of global temperatures with both El Niño and La Niña events removed. This was a much larger effect than the 0.04C estimated for 2023, when El Niño emerged relatively late in the year and peaked in November.

Effects of El Nino and La Nina on global temperatures

Annual global average surface temperatures from the WMO average of six different datasets , as well as Carbon Brief’s estimate of global temperatures with the effect of El Niño and La Niña (ENSO) events removed using the Foster and Rahmstorf (2011) approach. Chart by Carbon Brief.

However, this approach – which relies on a historical lag of around three months between peak ENSO conditions in the tropical Pacific and global surface temperature response – may not fully reflect El Niño effects on 2023. As discussed earlier, the fact that El Niño occurred on the heels of unusually-long La Niña conditions may have contributed to an earlier global temperature response than has been seen in other recent strong El Niño events.

Observations broadly in line with climate model projections

Climate models provide physics-based estimates of future warming given different assumptions about future emissions, greenhouse gas concentrations and other climate-influencing factors.

Here, Carbon Brief examines a collection of climate models – known as CMIP6 – used in the 2021 science report of the IPCC’s sixth assessment. In CMIP6, model estimates of temperatures prior to 2015 are a “hindcast” using known past climate influences, while temperatures projected from 2015 onward are a “forecast” based on an estimate of how things might change.

The figure below shows how observations compare to the full ensemble of 37 CMIP6 models (under the middle-of-the-road SSP2-4.5 emissions scenario for future projections). The blue line represents the average of all the models and the grey areas showing the 5th to 95th percentile range. Observational temperatures are plotted on top of the climate model data, with individual observational records represented by red lines of different shades.

The chart illustrates how observations have generally been below the model average over the past two decades and are slightly above model average in 2024.

Global surface temperatures 1950-2024: CMIP6 models and observations

Annual global average surface temperatures from CMIP6 models and observations between 1950 and 2030 (through 2024 for observations). Models use the SSP2-4.5 scenario after 2015. Anomalies plotted with respect to a 1981-2010 baseline. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The CMIP6 ensemble is marginally more challenging for this comparison than past generations of CMIP because a subset of its models have unrealistically high climate sensitivity and they reproduce historical observations poorly. To account for this, rather than simply averaging all the models – as had been done in prior assessments – the IPCC employed an approach that effectively weights models by their performance. As a result, the models align better with the range of climate sensitivity derived from multiple different lines of evidence.

In the chart below, the blue line shows the average of 22 different models whose transient climate response (TCR) falls within the IPCC’s “likely” range (which results in temperature projections nearly identical to the IPCC-assessed warming). The grey area shows the 95% (two standard deviation) range of the TCR-screened model projections.

Global surface temperatures 1950-2024: TCR-screened CMIP6 models and observations

CMIP6 models compared to observations as in the prior chart, but models are screened to only include those models with a transient climate response (TCR) in-line with the IPCC’s “likely” range as discussed in Hausfather et al (2022). Anomalies plotted with respect to a 1981-2010 baseline. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The chart reveals that observed global surface temperatures (red lines) are further above the multimodal average, but remain well within the range of TCR-screened model runs.

This might be surprising given the focus on 2023 and 2024 being unusually warm. However, climate models broadly expect an acceleration of warming in the current period in a scenario like SSP2-4.5 where emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases continue to modestly increase, but emissions of planet-cooling aerosols like sulphur dioxide are rapidly reduced.

Record atmospheric temperatures

In addition to surface measurements over the world’s land and oceans, satellite microwave sounding units have been providing estimates of temperatures at various layers of the atmosphere since 1979.

The lowest layer of the atmosphere that satellite microwave units provide temperature estimates for is the lower troposphere. This data reflects temperatures a few kilometres above the Earth’s surface. It reveals a pattern of warming in the lowest troposphere that is similar – though not identical – to surface temperature changes.

The records produced by Remote Sensing Systems (RSS), the University of Alabama, Huntsville (UAH) and NOAA show 2024 as the warmest year on record in the lower troposphere. The chart below shows the three records for the lower troposphere.

Satellite lower tropospheric temperature records

Global average lower-troposphere temperatures from RSS version 4 (blue), UAH version 6 (red) and NOAA STAR version 5 (grey) for the period from 1979-2024, relative to a 1981-2010 baseline. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The lower troposphere tends to be influenced more strongly by El Niño and La Niña events than the surface. Therefore, satellite records show correspondingly larger warming or cooling spikes during these events. This explains why the year-on-year increase in lower-troposphere temperature – of around 0.3C – seen in 2024 is larger than the ~0.1C increase in surface records.

The lower-tropospheric temperature records show large differences after the early 2000s. RSS shows an overall rate of warming quite similar to surface temperature records, while UAH and NOAA show considerably slower warming in recent years than has been observed on the surface.

Greenhouse gas concentrations reach new highs

Greenhouse gas concentrations reached a new high in 2024, driven by human emissions from fossil fuels, land use and agriculture.

Three greenhouse gases – CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) – are responsible for the bulk of additional heat trapped by human activities. CO2 is by far the largest factor, accounting for roughly 42% of the increase in global surface temperatures since the pre-industrial era (1850-1900).

Methane accounts for 28%, while nitrous oxide accounts for around 5%. The remaining 25% comes from other factors including carbon monoxide, black carbon and halocarbons, such as CFCs.

Human emissions of greenhouse gases have increased atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane and nitrous oxide to their highest levels in at least a few million years – if not longer.

The figure below shows concentrations of these greenhouse gases – in parts per million (ppm) for CO2 and parts per billion (ppb) for methane and nitrous oxide – from the early 1980s through to October 2024 for CO2 and September 2024 for CH4 and N2O (the most recent data currently available).

Global greenhouse gas concentrations

Global concentrations of CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Based on data from NOAA’s Earth Systems Research Laboratory. Note that the y-axes do not start at zero. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Sea level rise is speeding up

Modern-day sea levels have risen to a new high, due to a combination of melting land ice (such as glaciers and ice sheets), the thermal expansion of water as it warms and changes in land water storage.

In recent years, there have been larger contributions to sea level rise from melting ice sheets and glaciers, as warmer temperatures accelerate ice sheet losses in Greenland and Antarctica.

Since the early 1990s, the increase in global sea level has been estimated using altimeter data from satellites. Earlier global sea levels have been reconstructed from a network of global tide gauge measurements. This allows researchers to estimate how sea level has changed since the late 1800s.

The chart below shows five different modern sea level rise datasets (blue lines), along with satellite altimeter measurements as assessed by NASA (in black) after 1993. (As sea level rise data has not yet been released for the whole year, the 2024 value is estimated based on data through to October.)

Global mean sea level rise between 1880 and 2024

Global average sea level rise reconstructed from tide gauge data between 1880 and 2024 from Frederikse et al 2020, Dangendorf et al 2019, Hay et al 2015, Church and White 2011, and Palmer et al 2021. Satellite altimeter data from 1993 (black) to present is taken from NASA. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Sea levels have risen by over 0.2 metres (200mm) since 1900. While sea level rise estimates mostly agree in recent decades, larger divergences are evident before 1980. There is also evidence of accelerating sea level rise over the post-1993 period when high-quality satellite altimetry data is available. (See Carbon Brief’s explainer on how climate change is accelerating sea level rise.)

Shrinking glaciers and ice sheets

A significant portion of global sea level rise is being driven by melting glaciers on land. Scientists measure the mass of glaciers around the world using a variety of remote-sensing techniques, as well as through GRACE measurements of the Earth’s gravitational field. The balance between snow falling on a glacier and ice loss through melting and the breaking off – or “calving” – of icebergs determines if glaciers grow or shrink over time.
The World Glacier Monitoring Service is an international consortium that tracks more than 130 different glaciers in 19 different regions around the world. The figure below shows the change in global average glacier mass from 1950 through to the end of 2023. (2024 values are not yet available.) Note that glacier melt is reported in metres of water equivalent, which is a measure of how much mass has been lost on average.

Global glacier melt, 1950-2023

Global average glacier melt over the 1950-2023 period from the World Glacier Monitoring Service, in metres of water equivalent. Carbon Brief.

Greenland ice sheets have become a larger contributor to sea level rise in recent years due to accelerating loss of mass. The year 2024 was the 28th in a row where Greenland lost ice overall, with 80bn tonnes of ice lost over the 12 months from September 2023 to August 2024. Greenland last saw an annual net gain of ice in 1996.

The figure below shows the cumulative mass balance change – that is, the net ice loss – from Greenland between 1970 and October 2024. The authors find that Greenland has lost around 6tn tonnes of ice over the past 50 years – more than 700 tonnes lost per person for every person on the planet.

Greenland ice sheet mass balance, 1970-2024

Cumulative ice loss from Greenland in billion metric tonnes (gigatonnes) between 1970 and 2024 from Mankoff et al 2021, updated through December 2024. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Near-record low Antarctic sea ice extent

Arctic sea ice was at the low end of the historical (1979-2010) range for most of 2024, but did not set any new all-time low records apart from a few individual days at the end of the year.

The summer minimum extent – the lowest recorded level for the year – was the seventh-lowest since records began in the late 1970s.

Antarctic sea ice, on the other hand, was the second lowest on record – after 2023 – for much of the year. Taken together, 2023 and 2024 Antarctic sea ice extent was “way outside anything we have witnessed in our satellite record for their winter months”, an expert told Carbon Brief in October last year.

While long-term trends in Antarctic sea ice have been ambiguous in the past (unlike in the Arctic where there is a consistent long-term decline), there is increasing evidence that human-driven warming is starting to drive significant loss of sea ice in the region.

The figure below shows both Arctic (red line) and Antarctic (blue line) sea ice extent for each day of the year, along with how it compares to the historical range (corresponding shading).

Arctic and Antarctic sea ice in 2024

Arctic and Antarctic daily sea ice extent from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center. The bold lines show daily 2024 values, the shaded area indicates the two standard deviation range in historical values between 1979 and 2010. The dotted black lines show the record lows for each pole. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Looking ahead to 2025

There is reason for caution when estimating likely temperatures for 2025. In 2023, temperatures were significantly higher than predictions made at the start of the year, while 2024 temperatures were towards the high end of annual predictions.

At the same time, there is strong reason to expect that 2025 will be cooler than 2024. As noted earlier, 2024 temperatures were boosted by more than 0.1C by a strong El Niño event that has largely faded by the start of 2025. While global land temperatures remain quite elevated, sea surface temperatures have begun to fall in recent months, and weak La Niña conditions are starting to develop in the tropical Pacific.

It seems unlikely that a strong La Niña will develop in 2025, and it is quite possible that the world remains in ENSO neutral conditions with no formal La Niña being declared for the first half of the year. There is even a small chance that the world will re-enter El Niño conditions by the latter part of 2025 – though most models forecast neutral conditions to persist, as shown in the figure below.

Model predictions of ENSO from Dec 2024
El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) forecast models for overlapping three-month periods in the Niño3.4 region (September, October, November – SON – and so on) for the end of 2024 and then into the spring and summer of 2025. Credit: CPC/IRI ENSO forecast.

There have been four published predictions – from the UK Met Office, NASA’s Dr Gavin Schmidt, Berkeley Earth and Carbon Brief (in this article) – of what temperatures might look like in 2025.

The figure below shows the four different 2025 predictions compared to the average of six different temperature records (NASA, NOAA, Hadley, Berkeley, Copernicus and the Japanese JRA-3Q reanalysis) used by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). These have been “normalised” to show 2025 warming relative to 2024 in the WMO dataset. This is to remove any differences in predictions due to divergences in the baselines used by different temperature records.

Carbon Brief’s prediction of likely 2025 temperatures is based on a statistical model using the average temperature of the past year, the latest monthly temperature and projections of ENSO conditions over the first three months of 2025.

Comparing different 2025 temperature projections

Temperature projections for 2025 from the UK Met Office, NASA’s Dr Gavin Schmidt, Berkeley Earth and Carbon Brief, relative to pre-industrial (1850-1900) temperatures and compared to the historical average of six different datasets produced by the WMO. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The Met Office, Dr Schmidt, Berkeley Earth and Carbon Brief estimates all have 2025 most likely ending up as the third-warmest year on record, after 2024 and 2023. However, it is still possible that it could be as high as the second-warmest year or as low as the sixth-warmest year, depending on how global temperatures evolve in the coming months.

Against a 1880-99 pre-industrial baseline, the central estimate of all four forecasts for 2025 is around 1.4C warming, with the world relatively unlikely to top 1.5C again next year.

Ultimately, what matters for the climate is not the leaderboard of individual years. Rather, it is the long-term upward trend in global temperatures driven by human emissions of greenhouse gases. Until the world reduces emissions down to net-zero, the planet will continue to warm.

If global emissions remain on the current trajectory, the world will likely firmly pass 1.5C in the late 2020s or early 2030s, as shown in the figure below.

The world will likely firmly exceed 1.5C in the coming years without rapid emissions reductions

Annual global average surface temperatures from the composite average (black dots) along the 30-year LOWESS fit (red line), combined the AR6 assessed warming projection for SSP2-4.5 as published and without any baseline alignment. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The post State of the climate: 2024 sets a new record as the first year above 1.5C appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers

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An exceptional El Niño is building. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says it has intensified to very strong levels and is likely to last at least through February 2027. If its current trajectory holds, it could become stronger than anything seen since WMO monitoring began four decades ago.

That is bad news for agriculture. El Niño – a naturally occurring weather phenomenon – can scramble rainfall patterns across the world, bringing drought to some regions and floods to others. And this time it is unfolding against the backdrop of a significantly hotter climate, with farmers already contending with unreliable growing seasons, extreme heat and less predictable rainfall because of global warming.

El Niño expected to bring next record-hot year as soon as 2027

We are seeing the consequences already. In Sri Lanka, drought linked to El Niño has dried wells and reservoirs and cut into crops and farmer incomes. Indonesia is experiencing its worst wildfire season in 11 years, with prolonged drought and extreme heat exacerbated by El Niño. And in Peru, authorities are preparing for the opposite extreme: intense rains, flooding and landslides which the national civil-defence agency says could affect around 1.2 million people.

These impacts will multiply as El Niño intensifies.

And yet, just as the risks to food production are rising, the money available to help farmers withstand them is shrinking.

10% funding decline in 2024

A forthcoming analysis from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows that climate-related development finance for agrifood systems is moving in the wrong direction. In 2024, the latest year for which data is available, it fell by 10 percent compared with a 2 percent overall decline. The sectors that put food on our tables — crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries — received just 5 percent.

Yet this is precisely the moment when climate investment in agriculture needs to grow, not shrink. It can help communities adapt, build resilience and protect food security, while unlocking larger flows of public and private finance. Agriculture feeds us, supports the livelihoods of well over a billion people, and is often the first sector hit by drought, floods and extreme heat. Cutting that investment now is a false economy.

One failed harvest can plant the seed for the next crisis, forcing farmers to eat the seed they have saved for planting, sell livestock or tools, or take on debt. It can also deepen food insecurity, disrupt supply chains and drive up prices, showing up months later in supermarket aisles far away.

Comment: A supercharged El Niño is coming – are we ready?

The Central American Dry Corridor, stretching through much of the region, shows both how exposed farmers are, and what investment can do. Based on an analysis of 41 years of satellite observations, FAO finds that some crop and pasture areas there face more than a 50 percent chance of agricultural drought over the coming months.

About half of Central America’s 1.9 million producers of maize, beans and other basic grains live in the Dry Corridor. Many grow food both for sale and for their own families. When a harvest fails, they lose both income and dinner.

El Salvador project conserves water and soil

In El Salvador, which lies within the Dry Corridor, more than 50,000 farmers have adopted practices to better withstand drought and increasingly unreliable rainfall through RECLIMA, a project financed by the Green Climate Fund and implemented by FAO in partnership with the government of El Salvador. It has substantial national co-financing, including from the country’s Environmental Investment Fund.

El Niño can intensify El Salvador’s annual mid-season dry spell, known as the canícula, turning it into a longer, harsher drought just as maize needs water most.

RECLIMA promoters carry out the construction of hillside ditches to optimise water infiltration and minimise the loss of fertile topsoil, thereby strengthening the climate resilience of their local livelihoods in Santiago de María, Usulután North, El Salvador, June 4, 2025. (Photo: © FAO / Mario Araujo)

RECLIMA promoters carry out the construction of hillside ditches to optimise water infiltration and minimise the loss of fertile topsoil, thereby strengthening the climate resilience of their local livelihoods in Santiago de María, Usulután North, El Salvador, June 4, 2025. (Photo: © FAO / Mario Araujo)

For María Cristina Corvera de López, a second-generation farmer in rural Nahualapa, adapting means changing how every drop of rain is captured and used. She plants trees alongside her crops to provide shade and minimise evaporation and uses simple irrigation channels and a homemade drip system to conserve water. Instead of burning stalks, leaves and husks after harvest, as generations before her did, she turns them into mulch to hold moisture in the soil.

“The effects of climate change are a constant challenge,” she says. But the new techniques have made her farm more resilient to El Niño as well. Where she once harvested about 50 bags of maize per acre, she now gets around 80, even during droughts. It’s enough to feed her family and sell the surplus.

Managing risk now cuts future costs

Together, these adaptations can mean the difference between losing a crop and getting through a dry season with enough food, seed and income to plant again. They are also the result of climate finance invested before disaster strikes.

RECLIMA shows what that kind of adaptation investment can buy. Adaptation accounted for 45 percent of climate-related development finance to agrifood systems in 2024, and multilateral development banks are directing more agricultural finance towards resilience. That shift reflects a growing recognition that adaptation is a form of risk management, not just a development cost.

We need much more of it. The same investments that help farmers withstand El Niño also enable them to adapt to a hotter, more unpredictable future. Cutting investment in the people who produce our food just as climate risks intensify does not save money. It simply pushes a much larger bill into the next harvest, the next food crisis, and the next El Niño.

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Analysis: Lula presidency saved at least 20,000km2 of Brazilian Amazon since 2022

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An area of Amazon forest roughly the size of the US state of New Jersey has remained standing due to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s leadership of Brazil, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

Lula beat Jair Bolsonaro in the 2022 election to become president of the nation that is home to nearly 60% of the Amazon rainforest.

Forest loss surged during Bolsonaro’s far-right presidency and dropped sharply under the left-wing Lula, with Amazon deforestation likely to hit its lowest level on record this year.

Now, as another presidential election approaches, Lula is facing off against Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, whose “anti-environmental” policies are similar to his father’s.

Carbon Brief’s analysis suggests that at least 20,000 square kilometres (km2) of deforestation has been avoided since Lula took office and prioritised Amazon protection.

The analysis is based on modelling by an international research team of an alternative scenario in which Brazil’s flagship forest code legislation was not enforced – a proxy for Jair Bolsonaro’s leadership.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that this estimate is likely “conservative” and that actual deforestation under Bolsonaro could have been “much higher”.

With Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro tied in the polls, the upcoming election is expected to significantly shape the level of environmental action in the world’s fourth-largest emitter, whose emissions are largely driven by deforestation.

‘Brazil is back’

When Jair Bolsonaro was president of Brazil between 2019 and 2022, he championed the nation’s powerful agribusiness sector and oversaw an unprecedented increase in Amazon deforestation.

Bolsonaro weakened regulations, slashed federal agency budgets and empowered illegal activities in the Amazon, while attacking Indigenous and environmental groups.

This meant that the forest code – Brazil’s flagship legislation that requires landowners to preserve and restore forest on their property – was not properly enforced.

After Lula’s presidential victory in 2022, he promised to target “zero deforestation” by 2030, telling the COP27 UN climate summit that “Brazil is back”.

Lula rolled back Bolsonaro’s wave of deregulation and reinstated a deforestation “action plan”. Led by celebrated environmentalist Marina Silva, the environment ministry scaled up enforcement and policing activities in the Amazon.

As a result, annual deforestation in the Amazon has more than halved from 11,594km2 per year in 2022 to 5,731km2 in 2025.

Data from August 2025 to July 2026 – the timespan used in government records – is yet to be released, but preliminary satellite alerts put the deforestation figure at 2,874km2.

While the final figure is likely to be higher, experts still think Amazon deforestation in 2026 could hit its lowest level since records began in 1988.

New Jersey-sized forest

Compared to a scenario in which Bolsonaro won in 2022, Carbon Brief analysis suggests that at least 20,000km2 of Amazon forest remains standing today due to Lula’s leadership.

This area – roughly the size of Wales, Belize, Slovenia or the US state of New Jersey – is indicated by the grey area in the chart below.

Chart titled Lula presidency saved at least 20,000km2 of Brazilian Amazon since 2022, subtitle Annual Amazon deforestation, km2. Deforestation peaked above 13,000 km2 in 2021 under Bolsonaro, then fell sharply under Lula to around 6,000 km2 by 2024. Source: INPE PRODES, INPE DETER, Soterroni et al. (2023). - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Each year covers a period from August to July. Deforestation data is from INPE’s PRODES dataset, except for the 2026 figure. This is based on INPE’s DETER real-time satellite alert data, which tends to give lower estimates than PRODES. The “Bolsonaro” projections are based on a scenario with no forest code enforcement, from a 2023 study.

This analysis is based on a 2023 study on the role of nature-based solutions in Brazil’s pathway to net-zero emissions. This was a refined update of a 2018 study that used the same GLOBIOM-Brazil model, from researchers at the University of Oxford, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE).

It is based on a comparison of forest code implementation with a “baseline” scenario in which the code is not enforced, reflecting the kind of weak governance seen under the Bolsonaro administration. (See Carbon Brief’s 2022 article for more details of this modelling.)

Dr Aline Soterroni, a University of Oxford researcher who led the 2023 analysis, tells Carbon Brief that the reversal seen under Lula “shows how quickly deforestation can respond to political will”.

However, she stresses that the modelling of the “no forest code” scenario is “relatively conservative”, with deforestation remaining high but not rising.

Deforestation in this scenario – used here as a proxy for a Bolsonaro election win – is tempered by slower demand growth for Brazilian beef and soy, says Soterroni. She notes that the scenario also does not capture the potential for illegal forest clearing in response to weak governance.

Indeed, some experts anticipated in 2022 that a Bolsonaro victory would send deforestation rates rising to near-record levels.

Claudio Angelo, international policy coordinator at Brazil’s Climate Observatory, tells Carbon Brief that if Bolsonaro had won in 2022, “we have reason to believe [this would have resulted] in much higher rates than during his first term”.

Angelo says the “political signal” would likely have driven an “explosion of wildcat mining” and illegal deforestation in the Amazon. He also points to efforts – including by Flávio Bolsonaro – to formally dismantle the forest code in the Brazilian congress, during Jair Bolsonaro’s first term.

Soterroni notes that deforestation rates did not immediately drop following Lula’s election, as suggested by modelling of a full “forest code compliance” scenario. She says this reflects the “gradual and imperfect process” of restoring and enforcing the law.

Nevertheless, she tells Carbon Brief:

“The key message from our modelling is the contrast between these trajectories: weak environmental governance keeps deforestation substantially higher than full implementation of the forest code. That message remains relevant today.”

Election significance

With Jair Bolsonaro in prison for plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election, his son Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator for Rio de Janeiro, is standing against Lula in the upcoming contest for president.

There are 13 candidates, but Flávio Bolsonaro and Lula are by far the frontrunners and are currently neck-and-neck in opinion polls.

If Lula wins, experts say he is likely to continue with the “zero deforestation by 2030” agenda that has already had a pronounced impact on forest loss.

As the chart below shows, periods when Amazon deforestation fell in recent history all occurred during Lula’s three terms as president.

Amazon deforestation has only dropped in recent years when Lula has led Brazil. Subtitle: Annual Amazon deforestation under Brazilian presidents, km2. Source: INPE PRODES, INPE DETER. The bar chart shows deforestation peaking near 28,000 km2 in 2004, falling sharply under Lula, rising under others, and dropping again after 2022. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)

In contrast, experts say Flávio Bolsonaro, a climate sceptic who has indicated he will continue his father’s political agenda and favour agribusiness and mining, will likely drive a surge in deforestation. Angelo tells Carbon Brief:

“At the risk of sounding alarmist, I’ve been saying that Lula’s re-election is the only thing standing between us and a wide destruction of the Amazon.”

A Bolsonaro win would be a “tremendous disaster”, says Dr Patricia Pinho, deputy science director at the Amazon Environmental Research Institute, adding:

“I don’t think we can afford four years of increasing deforestation [and] violence against Indigenous peoples.”

Dr David Lapola, an ecologist focused on Amazon research at the University of Campinas in Brazil, says he believes deforestation “would certainly rise” and Brazil’s climate and deforestation goals “would be thrown in the trash bin”. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The Bolsonaro administration in the 2019-2022 period showed that the deconstruction of environmental policies and institutes can be done very, very quickly.

“In a matter of a few months, they can destroy what has been constructed over decades of environmental policy and activism in Brazil.”

‘Greenest’ policies

Lula has the “greenest” policy proposals of Brazil’s six top-polling presidential candidates, according to analysis by the Climate Observatory.

The analysis identifies 16 “positive and detailed” environmental commitments in Lula’s proposals, including reaffirming his “zero deforestation by 2030” goal.

Flávio Bolsonaro, on the other hand, has one positive environmental commitment and seven “clearly anti-environmental” proposals.

The right-wing politician has committed to zero “illegal” deforestation by 2029. However, he has also previously led an attempt to change the forest code, opening up large tracts of previously out-of-bounds forest for legal clearance by extractive industries.

Given this, Angelo tells Carbon Brief that he is sceptical about the 2029 pledge.

“The only way you can trust him on this is to think that he is going to revoke the forest code and make all illegal deforestation legal.”

Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro with a cardboard cutout of his father, former president Jair Bolsonaro
Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro with a cardboard cutout of his father, former president Jair Bolsonaro. Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo

Lula is also the only major candidate to list a clear target for cutting national emissions, sticking with Brazil’s existing goal to cut emissions by 59-67% by 2035, compared to 2005 levels.

Overall, the Climate Observatory notes that climate change and environmental issues “are off the radar for most candidates”, who are instead focusing on the economy and security issues.

Pinho adds that deforestation and the Amazon have not been at the “forefront” of this election, compared to 2022.

If Bolsonaro wins, up to 95% of the Amazon would fall under the leadership of right-wing national governments – including those in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – reported Mongabay. It noted that presidents in all these nations “explicitly favour agribusiness and mining over environmental conservation”.

If no candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round of Brazil’s election on 4 October, a runoff will take place on 25 October, as has happened at every presidential election since 1998.

Soy moratorium and Brazilian congress

Other factors will also play a role in future deforestation in Brazil, regardless of the next president.

One is the effective end of the Amazon soy moratorium. This is a voluntary agreement signed by companies committing to not buy soya beans grown on land in the Brazilian Amazon that was deforested after 2008.

Conservation organisation WWF’s international director general, Kirsten Schuijt, previously described it as the “most impactful voluntary supply chain policy ever implemented”.

However, major grain traders withdrew from the agreement earlier this year, effectively bringing it to an end. Pinho describes this move as a “huge destruction” of Brazil’s environmental protections.

Research shows the moratorium prevented around 18,000km2 of deforestation in its first decade of operation from 2005-16.

In contrast, a 2026 study estimated that the end of the moratorium could result in 14,000km2 of additional deforestation in the Amazon by 2036.

Alongside choosing a new president on 4 October, Brazilian voters will elect state governors and members of congress, which will also factor into future environmental impacts.

Right-leaning parties, including the far-right Liberal Party linked to the Bolsonaros, currently hold half the seats of the two chambers of congress.

This has led to conflict between lawmakers and Lula. For example, in 2025, congress bypassed Lula’s veto of several aspects of a controversial piece of legislation dubbed the “devastation bill”.

Pinho says that the potential for a right-wing congress and president would be “devastating for the environmental and climate agenda”.

Lapola notes that a Flávio Bolsonaro presidency “would consolidate the view in Brazil that environmental protection is solely a matter of political preference, and not a crucial need of all people”. He adds:

“Land pillage, destruction of precious biodiversity and scorning of Indigenous peoples simply cannot be a nation’s project in the 21st century. We have got to be smarter than that, for sure.”

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Alive on Earth, with you

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This letter is a bit more direct and longer than most of those which I write, but I hope you will be okay with that, because the times seem to call for being plain.

A few weeks ago I got a text message from an old and dear friend —let’s call her Hannah.

I have enough shared life with Hannah that, whenever we talk, the conversation always feels current and effortless, despite gaps of months or even years.

Hannah has been talking with her son — we’ll call him Neil — who is a teenager and doing well in school, but wildly worried about the state of the world, including the imminent trajectory of global warming. Hannah and I don’t text each other other very often, but on this occasion she’s reached out with something visceral:

Neil has challenged me to point him to something hopeful, if I can find it. He says so far no one is showing any will to uphold the Paris Agreement. I am checking in to see how you still manage to have real hope.*

Then, just a few days later, the United Nations Environment Programme Limiting Overshoot report landed, containing the principal finding that it is likely the global temperature will soon exceed 1.5°C.

After that news, and the real time devastation in Nepal, and in the context of the broader state of the world, I found myself having multiple conversations with friends and colleagues about the structure of hope. I want to openly share that after a few of these exchanges, I metaphorically closed the blinds, and wondered how to feel, and what to do, because there is no avoiding the dreadfulness of the news, and what it means for the suffering of people and life on Earth.

But if you are fortunate enough to have time, space and security to do so, then after the darkness, you open the shutters and once again there is light. This is the structure of my innermost resolve.

* * *

Our lives — those of us living on our magnificent earth now — have the greatest possible purpose.

There is virtually no problem that we endlessly clever and creative, human beings cannot solve, when we work together.

And we are not just intelligent and ingenious; we are inherently social, nurturing and brave; capable of the deepest enduring love.

Each of the roughly 12,000 generations of humanity so far has made life possible for those who have followed, through acts of devotion.

Babies have been held and fed. Water and food have been found and shared. Shelter has been built. For 12,000 generations we have held the hands of our children.

Every single one of us was once carried in the arms of another, unable to walk ourselves. It is our thoughtfulness, kindness and care that have seen us through as a species. Sometimes this has been in the most exigent of circumstances, when enough of our ancestors did not give in, faced incredibly difficult things, to somehow make it through.

And so it comes to this. To what we now must do. We must do as 12,000 generations of people did for us.

The struggle to keep global warming to under 1.5 degrees may be over. The battle of return—to get our planet back to safe temperatures at emergency speed and scale — is just beginning. Upon this struggle depends the future of all we care about, and that of all life on Earth. The prospects of the next 12,000 generations are conditioned by our efforts now.

Our work now is to keep the overshoot as low as we can, make it as brief as possible, and do everything within our power to alleviate other pressures on nature. It is to take care of humanity — of one another — in the face of mounting climate and ecological damage. And by these efforts, create the conditions for future flourishing. Every fraction of every degree matters.

What must now be done is hard, much tougher than should have been necessary, because of the vested interests in coal, oil and gas and deforestation, and the failures of decision makers. And while renewable energy has surged, making the case for change much simpler, on the other side of the ledger there’s the reactionary and gangsterist turn of politics and the multiplier effects of wars and mass violence, with the existential destabilisation of big tech looming over all.

There is no sugarcoating the scale of difficulty. But what is necessary remains within our collective power. We must never, for one second, say that returning our planet to flourishing is impossible — many of the obvious solutions already exist; but even where transformation relies on reforms, technologies or capabilities that might sound fanciful, or historical changes that are unprecedented, this can be no barrier to our conviction. After all, much of what we take for granted today as ordinary features of social life, would have been considered impossible by every single generation before us.

The world has not been destroyed by nuclear war; we solved the growing hole in the ozone layer; Antarctica was kept sacrosanct from exploitation. Humanity has collectively triumphed before, and can do so again.

We can find the necessary social and political will to do what is needed because these are endlessly renewable resources. The necessary financial capital exists. Apart from the fossil fuel industry, the greatest barrier we face is to mistakenly concede that what lies before us is insurmountable. It is not.

We must avoid the siren song of fatalism. Because. It. Is. Never. Too. Late.

None of which is to be insensitive to the horrors already unleashed — the deadly and grotesque harm to people, places and species that cannot be undone; or to be blind to the impacts that are coming. But where we have the power to act, we also have the responsibility — and the extraordinary privilege — to do what must be done.

Although she is wounded, our planet is still alive and beautiful beyond all of our comprehension. Hundreds of billions of creatures live and thrive still upon this earth. Nothing has happened until it has happened, and life fights for life. Every beetle, every tree, all the fish in the ocean, the smallest of the geothermal shrimps, the greatest of the whales and the mightiest of the birds — all demand life every second of their existence, so that their species too may have future generations.

No individual has to know how to solve this alone. Indeed, finding some detachment and humility is essential to concentrate on the role that each of us can play.

Hope is not merely a mindset or a story we tell ourselves. Collective power is not abstract; it is what we do, together, applying ourselves to the practical mechanics of change and contestation within society, by being part of the organisations and networks of people that are dedicated to effective strategies. It is why I am so committed to Greenpeace.

Working from without and within, there are opportunities to make rapid change within institutions, governments, businesses and communities to create the social, economic and political momentum for emissions reduction at speed and scale, reminding ourselves always of what remains possible, even if it hasn’t happened yet.

We can return the planet to safer temperatures. We can put technologies back in the service of people and life. We can return to the assumptions that seemed so obvious just one generation ago — that it is both possible, and our obligation, to build a better future for all people, and for life on Earth.

I did write back to Hannah and Neil, to say honestly to a treasured friend and her son, that yes, as a matter of faith, conviction, evidence and strategy, absolutely there is real hope. And this is a pledge not just to Neil and his generation, but to the next 12,000.

Together, we have the power. Together, we cross this bridge through the dark. To secure an Earth capable of nurturing life in all of its magnificent diversity.

We did not choose to carry this historic responsibility, but here we are. And it is so lucky that we are here.

I wouldn’t choose any other time to be here, alive on Earth, with you.

Alive on Earth, with you

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